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ABSTRACT 
 
Criminalizing Space: 
Ideological and Institutional Productions of Race, Gender, 
and State-sanctioned Violence in Houston, 1948-1967 
by 
David Ponton III 
 
Criminalizing Space is a social history of ideas that explores various ways racial residential 
segregation affected the life chances of black Houstonians during the middle of the twentieth 
century. Jim Crow polices, custom, and living patterns marginalized black citizens from their 
white counterparts, negatively shaping the ways white people could relate to black people and 
the places they lived in. As Jim Crow slowly withered away, however, Houstonians struggled to 
redefine the meaning of race in ways that could be compatible with liberal individualism. Many 
came to rely on spatial logics. Spatial distance undergirded the social distance that stratified 
groups in a persistent racial hierarchy. It allowed for sustained Negrophobia, which included 
notions that black people were inherently predisposed or culturally conditioned to live in 
squalor, indulge in vice, and practice crime. For many white Houstonians, these were inherent in 
black spaces and justified the need for their containment through various forms of municipal 
neglect and abuse. Despite the efforts of black women activists, politicians, and philanthropists, 
the criminalization of black spaces had devastating effects on black people. It overexposed them 
to environmental hazards, poverty, violent crime, and police brutality. Spatial marginalization 
exacerbated the effects of these on black women, who faced sexual assault at the hands of 
police officers and employers as well as increased risks for assault and murder by their intimate 
partners in their own homes. And in contradistinction to its reputation as a progressive city, 
Houston did not relinquish Jim Crow without state-sanctioned violence. Residential segregation 
and so-called criminal justice were maintained as linchpins of the city’s new racial order as it 
looked toward the end of the twentieth century. 
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INTRODUCTION: A NEW TYPE OF SEGREGATION 
 
 
uly 29, 1954.  Relentless rain threatened to drown the city of Houston. The eye of 
Tropical Storm Barbara would never visit the growing metropolis, but its winds and 
water-filled clouds nevertheless tore at the Bayou City. Barbara was a “menace” and a 
“nuisance”—displacing over 125 families as it swept water into homes sitting too close to 
Hall’s, Green’s, and Little White Oak Bayous. Hundreds of other residents were evacuated 
throughout the rest of Harris County. As night fell, the rain continued to soak the earth 
beneath Houston’s feet.1 
Houston’s humid air wrapped itself around Blanche Beard on the night Barbara came 
to town. The forty-two-year-old white mother of one had recently taken up a job as a 
waitress at Leo’s Tavern to help care for her six-year-old son and her husband Orvis, who 
was recovering from an injury that prevented him from going to work. When she began the 
five minute walk to her Lawndale Street home at 10:10 that night, Mrs. Beard could not 
have predicted that danger lurked nearby. Her neck of the woods, the Harrisburg 
neighborhood on the East End of Houston, was a small town that had been annexed by the 
growing city in 1926. She was only a little over one hundred feet from the safety of her 
home.2 
She could get out of her wet clothes and maybe see her little one to bed. She might 
tell Orvis a funny story about a drunken patron or complain about how her feet hurt. Or 
she might just want to take a cool shower. Either way, she would be able to sigh with relief 
that another dollar had been earned for the Beard family. 
Until she was blindsided. 
J 
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He was dark and blended in with the night so well. Johnnie Elwood Gordon had 
gotten off of work at nine o’clock that night, and after a jaunt downtown for a late dinner, 
he rode the bus to Harrisburg and by ten o’clock he was searching for a “good time” 
around the neighborhood. He could not seem to find the two local girls he was acquainted 
with, and after all of this fruitless searching for them in the rain, he decided it was time to 
head home. That was until he spotted her. Blanche. She was walking down Frio Street and 
she looked alone enough.3 
He appeared to be seven feet tall. Indeed, he embodied all of the monstrous, 
“Negro buck” features little white girls had been taught to fear; he was powerful, insatiable, 
vicious, and as black as the night under the cloudy sky.4 The “slender young man wearing a 
white T-shirt” grabbed Blanche, and together she and Johnnie rolled into a ditch.5 She tried 
to let out a scream, but he grabbed her by the throat. “If you scream, you s – o – b, I will 
kill you,” he snarled.6 She struggled some more, but she could not get a sound out as the 
ravenous Johnnie Elwood Gordon forced her throat closed and warned her again, “You 
scream and Iʼll kill you.”7 
With Blanche subdued, Johnnie reached his hand under her dress and “tore the 
crotch from her pants.”  She lost consciousness. Three times. That was the total number of 
times Blanche blacked out, awakening the first two times only to realize she was still under 
assault. While her mind escaped her body for the third time, Gordon “reached a climax and 
took [his] penis out of her.” The entire ordeal could not have lasted for more than fifteen 
minutes, but before Blanche awakened to realize she had been freed from Gordon’s grip, 
the monster had already climbed out of the ditch and began a determined sprint down 
Manchester Street toward a bus stop.8 
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The Census tract wherein Blanche Beard lived was overwhelmingly white. Most of 
the 3,764 residents (91.7 percent) looked like her, and the majority of them owned their 
own homes (52 percent). About two out of every three black residents there were renters 
and most of them (53.5 percent) were domestic and service workers. In the seven blocks 
near Mrs. Beard’s home that stretched down Frio Street around Lawndale Avenue, 119 
occupied units housed only seven non-white families. Beard’s neighborhood was like most 
other Houston neighborhoods then: highly segregated by race. The proximity of black 
service workers was also typical—in many cases desirable for white families who preferred 
access to “the kinds of colored servility most white [people] deemed a southern 
tradition…” The infinitesimal black professional class nearby illustrated the other side of 
that reality; white Houstonians had little need for residential proximity to those middle class 
black folks whose labor they could not exploit, and throughout the city’s history used both 
legal and extralegal strategies to maintain hard dividing lines between spaces that they 
identified as black and others they saw as their own.9 
The news of Blanche Beard’s rape, while it upset Houstonians, black and white, did 
not precipitate a race war or threats of lynching. The last recognized lynching with roots in 
Houston—the first in fifty years—had been in 1928, when seven white men took Robert 
Powell, a city man, from Jefferson Davis Hospital. Powell had murdered Houston detective 
A. W. Davis after he fled the officer during a stop-and-harass encounter. Mayor Oscar 
Holcombe and the wealthy elite, such as Jesse Jones, immediately condemned the lynching, 
and city newspapers lamented the blemish in Houston’s reputation on the eve of its hosting 
the Democratic National Convention. Six of the men were arrested and charged with 
murder, though after the convention left town and Houston fell out of the national spotlight 
the cases against the defendants seemed to fall apart. After the trial of one defendant in the 
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summer of 1928 the “district attorney’s entire file of information” regarding the case went 
missing, “including the purported confessions of four of the defendants.” Nevertheless, the 
city’s initial official response to the lynching helped it present itself to the nation as 
progressive, even as it remained adamantly Jim Crow. Indeed, powerful Houstonians, for the 
sake of the city’s image and their personal business interests, as well as in response to the 
outcries of the city’s black leaders, convinced themselves and their neighbors that 
“Houston’s Jim Crow system would be enforced in the future by a larger, better organized, 
and better-equipped police force, not by lynch law.” As historian Bernadette Pruitt 
explained, though “civic leaders often exaggerated race relations in [Houston], suggesting 
people got along quite well, in hopes of influencing internal migration into the city,” the 
historical record revealed that “Houston did not shield African Americans… from racial 
antagonism, the threat of injury, or violence.”10 
Indeed, despite its reputation otherwise, Houston did not relinquish Jim Crow 
without resistance. White terrorism, in the forms of physical and discursive violence, 
remained an ever-present danger to black residents. But by the time Johnnie Elwood 
Gordon faced the courts, Houstonians in the mainstream preferred to have what they called 
“justice” carried out by a professionalized judicial system rather than vigilante mobs. The 
trial itself, an interracial rape case, exposed the cultural convictions and anxieties of white 
Houstonians. Though there were white Houstonians who occupied the extremes 
concerning the future of race in the city—some advocated integration while others opposed 
it wholeheartedly—many residents fell somewhere in the middle. They were admittedly 
prejudiced toward “Negroes” because the group was “wholly without honor and morals,” 
but were also willing to admit that black people at least deserved the same kinds of 
opportunities white people received, sans “social equality.”11 Their attempts at refinement 
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notwithstanding, even these moderate white residents seemed unable to resist their basest 
fears about their Negro counterparts. “Negro crime” featured prominently in white 
newspapers, in private letters, and in the rhetoric of segregationists as the reason they did 
not want to share their schools or neighborhoods with black folk. It was in these 
“campaign[s] to defame the Negro” by newspapers and their readers that white 
Houstonians exposed the root of their anxiety: segregation was essential to the 
demarcation of space as a way to remain property holders, even hostage takers, of white 
women, real estate, and social, economic, and political resources.12 
They expressed as much in 1954, after the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. 
Board of Education. Panicked Texans flooded Governor Allan Shivers’s office with letters 
demanding action on the issue of desegregation, suggesting measures as drastic as secession, 
interposition, and shutting down the state’s public school system entirely. Rarely, some 
letters asked the governor to soften his stance on segregation in the business and moral 
interests of the state. But most derided the Supreme Court’s decision and the “agitators” 
who had presented the case, echoing the sentiments of one letter-writer, Bessie Bizzell 
Mayrant of Palestine, Texas: 
I know not how you will be able to help us but I appeal to you, a descendant of the 
kind of noble men who wrote our Constitution and revered God and who never 
intended the minority to rule the majority…. You cannot appease negroes. If you 
give him an inch, he takes a mile (sic) He is brutal and cruel and generally his I.Q. is 
far below that of the white race. He is not proud of his race…. The ultimate aim of 
the negro is not integration of society, the schools, etc., but integration of the races. 
He brags that “We’re reaching for the top rung[”] and we know what they mean. 
They are by nature thieves and liars also…. In the Houston Post, Will Kilgarlin, 5704 
Capital Ave, offers this diabolical, revolting idea for forcing this nauseating, horrifying 
thing down the throats of us Southern people, namely: to perpetuate this shameful 
thing on our little ones first, just babies, entering school, because, he says, they are 
not prejudiced…. Just last week there was a verdict of 10 years given a negro here 
who had molested women and little girls in central Texas for 10 years. Of course he 
will be out in a few years, and God pity the white girls and women in Texas.13 
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In the minds of many white Americans, black men threatened white women’s safety as well 
as the so-called purity of the white race. This was not merely a problem of biological 
reproduction, but also one of social reproduction. The rise of a “mongrel” race threatened 
to extend all of the wealth and privileges conferred to white people to all Americans. The 
former anxiety of the black male rapist, of course, was largely unfounded.14 The latter fear 
of losing racial purity willfully confused the actual history of interracial rape in the South: 
which white men were the prime perpetrators of interracial sexual violence across the 
region.15 
For black Houstonians, sentiments like Mayrant’s were insulting, certainly because 
they consistently configured black men as libidinous monsters, but also because of the 
erasure of black women from the conversation. Carter Wesley, publisher of the Houston 
Informer, a black-owned newspaper, repeatedly provided substantial ink for calling out the 
hypocrisy of white laypeople and representatives of the police and court system. While they 
claimed to be horrified by the idea of interracial sex, consensual or not, and even more 
disgusted by the act of rape in general, they did not extend the courtesies of “womanhood” 
to black citizens. Wesley wrote: 
[W]hen white men violate Negro women, grand juries refuse to indict, or juries 
refused to convict; sometimes the courts just won’t entertain the case at all. In the 
case of the Negro’s having look at the white woman, all of the daily papers and the 
white leaders deplore the bestiality and depravity of the Negro race! But when a 
defenseless colored woman is wronged by white men, even the white women… 
don’t speak up in favor of the colored woman, and they don’t demand punishment 
for those who wrong her.16 
Likewise, Wesley’s editorial staff wrote in 1953: “Until rape is rape, and crime is crime, and 
justice is justice regardless of race, race relations will never be much better than they are 
and Houston will never be much more civilized than it is.”17 Black women, then, were 
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denied the inclusion into the category “woman” in the eyes of a court system that privileged 
the voices of white people and the mythos of innate “Negro criminality.”  
Like other black people standing trial in cross-racial crimes in Harris County in the 
1950s, Gordon was tried before an all-white, all-male jury that did not wince when the 
prosecutor used the word “nigger” in the courtroom. Gloria Bradford, a member of 
Gordon’s defense team and the first black graduate of the University of Texas’s law school, 
argued that the case had no merit on multiple grounds. First, the physician who examined 
Blanche Beard “found no positive evidence of rape and could not find many of the alleged 
scars and bruises which the complaining witness stated were present.” Bradford pointed out 
to the court that the lack of medical evidence in the case supporting a claim of rape “was 
completely disregarded.” Second, she claimed that local officers had “threatened” Gordon 
with “bodily harm” ahead of forcing him to sign a confession. Third, the only additional 
witness to the attack on Blanche was a man driving his car, Bob McClendon, who testified 
that the assailant he saw running from the muddy ditch was “bareheaded,” but Gordon, 
when found at a nearby bus stop by Orvis Beard, “had on a cap.” Fourth, when it came to 
his identification as the rapist, Gordon believed he was fingered at the lineup by Beard 
because he was “the only Negro present,” and, moreover, his height, at about six feet and 
five inches, was not comparable to anyone else present in the row. Related, Beard indicated 
that on the night of the attack she could not provide any description of the man other than 
the fact that he was black, despite having claimed to have gotten “a good look at [him].” 
“The nearest street light,” Bradford noted, was “located approximately one hundred 
twenty-five feet” away from the place of the attack, making visibility even more difficult on 
that dreary night. Fifth, even Beard's husband testified that when he found Gordon waiting 
at a bus stop, the black suspect's clothes were not “wet and muddy in the fashion” of 
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Blanche Beardʼs.18 Nevertheless, the jury determined that Gordon had assaulted Blanche 
and recommended his death by electrocution.19 
Gordon’s case demonstrated the ways Houstonians wrestled with and managed the 
city’s color line during a moment in which black Americans were actively dismantling Jim 
Crow’s legal apparatus and in which all Americans were being compelled to reconcile the 
racial status quo with the values of liberal individualism.20 Houstonians responded with 
relative calm to the allegation of interracial rape, though white residents decried Gordon as 
an example of black predatory criminality. Maintaining segregation meant protecting all 
forms of white property from degradation and depreciation, whether that property was real 
estate or white women themselves. But the best way to sustain Jim Crow, most white 
Houstonians agreed, was to mete out punishments to black people through a criminal 
justice system that might start with vigilantism, but which would ultimately be left to police, 
sheriff’s deputies, and the courts.  
The white supremacy of the earlier twentieth century and its tactics of mob terror 
became increasingly untenable in the midst of Cold War politics in Houston. However, it 
did not die. Rather, it adapted. In fact, after the Supreme Court decided that Jim Crow 
public schools were unconstitutional in 1954, Henry Allen Bullock, professor of sociology at 
Texas Southern University, warned black Houstonians that if they were not proactive “a 
new type of segregation” would undo their recent civil rights gains.21 One way through 
which this new-but-familiar racial order would manifest would be in the criminalization of 
neighborhood spaces stigmatized as “black.” The social, economic, and political processes 
that helped give rise to and maintain segregation in Houston’s landscape reflected the 
citizenry’s dual commitment to liberal individualism and their tacit belief that racialized 
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spaces were natural to a city’s social geography, as that geography reflected irreducible 
differences between racial groups. 
“Criminalizing Space” is a social history and a history of ideas that explores various 
ways racial residential segregation affected the life chances of black Houstonians during the 
middle of the twentieth century. Jim Crow policies, custom, and living patterns marginalized 
black citizens from their white counterparts, negatively shaping the ways white people could 
relate to black people and the places they lived in. As Jim Crow slowly withered away and in 
the cauldron of Cold War politics, however, Houstonians struggled to redefine the meaning 
of race in ways that could be compatible with liberal individualism. Many came to rely on 
spatial logics. Spatial distance undergirded the social distance that stratified groups in a 
persistent racial hierarchy. It allowed for sustained Negrophobia, which included notions 
that black people were inherently predisposed or culturally conditioned to live in squalor, 
indulge in vice, and practice crime. For many white Houstonians, these were inherent in 
black spaces and justified the need for their containment through various forms of municipal 
neglect and abuse. Despite the efforts of black women activists, politicians, and 
philanthropists, the criminalization of black spaces had devastating effects on black people. It 
overexposed them to environmental hazards, poverty, violent crime, and police brutality. 
Spatial marginalization exacerbated the effects of these on black women, who faced sexual 
assault at the hands of police officers and employers as well as increased risks for assault 
and murder by their intimate partners in their own homes. This project takes advantage of 
Geographic Information Systems technology to manipulate the scale at which historians can 
understand how racialized space gets made and integrates spatial analysis with traditional 
archival materials and oral histories. It elucidates the ways white Americans stigmatized, 
abused, avoided, and practiced violence against “black space,” which is not the equivalent of 
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urban space, the rhetorical somersaults white supremacy practiced preceding the 
emergence of so-called colorblind racism, and the deleterious effects of these on ordinary 
people. 
The dissertation consists of six chapters. Chapter 1 asks: what is “black space” and 
what was its function? It charts the history of six historically and predominantly black 
residential areas in Houston, three of them urban in character, one suburban, one “rurban,” 
and another rural. Black spaces were the physical manifestation of white people’s ideas 
about blackness that emerged out of white supremacist social, economic, and political 
action. Indeed, the very notion that a space could be black—“Negro quarters” as they were 
called in the 1950s—was predicated on the idea that race, a white supremacist construct, 
could spill out of the body and transform the nature of a space. Once solidified in Houston’s 
social and political geographies, black spaces operated as containers for surplus and refuse: 
poor people of all colors, waste dumps, and vice. Whereas urban historians often argue that 
these experiences in other cities reflected the ways “chocolate cities” were increasingly 
seen in opposition to “vanilla suburbs” in the post-War period, Houston’s growth did not 
commit to such a pattern. Houston demonstrates, instead, that the racialization of space, far 
more than the quality of the space itself, determined its value.22 
The second chapter asks how black Houstonians envisioned their city’s future given 
its past and present. During the 1940s and forward, black Houstonians, with increasing 
effort, agitated for fair housing and employment, educational and residential desegregation, 
and equal protection under the law in municipal and county courtrooms. They articulated 
varied visions of a “raceless” future for the city, where individual merit determined a 
person’s station in society, rather than their color or race. They put their faith in “Heavenly 
Houston” for its relatively calm race relations and in the cult of liberal ideology that 
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undergirded Cold War Americanism. But while Houston’s mainstream black civil rights 
leaders tended to agree that the future should be raceless, they often disagreed on tactics. 
Although scholars tend to identify the cleavages that existed between leftist and 
conservative black Americans, as well as those spread on the spectrum in between, I note 
that even those who shared the same political perspective could be committed to 
oppositional civil rights projects. Disagreements between black leaders often revealed the 
ways that gendered self-conceptions shaped what Houstonians thought was practicable at 
pivotal moments in the city’s burgeoning civil rights struggle. 
“God, Sex, and Dynamite,” the third chapter, addresses the question of how white 
Houstonians and white Americans more broadly responded to the increasingly forceful 
demands from their black counterparts that the nation respect its commitment to liberal 
individualism. White Americans’ attitudes, ranged from interest in the possibility of 
desegregation, to distress at the meaning of integration for their property values, and even 
to rage. Some performed acts of terror both large and small, reflecting the ideological and 
discursive struggles of their day. Ultimately, however, with very few exceptions, white 
Houstonians maintained that black people deserved their lower position in society, and a 
return to the familiar discourse of “black criminality” served to justify their conclusions. 
While many scholars have credited the rise of “colorblind racism” to evolutions of racial 
ideology following the Second World War, focused readings of private letters, newspaper 
editorials, civic organization notes, and political campaign materials reveal a diversity of 
thought among white Americans that is not accurately capture by the term “colorblind.” 
This chapter introduces terms that encourage a more nuanced interpretive scheme for 
categorizing the diversity of white thought at a moment in which Jim Crow was becoming 
destabilized. Namely, the Houston case demonstrates that some Americans were color-
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rejecting and engaged in conscious efforts to complete anti-racist work with attention to 
historical inequality. Others were color-evasive, evincing conscious and subconscious efforts 
to maintain the notion that color (and history) did not and should not matter in correcting 
existing inequalities because only individuals—not groups—were of material importance in 
American jurisprudence. Some black folks were keenly color-aware, expressing a pragmatic 
need for minority groups to close ranks and support in-group economic upward mobility 
and racial uplift while espousing a consciously non-separatist, integrated vision for the 
future. And finally, there were the familiar color-valuing Americans who maintain staunch 
beliefs in the inherent biological, behavioral, cultural, and/or spiritual differences between 
racial groups. At times antagonistic and at other times complementary, these ideas shaped 
Houstonians’ desires for the future of the city and directed their actions in the 1950s. 
The second and third chapters demonstrate the overlap in liberal individualist values 
across white and black Houstonians. Chapter 4 asks: if liberal individualism was valued by 
both black and white Houstonians, who did it actually benefit in a time defined by the slow 
demise of Jim Crow? Were black Houstonians able to marshal liberalism in their favor, or 
could white supremacy and institutional racism be reconciled with so-called racelessness? 
On October 11, 1951, Johnnie Lee Morris, a black Houstonian married to a white woman, 
killed a white public bus operator, Florian Novak. Morris had acted in self-defense after 
Novak and a white passenger physically assaulted him for flouting the unwritten rules of 
racial etiquette that structured interracial interaction in the city. Tried by an all-white jury, 
Morris was found guilty of murder, but spared the death penalty. His attorneys and 
supporters touted this as a victory. Their resignation elucidated a limit of the color-rejecting 
vision espoused by Houston’s black leaders and their white allies. Liberal individualism, far 
from sustaining Morris’s right to self-defense, instead undergirded a justice system wherein 
13 
 
 
racial tokenism, color-evading peremptory strikes, and avoidance of explicitly racist appeals 
could protect the all-white prosecutorial team, the all-white courts, and the all-white jury 
from claims of discrimination. Cases like Morris’s dot the historical record and are often 
acknowledged by scholars as the bittersweet victories that contemporaries recognized them 
as. But Morris’s case, like the others, affirmed stereotypes of black criminality and systems 
of white supremacy in ways that encouraged white people to seek out “more segregation” 
for the duration of the century.23 
White Houstonians’ calls for increased segregation from and punishments for black 
communities became part of a long list of discursive and material practices that 
overexposed black residents to various forms of economic exploitation, discrimination, and 
specific types of crime. The fifth chapter asks, how exactly did crime limit the life chances of 
black Houstonians in segregated communities? How did gender and sexuality interact with 
those constraints? Using a data mine from two city newspapers from 1950-1959, Chapter 5 
maps the ways law enforcement officials and the newspapers’ editors themselves devalued 
black lives and confirmed, for those willing to believe it, that black people were inclined to 
commit crimes and to endure them. While black men suffered the most criminal and state-
sanctioned violence, black women and gender non-conforming people disproportionately 
bore the weight of all forms of violence, including verbal, sexual, and domestic abuse. The 
chapter uses newspapers and GIS to map the city’s social geography as it would have been 
made legible to the reading public, and while the findings in the chapter make the case that 
the equation of “black spaces” with crime was unwarranted, I also argue that the press, both 
made the opposite case. 
The final chapter explores the ways the segregation and political patterns traced 
throughout the 1950s continued to manifest into the late 1960s as the city trended toward 
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increased residential segregation, despite that nearly two decades had passed since the 
Supreme Court decided in Shelley v. Kraemer (1948) that racial restrictions in private deeds 
were no longer enforceable in the nation’s courts. Houston, which had never gotten a 
majority of its voters to approve a racial zoning ordinance, then lost its only legal 
mechanism for maintaining neighborhoods as exclusively white-owned. Yet, the patterns of 
yesteryears persisted, and in some cases, the color line became more starkly drawn. Cities 
like Houston and Atlanta are often juxtaposed with places like Birmingham, Dallas, and Little 
Rock, as examples of how the white American business elite could guide southern 
metropolises through the desegregation process nonviolently.24 
But on May 17, 1967, the Houston Police Department emptied over two thousand 
gunshots into men’s dormitories on the campus of Texas Southern University, following a 
year of non-violent civil rights activism emanating from the campus community. The assault 
on TSU students was an act of terrorism in the service of white supremacy, and revealed 
that Houston, despite its reputation otherwise, was not unlike other southern cities that 
failed to desegregate peacefully. Indeed, whereas much of this work attends to Houston’s 
particularities and the ways those gave shape to local politics, the larger instructive piece is 
that challenges to white supremacy are always met with violence, even when it may appear 
otherwise.  
The violence at TSU represented a crisis for the city of Houston, which had for 
decades lauded itself as an exceptional city of racial progressivism. It highlighted the 
prevailing issue of residential and educational segregation and explicitly demonstrated the 
ways the racialization and criminalization of space could justify the continued “containment” 
of black people in a society where liberal individualism was coming to prevail over Jim 
Crowism. The attack at TSU, in addition to the practices of “slow violence” discussed 
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throughout Criminalizing Space, reveals that desegregation never proceeded without threat 
or brutality. In Houston, two decades of agitation by civil rights groups were met with 
terror. When TSU students came face-to-face with that horror in 1967, it confirmed that 
nineteenth-century segregation would not die without a fight, even as a new type of 
segregation, put in place by a federally-funded “war on crime,” became installed as Jim 
Crow’s successor. 
Exploring these topics required the use of traditional archival resources such as 
newspapers, manuscript collections, and Census data. Additionally, oral histories recorded, 
collected, and curated by the Houston Public Library system and Houston Arts and Media (a 
local nonprofit) as well as interviews conducted by sociologist Gunnar Myrdal’s researchers 
in the 1930s help fill in gaps and make it possible to write a history that attends to the 
quotidian.  
But many of these questions are also spatial. Thus, I have also used GIS technology 
toward three specific ends. First, I have provided a series of maps throughout the chapter 
that act as visual aids. They should help readers who are unfamiliar with Houstonian’s 
geography get a sense of where particular neighborhoods, streets, and points of interest 
were (and sometimes remain) spatially related. For example, when readers follow Anna and 
Clarence Dupree across racial boundaries on public conveyances when traveling from work 
in River Oaks back to their home in Third Ward, readers can see that their travels from 
east to west would have taken them through multiple but differently segregated spaces. The 
maps then provide a visual sketch of the ways black people like the Duprees had to endure 
the absurd, yet mundane racial interactions that demanded subservient courtesy from black 
folks occupying public spaces with white folks, as they crossed through pockets of affluence, 
mixed-income neighborhoods, and impoverished ones that were all racially marked. I used 
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both data from the 1960 U.S. Census and newspaper stories to construct these maps and to 
geocode (or pinpoint) noted institutions, streets, and neighborhood boundaries. 
 
Map 1 Home Owners' Loan Corporation housing security map of Houston. National Archives and Record Administration. 
Secondly, these maps work together to serve as another way to think about the 
relationship between residential segregation and opportunity. Produced during the Great  
Depression, the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation’s residential security map (see Map 1) 
will help readers to see how lenders spatialized opportunity.  These “redlining” maps helped 
federal and private lenders determine where to make loans available to homebuyers. 
Juxtaposed to maps that indicate the racial make-up of neighborhoods by census tracts 
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thirty years later, readers can conclude that the places where black people were most likely 
to live (and until 1948, the places where they could own homes) were also the least likely 
places for building wealth through home ownership.25 
  Thirdly, I have created and provided block-level maps of some of Houston’s 
neighborhoods to demonstrate the heterogeneity within them. Tract-level maps suggest 
that black neighborhoods were wholly impoverished, undereducated, and undesirable. 
However, the block maps show a great deal of socioeconomic diversity within black 
neighborhoods and entire blocks where home values were as high as those in restricted 
white neighborhoods. These maps, then, illustrate what should be intuitive: if wealthy and 
middle class black people could not live in predominantly white communities where incomes 
and wealth were commensurate with their own, their neighbors would be black and 
situated across the entire economic spectrum. Black neighborhoods—the civic, social, and 
commercial spaces that black people created—were quite different, then, from “black 
spaces”—those areas marked as “Negro” and overexposed to white abuse, terror, and 
neglect.26 While historians have not made great use of block-level data, perhaps because the 
data is not digitized and is therefore not readily available for spatial or statistical analysis, 
such information provides an opportunity to re-imagine the scale at which we study 
segregation and to see black neighborhoods in ways that would be more legible to the 
people who actually lived in them. For example, Map 2 shows three statistical measures of 
Houston’s historically black Fourth Ward near downtown. At the census tract level the 
neighborhood looks dilapidated and impoverished on the whole. Additional measures not 
pictured also place Fourth Ward as one of the most densely populated areas in the city. 
However, at the block level it is clear that while a disproportionate number of families 
suffered overcrowding in Fourth Ward, many did not. Likewise, although some residential  
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property values were among the lowest in the city, reaching only into the low $4000 range, 
some real estate in Fourth Ward was just as valuable and sometimes more valuable than 
property in the adjacent white community of Montrose. The difference between these two 
spaces, then, was greater class heterogeneity in predominantly black areas, not abject decay 
and ubiquitous poverty. Ordinary life in these spaces, as well as the kinds of politics and 
organizing that came out of them, then, would be similarly diverse and complex and worthy 
of interrogation.27 
This research presents an opportunity to re-conceptualize the shifting of Houston, 
and the South’s, racial re-ordering as Jim Crow was deconstructed. The effects of residential 
segregation on black Houstonians endured throughout the 1950s as black neighborhoods 
remained largely excluded from the appropriation of city resources, over-exposed to 
poverty and therefore crime, and over-policed for petty crimes. While the laws of the land 
changed, the social geography of the city did not, and this sense of what the city looked 
like—black and high crime over there, white and right over here—played a significant role 
in the rhetoric surrounding black criminality and justifications for abusive policing. This 
criminalization of blackness and black spaces grew so dire, that by the 1970s, Houston 
mayor Fred Hofheinz attested that, “Police brutality in black communities was the major 
issue and it was treated like a war zone by the police department.” He continued, saying 
that “the basic instinct” of the police department was “that all blacks are criminals.”28 The 
1950s then, the decade when policing became professionalized, was also a moment in which 
policing re-emerged as a mechanism for denying opportunities for group advancement in 
black communities as Jim Crow fell and “a new type of segregation” emerged. 
Across the nation, black Americans understood, “Segregation in housing” as “one of 
the stubborners [sic] forms of segregation and hardest to combat.”29 They resented crime in 
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their neighborhoods, but they also suggested, even in the case of the most heinous crimes, 
that their communities suffered because criminal activity was “compounded of frustrations, 
derangements, and various other factors that warp human personality.”30 The editorialists at 
the Houston Informer, a black-owned newspaper, lamented the ways that “segregation with its 
limitations on freedom and opportunity” caused “ever-increasing numbers of Negroes” to 
leave the “rural South for the cities, both South and North,” only to precipitate the “flight of 
segregation-minded white [people]” and a squandering of the educational and labor potential 
of the black population by those cities.31 And, tying these themes together, a citizen wrote a 
letter, saying, “I keep reading from time to time that Negroes commit more murders than 
anybody else in Houston. Somehow I don’t believe the picture is complete if one just takes 
the total number of murders committed by any race. Are our poor housing, our lack of 
healthy and proper recreation centers, both combining to drive our people more into beer 
taverns?”32  
“Criminalizing Space” identifies residential segregation as a necessary component of 
the structure of racial inequality in Houston, critical to inequities that persisted in education, 
employment, health, and exposure to environmental hazard and police brutality. It illuminates 
the consequences of the artificial boundaries that signify “white” and “black” spaces on 
communities once the legal apparatus that fortified those borders were, ostensibly, removed. 
Effects on environment, culture, wealth, mobility, crime, and policing practices figure heavily 
into the story of Jim Crow Houston, as well as into the city’s biography during the dismantling 
of that system of racial ordering. And indeed, black Houstonians were overexposed to all 
these deleterious effects of segregation, including higher rates of crime. However, these 
reflected the fact that “crime [is] structured action” rather than a racial predisposition to 
criminality among black Americans. Higher crime in black communities and its correlates were 
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consequences rather than causes of segregation.33  As a study of Houston, this project is an 
attempt to demonstrate how the biography of a particular locality illuminates the structure 
of living, exposure to crime, and access to opportunity with respect to race, gender, class, 
and sexuality. This study of Houston is a story of Jim Crow and the South, but it is also a 
national one. In the middle of the century Houston exemplified one of the ways a city’s social 
and physical structure, a citizenry’s desire for racialized social distance, and the limbs of the 
so-called criminal justice system could converge to form a powerful social organism that 
birthed an evolved racism and a “new type of segregation.” 
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CHAPTER 1: MAKING BLACK SPACE 
 
hat is “black space?” Scholars have examined the many ways black spaces came 
to be in cities across all regions of the United States. White flight, racially 
restrictive deed covenants, racial zoning laws, private real estate development practices, 
white vigilante terrorism, urban renewal/slum clearance projects, and underbounding (i.e., 
discriminatory annexation) have all contributed to the building of residential barriers 
between white and black citizens. Black spaces in Houston emerged out of all of these 
actions, save for racial zoning, which city voters never approved. These historians have 
noted the varied expressed anxieties of white Americans in cities in the North, South, 
Midwest, and West, noting the ways they came to associate “blackness and criminality, 
blackness and poverty, [and] blackness and cultural depravation” with the urban 
environment. Indeed, following World War II, as highway projects and suburban 
development transformed the American landscape, the “chocolate city” and its social ills 
became the predominant image of “black space.”1 
“Black spaces” in Houston were white creations. Racially restrictive deed covenants 
defined their borders and limited black residential mobility during pivotal decades in the 
city’s growth in the early 1900s. Municipal authorities defined their conditions, refusing for 
decades to attend to the basic needs of old, established black neighborhoods which stood in 
the shadows of a growing and brightening downtown skyline in the middle of the century. 
Local white politicians assured the undesirability of black neighborhoods by siting garbage 
dumps and incinerators in areas of the city dominated by black residents. Law enforcement 
officers helped control black people’s mobility, over-policing their neighborhoods and their 
W 
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persons for petty crimes and violations of Jim Crow norms, while simultaneously 
participating in a so-called justice system that under-protected black victims of crimes—
crimes committed by both civilians and police officers themselves.2 
But “black spaces” were not merely those locations where black people lived. Black 
people’s bodies themselves were sites imbued with negative social meaning, replete with the 
capacity to contaminate and diminish white racial integrity. Most importantly, as historian 
Grace Elizabeth Hale implies, black people did not own black spaces. Rather, “black spaces” 
could be lynched, beaten by police officers, neglected by city leaders, avoided by white 
home buyers, limited or expanded on the given leg of a bus route, or taken through eminent 
domain by the state.3 
Once solidified in Houston’s social and political geographies, black spaces operated 
as containers for surplus and refuse—poor people of all colors, waste dumps, and vice. 
When white segregationists thought of black spaces they saw squalor, muddy streets, and 
homes that doubled as firetraps—excuses to demolish the “slums” to make way for white 
residential development and highway construction. They understood, consciously or not, 
black spaces as “racial-sexual frontiers,” further justifying heavy-handed containment of the 
people who resided there. They saw, even in the absence of official crime data, criminal 
spaces, which warranted police harassment and abuse. What they failed (or refused) to see 
was that white power, not black occupation, had created these spaces and made them 
“black.”4 
Houston, often left unexplored even by historians of the Sunbelt metropolises, 
exposes theoretical fractures in urban history.5 Studies of cities like New York, Chicago, 
Detroit, and Philadelphia often highlight the racialization of space through an urban-
suburban dichotomy, where blackness and urbanity became conflated following the Second 
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World War and the onset of post-industrial blight.  Research into New South cities like 
Charlotte and Atlanta often re-state this urban-suburban model.6 However, Houston 
experienced explosive population growth and great economic fortune while other cities 
experienced post-War decay. Of the largest cities in the country, only Houston and Los 
Angeles witnessed increases in their white populations in the 1950s.7 Thus, while scholars 
have revealed much about the rise of the suburbs, the phenomenon of white flight, and the 
subsequent racialization of "urban" as "black," they have overstated the urban quality of 
“black spaces” in their narratives of white flight and fear.8 That is, while historians have 
uncovered the ways blackness and decaying urbanity became ideologically bound to one 
another, Houston’s case demonstrates that white Americans understood black spaces, 
urban or not, as hazardous geographies.9 
In efforts to recover black people as more than victims of history, scholars have also 
produced a mass of research demonstrating black people’s civic, political, and economic 
actions within such spaces. They have challenged the notion that following the 1890s black 
Americans endured a nadir in race relations created, in part, by their acquiescence to the 
new status quo: Jim Crow.10 The result has been a historiography which casts black space 
simultaneously as a consequence of white racism and fertile ground for black liberatory 
politics. Yet, as part of a lineage of scholarship that understands de jure segregation as black 
people’s accommodation to white supremacist laws and practices that would have 
otherwise completely excluded them from social and political institutions, this scholarship 
implies and sometimes explicitly argues that black people were co-conspirators in the 
manufacturing of segregation.11 This theoretical slippage, concerned as it is with a desire to 
salve the “agency” of oppressed people in history, obscures the reality that black people’s 
political actions were always contingent on the environs out of which they came.12 Black 
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people were never the idle victims of history, and indeed, were actively involved in 
sustained struggles toward their total emancipation. Their strategies for survival and political 
reform cannot be accurately described as accommodations to white racism, but rather 
conditional and pragmatic tactics, almost always—even among black nationalists—toward 
the goal of a society where color would not be a factor in an individual’s life chances. Rather 
than present the efforts of black communities to improve their quality of life as 
accommodations to Jim Crow or as displays of black autonomy—historiographical positions 
that both fail to fully appreciate black racial politics as conditioned responses to historical 
circumstances—I understand black political action in Houston and elsewhere as structured 
action. Hence, “black spaces” were not a consequence of black acquiescence to oppression. 
“Black spaces” were manifestations of oppression itself. 
On the ground in Houston, anti-black home-buying patterns produced 
neighborhoods with higher concentrations of poverty. In Houston this was accomplished, 
not by racial zoning, but by racially restrictive deed covenants. Segregation, however, did 
not abate. Rather, it continued and intensified over the remainder of the twentieth century. 
The “slum” conditions in which these people lived were understood by contemporaries as 
catalysts for crime. Thus blackness, poverty, slums, and crime became interlocked in popular 
discourse about what defined “black” spaces. But even those black neighborhoods that did 
not suffer from high poverty, overcrowding, or high rates of crime suffered the same 
stigmatization. Racialized law enforcement joined the “raceless” practice of residential 
segregation, reinforcing social isolation and criminalizing all spaces where black people could 
make residential ownership claims. This isolation from municipal care and social empathy 
had lasting racialized, gendered, and classed effects on black Houstonians, while it reinforced 
the notion that black spaces were criminal. 
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Map 3 Fourth Ward Census tracts in 1960, including HOLC housing securities reference map. 
reedman’s Town was one of the first major “black spaces” in Houston, located just 
west of central business district. It included western portions of the downtown area 
until Highway 45 bifurcated the neighborhood from the central business district in 1959. As 
the Civil War ended, when many recently emancipated black Americans spread across the 
country looking for family members and new places to call home, several found community 
in Houston. On what was then the outer limits of the small town of Houston, these 
migrants built Freedman’s Town in Fourth Ward along San Felipe Road (now West Dallas 
Street). Fourth Ward quickly grew to become a center of black culture and business in 
Houston in the latter half of the nineteenth century.13 Like their emancipated counterparts 
throughout the South, black Houstonians in Freedman’s Town focused much of their energy 
F 
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on education, particularly literacy. In 1866, the Freedman’s Bureau established the Gregory 
Institute (later Gregory Elementary School) as a place to train black teachers. After 1872, 
the school began serving as a neighborhood school for those who could pay the tuition. In 
1876, Houstonians elected to establish a public school system within the city, of which the 
Gregory Institute became a part.14 
San Felipe Road was “the retail and service artery” of black commerce in the city, a 
“home to barbershops, furniture and dry goods stores, and two of the three undertakers,” 
as well as grocery stores, jazz clubs, and cafeterias. Closer to the central business district, 
black doctors, dentists, attorneys, printers, insurance companies, and realtors “gathered to 
do business in sight of Market Square, primarily in the 400 blocks of Milam and Travis, with 
some connecting on Prairie.” Historian Tomiko Meeks records, “By 1915, over four 
hundred Black-owned businesses existed in Freedmen’s Town [sic],” and she shows that by 
1920, the population in Freedman’s Town was one-third of Houston’s total.15 
Freedman’s Town was very much “black” in the city’s social geography. The people 
who lived there understood it as such, recalling the ways “the people seemed to work 
together to improve” their community. Together the “neighborhood… raised children,” 
educated them, fed them, and cared for them. And by the 1910s, black-owned and black-
serving institutions had become concentrated in Freedman’s Town and San Felipe District. 
Additionally, the area became home to black Houstonians’ public and community 
institutions. With the help of philanthropists and their own funds, black Houstonians 
established Colored Carnegie Library there in 1913, in close proximity to Colored High 
School and Antioch Church. Union Hospital, established by black doctors Rupert O. Roett, 
Benjamin Jesse Covington, Henry E. Lee, Charles Jackson, and F. F. Stone as 1918 turned to 
1919, was the only hospital where black doctors could practice in the city until the Houston 
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Negro Hospital was built in 1926 in Third Ward.16 In short, Lulellia Walker Harrison, a 
graduate of Colored High School’s class of 1928, explained: “We must remember that the 
center of black life was the Fourth Ward,” and when she attended the school “there were 
several black businesses located right around that school.”17 
Like their newly emancipated counterparts in Fourth Ward, the new black residents of 
Third Ward also sought homeownership, and by 1880 a quarter of black Third Ward 
residents owned their homes. Growing increasingly popular to black residents of Houston 
through the early twentieth century, Third Ward “eclipsed” Fourth Ward in 1910 as a 
residential destination. The size of Fourth Ward would diminish in the middle of the century 
through eminent domain seizures to construct San Felipe Courts—an all-white housing 
project—and I-45. In 1870, 35.6 percent of black Houstonians lived in Fourth Ward, and 
29.1 percent and 15.7 percent lived in Third and Fifth Wards, the areas in the city with the 
highest proportions of black residents, respectively (see Figure 1). In 1890, Fourth Ward’s 
proportion remained about the same, while Fifth Ward’s grew to 19.2 percent and Third 
Ward’s declined to 25.6 percent. In a dramatic reversal of trends, by 1910, Third Ward 
accounted for 32 percent of Houston’s black population and Fourth Ward’s declined to 26.6 
percent while Fifth Ward showed less remarkable growth rates, only accounting for 20.8 
percent by the start of the decade. “By the 1930s,” journalist Alan Ehrenhalt notes, “…the 
Third Ward became the center of Houston’s African American life.”18 
During Reconstruction, with the help of the Freedmen’s Bureau and the American 
Missionary Association, black residents of Third Ward secured educational opportunities 
for their children in Frederick Douglass Elementary School. Jack Yates and his Antioch 
Church members bought land in Third Ward, establishing Emancipation Park in 1872—
Houston and Texas’s first public park. And as San Felipe District declined, black 
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Map 4  Third Ward Census tracts in 1960, including HOLC housing securities reference map. 
 
  
Figure 1 Population shifts in Houston's first major black residential areas. 
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Houstonians established new institutions in Third Ward to service their communities. In 
1916, Third Ward also housed Blackshear Elementary School, established as Emancipation 
School. Jack Yates High School, the second high school to serve black Houstonians, opened 
in 1926 on Elgin Street, about one city block from bustling Dowling Street and the lively 
Emancipation Park. In 1926, the Houston Negro Hospital (now Riverside Hospital) was built 
on Elgin as well, the next block east of Yates High School on a $25,000 plot of land with an 
$80,000 building donated by Joseph Stephen Cullinan, the oil magnate who founded Texaco. 
In 1885, Yates established Houston Baptist Academy (HBA), where the main focus, like 
many early black schools, was to make a literate population out of freedpeople and provide 
them with ministerial and vocational training. HBA survived until the 1920s, but the demand 
for professional education from black Houstonians did not subside. In 1927, the Houston 
school board established the Houston Colored Junior College, which evolved to become a 
four-year institution in 1934 under the new name Houston College for Negroes. Students 
attended evening classes for the college at Yates High School, until in 1947, in response to 
the Supreme Court’s decision a year prior in Sweatt v. Painter, the state established the 
Texas State University for Negroes (now Texas Southern University) in Third Ward.19 
Third Ward had the reputation, at least among the city’s black populace, of being 
more “upscale” than its Fourth and Fifth Ward counterparts—the “brain” to Fifth Ward’s 
working class “brawn,” as one journalist put it. Indeed, historian Tyina Steptoe notes of 
Third Ward that while “[s]ome black residents of the neighborhood were certainly poor… 
Third Ward had enough well-to-do African Americans and black enterprises to give it the 
reputation of being Houston’s most elite black community by World War II.” Born in 1935, 
Donald P. Lee, who attended Douglass Elementary and Yates High schools remembered 
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that Third Ward “was a very nice community…it was a lot of nice homes, fairly upscale 
people that lived in that neighborhood,” especially near his family’s home at Tierwester and 
McGowen streets. His parents “attached” his mother’s beauty salon to their five thousand 
dollar house, and their neighbors “were kind of well-educated people.” “It was nice,” he 
recalled, “what you call middle-class and upper-middle-class homes—people that lived there 
kinda kept their homes up.” His life there was entrenched in the neighborhood, its people, 
its traditions, and its institutions—the churches, the restaurants, and eventually the vibrant 
intellectual community of Texas Southern University: “It was a wonderful life.”20 
Commensurate with this middling-class reputation, Dowling Street housed some of 
black Houston’s most enduring and influential institutions and commercial enterprises of the 
twentieth century. St. John’s Baptist Church, located at the corner of Dowling and 
McGowen streets, was the religious institution of choice for many of black Houston’s 
business leaders. Churches like St. John’s were the center of life for some residents, who, 
outside of schools, had few spaces to enjoy structured community and for whom 
transportation to other neighborhoods was often a luxury.21 Other churches, funeral 
homes, several movie theaters, bars, restaurants, and beauty shops dotted Dowling Street. 
Lee recalled the vibrancy of the street and the surrounding community: 
Black people didn’t necessarily go downtown. Now, on the weekends we would 
probably go to Kress’s or Grant’s... but basically you would buy—we bought our 
stuff at Weiner’s, or Reubenstein’s—they would be like on Dowling Street which 
was the main vine for our neighborhood which was in Third Ward—was Dowling 
Street. And at that time they had mostly the black businesses. And that—kinda—the 
integration—uh, you went to, you stayed in your neighborhood. You didn’t have to 
go downtown. Had good shoe stores and the rest of your haberdasheries, this, that, 
and the other was on Dowling Street. You could just go down there and buy what 
you need.22 
Avoiding the indignities of shopping in segregated spaces, as well as, for some, the 
inconvenience of lugging heavy bags onto the LaBranch streetcar or the Dowling Street bus, 
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Third Ward’s residents shopped close to home. Lee recalled that the “Hig and Pig and 
Weingarten’s [grocery stores] were downtown” near Prairie Street, but in general, “you 
didn’t have to go to supermarkets.” He noted, “Basically, you went to the neighborhood 
groceries, which was just about one on every corner.” Likewise, Annabelle McMillon, born 
in 1913 in her family’s home on Live Oak Street, recalled fulfilling most of her everyday 
needs by shopping at local area grocery stores and other businesses, at times venturing to 
the Pilgrim Auditorium in Fourth Ward or the Harlem Grill on Harlem Street in Fifth Ward 
for dancing and entertainment.23 
But Third Ward also offered its own entertainment venues, and they were among 
the city’s most popular, fashionable, and well-known. The El Dorado Ballroom, built by 
wealthy black entrepreneurs and philanthropists Anna and Clarence Dupree on the corner 
of Dowling and Elgin streets, became a destination venue for black musicians from across 
the United States. There black Houstonians “could dance to the trendier sounds of big 
bands or urban ‘jump blues’” and on its most formal nights onlookers could catch sight of 
hundreds of guests in “colorful gowns [and] well-fitted tuxedos.” The club “was top of the 
line,” blues booking agent John Green recalled:24 
They had a restaurant downstairs, with the liquor store on that corner. The club 
didn’t serve liquor in those days; it was a “brown bag” joint. They sold beer and 
setups. Right next door to the restaurant on the bottom level was Playboy Sport 
Shop, a clothes store. Then there was a Walker-Brantley Appliance Store—that was 
in there. And then, later on, Lloyd Wells and Herbert Provost had a photography 
shop down there. To get to the club you’d go up the stairs, then you’d make a left 
turn and go up another flight of stairs, and then you were in the ballroom.25 
Attracting acts from around the country with its reputation for sophistication and elegance, 
the El Dorado Ballroom was a crowning jewel for Houston’s Third Ward and a centerpiece 
of the Dupree commercial empire.26 
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Map 5  Fifth Ward Census tracts in 1960, including HOLC housing securities reference map. 
Like Freedman’s Town and Third Ward, Fifth Ward witnessed the arrival of 
hundreds of newly emancipated black Americans at the end of the Civil War. The 
intersection of Buffalo and White Oak Bayous defined Fifth Ward’s border with the central 
business district’s northeast edge. Unlike the other Wards, the Fifth Ward did not exist 
until the arrival of these new black residents compelled municipal leaders to carve out the 
new jurisdiction in1866 with an appointment of two alderpersons. Prior to the start of 
Reconstruction, what became known as the Fifth Ward was a small residential village on the 
outskirts of the city. Domestic and foreign-born white folks made homes along mud roads, 
but “by 1870” the demographics of the area shifted and “561 white and 578 black residents” 
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called Fifth Ward home, becoming the only of the five existing wards where black people 
composed a majority.27 
In 1871, after a new 1870 city charter allowed black people to hold office, Governor 
Edmund J. Davis appointed two black men, Hilliard Taylor and Willis Hitte, to both of Fifth 
Ward’s alderperson positions.28 Black residents rapidly built up Fifth Ward to accommodate 
their social and material needs. In 1865, an enslaved man named Toby Gregg was permitted 
by his owner, Darius Greg, to construct a church “for the purpose of worshipping only.” 
After emancipation, “Toby’s Church” became “Union Church,” perhaps in honor of the 
Union that had fought against the Confederacy. In the late 1870s it was renamed Mount 
Vernon Methodist Episcopal Church, and remains Fifth Ward’s oldest religious institution 
today.29 
From its beginnings, Fifth Ward attracted a more homogeneous working class 
population than its Third and Fourth Ward counterparts. As a major entry point into 
Houston for intercity and interstate commerce along Buffalo Bayou, the area housed the 
“Fifth Ward Yard,” a railway depot built in the early years of Reconstruction, which 
attracted additional plotting of freight yards, railroad lines, and switches. By 1955, the 
renamed Hardy Street Yard “had 23 tracks with aggregate length of 52,252 feet.” Many Fifth 
Ward residents lived in the area to work for railroad companies like Southern Pacific, but 
the wages of many workers living there in the1880s only afforded them “shanties” that 
“stood on stilts” and cramped shotgun houses. With less socioeconomic diversity, unlike 
the Third and Fourth Wards, then, Fifth Ward as a whole became more exclusively 
associated with the working class, “contain[ing] a higher proportion of workers—30.3 
percent—than any other.” There, both poor black and white people fought to survive 
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“conditions” that “bred the hopelessness and despair,” living—or perhaps dying—“in houses 
which had no bathtubs, running water, or sewage connections.”30 
However, as the city’s industry grew—in the 1880s the city “became the top rail 
center in the Southwest”—so too did the quality of life in Fifth Ward mature. When 
Louisianan evacuees from the Great Flood of 1927 arrived in Houston, many of them 
settled in Fifth Ward where they found work with Southern Pacific and forty black 
businesses along the now-bustling Lyons Avenue. The black arrivals, many of whom spoke 
French and identified as Creoles and not Negroes, contributed to the vibrant multicultural 
polyglot that distinguished Fifth Ward from San Felipe District and Third Ward, establishing 
black Catholic churches that rivaled the community’s Methodist and Baptist ones, and 
introducing new music, cuisine, and language to the sensory landscape. Indeed, when these 
newcomers arrived, historian Tyina Steptoe notes, “the section of Fifth Ward that lay 
between Jensen Drive and Chew Streets was primarily a ‘black space,’” but their arrival 
marked the advent of Frenchtown, an enclave of black Fifth Ward of about 1.3 square miles 
that had begun seeing a concentration of French-speaking black transplants around 1922. 
While these Louisiana Creoles would have still found Fifth Ward streets unpaved, they 
would not witness the degree of squalor residents lived with in the previous century. Now 
they would find small homes—sometimes owned by Italian landlords who lived nearby and 
were sometimes next door neighbors—that were often occupied by single families who 
raised livestock and who supplemented their diets with vegetable gardens in their yards. 
They would be able to send their children to Phillis Wheatley High School, serving over 
2,500 students as one of the nation’s largest black high schools.31 
As they did in other areas, a few black entrepreneurs in Fifth Ward managed their 
ways out of poverty and developed successful businesses that served the maligned 
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communities they lived in. By the mid-1950s, for example, Louis W. Dickerson had made a 
fortune in real estate and had also established the Crystal Cab Company to serve black 
riders, the Crystal Hotel, and Club Matinee—the “Cotton Club of the South”—all located 
and headquartered on Lyons Avenue. Grocers, auto mechanics, restauranteurs, innkeepers, 
nightclub managers, and liquor dealers set up shop along the busy corridor, spilling onto 
Jensen Drive as well, and attracting local residents and black people from around the city to 
enjoy themselves.32 
 
Map 6  Acres Homes Census tracts in 1960. 
Third, Fourth, and Fifth Wards were the most urban black communities in the 
Houston metropolitan area. However, black Houstonians were not only urbanites. 
Throughout Houston’s expansive twentieth century development, racially restrictive deed 
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covenants had limited the places where black Houstonians could live, but especially the 
places where they could own homes. For while black domestics and servants often lived 
close to and sometimes on the same lots as their employers, they could not own homes in 
those neighborhoods. To meet a growing demand for homeownership among black 
Houstonians, in 1910 the Wright Land Company established Acres Homes, also called 
Acreage Homes by some of its residents, which by 1957 became “the largest all-Negro 
Community in the United States,” ten miles northwest of Houston’s city limits, covering 631 
acres. Black folk looking to remain close enough to the city for urban labor opportunities 
could do so while also taking advantage of the opportunity to own their own homes, grow 
their own food, and raise their own livestock. One “old time resident” of the community, 
Mrs. Abe Grabenheimer, noted that, “Everybody is looking for a place to stay,” and said that 
she believed Acres Homes remained attractive especially for people seeking to “escape high 
rents and… rural areas.” By “rural,” Grabenheimer probably referred to those black 
sharecroppers and tenant farmers who streamed into cities like Houston in the 1910s and 
1920s during the Great Migration. With a $5 down payment and $5 monthly mortgage at 
six percent interest, black folk who were able could own an entire acre of land for $120. 
This affordability made it possible for them to “live isolated from fear of meeting the rent 
man in their older years, as practically all of the homes are owned by their persons living 
within them.”33 
Despite being viewed as “all-Negro,” Acres Homes was always a mixed community, 
even if it was disproportionately black.34 In 1920, forty black families called the bourgeoning 
community home, and their neighbors included thirty-seven native-born white families, and 
additional white families from “Germany, Italy, Mexico, Holland, Prussia, Switzerland, and 
Sweden.” Some described the rural town as idyllic. Residents remembered being able to 
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“leave your doors unlocked, windows opened and nobody bothered you.” Even in the 
1950s, a Negro Life magazine feature on the town still described the community as “clean, 
quiet, at peace with the world.” It maintained a rural quality—less the white paternalist 
plantation economy—with single family homes sitting on large plots of pasture land, where 
families raised subsistence crops and livestock.35 The area was mixed-income, the landscape 
“dotted with homes varying in size from incompleted one-room huts to state[ly] an[d] 
magnificent two-story homes equipped in every detail with the latest modern 
conveniences.” From 1950 to 1960, as the city of Houston experienced explosive 
population growth, so did Acres Homes, doubling in size from 10,000 to 20,000 residents. 
Increased population density, especially of the middle class variety, enabled Acres Homes’ 
citizens to build businesses to serve their community’s daily needs.36 
Enterprising black people built their own businesses and established them along the 
main drags of West Montgomery and West Little York roads. These “stores and shops” 
sufficed to serve “almost every human need” and provided such abundant opportunities for 
employment that “many of the inhabitants leave the community only on rare occasions.” Of 
course, many Acres Homes residents continued to travel into Houston for work, but they 
spent “a significant amount of their income” on businesses closer to home. These consisted 
mostly of restaurants, the Houston Informer tabulated, but also “filling stations, tailors, 
grocery stores, amusement places, drug stores, cab lines, undertakers, [a]nd practically 
every other type of business.” Black Acres Homes residents prided themselves on their 
ability to sustain an “autonomous” community that provided them a quality of life 
uncharacteristic of big city living.37 
Acres Homes’ lack of basic services, however, did not appeal to the black suburban 
“pioneers” of the postwar period. Like many Americans still reeling from the Great  
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Map 7  Tri-community Census tracts in 1960, including HOLC housing securities reference map. 
Depression and trying to take advantage of the New Deal and eventually the post-WWII 
economy, they shifted their aspirations toward homeownership in modern suburbs. 
Recognizing this demand for quality homes among black Houstonians and the great potential 
for profit, in 1941 Cortez Ewing King, a resident in Southampton near Rice Institute, helped 
establish the Clinton Park Development Company (CPDC) as lead developer. The CPDC’s 
goal was to build the “largest… development ever built exclusively” for black Americans. 
Unlike many of the Houston area’s other all-black or majority-black projects, Clinton Park’s 
developers aspired for the area to feel like a middle class suburb, and by 1959, Clinton Park 
led one-third of black Houstonians into suburban enclaves. Covering nearly ninety percent 
of its construction costs with funds from the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), the 
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CPDC set out to construct 533 houses in the new Clinton Park Addition on Houston’s 
eastern edge. The area, which included the Fidelity Addition and eventually Pleasantville, 
would create a tri-community of suburbs predominantly occupied by black families.38 
Developers hoped the subdivision, consisting mostly of single-family, detached 
houses would eventually have 4,000 black residents in a neighborhood resembling its white 
suburban, middle-class counterparts in the Houston area. King hoped “to make home 
owners out of” potential residents, “rather than renters.” The FHA participated in this 
vision, stipulating that all homes had to be built of solid, sturdy material. The CPDC also 
ensured that all streets in Clinton Park were paved, guaranteed “installation of all essential 
utilities,” including sewer disposal and water service, and provided land for the 
establishment of a 50-acre park and school. Homeowners, on average, would occupy four- 
or five-room houses, with plenty green space on their lots for “individual flower and 
‘victory’ vegetable gardens.”39 
By August 1942, over 500 black families had “moved from overcrowded and 
substandard quarters in and near Houston” into Clinton Park. Purchasers made $25 down 
payments, and for a home worth $2,435, the weekly payment to the CPDC was about 
$4.90. Many of these homeowners benefited from mortgages insured by the FHA—most 
becoming able to pay off their loans by the early 1960s—and enjoyed lower mortgage 
payments “in a new community than they had previously paid in rent for substandard living 
quarters.” Funds also provided for police patrols, firefighters, and garbage collection—albeit, 
the Houston Fire Department directed black firefighters to serve only at stations in 
predominantly black areas like Clinton Park and Sunnyside.40 
The Clinton Park community quickly saw small businesses crop up to serve 
residents’ needs, including small grocery stores, washer services, barber shops, and drug 
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stores—“all operated by Negro employees.”41 In 1945, the Indianapolis Recorder, remarking 
on the success of the FHA project, reported: 
Clinton Park is now in operation as a complete, self-sufficient community with a 
decidedly active community spirit. This type of stable community, with its occupants 
drawn almost entirely from substandard neighborhoods, shows what is possible 
when a project designed to meet a specific need, constructed in accordance with the 
best land-planning practices, and carried to completion with the close cooperation 
of operative builders, lending institutions, the FHA and the ultimate home owners 
themselves.42 
Residents contributed both money and time to improvements for the neighborhood, 
establishing their own bus company to “transport workers to war industries along the Ship 
Channel.” They also worked with developers to establish the Clinton Park Country Club, 
which included a nine-hole golf course. As Clinton Park grew, it coalesced with the growing 
and neighboring black communities of Fidelity and the “fashionable subdivision” of 
Pleasantville to form a black belt around the northeast corner of Houston.43 
Like the residents in the tri-community area, the black citizens in the Sunnyside-
Chocolate Bayou area had established themselves as a middle class suburb of Houston. 
Sunnyside-Chocolate Bayou, about six square miles, was established in 1912 by H. H. 
Holmes and F. H. Holmes as “the first addition south of the City of Houston to be 
developed and offered exclusively for Negroes.” Three main drags defined the heart of the 
neighborhood: Holmes Road, Reed Road, and Chocolate Bayou Road (now Cullen 
Boulevard). Sims Bayou marked the southern border. Lots cost potential owners $10 down 
to secure a payment plan of $10 per month. When established, Sunnyside was very much a 
rural community and even today retains many rural traits, including “sparsely populated lots, 
fields, and livestock.” As a farm town on the outskirts of Houston, Sunnyside lacked many of 
its own public institutions, including its own schools, so “they bussed all the black children 
to the Third Ward.” However, it did experience rapid suburbanization in the 1940s when  
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Map 8  Sunnyside-Chocolate Bayou Census tracts in 1960. 
the Holmeses developed plans for several additions to the community, including Sunnyside 
Place Addition, Brookhaven subdivision, and Sunnyside Extension South.44 
After World War II, Sunnyside was an increasingly attractive escape from inner city 
Houston, yet less than ten miles directly south of the center of downtown. One particularly 
compelling development, the Chocolate Bayou Estates, established around 1950, was touted 
as ideal for “families seeking new homes” in a strictly residential area. Each house had two 
or three bedrooms, were secured with “first quality, fire-proof asbestos siding,” fashionable 
aluminum windows, and “oak and asphalt floors.” Unlike earlier subdivisions marketed to 
black communities, Chocolate Bayou Estates promised “broad, concrete streets and 
sidewalks” throughout, as well as “sanitary and storm sewers… excellent drainage, and all 
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utilities.” To secure the suburban quality of the neighborhood, restrictions ensured that no 
businesses could be erected in the residential section for twenty-five years. In 1951, the 
Negro Chamber of Commerce inspected the Chocolate Bayou Estates. The organization’s 
secretary, Roscoe Cavitt, noted that he was “pleased with the general aspects of the 
housing project,” and indeed, developers had delivered on the infrastructure they had 
promised a year prior. One hundred eighty-seven black homeowners now called the Estates 
their home, with seventy-one additional houses still under construction that year. By 1952, 
the residents had created their own civic club, which organized meet-and-greets for the 
new neighbors and recreational activities for community children.45 
Sunnyside residents, like those in Acres Homes and the Pleasantville area, developed 
an “autonomous” ethos, “in part because of legally enforced segregation… and also because 
black [communities] were seeking independence and opportunity in an area where rural 
traditions were still strong,” architectural researchers Rafael Longoria and Susan Rogers 
note. The community developed its own gas lines and created its own volunteer fire 
department, and families stretched their budgets with home gardens. Longtime residents 
like Dora Mosley recalled when the neighborhood was, indeed, a community, citing, in 
particular, its low levels of crime: “You never had to put bars on your windows. You never 
had to leave the lights on at night.” Although after World War II many of the neighbors 
were new, they quickly developed community around civic goals and in their entertainment 
venues such as the Chocolate Bayou Drive In Theatre, where, for example, in 1955 they 
held a special celebration for the showing of “The Jackie Robinson Story.”46 
Each of these six black spaces in Houston, though they all maintained black 
majorities, had different historical lineages and different resultant demographics (see Table 
1). Marriage rates, for example, were higher in the outlying areas. Those areas also  
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Third 
Ward* 
Fourth 
Ward 
Fifth Ward* 
Acres 
Homes* 
Sunnyside* 
Clinton 
Park / 
Fidelity / 
Pleasantville 
Total population 27,285 10,342 22,132 16,382 16,392 11,882 
Density (persons 
per sq. mi.) 
18,524.1 16,846.4 9,547.8 2,487.5 2,288.4 3,161.1 
% Non-white 99.3 69.0 98.3 96.5 98.2 89.5 
% Married 51.4 44.8 54.4 63.3 67.7 70.3 
Census Tract Socioeconomic Indicators 
% Completed 
High School 
16.8 12.4 16.4 13.0 16.9 16.7 
% Completed 
College 
4.5 1.9 3.7 2.2 3.2 4.7 
% Unemployed 6.3 10.9 8.3 7.6 5.4 5.4 
% Impoverished† 65.4 77.5 58.5 55.8 33.9 32.2 
% Lower Middle 
Class† 
27.8 19.9 31.7 35.5 49.1 43.11 
% Middle Class† 5.9 2.0 8.0 6.1 15.1 20.7 
% Wealthy 0.9 0.5 1.8 2.5 1.9 4.03 
% Car 
Ownership 
43.3 27.5 48.8 61.8 76.1 77.6 
Census Tract Housing 
% Non-white 
owner-occupied‡ 
20.0 0.04 30.6 74.7 81.3 66.1 
% Crowded 22.7 22.5 23.4 23.4 25.3 27 
% In “Sound” 
Condition 
67.9 64.5 66.0 70.0 75.6 81.5 
% 
“Deteriorating” 
27.1 27.4 27.6 20.1 17.0 16.6 
% Built before 
1940 
55.7 58.8 57.6 20.1 5.9 9.2 
* Indicates areas where I have averaged or aggregated across at least two census tracts to define an area. All 
measures come from the 1960 Census. 
 
† In 1960, the poverty threshold for a family of four was about $3,000. Families that earned over $10,000 per 
year were tabulated as such in the Census, and occupy a “wealthy” category. I have developed the other 
economic class categories using Jenks optimization method. The lower middle class earned between $3,000 and 
$5,999; the middle class made between $6,000 and $9,999. 
 
‡ This measure does not include the proportion of all homes in a tract that were owned by non-white people. 
This measure is unavailable in the Census. I calculated the above rates by using the total number of occupied 
units in each tract as the base. 
 
Bolded figures indicated maximums for each trait. 
Table 1 Demographic, socioeconomic, and housing characteristics of Houston's largest majority black Census tracts 
in 1960. 
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experienced less density, with Third Ward being roughly eight times as populated as 
Sunnyside. Higher rates of non-white home ownership and overall car ownership also 
prevailed outside of the urban core. The newer homes in Sunnyside and the northeast tri-
community area were noted by Census enumerators as being in better condition on average 
than those in Third, Fourth, and Fifth Wards, though even Acres Homes, which was five 
decades old in 1960, fared much better than the inner city on this subjective measure. 
Unemployment rates were higher for the more densely populated inner core, and may have 
been related to years of completed formal education, although on this measure Acres 
Homes is an outlier. Despite having fewer average years of completed schooling, Acres 
Homes residents had higher rates of employment than Fourth and Fifth Wards. About two-
thirds of the suburbanites made middle class incomes, while more than half of all families 
living in the inner city and Acres Homes lived below the poverty threshold. Even among the 
three wards, however, poverty levels varied significantly, with almost eight out of ten 
families below the threshold in Fourth Ward, while the same was true for only about six 
out of ten families in Fifth Ward. 
 The level of socioeconomic diversity in black neighborhoods was a result of a long 
history of limited residential options for black Houstonians. By the time suburban expansion 
began, many wealthy and middle class black folks had made the inner city “Negro quarters” 
their homes, alongside their working class counterparts. Thus, Third Ward exhibited widely 
spread socioeconomic indicators that sometimes varied from block to block (see Map 
9Error! Reference source not found.). A block with 75% owner occupancy might abut 
another with only 14% owner occupancy. The average home value on one block might be 
close to $20,000 while the adjacent block’s homes hovered somewhere around $6,500 in 
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worth. Certainly, blocks on the northern fringes of Third Ward exhibited more “slum” 
characteristics than those closer to Texas 
 
Map 9 Rates of homeownership on Third Ward blocks in 1950. 
Southern University—for example, those northern blocks had higher rates of overcrowding 
in housing units, greater block density, and more deteriorating dwellings without running 
water—even there the quality of life varied greatly.47 
Thus, “black Houston” was economically diverse and geographically dispersed. 
Unlike other cities, sociologist Blair Justice testified before Congress in 1967, Houston had 
“no large one concentrated ghetto.” While poor black Houstonians tended to have limited 
housing options and remained clustered in the inner city neighborhoods, “the traditional 
inner-city transition zones that produce slum housing for urban Negroes have been only 
one source of residence for Houston black people.” Nevertheless, despite that black 
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Houstonians’ residential enclaves could not all be defined as inner city slums, white 
Houstonians with means avoided sharing their neighborhoods and amenities with their black 
counterparts. 
Between 1950 and 1955, nearly all of the census tracts in Houston’s core 
experienced population decline, as residents found opportunities for home ownership in the 
new suburban ideal (see 
 
Map 10). White and black families offered similar reasons for their flight from the 
central city.  They wanted “to get away from traffic” and car pollution; “more fresh air, 
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more sunlight, and more space”; opportunities to own their own homes and “rear their 
children in a single-family residence rather than in an apartment.” They fled “the crowded 
apartments in violence-ridden neighborhoods of the city” and joined communities that 
signified their newfound middle class statuses in the postwar economy. Black suburbanites 
expressed the same desires. However, white homebuyers still sought homogenously white 
communities, and even though Shelley v. Kraemer (1948) had already determined that racially 
restrictive deed covenants were unenforceable in courts, private  
developers, some of them backed by the FHA, marketed communities explicitly to 
“colored” or “white” homebuyers. For suburbanites “[t]he common denominators were 
income, age, and reliability,” and their ascendancy into these middle class neighborhoods 
indicated for them “a democracy of a kind, on a broader spectrum of inclusion than was 
true of the ‘residential’ and ‘restricted’ neighborhoods in the cities and the earlier suburbs” 
like Houston’s Riverside Terrace and River Oaks. However, as the Houston Post reported in 
1959, white suburbia’s “exclusion of Negroes, mainly for fear that they would cheapen real 
estate values, showed how limited a democratic dream it still was, and how the same 
dependence on the market that released it from some of the fetters of prejudice kept it 
fettered in others.” The coterminous development of black and white suburbia in Houston 
throughout the first half of the twentieth century had not encouraged citizens to stop 
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Map 10 Houston Post, June 12, 1955. 
avoiding their black counterparts. These trends continued through the last half of the 
century. If white Americans had been escaping the kinds of violence and poverty they 
associated with black urban spaces, they still shunned spaces they saw as black that were not 
urban, impoverished, or susceptible to crime, vice, or violence. The mere presence of black 
people as permanent, home-owning residents encouraged white panic—or so the story 
went.48 
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Black Sunnyside residents fell prey to this white anxiety before and after they came 
to occupy the new additions to the subdivision in the 1940s and 1950s. As the community 
grew during the middle of the century, it faced several dangers, including terroristic threats 
from separatist organizations and environmental abuse at the hands of the city government. 
Located south of Sims Bayou, the Minnetex-Mykawa community had developed as an 
unincorporated rice farming town in the early twentieth century, owing its name to the 
Japanese influence of some of its earliest residents. By 1950, Mykawa was a segregated, 
white community, wary of the potential of residential integration due to the 1948 Shelley 
decision and the expansion of black homes pressing against the borders of Sunnyside. In 
June 1950, community members in Mykawa began spreading rumors that “violence” would 
be used to “force Negroes from moving into homes” in Sunnyside. The Minnetex-Mykawa 
Civic Club denied that they or their members were involved with the threats, saying, “We 
have no enmity against Negroes, we just think the city and greedy real estate developers are 
encroaching upon us and the Negroes by piling them on top of each other out there.” The 
club, led by resident George Hubert, petitioned the city to solve “their problem of shortage 
of housing for Negroes” in a way that did not bring them into proximity of white 
neighborhoods. 49  
Like many white Houstonians, the Club spokesperson projected what he seemed to 
hope was a sober kind of antiblackness, saying, “We want to see Negroes progress; in fact I 
am training my children to get ready for non-segregation, but I feel that the city and the 
greedy real estate developers aren’t doing us nor the Negroes any good by posing traffic 
and health hazards in crowding Negroes into the area just so they can make money.” 
Positioning itself as an ally of black Houstonians, the Club argued that developers were 
“extort[ing]” money from eager black homeowners and renters seeking to escape 
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overcrowded inner city communities—probably true—only to be fooled into an increasingly 
“crowded” Sunnyside—definitely an exaggeration. The Informer reported that, “One club 
member said that a developer bragged that he could make more money out of Negroes 
than if he were building for whites,” because white Houstonians would refuse to be 
crowded “on top of one another” or pay “the high prices” that black folks paid for 
insufficient homes. “There are 15,000 Negroes already living in the addition,” the Club 
complained, noting that real estate developers planned to cram another 20,000 into 
“substandard” housing. Ironically, though the Civic Club argued on the face that they 
preferred a more spatially responsible response to the housing shortage for black 
Houstonians, they still appealed to the Commissioners Court to block advancement of black 
housing developments south of Sims Bayou.50 
Hubert and his fellow club members associated black space, intrinsically, with health 
and environmental hazards. Their fears were not necessarily unfounded, though it was not 
blackness or black people that made this true, but rather segregation, Negrophobia, neglect, 
and abuse at the hands of white citizens and government officials that produced space as 
“black” in the first place. Club members had seen in Houston, and elsewhere, that black 
neighborhoods often lacked essential municipal services and care. They seemed to associate 
these conditions with the blackness of the neighborhood rather than the anti-black 
neglectful patterns of behavior by municipal authorities. The Informer remained flabbergasted 
that white folks could not understand that when black families “encroached” on white 
neighborhoods it was not because they desired, necessarily, to live near white people, but 
precisely that they wanted access to the quality-of-life amenities that made those 
communities desirable to white people: modern housing, running water, paved streets, 
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sewage, and flood drainage. Residential segregation was resource segregation, and black 
people, now that they could post-Shelley, sought to live where the resources were.51  
But, Hubert and his ilk associated Sunnyside with another black space popular in the 
American imagination: “Chicago.” He complained that “the crowded conditions, health and 
traffic hazards caused by lack of proper provision of drainage in Negro neighborhoods” 
would cement an expanded Sunnyside community as Houston’s own “little Chicago.” It was 
an odd comparison, given that to call Sunnyside a suburb was sometimes a reach too far—
the community never did lose its many rural attributes. However, the association of 
blackness with the conditions of urban blight, it seemed, would not bow to the spatial 
realities that stood before Huber and his Club. Hubert ensured the Informer, again, that his 
opposition was not to black people: “We white people have to protect our homes and 
property” and “hold nothing against Negroes.” Despite these reassurances, however, the 
black residents of Sunnyside must have been uncomfortable as the new Sunnyside Addition 
was developed, as reports of bombings of black homes from across the country, and 
increasingly so in nearby Dallas, headlined newspapers following the Shelley decision.52 
With little legal recourse to stop the expansion of the “Negro section,” the Civic 
Club rested its petition on the argument that new real estate development in the area 
would exacerbate the area’s flood problems. They presented photographic evidence of 
community flooding, showing their children “standing waist deep in water in their front yard 
after a heavy rain.” They worried that an increased population in the area would cause not 
only the bayou to flood, but also would tax the capacity of a nearby sewage facility, causing 
it to spill its waste into the community. Club member Harry L. Messecar again repeated the 
claim that his group’s sentiments were not anti-black, though he simultaneously argued that 
“Negroes living in the area would lower the value of the property owned by whites” 
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because black people did not improve their homes. As Messecar’s non-sequitur evinced, 
while this white community certainly had legitimate concerns about flooding, as did many 
neighborhoods in the flood-prone Bayou City, they never completely rationalized their 
opposition to the expansion of Sunnyside in terms of the environmental risk. Their pro-
segregationist thoughts and their stereotypes concerning black people always surfaced in 
their protests. Their concerns about health, housing quality, and home values reflected their 
beliefs in the intrinsic relationship between black spaces and slum conditions.53 
Many of these racial stigmas reflected the material conditions of some black-
occupied blocks in the city’s core. However, while white Houstonians related negative 
stereotypes to black people—whether due to biological or cultural inferiority—black 
Houstonians understood that their residential areas suffered as a result of neglect and abuse 
by white city officials. They also knew that decreases in property values were not the result 
of black folks moving in—in fact, property values tended to rise as black homebuyers paid 
more to buy into middle class neighborhoods. Indeed, studying real estate advertisements, 
Informer editorialists found, “New housing for white [people] with every modern 
convenience including planned neighborhoods is offered to white [buyers] at prices below 
Negro offers for houses outdated by twenty years.” Rather than being a consequence of 
black “encroachment,” declines in property values could be traced to municipal action and 
white avoidance of and flight from racially transitioning residential spaces. White racism, not 
black bodies, caused declines in neighborhood desirability and, ultimately, material decline. 
White flight and fear created “black spaces.”54 
So, too, did municipal abuse and neglect produce “black spaces.” Vibrant and 
enterprising as it was in the eyes of black Houstonians and black visitors to the city, many 
white folk still identified the “Fourth Ward” as merely the “home of the Negroes in this 
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city.” They described the houses as “for the most part old-fashioned frame shacks…. all in a 
dilapidated condition.” The Pittsburgh Daily Post emphasized the decayed condition of the 
buildings: “The shutters are hanging on the houses by strings and wires. Here and there the 
chimneys have toppled in. Almost all of the houses are built on strong stilts to protect them 
from the water.”55 Yet, the condition of Freedman’s Town was a reflection of city neglect 
and concentrated poverty, rather than the desires of the residents. The streets flooded 
during rains because the city refused to install drainage on the streets; in fact, the streets 
only existed because black residents manufactured and laid the bricks that defined them. 
The city’s neglect of Freedman’s Town, its residents, and its need for public services were 
also reflected in the environmental hazards the neighborhood was exposed to, particularly 
the city’s decision to site a garbage dump and incinerator there in the 1920s.56 
White Houstonians, and even the national press, understood that Freedman’s Town 
was the “negro quarter” of the city. Concomitant with a view of black spaces as areas of 
crime and impropriety, in 1907 the city established the “Reservation,” a sanctioned red-light 
district covering ten blocks of San Felipe district. As the city’s new vice district, “gambling 
and brothels flourished” there and “forc[ed] many black families to abandon the homes that 
they had built there.” Thus, the “negro quarter” became synonymous with prostitution, a 
seedy reputation it did not necessarily lose after the city shuttered the Reservation in 1917. 
Through this racialization of space and criminalization of race, all of San Felipe district’s 
residents, not just those who frequented the Reservation, were overexposed to police 
brutality. Meanwhile, officers rarely accosted white visitors to the Reservation, and little was 
done to disrupt business. Historian Tyina Steptoe notes most of the “Reservation’s saloons, 
gambling houses and shooting galleries… were owned by well-known white citizens.” 
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Indeed, “Police reportedly concentrated ‘almost exclusively’ on arrests of black prostitutes, 
gamblers, and bootleggers” while the Reservation existed.57 
Neglect and abuse toward Fourth Ward extended into the middle of the twentieth 
century, as eminent domain practices razed the homes of thousands of locals. In 1938, the 
Housing Authority of the City of Houston (HACH) demolished the area that had been the 
Reservation to develop the San Felipe Courts—a public housing project for only white 
residents during the Second World War. Black Fourth Ward, historian Zachary Montz 
explains, “hemmed in by an expanding downtown and, to the south and west, by race-
restricted white housing developments, was in the way.” In the name of “slum clearance,” 
about 1,300 black Houstonians faced displacement by HACH’s plans “to clear Negroes out 
of this area.” As Montz argues, “Indeed, the San Felipe project was only the beginning of a 
planned racial transformation of the [Fourth] Ward,” where HACH hoped “[o]ver a period 
of twenty or twenty-five years Negroes will probably be eliminated from the Fourth Ward 
altogether…”58 White authorities believed the Courts, completed in 1944 after twenty-five 
percent of Freedman’s Town land was seized through eminent domain procedures, would 
“replace one of Houston’s undesirable residential sections with one of the finest beauty 
spots in the south,” as what remained of Freedman’s Town was separated from the new 
housing project by a chain link fence.” Even when the city did well, such as when the 
Houston Housing Authority constructed Cuney Homes, a public housing project in Third 
Ward near Houston College for Negroes in the 1940s, it failed to adequately consider the 
needs of black Houstonians, who needed far more than the 3,868 units provided by the new 
development and Kelly Courts in Fifth Ward. And while the San Felipe Courts in Fourth 
Ward had displaced black families the city refused to fill hundreds of vacancies there with 
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needy black Houstonians because the Courts were to remain a segregated “white” housing 
project. Black spaces were to remain black; white ones were to remain white.59 
“Slum clearance” and “urban renewal,” historian Carolyn Elizabeth Whitsitt explains, 
“became a euphemism for ‘Negro removal’” and displaced black Americans, in Houston and 
in cities across the country, “on a disproportionate scale.”60 Freedman’s Town residents 
witnessed this first hand, when after just losing their fight against HACH to bulldoze 
seventeen blocks of their neighborhood, also found themselves cut off from several of their 
long-standing institutions and businesses by the construction of the Gulf Freeway (I-45). By 
1962, one-third of Freedman’s Town was demolished for the highway, including the Colored 
Carnegie Library. While towns between Houston and Galveston benefited from the new 
superhighway—some “land values along the right-of-way had jumped as much as 67 
percent,”—historian Cary D. Wintz explains that the interstate “eliminated many of the 
[Fourth Ward’s] most important buildings and destroyed the geographical integrity of the 
community.” Another 40,000 residents were displaced and the neighborhood descended 
into decay and decline over the next several decades, even as Houston’s economy 
boomed.61 
Like the black community of Fourth Ward, Fifth Ward’s commercial life was 
disrupted by highway construction that would further encourage urban sprawl to the benefit 
of a middle class that could afford to commute to the city center but live on its developing 
outskirts. “In Houston,” sociologist Jan Lin reports, “the building of the highway system 
served the interests of middle-class Anglo suburbanization at the cost of near-city minority 
neighborhoods, which did not have the political clout to contest these land-use decisions…. 
Minority enclaves were not just ‘in the way,’ but ‘invisible’ to the southern Anglo 
industrialists of Houston.” The trouble began in 1952 with plans to build Eastex Freeway 
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(U.S. Highway 59) through Fifth Ward and into downtown. What had once been a 
collection of homes and businesses along Whitty Street would eventually become a massive 
freeway. While some residents could afford to move or build elsewhere—one woman 
planned to purchase a home in Riverside Terrace—there remained “a very large number 
who will not be able to build any time soon.” At the same time, the city ordered the 
demolition of a Veterans housing project in Fifth Ward, but promised to build the Wheatley 
Plaza Apartments to house about 108 of the families displaced by both developments. The 
highway bisected the community from north to south, spawning dozens of dead end streets, 
pathways that had once connected Jensen Drive to the majority of the residential 
community the businesses there served. Meanwhile, residents near the deconstructed 
Veterans housing project, many of whom were middling and middle class and had developed 
the Schweikart Street area into a “fashionable” residential neighborhood, feared that the 
empty lot would “likely… become the site of some giant industry…”62 
With construction beginning in the late 1950s, East Freeway (I-10), running east to 
west, perpendicular to U.S. 59, severed the remaining concentration of lower Lyons Avenue 
businesses from the eastern portion of the community. I-10 functioned as a formidable wall, 
defining the northern limit of the “the Bottom,” as the area between the freeway and 
Buffalo Bayou came to be known. What had formerly been “choice real estate” and had 
included the Schweikart area now was the home of “the biggest rats, meanest dogs, worst 
stench, and deepest mud in Fifth Ward, all this in a shroud of constant steam and smoke 
from burning rice-hull piles stacked by the nearby Comet Rice Company.” As a result of 
complete negligence concerning the economic, environmental, and social effects of the 
highway, I-10 transformed the Bottom into a “literal… dump.” The two noisy freeways and 
the smog they brought with them hugged Kelly Courts, which had been opened in 1940 as 
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black public housing, and physically separated those residents from the rest of the 
community. The environmental and commercial impact on Fifth Ward was undeniable. 
Historian Joe R. Feagin argues, “These two freeway systems literally crucified the area by 
creating large freeways in a cross pattern through its heart. This massive cross disrupted 
community life during its construction and permanently destroyed many black homes and 
business…”63 
Businesses “all but abandoned” the people in Fifth Ward, and once the highways 
were completed, the city returned to its habit of disinterest in the area. In the middle of 
January in 1955, the Greater Fifth Ward Citizens League organized community members at 
Porter Institutional Colored Methodist Church to compel visiting councilpersons to finally 
pave the area’s “mud-soaked” roads. While Mayor Roy Hofheinz and the city council had 
allocated funds for road pavement in eighteen areas of the city, “only one Negro community 
[was] included in the number”—Houston Gardens, which had been built under the 
direction of the New Deal’s Suburban Resettlement Administration. Residents expressed 
their displeasure with the city government: “Approximately 80,000 Negroes make their 
home in Fifth Ward and most of them are mud and water weary.” The city complained that 
infrastructure development in the area would be too expensive and that the city had already 
improved drainage on the majority of Lyons Avenue. Citizens rebutted that this was the 
price when an area “had been neglected so long.” Meanwhile, homeowners and 
businesspeople continued to pay for lack of city services: a local clinic suffered $8000 
damage due to standing water after heavy rain and was forced to install a $5000 pump in its 
basement to prevent the establishment from developing an underground pool.64 
The following week, Fifth Ward residents pointed to their water-logged streets, 
businesses, and homes as evidence of the city’s neglect. The Informer reported that the 
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community “felt a hard blow and were angered this week from unfair tax-money 
distribution when heavy rains again dumped high waters on Lyons Avenue.” Still expected to 
find their way to work, “[m]any of the gentle women who are also bread winners” waded 
through the cold, knee-deep water during a week where the average temperature hovered 
around fifty degrees Fahrenheit to find their way to distant bus stops. The Lyons bus route, 
of course, could not run. Many had to forgo their wages for the day entirely. A. J. Lang, who 
owned a grocery store and filling station at Lyons Avenue and Waco Street across from 
Porter Institution CME, again found himself sweeping water out of his business 
establishment: “I have lost a whole day’s business at the filling station and café located next 
to the filling station,” he reported. The sprawling freeways made things worse for children 
traveling to school after heavy rains, including 300 who attended the segregated Dogan 
Elementary School and had to “walk through mud and water in addition to having to go 
blocks out of their way enroute to school because of dead-end streets” created by the 
highways. Taxis refused to service the area and grocers decided their trucks were not 
worth risking to stock their shelves. The city’s historical and contemporary neglect—a 
consequence, the Informer believed, of the only recently toppled white Democratic Primary 
process—simply made days and weeks like those in the middle of January insufferable for 
Fifth Warders.65 
Even Houston’s black suburbs of Pleasantville, Fidelity, and Clinton Park suffered a 
“history of municipal neglect,” despite that they had been developed with conveniences of 
paved roads and modern plumbing. Houston’s rapid annexation of outlying suburban areas 
in the 1940s and 1950s had increased the city’s tax base, but many of these suburbs endured 
a lack of city services as municipal boundaries grew faster than the city’s ability to meet 
every residents’ needs. However, residents of predominantly black subdivisions annexed by 
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the city noted lengthier waits before they received city services. The Fidelity area of Clinton 
Park, for example, did not receive water service from the city until 1954. Like many 
residents of independent black subdivisions had felt prior to annexation, Fidelity’s 
homeowners did not trust that the city had their best interest in mind when they debated 
their community’s inclusion in the city’s newly developed water plan that year. At a Fidelity 
Civic Club meeting the previous year, several speakers voiced concerns about water quality 
and “stated that about 3 children [have] taken sick from the water that is being drank from 
the wells.” The contaminated water had given the children typhoid fever, the Civic Club 
learned a week later. Members complained that “the mayor” had no “concern” for the 
community, and neither did Houston’s industrial leaders, whose trucks dumped trash on the 
side of the railroad tracks that ran through their neighborhood. Their fears came to fruition: 
even though the city agreed to service the area with running water in 1954, the community 
was still without sewage service in 1956. As 1959 came around, without improvements to 
their streets, their sewage, and drainage ditches, residents feared that their suburban retreat 
was becoming a “slum area.” Residential segregation indeed was resource segregation for 
black Houstonians.66 
Annexation proved to be a point of contention for Houston’s suburbanites—and 
especially for predominantly black communities. They noted the systemic neglect city 
leaders displayed toward areas already incorporated into the city, and worried that like 
those black families, they too might bear the burden of “unfair tax-money distribution,” as 
the authorities used tax revenue to improve white communities at the expense of black 
ones. Houston annexed Brookhaven, the northernmost portion of Sunnyside in 1949 and 
the remainder of Sunnyside in 1956.67 Unfortunately for its residents, like other areas of 
black Houston, city councilwoman Ada Edwards noted in 2007, “Sunnyside has been 
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marginalized. They were annexed in, and then they were forgotten. What was once a jewel 
became a dumping ground for the city.” Indeed, Sunnyside, like Fourth Ward, became a 
literal dumping ground for Houston. In 1967, the city added an incinerator to the Holmes 
Road Dump, “the city’s principal landfill from the 1940s through the mid-1960s.” The Dump 
was adjacent to a community park and just across from Sunnyside Elementary School on 
Bellfort Street and had always presented a health risk to the surrounding community. The 
incinerator was “designed to burn 800 tons of garbage a day,” releasing toxic byproduct into 
the air where Sunnyside residents lived, worked, and played. As historian Robert D. Bullard 
argues, the city government sited dumps and incinerators with particular attention to the 
racial make-up of the communities: “All five of the large city-owned garbage incinerators 
were located in African American and Latino neighborhoods.” Sometimes the entire city 
could find itself at risk for neglect of black spaces. For example, in 1946, Houston suffered a 
polio outbreak of “epidemic proportions,” setting a record of “19 new cases and three 
deaths for any 15-day period.” The city’s health officer, Dr. Fred K. Laurentz, believed that 
the Holmes Road garbage dump and its community of flies were to blame.68 
The Holmes Road dump marked Sunnyside, already engraved as a “black” area in 
Houstonians’ social geography, as filthy and disease-ridden.69 For example, residents of 
Bellaire, a lily-white enclave city that refused annexation to Houston, viewed the Holmes 
Road dump as a breeding ground for polio-carrying flies, and the community that 
surrounded it as inadequately sanitary as a result. Likewise, an editorialist at the Rice 
Thresher complained that filthy students should “learn to keep the [student] lounge clean or 
adjourn to the Holmes Road Dump.” This signification was not unfounded: the Holmes 
Road dump indeed negatively impacted the quality of life for its neighbors and, according to 
Homer Williams, a longtime resident of Sunnyside, left “scars” on “this whole area” as a 
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community where the city could dump its trash. However, the intentional siting of the dump 
and the incinerator in a black community indicated the ways city and county officials 
responded to the demands of white communities and created black spaces as appropriate 
containers for filth and refuse.70 
This pattern of neglect and abuse made those black citizens still outside of the city 
limits question the value of annexation. By the late 1950s, Acres Homes residents 
understood that as a sparsely populated, predominately residential area they could not 
amass enough tax revenue to furnish their own comprehensive infrastructure. Annexation 
by Houston, some residents hoped, would change that. The city, however, had developed a 
pattern of only annexing “improved” black communities—specifically those like Sunnyside 
that had purchased and built their own water-supply infrastructures. In 1957, for the writers 
at the Informer it seemed clear that “the city does not want to take in either… Acres 
Homes” or newer additions to the “Chocolate Bayou area” based on the ways the Houston 
had drawn its own lines of incorporation. Deterred by the severe municipal needs of Acres 
Homes, as well as its sizeable black population that would come to bear on the city’s local 
politics, Houston seemed determined to avoid annexing the community, even as it 
voraciously added to its city limits throughout the middle of the twentieth century. Indeed, 
the city incurred the debts and took on responsibilities for white subdivisions it annexed 
throughout the 1950s and 1960s, while mostly avoiding “pockets of semirural, largely Negro 
population[s]” that “lie just outside the city.” Underbounding, too, contributed to the 
stigmatization of “black spaces” as undesirable and hazardous.71 
As an alternative to annexation, some residents suggested to incorporate Acres 
Homes into a township in 1957, a proposal which citizens hotly debated. They gathered at 
Phillips Chapel Colored Methodist Episcopal Church, where the Protective Voters League 
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and several white business owners voiced their opposition to incorporation. They believed 
incorporation would quickly increase property tax bills, and desired instead that Houston 
would annex the area and thereby allow voters access to city services that they needed, 
including police protection and regulated utility service. Supporters of the petition argued 
that if absorbed into a large city like Houston, Acres Homes’s residents would effectively 
become minority voters in local issues. Noting the racialization of space and the ways 
Houston had historically treated areas marked as “Negro,” supporters of incorporation also 
argued that Acres Homes would “be made into ‘another Fourth or Fifth Ward’ with bad 
streets and lack of proper drainage, despite the fact that the homeowner will be paying the 
same city taxes.” They pressed that white business owners had already leveraged their 
capital and influence to prevent the development of a central water system in the town by 
scaring homeowners into believing they would be mortgaging their homes away to pay for 
it. Now, they argued, these selfsame white people “do not want to have to pay taxes to 
support a Negro town.” If Acres Homes was to remain both black and increasingly self-
sufficient, the petitioners argued that they should avoid annexation by Houston, arguing that 
the community had already been a victim of county neglect. For example, they noted the 
“county had built a multi-million dollar park for white children in the district and had placed 
a few swings under some trees for Negro children.” Supporters like Hiram Jackson, an 
Acres Homes resident, remarked on the need to improve Acres Homes as, not just a black 
community, but a black-owned community: “He said that the area is a large community that 
is ‘without adequate local self-government’ and that the general citizen has been 
‘brainwashed into thinking we cannot do what other races are doing all over the world.’” 
Jackson suggested that incorporation would be an act of subversion against “the mother 
country”—signifying Acres Homes and black Americans as colonized subjects.72 
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Thus, despite their differences, black spaces in Houston shared experiences of abuse 
and neglect at the hands of city government, through underbounding and eminent domain 
practices, and by white ideological terror, white avoidance, and white flight. As spaces of 
refuse they seemingly invited the city to site a vice district in the midst of their homes, 
incinerators close to their grade schools, and clusters of public housing in their 
neighborhoods. Containing and surveilling these spaces allowed city officials to remind the 
people therein to never forget their place in the racial hierarchy of the Jim Crow city.  
The irony, for many black Houstonians, was that the city pushed crime into their 
neighborhoods and then failed to protect the residents even as law enforcement officers 
over-policed their spaces. In 1917, for example, when black soldiers of the Twenty-fourth 
United States Infantry were stationed at Camp Logan in Houston, they were drawn to 
Fourth Ward for food and entertainment. When these soldiers marched through the city to 
demand respect from the Houston Police Department after several clashes with Jim Crow 
authorities, white police officers, soldiers, and guardsmen seized Freedman’s Town, where 
they searched for black soldiers who had been involved in the mutiny. In the process, they 
disarmed private black civilians of their firearms.73 
Understood as a black space, San Felipe District had “faced a constant white 
presence in the form of law-enforcement officials,” even before the 1917 soldier rebellion. 
Historian Tyina Steptoe notes: “Police officers buttressed the white power structure in 
Houston by enforcing Jim Crow authority and demanding submission from an expanding 
black population.” Thus, black residents could expect over-policing and under-protection by 
a city police force that viewed black people as inferior and their neighborhoods as 
inherently criminal.74 
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Despite high murder rates relative to other major cities, about 98% of all crimes in 
Houston in the 1950s were property-related crimes, and these tended to occur closer to 
the city’s core on main drags with many businesses. Thus, higher rates of certain crimes 
would prevail closer to inner city neighborhoods.75 But policing was not a mechanism used 
for crime reduction or prevention; rather, it was a mechanism through which to maintain 
the social order of the city. Black folks who traversed spaces outside of their neighborhoods 
risked facing the police baton, and this was always a risk when traveling between Houston’s 
black enclaves. In 1955, for example, a group of black teenagers traveling to Booker T. 
Washington High School (formerly Old Colored High) “were unceremoniously pulled from 
the Studewood bus by white policemen, and taken to the police station after a verbal clash 
with a bus driver over a seat.” One teenage student had been riding in a front seat “when 
an ‘off-duty’ bus driver boarded the bus at Travis and Capitol” in downtown and demanded 
that the sixteen-year-old girl move because “he was white” and “did not want to sit beside a 
Negro.” The young student, snarky and rebellious, refused, saying, “[T]here are no white 
people in the world, ‘only pink ones.’” Moreover, she rebuked him for freeloading, noting 
that she was a paying customer and he was a getting a free ride at her expense. After 
several more refusals, the driver recruited “three carloads” of police officers to enforce the 
Jim Crow code of public transit. The police officers, rash and brash, grabbed two fourteen-
year-old boys off the bus who were asking for transfers, and when one teenage girl mocked 
them for arresting “two little boys” she “was pulled into the police car” with them and 
taken to the city jail. Whether the initial rebellious teenage girl had been removed is 
unclear, but the consequences nevertheless remained clear: black bodies in public space—
even those of children—could be criminalized, regardless of their particular actions, for 
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being black. Black bodies, as black spaces, were subject, like the neighborhoods they lived in, 
to neglect, abuse, and criminalization.76 
Indeed, black residents suffered abuse by police officers only footsteps away from 
their own front doors. In one case, on an otherwise typical Wednesday morning, sixty-two-
year-old Owens Posey, who lived on Polk Street on the northern fringes of Third Ward (in 
what is now East Downtown), was “beaten in front of his blacksmith shop,” which he 
operated at 1313 Nagle Street. The officer, P. W. Pierson, claimed Posey was arrested for 
“using abusive language” and denied that he ever beat the blacksmith. The officer resented 
the black neighborhood, viewing it as criminal and self-destructive, and promised to “clean” 
it up saying, “As long as winos are rolling dice and chasing each other up and down the 
street, I will be there. I’m going to clean him (Mr. Posey) out.’” Pierson had long been 
fussing with Posey about letting “winos” loiter around his shop, and on that Wednesday 
morning, when Pierson ordered one of Posey’s workers to leave the premises at gunpoint, 
Posey approached him. While one community member, Anita Debose, who lived in Fourth 
Ward but whose husband owned a junk yard in Third Ward, agreed that the “winos” were 
a “disgrace,” others found the police response agitating. Posey’s sister, Bessie Mae Barrett, 
testified that she heard the officer threaten her brother, saying, “I ought to blow your head 
off,” and witnessed Pierson hit Posey in the head before “forcing him into the police car.” 
Barrett, who lived one block down on Nagle, then recounted seeing Pierson “get in the 
backseat with her relative, and… beat him, as the car drove off.” After being released, Posey 
“was hospitalized for two days,” enduring a stroke that “affected his speech.” Pierson 
denied the allegations. The public abuse of black Houstonians on the inner core’s urban 
streets was not an uncommon sight. However, police brutality was not restricted to public 
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spaces, nor was it limited to urban environs, and neither was it only practiced upon the 
poorest, most vulnerable black Americans.77 
The rural dwellers of Acres Homes and the all-residential Pleasantville suburbanites 
noted that police officers effectively criminalized their spaces, even though their 
neighborhoods did not suffer crime levels like those in Fifth Ward or downtown did. 
Keeping black people in their place, even when the spaces they lived in defied popular 
stereotypes about them, was paramount to the integrity of Jim Crow. Therefore, black 
spaces were always hazardous for black lives, and as sociologist Andrea Boyles explains, this 
was true “particularly as the police upheld, supported, and in many instances, inflicted 
brutality upon black [people] individually and collectively.”78 
Like the residents of those black urban enclaves, and despite being bona fide 
suburbanites, folks who lived in Clinton Park, Fidelity, and Pleasantville suffered the 
criminalization of their space and its manifestation through police harassment. Judson 
Robinson, Jr., son of a black real estate agent and precinct judge of Pleasantville, followed in 
his father’s footsteps and also served as precinct judge of Pleasantville beginning in 1967. 
Earlier, he served as a campaign staffer for the first black person, Hattie Mae White, elected 
to the HISD school board, and had served as a delegate with Christia Adair at the Texas 
Democratic Convention where both were denied seats, and also eventually became the first 
black city councilman in the city since Reconstruction in 1971. In 1958, the senior Robinson 
was still precinct judge, and the junior Robinson and his wife resided in the tri-community 
area. One night that year, after building a new addition to their house, he and his wife, 
Margerette Robinson, a nurse at the Veterans Hospital, hosted several friends for a party.79 
One of his neighbors, invited but too ill to attend, suddenly knocked on the door and 
warned the Robinsons that “there are policemen in your back yard.” Judson looked out of 
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the large picture window at the rear of his house, and “sure enough,” he remembered, 
“there are 3 policemen”80: 
And I said, “What are you doing?” And they said, “Who are you?” I said, “I live here. 
This is my house. What do you want?” They said, “You want to be smart don’t 
you?” I said to myself, Uh-oh. I’m out here by myself. These guys will jump on me 
and say all kinds of things. I said, “Officer, if you think something is wrong, why don’t 
you come inside.” I figured if I got them in there, then I had a better of chance of 
them not jumping all over me. So he said, “You think you’re smart. Let me let you 
see what this flashlight feels like.” I said, “You don’t have to do that. Just come in 
and you can see.” Finally, I get them in. They’re 3 spies. One of them is just out for 
kicks. He wasn’t even a policeman…. Now these policemen are inside. My brother 
just finished law school… We asked them what was wrong. Well, here are these 
officers sitting there: “We’re going to arrest you all for consuming liquor after 
hours.” I said, “But, sir, I’m in my house.” He said, “I don’t care. It’s against the law.” 
My brother said, “No, it isn’t. I’m a lawyer.” So anyway, they called the sergeant. 
The sergeant comes out, he sees what’s going on, he recognizes that my father is 
the precinct judge, and stuff like that. He tried to smooth it over…. So we go to 
council, and they suspend all the guys for five days each. My wife and I lived in fear 
for six months…. They would call every night and say, “Nigger, I’m gonna get you 
tonight. I’m gonna get you.” I’d be afraid to go out my house. So I know what it is. 
I’ve had the abuse and things.81 
When asked how black Houstonians felt about the police, Robinson answered, “…if you 
asked the average black person what he thought of the police department, they’d always tell 
you the same thing. They oppress us. They’re mean. They’re here to keep us under 
control.” Moments like these in the tri-community area demonstrated that even those black 
areas of Houston that did not look or feel like inner city slums and that did not see high 
rates of crime remained vulnerable to abuses by white police officers who exerted racial 
and institutional authority over the segregated black population. Keeping black people under 
“control,” then, had little to do with actual crime rates or any of its neighborhood or 
educational covariates. Criminality and inferiority were inherent in blackness in this white 
imaginary, and thus black people should always be subject to white control.82 
Anna Dupree, an entrepreneur and philanthropist, understood that whatever 
statistics might confirm for white Americans that black folks were prone to criminality and 
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deserved surveillance, the problems that plagued black communities were the result of 
larger structural forces. Dupree had been born in rural Texas as the granddaughter of 
freedpeople. In Houston, as she amassed a fortune through her beauty empire and other 
business ventures with her husband Clarence Dupree, she donated heavily to black 
communities. In the 1950s and 1960s, Our African American Community Council 
(OAACC) of Houston and Harris County, of which Anna was chairperson, developed a 
campaign to spread the “Truth” about black Americans’ contributions to the United States 
during Negro History Week and Memory Day (the fourth Sunday in June) to promote 
interracial “understanding” and anti-racism. They sought to remind the nation that, “These 
black hands helped build this giant southland,” but that those selfsame people were not 
given the opportunity to share in the South’s growing prosperity. The goals of Memory Day 
directly reflected the anxieties people like Anna had about black people being stereotyped 
and misunderstood—about the collective amnesia and willful sightlessness white people 
seemed to have regarding the historical and contemporary conditions that condemned black 
people to blight and overexposed them to crime. They remarked on the “1,500 illegitimate 
Negro children” born in Houston and Harris County each year, who typified the local black 
population that was often “homeless, uncared for and unloved, left to make their own way 
at an age when most youngsters are learning that life is worth living.” They tired of the city’s 
neglect of these indigent youths and their subsequent criminalization, pointing out the 
pipeline from homelessness, to underpaid labor, to crime, and to imprisonment: “These are 
the homeless Negroes who came before ‘Social Security’—those whose loyal devoted and 
cheap labor who helped buil[d] a giant America, those who are now the unneeded, 
unwanted ‘spoils’ of yesteryear.” Anna and the AACC chided the city: “Houston being 
entitled as the ‘Murder Capitol’ of the world is because of a major factor in crime and low 
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morals and the shameful neglect of Negro children.” They demanded food, shelter, and 
clothing for destitute black folks, for while six organizations provided these resources for 
white children—three of them administered by the county—none existed for black 
Houstonians.83 
 
cres Homes, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Wards, the Pleasantville-Clinton Park area, 
and Sunnyside thereby reveal the ways the racialization of space as “black” could 
reinforce negative ideas about black people. Despite their differences, these “black spaces” 
emerged from similar forces of abuse and neglect, including white flight, resource 
segregation, underbounding, unscrupulous eminent domain practices, environmental racism, 
and criminalization. These residents suffered the effects of these, losing out on opportunities 
to build wealth and dispel myths about blackness.  
Following World War II, Americans learned to conflate property ownership with 
whiteness, and thus saw white middle-class ascendency as merited based on individual hard 
work and black poverty and segregation as a consequence of black folks' individual and 
cultural failings. Through the middle of the century, black Houstonians struggled against 
these ideological and material impositions. They developed, among themselves and in 
conversation with white Houstonians, visions for the city’s future with regard to race. They 
believed—with each win the NAACP earned in court and with each editorial and political 
cartoon that exposed America’s failure to embody its alleged democratic ideals vis-à-vis the 
atrocities of Nazi Germany—that they were on the precipice of change. Moreover, despite 
the ways that black space functioned in Houston, they often lauded their city as an outlier in 
the South, led by progressive businesspeople rather than ravenous mobs. Eventually, they 
believed, Houston would become a raceless city, where individual merit rather than color 
A 
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determined a person’s social location. Even as Houston’s Jim Crow system fell away over 
the course of the 1950s and 1960s, however, residential segregation remained, and black 
space continued to limit the life chances of black people. 
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8 David Freund challenges attempts by historians to disaggregate white people’s racial reasoning from their 
material desires. Much of this historiographical conversation is bound up in attempts to understand how 
white racial identity transformed in the postwar era, where many white Southerners seemed to finally 
embrace a “colorblind” ethos—if only in word and not necessarily in deed. Dan T. Carter’s seminal Politics 
of Rage chronicles the career of infamous Alabama governor George Wallace. Through the 1950s and 
1960s, Carter argues, Wallace reinvigorated a waning conservativism by boldly injecting anti-black racial 
prejudice into discourses involving urban violence and so-called black criminality, “business 
progressivism,” local control of schools, private property, and small government. These issues had 
become particularly meaningful to white conservatives, northern and southern, urban and new suburban, 
as a response to what appeared to be civil rights gains for black Americans and increasing government 
intrusion in white people’s spaces in order to secure those gains for black folk. Carter’s “white backlash” 
remains critical for scholarship on post-WWII conservativism. Several modifications to Carter’s thesis 
have been made by social historians since Carter first published Politics of Rage in 1995. Joseph Crespino’s 
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northern post-War metropolis, Freund argues that as early as the 1940s, white Americans’ racial 
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matter,” and so discounts scholarship that argues against the significance of race in post-War 
conservatism. Instead, he contends that whiteness, as an identity construct, became defined by the 
ascendancy of the suburb, the birth of a new middle class, and white folks’ growing investment “in new 
ideas about the relationship between race and property.” Race and racism, he argues, were not “static,” 
but evolving and adapting all the time, and that the biological racism of the 1910s was no longer the 
fulcrum of white supremacy/exclusivity by the 1960s. Freund’s analysis emerges in the literature as a 
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10 Following C. Vann Woodward’s 1955 The Strange Career of Jim Crow, historians have sought to confirm 
or debunk the “Woodward thesis.” Strange Career was more an extended essay than a historical 
monograph, and its central contention was that racism had a history—that it was not just a fact of 
human intergroup contact. In particular, Woodward argued that Jim Crow had origins, and that it was 
institutionalized in the late 1890s, about two decades after the end of Reconstruction. In that time, he 
explained with local examples, cities and states in the South wrestled with how they would rebuild 
southern society’s social landscape. Across the region’s urban spaces, they invariably settled on Jim Crow 
segregation, though each location approached that conclusion at different times and segregation always 
evinced local variants. Scholars responded with a flurry of research, some of which sustained 
Woodward’s argument about the origins of Jim Crow, but others vigorously challenged it. Looking much 
more closely at local practices and laws, Howard Rabinowitz argued that segregation had existed well 
before the 1890s, and Richard Wade found evidence of residential segregation in the antebellum South. 
Still more scholars sought to understand the ideological origins of Jim Crow segregation, even if their 
chronologies did not comport entirely with the Woodward thesis. Joel Williamson suggested an 
economic split-market antagonism thesis and Jacquelyn Dowd Hall in Revolt against Chivalry highlighted 
the ways gender and sexuality within a white supremacist patriarchal context became symbolic sites of 
anxiety for white men who developed ways to constrain black men’s, black women’s, and white women’s 
sexual freedoms. Recently, scholars have resigned that it is seemingly impossible to locate a singular 
temporal origin of Jim Crow, but the hard center of Woodward’s argument—that racisms need to be 
historicized rather than taken for granted—stands. I agree with John Whitson Cell that historians have 
largely failed to meet Woodward on his own terms regarding his definition of Jim Crow’s separate-but-
equal doctrine as being formalized legal statutes recognized as constitutional at all levels of government. 
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demonstrated, although whether they were excluded from public health institutions, schools, and 
eventually streetcars seemed to vary by location and time. Indeed, the streetcar example, for August 
Meier and Elliot Rudwick, demonstrated that while segregation had been common in some places 
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Rabinowitz followed their work, demonstrating that the solidification of the doctrine that would come 
to define Plessy and Jim Crow—“separate but equal”—was the result of Republican machinations, 
incoming “Redeemers,” and black “acceptance.” Rabinowitz suggests this acceptance was motivated by a 
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12  As a result, many scholars often speak of two dichotomous black political traditions: 
“accommodationism” and “radicalism,” typified by Booker T. Washington and W.E.B. Du Bois, respectively. 
(Though, as Louis Harlan points out, the chasm between Washington and Du Bois was not immediate 
and Du Bois initially lauded the “Atlanta Compromise”.) This need to recover the “agency” of oppressed 
groups is a response to a much earlier political histories, which often focused on the political action of 
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and the capacity for humans to effect change, while those who seek to recover “agency” have yet to 
reconcile the paradox wherein history is necessarily wrapped up in contingency, and therefore, human 
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CHAPTER 2: “WE WANT IN, NOT OUT”: ENVISIONING A 
RACELESS HOUSTON 
 
lack Houstonians did not endure the indignities of white supremacy without 
protest. Since Clifton F. Richardson founded the Houston Informer in 1919 he 
used its pages to speak against Jim Crow and American hypocrisy. In the previous 
year, black Houstonians established their city’s branch of the NAACP.1 Until the 1960s 
when student activism picked up, Houston’s civil rights leaders were generally middle 
class—editors, attorneys, and entrepreneurs. They often lauded Houston for its relatively 
smooth, if slow, transition away from Jim Crow customs through the 1950s and early 
1960s.2 Shaped by their belief in Houston as a city of racial tolerance, deeply affected by 
their personal biographies and gender subjectivities, and molded in particular ways by their 
commitment to liberal individualism, Houston’s black leaders worked toward fulfilling the 
vision of a city wherein race would not determine a person’s life chances. 
The collective vision of Houston’s mainstream black leaders of what they sometimes 
called a “color blind” future was structured by at least three factors.3 First, as middling and 
middle-class women and men, socialized to believe in the possibilities of economic mobility 
afforded by American capitalism, they remained invested in the mythos of individual uplift, 
meritocracy, and democratic equality. Throughout the 1950s, Houston’s mainstream black 
civil rights activists publicly campaigned for their collective racial interests, but their calls for 
racial solidarity, they explained, were toward the end of securing equal opportunity and 
access for individuals, believing that each black individual’s success could undermine 
prejudice against the group. The group’s well-being was important insofar as racism 
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continued to limit the life chances of individuals within the group, but in a future without 
racism, individuals would be able to fend for themselves.4 
Second, their sociopolitical vision took shape in the city of Houston. Houstonians, 
black and white, understood themselves as exceptional, and their city as an outlier to “the 
South” that they were regionally connected to. Texans had long understood themselves as 
special, and Houstonians perhaps believed they were even more divergent from 
stereotypical southern-ness than their fellow Texans. “Heavenly Houston” (see Image 1), as 
they called it, was a city of progress, a leader in business, arts, and race relations, they 
would often argue. It was the Chicago of tomorrow, the nation’s next great metropolis—a 
city where even black people could realize their dreams. Whether Houston’s uniqueness 
was real or imagined, mainstream black Houstonians shared with their white counterparts a 
perception that their city challenged what it meant to be of and to live in “the South.” If 
Houston could integrate its schools without one incident of mass violence, if white 
supremacist terrorists could be prosecuted and convicted in court by an all-white jury, and 
if economic interest could trump racial antipathies, then so too could Houston realize a 
future where color did not prescribe life outcomes. Black Houstonians witnessed a city that 
looked, sounded, and felt different than did tumultuous Little Rock, or, closer to home, 
battle-scarred Dallas. They lauded what they saw as their city’s relative propensity for 
civility and race-blind justice, and banked their vision for a raceless future on that 
perception.5 
Lastly, Houston’s black civil rights leaders’ beliefs and strategies were also shaped by 
their gendered conceptions of themselves.6 Their gendered concerns, usually articulated in 
terms of manly courage and motherly responsibility, as opposed to masculinity versus 
femininity, compelled black Houstonians to work for a future in which their spouses and 
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children would not be subjected to the same social, economic, and political insults that had 
been lobbed at them. Indeed, while many gender theorists describe gender in the twentieth 
century United States in terms of masculinity and femininity, those two symbols and ways of 
“doing gender” were not the most salient when black Houstonians discussed their 
aspirations for a raceless future. Indeed, rather than embodying these oppositional gendered 
ways of being, black leaders worked to fulfill what they been taught were their gendered 
obligations to the “Negro race.”7 Black women like Houston NAACP Executive Secretary 
Christia Adair and school board member Hattie Mae White practiced what Alice Walker 
would later term “womanism.” Womanism is a performative politics and guiding ideology 
defined by black women’s understanding that their well-being was informed by the 
interconnectivity of their myriad identities as mothers, daughters, housewives, 
businesswomen, churchwomen, and so on. The work they completed for their communities 
was also work that they accomplished for themselves, for in fulfilling their “womanly” roles, 
they sustained the families, communities, and civic organizations that could reciprocally 
sustain them.8 Black men like Carter Wesley, publisher of the Houston Informer, expressed 
different concerns.9 He articulated his fight against Jim Crow as a black middle-class man, 
defining his manhood, not in opposition to femininity, but in opposition to the “cowardice” 
demanded of black men by white supremacy. His understanding of manly courage, informed 
by the traditional “masculine” value of rationality, shaped what he viewed as acceptable civil 
rights politics. Compelled by what they perceived as their gendered obligations, black 
Houstonians, then, entered into the dangerous work of forcing a Jim Crow city to confront 
its quotidian, structural, and legal racism. They did not always agree on tactics, but their 
prevailing commitment to liberal individualism helped them sustain, across their differences, 
the same hopes for the nation’s future. 
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The differences in tactics and ideas among mainstream black leaders in the 1950s, 
however, points to a diversity of black political thought that reflected a lack of surety about 
whether Jim Crow would wither and what the aftermath might be. While many scholars 
have studied the ways white Americans responded to black citizens’ civil rights gains in the 
1950s and 1960s by turning against the Great Society and embracing an ardent “colorblind” 
individualism, the term “colorblind racism” fails to encourage interrogation into the nuances 
of Americans’ changing understandings of race vis-à-vis their commitment to liberal 
individualism.10 Moreover, much of this literature focuses on white racial identity politics 
while it flattens the diverse ways black Americans approached the question of how to 
realize a raceless future. Like their white counterparts, in the post-War years preceding Jim 
Crow’s demise, black Americans reimagined how to reconcile liberal individualism with 
racial identity and its ascribed values in American society.  
Generally Houstonians evinced varying, sometimes overlapping, and oscillating 
allegiances to color-rejecting, color-evasive, color-valuing, and color-aware discourses—different 
notions of how to approach the problem of racial inequality in a changing society.11 Color-
rejection refers to those conscious efforts to complete anti-racist work with attention 
toward historical (dis)advantage. Color-aware leaders, offering a throwback to Garveyism’s 
black nationalism and a prelude to black nationalist resurgence in the late 1960s, but not 
precisely mirroring either of those political developments, proposed that minority groups 
must be pragmatic by closing ranks and supporting in-group economic upward mobility even 
as they espoused a consciously non-separatist hope for the future. Color-valuing 
Houstonians maintained conscious and subconscious beliefs in the inherent biological, 
behavioral, or spiritual differences between racial groups. And, most similar to 
“colorblindness,” color-evasion reflected conscious and subconscious efforts to maintain 
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that color did not and should not matter in correcting existing inequalities. At times 
antagonistic, these ideas converged on the issue of individualism in the cauldron of Cold 
War politics, which allowed Houstonians, black and white, to experiment with each of them 
when politically expedient as they worked out their visions for the city’s racial future. 
From her earliest activist days fighting corruption in the small town of Kingsville, 
Texas, Christia Adair practiced building interracial coalitions to address social ills. After 
moving to Houston, a larger city with a substantial business class and a reputation for racial 
tranquility to maintain, she developed a color-rejecting philosophy wherein she worked 
across racial lines to address problems of historical disadvantage that had proscribed black 
Americans’ life chances. As executive secretary of the NAACP she rejected racial 
provincialisms and used her relationships, across color lines, to tackle longstanding 
inequalities, successfully “enlist[ing] the cooperation of the various denominational, civic, 
and political groups in the city,” which reflected “her own fine spirit of cooperation.” In the 
early 1950s, when she helped organize the Harris County Democrats, and later as the 
organization struggled with whether to support Hattie Mae White’s bid to become a 
member of the Houston school board, she warned the organization’s white members that 
they needed to “understand the aspirations, needs, hopes, and dreams of the black people 
of this community”—that without acknowledging and addressing racial discrimination 
explicitly, there was no political future for liberals.12 
 Carter Wesley’s protests against racial inequality were more fluid—a reflection, 
perhaps, of his position as a newspaper publisher as opposed to Adair who, as a leader, 
remained accountable to the nation’s foremost civil rights organization. He used the 
Informer to fight for what he believed was, at the given moment, the most pragmatic 
approach to addressing a particular issue. In the case of whether black Houstonians should 
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rally behind the establishment of Texas State University for Negroes—a school formed in 
order to prevent the integration of the University of Texas—Wesley argued against 
Thurgood Marshall and Lulu B. White, who demanded that Texas desegregate its flagship 
school rather than build a substandard one for black Americans. As president of the 
Southern Conference for Equalization of Educational Opportunities, Wesley argued that the 
NAACP could fight its desegregation battle concurrent with his organization’s equalization 
fight. “My firm belief,” he noted, “is that Negroes should ask for integration into the 
University of Texas or any other school where white [people] attend,” but if white 
Americans “invoke their Constitution and their statutes and insist upon providing a separate 
school, then I believe Negroes should demand that they make it equal in every particular to 
any that they furnish to white [people] on the separating line.” Marshall and White 
interpreted this as capitulation to white supremacy. Wesley repeatedly remarked that they 
misrepresented his position on the matter. His public and bitter conflicts with them, 
however, evinced his desire to realize a raceless future through means he deemed 
immediately pragmatic. Wesley’s optimism regarding what he saw as the inevitable victory 
of black Americans in the fight for racial equality, however, often failed to live up to his 
expectations. Additionally, the liberal individualist commitments that undergirded his 
political philosophy sapped the strength of his structural critiques of racism, leaving space 
for Americans, liberal and conservative, to reconcile racial inequality with liberal 
individualism by invoking racialized discourses of criminality. That reconciliation ultimately 
helped white supremacists salvage what they could of a withering Jim Crow.13 
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hristia Adair grew up in Edna, Texas, a town about 100 miles southwest of 
Houston and the place she credited for her moral and ideological 
development: “…all that I am or hope to ever be, if that is anything, I owe it to 
Edna, Texas, this small town.” It was the place that shaped Adair’s religious and gender 
identities. She “professed religion” at the age of eleven, when she learned that her 
godparents had blessed her as an infant, and prayed that she “would grow up to be a useful 
woman and a devout Christian.” As a child, she played with toy dolls, a reflection of early 
gender socialization, teaching them the lessons she learned from her parents. She would 
later do much of the same when, as a teenager, she took over the Sunday School program 
at her church. Adair’s parents taught her and her sister to be gentle and empathetic, even 
toward those who did not share their inculcated senses of respectability. Yet, Adair also 
knew her parents expected her to behave as if she understood “there was a difference 
between a girl who made a mistake and a girl who had kept her chastity.”14 
Adair’s parents were illiterate, “but they both had high ideals.” Her father, Handy 
Daniels, inherited a hauling business from his father. Adair assumed that Daniels learned his 
work ethic and his sense of honor by working with her grandfather. Daniels’ daughters were 
expected to represent their father’s values in public. Adair’s mother warned her and her 
older sister that if they got a whipping at school, they could expect a reprise at home: 
“Girls, don’t get whipped by other people. Nobody whips you. Your daddy don’t whip you, 
so I am the only person to whip you, but you’re going to get whipped.” Whenever her 
father learned that Ada had given the girls a whipping, he would express “disgrace” at “the 
very fact that his daughter got a whipping.”  Her mother taught her that “no matter what 
anyone else has, you take what you have and make it useful. And don’t let anything, job or 
anything else, make you; you make the job.” Adair learned from her parents, then, to “make 
C 
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the responsibility count,” to value hard work, to prove her merit, and to do these within 
the strict confines of respectable womanhood.15 
Adair attended public school in Edna until the age of fifteen, when her godfather, 
Professor John W. Frazier, asked that she be sent to Austin to attend Samuel Houston 
College (now Huston-Tillotson College) to complete her secondary schooling. The school 
was, for her, “just a great big family,” where in addition to traditional curricula, girls studied 
sewing, cooking, and home economics and the boys learned shop. After finishing at Sam 
Houston, she attended Prairie View, where she entered as a junior after passing entrance 
exams. She returned to Edna and taught there for two years until she accepted an offer 
from the superintendent of schools in Kleburg County to teach there. Her father 
recommended she ask for a raise, and she received one, teaching in a rural school at $40 
per month, a $5 raise over her salary in Edna. There, about 130 miles southwest of Edna, in 
the small town of Kingsville, she met her husband, Elbert. He was a brakeman at a Missouri 
Pacific railroad junction whom she married about a year and a half later. They wed in May 
1918 and stayed in Kingsville for the first eight years of their marriage. Of her husband, she 
recalled, he “was not a selfish man but he had high ideals and he had a lot of pride and he 
was a man.”16 
Image 2 Ada Daniels' poll tax receipt in 1926.  “Poll Tax Receipt,” January 1, 1926, Box 4, folder 9, 
Christia V. Adair Collection. MSS 109, HMRC, HPL. 
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Gender, then, was an ever-present structure in Adair’s early life. It shaped her 
relationship to her parents, her public performances, her education, and ultimately her 
career aspirations—though race certainly informed each of these as well. She remarked, for 
example, that she “became a woman” during her time in Kingsville, embracing her roles a 
wife and a community leader. Kingsville was a “little town… populated according to race.” 
Adair recalled, “It had what they called Negro Town, White Town, and Mexican Town. And 
it looked like never the twain shall meet.” Her challenge as she saw it in the black 
community was a “big gambling house” that seemed poised to crush the life out of local 
families. Authorities had no interest in shutting it down because they were accepting bribe 
money to turn a blind eye. She was also disappointed that “[c]ommon-law marriage just 
prevailed terribly” in the town—a terrible stain on the race in the eyes of many middle class 
black Americans. She “found out that what people needed were example and leadership.” In 
her eyes, the town’s churches were a dismal failure: the Baptist congregation had gotten rid 
of its pastor and “the Methodist minister was capitalizing on the fact that the money was 
easy, and whoever got to the men first would get their money. The gambler, the bootlegger, 
the preacher, the whatnot. So he was making a good stab at it and he was getting to them 
first and he was just taking advantage, I thought, of people.”17 She started a non-
denominational Sunday school in the fall of 1918, pulling in children from around town, and 
using the children’s involvement in church to capture their parents. She also convinced the 
Methodist bishop to replace the pastor, and a respectable Baptist minister moved into the 
Baptist church. The churches worked together to build community, and Adair recalled, 
“Parents began catching the spirit of furthering their children’s education and people began 
sending their boys and girls away to school, to colleges. I think we got some very good 
results from those boys and girls whose lives we reached when they were little children.”18 
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Adair built community among the women of the town. Kingsville women had “fine 
ideals,” but needed a civic outlet, which Adair positioned herself to lead. Their experiences 
resembled that of their black foremothers: “Their songs were written and never sung.” 
Black women’s struggles and needs diverged a great deal from the concerns of white 
women, for black women labored for their larger communities under conditions that white 
women did not have to endure. Of second-wave feminism, then, Adair later opined, “I don’t 
particularly care about woman lib because the Negro woman has always had to work. I 
don’t think we had to get laws and bills passed for her to get a job, she could always work. I 
think, she, like everybody else if she prepares herself, she gets what she wants.” 
Nevertheless, Adair eventually became heavily involved in securing political rights for 
women after building an interracial coalition of “mothers” against vice in her town.19 
When she saw one of her teenage Sunday School students exiting the gambling 
house one day, Adair said, “It just put war-fire in me. I just knew we had to do something, 
find a way or make one, because this was the last straw.” She learned from the student that 
he and other teenagers had been hired to work at the tables. She recognized it as a 
women’s issue, perhaps because so many of the men were heavily involved in gambling, or 
because she understood the moral rearing of children to be women’s duty, even though she 
had no children herself—or perhaps for both reasons and more. Whatever the reason, 
Adair believed that women had a gendered obligation to protect their families from 
immorality, but recognized that black women in Kingsville lacked the necessary political 
clout to effect change alone. One of her acquaintances, a white woman, was president of a 
Mothers Club, a predecessor to Parent Teacher Associations. “So we went to this woman,” 
Adair recounted, “and told her what was what and she just became fired up with it too. She 
said, ‘Well, no, you wouldn’t have no business trying to do it by yourself, because we can 
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help.’” Negro Town organized its own Mothers Club, but Adair insisted, “It was really an 
interracial Mothers Club, but we didn’t recognize it in those days like I would now, or could 
appreciate it like I could now.”20 
The local sheriff became alarmed at the political organizing, “subpoenaed a lot of 
women to come to his office,” and there “held court.” Elbert informed Adair that the sheriff 
had no right to do this, but recommended that his wife and the other women show up at 
the sheriff’s office and simply deny any knowledge of what was happening. After allaying the 
sheriff’s fear with their feigned ignorance, Adair and the black women in her community 
contacted the white women of the Mothers Club to tell them of the sheriff’s actions. Those 
women encouraged Adair to call the district attorney. Once he learned that there was a 
gambling house in Kingsville, he “called real court then with authority,” and the sheriff was 
ordered to “nail up the building himself” as the women of Kingsville stood “on the sidelines 
rejoicing and praising God.”21 
“The woman’s suffrage question” soon eclipsed the celebration. Adair did not find 
intrinsic “value” in suffragists’ efforts, aware that even if she had the right to vote, like black 
men in Texas, black women wouldn’t be able to vote in primaries, and the one-party state 
would continue to be ruled by white supremacists. Granted, Adair “knew we could vote in 
presidential elections and were satisfied, but we just figured we were not supposed to and 
didn’t try.” However, the white women of the Mothers Club “told us about this effort being 
made to pass a bill where women would be able to vote like men.” Collectively, the women 
of Kingsville organized, as did women across the country, and eventually secured the right 
for women to vote.22 
When William G. Harding, at the time a presidential candidate, came to town in 
1920, Adair’s husband informed her of his arrival. Harding would be received at the train 
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station where Elbert worked. He told her that white teachers were taking their children 
down to the railroad junction to meet the candidate. With parental consent, Adair took 
eleven or twelve children with her to the train station, situating her class at the exact spot 
she knew “they would get the best attention.” (She discerned the precise location of the 
train’s stop because of the many times she had picked up her husband from work.) 
Harding’s mistreatment of her group of children compelled Adair to switch political 
parties.23 She recalled:  
And when the train stopped, well, my husband was the rear brakeman, and he came 
out to open the observation gates so the candidate could get out to talk with the 
people. And so my children were right at the steps. And some white children were 
there by white teachers or parents, and he—Mr. Harding—reached over my 
children’s head to shake hands with the white children and never did pay any 
attention to my children. And I pulled my children out, hurt, disappointed, and sorry 
for the children. But in my own heart, I said, “If that’s what Republicans do, I cannot 
be Republican. I’ll have to change parties. From here on out I’ll have to work for 
Democrat presidents.”24 
Adair’s sense of responsibility toward the children of her community made Harding’s affront 
far too difficult to bear. She endeavored to begin working against the Republican Party by 
casting her own ballot in the upcoming election.25 
However, when the black women of Kingsville got “dressed up” and went to vote, 
Adair remembered they had been denied: 
They gave us all kinds of excuses why, but we just stayed. We stayed, we asked, ‘We 
want to know why we couldn’t vote.’ The answers to the questions were so invalid, 
we were not satisfied. So finally one woman, a Mrs. Simmons said, ‘Are you saying 
that we can’t vote because we’re Negroes?’ And he said, ‘Yes. Negroes don’t vote in 
primary in Texas.’ So that hurt our hearts real bad and we went on. There was 
nothing we could do about that but just take it.’”26  
Adair noted that the women stayed until officials explicitly said they were being denied 
suffrage because they were black. They understood that if they could get officials to 
acknowledge that race was the reason for disparate treatment at the polls, they could 
prepare a legal challenge to the practice. The predicament at the polling place, Adair 
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recalled, “made us realize that we—all the more—we had to do something that would 
break these discriminations.”27 
Black women, Adair reflected, had always been left out of prominent liberation 
discourses—both feminist and racial civil rights ones.28 Later in the twentieth century, white 
women clamored for “liberation”—by which they meant freedom from the cult of 
domesticity that kept many of them out of the labor market. Many black women could not 
identify with the “the problem that has no name.”29 Adair noted that black women had 
always been in the workforce, had always been compelled, by economic, political, and social 
circumstances, to aspire to better jobs and community leadership positions. Adair and other 
black women faced a different set of challenges than their male counterparts and their white 
counterparts; their survival hinged on breaking the mold of gendered expectations and racial 
restrictions, even as they embraced a language and legacy of racial uplift and attempted to 
secure their own womanhood. She would continue such efforts after she and Elbert left 
Kingsville. 
Adair and her husband moved to Houston in 1925 when they learned he was 
diabetic and needed a less taxing job. Adair immediately became involved with a local 
Methodist church and joined a woman’s club that was “concerned with… a home for 
delinquent girls, located in the Acreage Home area.” Adair testified that she had never 
interacted with the type of girls who lived at the Dorcas Home for Delinquent Negro 
Girls—girls “who were dressed like prisoners and treated like prisoners.” She and the 
clubwomen would visit the home and deliver “nice little goodies” to the girls, but did little 
of the kind of moral entrepreneuring she had become accustomed to leading in Kingsville. 
After years of underfunding by the county, Dorcas Home was condemned in 1932—one 
grand jury noted that it was not “a decent place in which humans can live”—removing the 
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only home for juveniles that served black children from Harris County. Houston was far 
from heavenly, then, for those most vulnerable black residents. Adair regretted not fighting 
to keep Dorcas Home and not providing the kind of motherly care she believed the young 
girls needed. However, she appreciated her privilege, acknowledging that most black women 
had not ever had the economic security to do the kind of work she engaged in. She would 
make up for her mistakes with the girls’ home by using her advantages as a housewife with a 
supportive husband to help lead black Houston’s civil rights efforts.30 
A year after her arrival to Houston, Adair became the assistant to the first 
recording secretary of the city’s NAACP branch, but shortly after joining, replaced her 
predecessor and became the “first volunteer secretary of the branch here.” A lot of her 
early work focused on “rape cases where white people used to become dissatisfied and 
disgruntled about a thing.” She explained, “The best way they could do, some white woman 
would holler that she’d been raped by a Negro or ventured to rape, or something like that, 
and of course that meant a burned or lynched Negro.” One such case happened in Conroe. 
“But we were able to get a lawyer,” she explained, “and a lawyer that won that case in our 
favor.”31 
When it came to issues of criminal justice, Houston was far less progressive than 
city leaders would have suggested. Though she appreciated the opportunities Houston 
offered black people, Adair also admitted that she “did not know that people could be 
treated like people in Houston were being treated.” Not only did the excitability around 
interracial rape cases strike her, but she was also taken aback by the treatment of prisoners 
in jails where “they would beat up people and anything they wanted to do and kill people.” 
The NAACP’s defense of these victims of white prejudice led the organization to become 
Adair’s “sole interest” next to her role at her church. Longtime black Houstonians would 
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remember her involvement in high profile cases, including the trial of Johnnie Lee Morris, a 
black man accused of murdering a white bus driver during a racial spat with a passenger. 
Her fundraising efforts helped afford Morris some of the city’s best criminal defense 
attorneys, whose arguments convinced a jury to spare Morris’s life.32 
In 1945, two years after her husband died, Adair realized that she needed a regular 
paycheck.  She began selling Seventh Ward Bonds and was asked by the county extension 
agent if she might want to work as secretary to the Home Demonstration and County 
Agricultural Agents, a job which she accepted. Around that same time, the NAACP was able 
to establish an office in same building as Adair’s workplace, and hired Lulu B. White as the 
organization’s executive secretary, where the two women became acquainted. Eventually, 
the board of the NAACP was able to hire an administrative assistant, a job White wanted 
for Adair, which she accepted for three years.33  
Houston’s NAACP experienced numerical and financial decline toward the end of 
the 1940s, due to Red Scare attacks and “infiltrat[ion].” As a result, by 1949 the 
organization could no longer afford to employ Adair or White. “So that left us without an 
NAACP,” she recalled, “and the Board members [Ernest Ollington Smith, Sid Hilliard, Lee 
Haywood Simpson] called and asked me if I would take it.”34 Unfortunately, the work would 
be unpaid, but Adair resolved to rebuild the Houston NAACP: “So I went back into the 
office in February, 1950…. And began serving as administrator.” The board assured her that 
her personal bills would be paid and that she could continue her lifestyle, and that as soon 
as they could, they would resume offering her a salary. She served in this capacity for twelve 
years, never salaried, but always receiving whatever was left after the organization’s bills 
were paid. She reflected that she was “happy,” saying, “I was doing what I wanted to do and 
liked to do and the people were cooperative.  I had no problem whatever getting members. 
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I had some of the richest white people, some of the finest industrial Negroes were 
members of NAACP. And people who were afraid, they thought, of it, well, I was able to 
get them.”35 
Adair struggled against Jim Crow, from mundane indignities in downtown 
department stores to discrimination at the Municipal Airport. After several women told her 
that they were disallowed from trying on hats, girdles, and other garments in downtown 
clothing stores like Sakowitz’s, at the corner of Main and Dallas streets, Adair decided to 
“go try it out myself to see if this is really fact.” For such excursions, she practiced taking a 
witness who could testify to explicit declarations of discrimination. They would attest, 
among other indignities that sales clerks would prevent black women from sitting in the 
vanities and trying on hats; instead they would model the hats on themselves for black 
customers. She forced the issue at Sakowitz when she went in to try on a girdle. Store 
personnel attempted to force her into the alteration room when she asked to have the 
girdle fitted. She protested until she got a chance to speak with the manager, who told the 
employee to take Adair to a fitting room. Adair then pressed further. As the clerk walked 
away, Adair told her that she needed to stay to help Adair fit the girdle. “And she sort of 
fumbled with me, my body, and I know she felt like her little hands were being 
contaminated, but that’s what had to happen.” Adair tried on two more girdles with the 
woman’s help, and when she found one that fit well, despite not needing a girdle, she paid 
the $29 for it.36 This was a small political victory. 
Adair’s work also extended to “‘big p’ politics.”37 After black Texans secured the 
right to vote following the Supreme Court’s decision to outlaw the white primary in Smith v. 
Allwright (1944), Adair and her peers became concerned with voter fraud and organized the 
Harris County Democrats (HCD) in response.38 Conservative white Democrats and 
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Republicans were buying the votes of “the gullible Negro and the ignorant Negro, the 
illiterate Negro, anybody that was weak enough to listen or afraid of something” with cash 
payouts and alcohol. M. L. Ward, a “perfectly ordinary man,” but president of his local civic 
club, Frankie Carter Randolph, a prominent member of the League of Women Voters, and 
attorney J. Edwin Smith and his wife Virginia, among others, became vocally concerned with 
this impropriety, and approached the Houston NAACP about rectifying it. After meeting 
with other black Houstonians for several nights, Adair’s new team of concerned citizens had 
a plan of action for disrupting the pattern of voter fraud, but they also understood they 
needed white allies. “At that time,” Adair recalled, “Negroes and white people couldn’t 
meet in public places together,” but the circumstances demanded an interracial assault. 
Allowed to meet in a local communication workers’ union hall, Adair held what she 
remembered was “the very first integrated meeting of people” in Houston. This kind of 
interracial cooperation would become more common in the 1950s. Adair said, “It was just 
like a League of Nations, because we went out and got the Mexicans and everybody else to 
come to the meeting.” That night, HCD was founded. “The chairman was a white man, the 
vice-chairman was a Negro woman, the secretary was a Negro woman, the assistant 
secretary was white, and on like that,” Adair explained. “It was just so mixed up so that 
they’d know nobody was left out.” She believed that HCD “did more for race relations, in 
promoting it in this county, than anything, including NAACP.” Together they learned how 
to build interracial coalitions of voters, how to shape issues that would resonate across 
racial divides, and how to secure wins for the local Democrat party.39 
The Harris County Council of Organizations (HCCO) became a major supporter of 
HCD, using its own infrastructure and connections in black Houston communities to 
bolster participation in HCD’s efforts. Adair’s prominence in the National Association of 
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Colored Women (NACW) also increased the HCD’s political leverage. She remembered, “I 
could sit down and send a letter out to women all over the state and say this is the decision 
that the women of Harris County Democrats and the Council of Organizations people have 
made and we solicit your support for this candidate or this issue. And we got it.”40 
In her capacity as executive secretary of the NAACP, as well as through her 
engagement with the HCD and HCCO, Adair became involved in the desegregation of 
Houston Municipal Airport (now William P. Hobby Airport). In 1951, Adair learned that the 
city of Houston was attempting to obtain financial support from the Civil Aeronautics 
Authority (CAA) to expand the airport, but that officials planned on continuing to mandate 
segregated accommodations, despite restrictions against the use of federal funds for Jim 
Crow facilities.41 Among other limitations on their freedom of movement, black folks (and 
non-black, dark skinned folks who were seen as “Negroes”) at the airport were not allowed 
to sit in the open waiting room, they had to crowd among four benches that were pulled 
together to form a tiny square, they could not approach counters to buy a beverage, if they 
wanted to buy food they had to go to the kitchen door and have their food handed to them 
from kitchen staff, and they had to eat their food at tables that faced their segregated 
restrooms. The city further insulted black travelers by banning their arrival or departure 
from the airport in limousines, allowing them only to be ferried by black taxi cabs.42 
Adair learned that “no one had been sent from the Washington Bureau to make 
protest or to find out what the existing conditions are at the airport affecting Negro 
travelers.”43 In her first major project as executive secretary, she began documenting the 
abuses at the airport.  One high profile case included Mary McLeod Bethune’s refusal to sit 
in the “Negro” section, raising the ire of airport officials and creating a standoff. Another 
case involved military personnel who, upon landing in Houston, were told they could not 
107 
 
 
mingle interracially. “Usually,” Adair said, white military men and women would stand in 
solidarity with their black compatriots and protest the unequal treatment. Adair sent 
photographers for each such incident, documented the events, and turned over the 
information to the NAACP’s legal department, which then shared its evidence of racial 
discrimination with the CAA.44  
When representatives of the Aeronautics Commission presented the City Council 
with copies of correspondence between the NAACP and the Council, and letters between 
the NAACP and the Aeronautics Commission, and informed the Council that federal funds 
could not be used to on a segregated airport, “The man who finally became the mayor of 
Houston [in 1964], Louie Welch…. Got up and said, ‘We don’t need their money. We’ll 
build an airport. We’ll float a bond and build an airport like we want it.’” The CAA rejected 
Houston’s request for federal funds and the city floated a bond issue on the election ballot. 
Houstonians rejected the bond and halted the modernization of the airport. Progress was 
finally possible when Houstonians elected Roy Hofheinz mayor in 1953, helping him beat out 
Welch, then a city councilperson, and incumbent Oscar Holcombe. Under pressure from 
Adair, Hofheinz mandated that the airport remove all of its Jim Crow signs and change its 
customs, making it eligible for federal funds. The new mayor gladly accepted the cash so that 
the city “could have a better and bigger airport.”45 
Hofheinz also worked with Adair and the NAACP on desegregating public 
transportation. Together, the mayor’s office, the Pioneer Bus Company, the Houston 
Transit Company, and the NAACP held “two or three conferences,” after which the mayor 
instructed the Chief of Police to inform his officers that they were not authorized to “get 
on a bus to transact or decide anything pertaining between passengers and drivers until” the 
chief and the mayor were personally informed that there was an incident. Moreover, the 
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owner of the bus company instructed employees to avoid disputes with passengers and told 
them it was not their job to bother police officers “unless we send them to you.” These 
changes happened with relative calm; Adair remembered only one incident of racial 
antagonism afterwards “because a white boy had set upon in the Pioneer area to just kind of 
heckle Negro passengers and heckled a hat pin into himself by heckling a Negro girl, but it 
didn’t even reach the courts. They didn’t make a case out of it.” For her work in 
desegregating the city, many later celebrated her as the “Rosa Parks of Houston.”46 
Adair’s fight for racial justice in Houston was shaped by her gendered sense of 
responsibility toward the race and was also guided by her understanding of black citizens as 
the avatars of “America”—the nation and the idea. Near the end of her tenure with the 
NAACP, she addressed a public letter to fellow Houstonian, Mrs. G. McDonald, who lived 
on the southern edge of the growing Texas Medical Center. McDonald had written to the 
Post, accusing the NAACP of being “trouble makers” influenced by outside agitators. Adair 
lambasted McDonald for her discursive choices, particularly for “still talking slavery time 
language” by referring to black Texans as “our colored folks.” Adair assured McDonald that 
white people no longer owned “colored” chattel. She argued that the NAACP, far from 
degrading American society, was advancing it, compelling American democracy to more 
closely approximate its promise rather than its tradition.47 The question for Adair was not 
whether black folk could prove their worth, but: 
...if the white people in question are civilized enough to know that Negroes are 
human beings and that they have been in America as long as the white man has and 
that under the weight of cruel and most difficult conditions they have used every 
opportunity toward advancement, and that they do deserve their rights in the 
country that they have helped to make and build.48 
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Adair’s harshest rebuke of McDonald came in the letter’s closing, telling McDonald it was a 
“reflection on [her] intelligence not to know the difference” between “trouble makers” and 
the NAACP. Adair’s patience had worn thin.49 
Adair’s letter did not go unnoticed. Mrs. A. McFarland, a white woman living in 
Oletha Texas, a rural town about equidistant between Houston and Dallas, wrote directly 
to Adair’s office at the NAACP, calling the executive secretary’s letter to McDonald a 
“verbal assault.” She accused Adair of revealing her own “ignorance” and told her to read 
“the U. S. History” to learn the truth about how “the white man” had arrived on North 
American shores before “the negro.” McFarland reprimanded Adair for being too sensitive, 
saying that “our colored people” was not a claim to possession, and that racial agitators like 
Adair were “looking for slights where none was intended.” McFarland felt confident that the 
“race pride” of “colored people” was a farce, and believed their wish for integration was 
proof of their own sense of inferiority: “If the colored people… feel that they are the equal 
of the whites, why,” she asked, “do the[y] try to force themselves on the whites?”50 
Adair responded to McFarland in kind. She asserted her knowledge of U. S. History, 
noting that the slave ship “Desire” arrived more-or-less with “the Pilgrim Fathers” of the 
Mayflower, bringing “livestock, household goods and other belongings, among which were 
the Negroes.”51 Adair also spent a few sentences educating McFarland on how white 
Christians developed race as an ideology to justify slavery despite widely-held religious 
beliefs about the incompatibility of continued enslavement after conversion and baptism. 
Adair then went for the jugular, attacking McFarland’s notion that Negroes “should spend 
more time and money to improve… morally.” Certainly remembering the experiences of 
her own grandmother, who bore the child of a white man, she asked McFarland how well 
she knew the moral depravity of white southerners: “Do you know that the white men who 
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were slave holders… left their wives’ bedrooms, went to the slaves quarters, ran the Negro 
men from their beds and their wives and there would spend as much time with her as he 
desired, many times he left his offsprings right there?” If McFarland opposed desegregation, 
perhaps she did not recognize that “all this,” by which Adair meant the sexual assault of 
black women, “was forced integration.” Taking the opportunity to attack white supremacist 
revisionist history, Adair suggested that McFarland seek out the Daughters of the American 
Republic and ask them to let her “read some of the history books which they have not 
altered, or torn pages from.” Finally, Adair asserted that the United States was every black 
Americans’ “home land,” and that her own political mission was not to be offended by white 
intransigence, but to teach women like McFarland “the true worth of womanhood,” which 
hinged on “justice, understanding, [and] tolerance.”52 
Refusing to accept McFarland’s characterization of black Americans’ civil rights 
demands as a kind of encroachment on and veneration of whiteness, Adair publicly argued 
that the claims black Americans had been making for equal treatment for centuries was 
perhaps the most American claim any group had ever made in the nation’s history, given the 
omnipresent scourge of white supremacy. She noted that it was both an act of respect and 
courage when “Negro Americans” continued the legacy of freedpeople, who had fought for 
their own emancipation, by demanding “more freedom… from the cruel monster of racial 
discrimination and segregation.” She assured readers of the Houston Post that black civil 
rights activists in Houston and across the country had “pooled their efforts, their finances, 
their ability, their prayers, their determination, and their loyalty to America” to “eliminate” 
racial inequality in the United States.53 
In addition to her subscription to the values of American democracy and liberty, 
Adair’s vision of a Houston and an America free of the “tyranny” of racialization was stirred 
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by her moral, social, political, and economic concerns as a woman, such that her polemics 
regarding racism were always refracted through a gendered prism. She felt that “the most 
beautiful thing that can happen to a woman” was to be a wife and a mother, and though she 
did not have children of her own, her life’s work had always been stimulated by a 
compulsion to teach and care for the generation that followed her. So, she entered into her 
dialogue with McFarland with much the same concerns that had animated her work as a 
Sunday school teacher, as a suffragist, as a member of the Mothers Club, and as a civil rights 
leader in Houston.  
As a woman, Adair demanded empathy from McFarland. She addressed her as 
“sister,” making a claim to the equality of their womanhood. She appealed to McFarland’s 
sense of moral respectability, placing contemporary black suffering in the context, not only 
of the bold-faced discriminations that black folks faced in the twentieth century, but also of 
the “wicked” degradations enslaved black grandmothers experienced at the whims of men 
that they surely “hated.” She called on McFarland to join in solidarity with her, as a woman 
and as a Christian, to move beyond the crimination of black folks’ morality, arguing that any 
perceived moral depravity among them was a consequence of the limits placed on their 
upward mobility by white supremacy. Instead, she demanded that her “sister” understand 
the fundamental equality of all people.54 
Adair’s rhetorical choices revealed how insistent she had to be in order to stake her 
claim as both human and woman. She reflected on the ways not only her humanity, but also 
her womanliness within humanity, had been disrupted by racism. Later, when asked about 
her avoidance of the term “black,” she responded, “I will never, never, never accept the 
word as a black woman. I don’t want anybody calling me a black.” Instead, she insisted that 
she was a “Negro-American.” Adair clarified what appears, out of context, to be a 
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contradiction. For semantic reasons, she protested that folks who were called “black” in 
America were anything of the sort—having a wide range of skin colors that reflected their 
varied ancestries. But more importantly, she argued, “black” was the device through which 
white Americans had managed to strip people of color of their Americanness. It othered 
them. It was inscribed on Jim Crow signs that limited where they could sit, eat, and play. It 
was the color minstrel performers used to “ridicule” Negroes. The color, beautiful “when 
it’s applied where it belongs,” was, in the American context in which Adair grew up and 
worked, a dehumanizing moniker. Adair saw herself as a champion for the nation and for 
the “Negro race,” which she believed encompassed a variety of peoples: “some white ones, 
some yellow ones, some brown ones, some red ones, some all colors would be in there and 
yet they would be Negroes.” As a Negro, she proved “to be a credit to humanity and to 
[her] nation,” and “the color of my skin,” she said, “has nothing to do with it.” The 
ascription of blackness to her social status by white folks compelled Adair to reject 
discourses rooted in recognizing color as a legitimate basis for difference, and in doing so, 
she worked to protect her identity as an American woman. Color, she learned when it 
came time to vote in the 1920s with white women, placed a disturbing strain on her 
capacity to be treated, fully, as an individual American with all her attendant rights. She 
rejected color, and thereby, sculpted a political vision where color-awareness encouraged 
interracial cooperation in civil rights struggles. Her efforts to salvage the liberal individual 
subject from America’s caste system demonstrated the challenge of hoping for a “color 
blind” future in a present where color determined so much. Given their historical 
inheritance, “Negroes” could not be judged by people like McFarland on the basis of some 
arbitrary or allegedly universal moral scale. And yet, ultimately, Adair hoped, one day they 
could be.  
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Lastly, Adair worked out this color-rejecting vision in Houston. She lauded her 
adopted home as a special place. Its generally calm response following the desegregation of 
the airport and library compelled her to reflect positively on the city’s capacity for racial 
progress. Houston, on the border of the South and the West, situated in Texas, but a 
coastal city with a robust economy, was perhaps Jim Crow lite. Black visitors, the black 
press, and Adair herself made note of how refreshingly calm, even if still demoralizing, the 
race relations in the city were: “I think Houston had less trouble with solving its problem in 
changing over from one custom to another than any city I know.”55 She had managed to 
build interracial coalitions and develop relationships with white city leaders that worked to 
tear down some of what Jim and Jane Crow had built. Houston, though it moved slowly 
toward her vision, had proven to Adair that what she imagined was not only possible, but 
that it could be obtained, peacefully, through interracial cooperation. However, though 
black Houstonians could appreciate the progress they were making in the middle of the 
century, these optimists would have to square off, constantly, against an intransigent white 
supremacy.  
 
egroes not wanted.” If a sign that explicit had been on the door of 
Lockwood Inn, Carter Wesley could have avoided standing in the 
kitchen of this barbeque house in Houston’s Fifth Ward, wondering 
how and why he had become Langston Hughes’ “darker brother” in a black-owned 
establishment. In January 1953 he penned his reaction to this disgraceful “facet” of Jim 
Crow: “segregation by Negroes of Negroes.” Wesley’s wife, Doris, was not in the mood to 
prepare dinner that evening, so she called her husband and asked him to stop by Lockwood 
Inn for some ribs. He obliged, even though he “knew the Lockwood Inn was a barbecue 
“N 
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house that catered primarily to white [people].” He, therefore, “never thought of 
patronizing it.” While the black-owned Kozy Kitchen across the street at 1101 Lockwood 
Drive attracted a mostly black clientele and customers looking for brisket, Lockwood Inn 
attracted “white office workers in shirts and ties” and patrons ready for ribs. As he walked 
up to the entrance, a white couple held the door open for him, and as he approached the 
counter, an older white man made room for him. Things were quite civil that day in 
“Heavenly Houston.” The clerk whom Wesley now stood in front of at the counter 
continued about his business, seemingly uninterested in the newly-arrived customer. Soon 
the tall and rotund manager of the restaurant approached Wesley and asked him, “Will you 
move around here?” Wesley complied, moving around the counter’s corner. Soon enough, 
another employee approached Wesley and requested that he “stand in there”—the kitchen. 
This humiliating relocation caught the attention of a white family who discussed the 
predicament in earshot and made Wesley wonder: was their analysis correct? Were these 
Negroes really maneuvering black patrons away from white ones? Once in the kitchen, he 
was again relocated to a table further away from the front of the house. Somewhere in the 
confusion, the manager finally took his order, but by now the pattern of service was clear: 
white customers were seated and served first in this black-owned business. Wesley spared 
no words for the manager, locking him in his “Ram’s Horn”—the name of his editorial 
column in the Informer—and calling him “a little, timid, cowardly man” who dishonored his 
children, his community, Christianity, and the Constitution because he was “afraid to be a 
man.” Wesley exited the back door of the establishment, telling the waiter who asked if he 
wanted his order, in so many words, that Jim Crow barbeque just was not appetizing. After 
Doris heard the story she told her husband she was “glad” he left the Lockwood Inn behind 
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with his manhood intact. She went into the kitchen, fried him a dozen oysters, and prepared 
for him a feast.56 
Wesley’s commentary about the Lockwood Inn owner exemplified Wesley’s 
editorial decisions in the middle of the century. As editor, he constructed a coherent 
narrative that linked, in one broad emancipatory project, school desegregation, fair 
employment and housing, electoral rights, access to public services, physical and sexual 
protection of black women, decriminalization of “the Negro,” and accountability for police 
abuses of power. This project derided cowardice and valorized manliness and individualism 
(and manhood as individualism).57 Ultimately, Wesley’s vision was of a color-rejecting 
Houston, where men, whether in restaurants, courtrooms, or on the real estate market, 
would be treated rationally, as individuals. In his here and now, however, Wesley was a 
pragmatist who believed racial identity politics were necessary in the civil rights struggle. 
Like Adair’s vision, Wesley’s was structured by his belief in the American mythology of 
rugged individualism and democratic equality, as well as the hope Houston in particular 
seemed to offer for a color-rejecting future. Additionally, Wesley’s gendered identity 
affected what he imagined was possible in his own moment, but also what he perceived 
might be possible in the future in terms of the eradication of race as a salient social 
category. As a man he had to be “rational,” but his sense of what could be rational was 
constrained by his social location in Houston and his faith in liberal philosophy. 
Wesley’s color-rejecting vision for Houston and America was also an effort to 
preserve his gendered sense of self, which had been dismissed and ridiculed at the 
Lockwood. Similar to the ways Adair opposed the discounting of her womanhood, Wesley 
despised the ways that race could strip him of his individuality, and hence his manhood. His 
vision of a “color-blind” democracy was informed by his gendered understanding of himself 
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and of what it meant to be a black man in segregated America. Fundamentally, Wesley’s 
sense of manly obligation to “the race” was defined, not in opposition to womanhood, but 
rather in opposition to the demands of white supremacy. It was characterized by 
commitments to what Wesley viewed as courage, rationality, and individualism. 
Thus, in his commentary about the events at Lockwood Inn, his most biting critiques 
against the owner center on manhood. Wesley castigated the “cowardliness” of the owner. 
The owner’s use of Jim Crow customs in his restaurant allowed him to pursue economic 
independence and providing for his family, sure. However, Wesley did not view this as 
acceptably manly enough, arguing that a man should not just take care of his wife and 
children financially, but should “provide honor for his family… [and] live honorably and with 
integrity in the community.” Living with integrity meant “honor[ing] the principles of 
Christianity, the principles of the Constitution, and the general Golden Rule of good will 
toward ALL men.” The owner of the Lockwood Inn apparently had a different 
understanding of his duties toward his family and community, and this was not an acceptable 
manifestation of manhood—a dereliction of masculine duty, even—for Wesley.58  
Wesley’s demand for racial collectivism did not contradict his commitment to liberal 
individualist ideology. For him, the circumstance of Jim Crow defined what was presently 
rational, producing exigencies that could change over time. In one of the closing issues of 
the Informer’s run in 1953 he explained this position as the South debated the future of 
public school segregation ahead of the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of 
Education the following year. At the time, Governors Hugh White of Mississippi and Jimmy 
Byrnes of South Carolina and Senator James Eastland of Mississippi were publicly discussing 
(and disagreeing about) a plan of action for keeping schools segregated if the Supreme 
Court ruled Jim Crow educational facilities unconstitutional. Foundationally, they agreed 
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that such a decision would be federal interposition on a states’ rights issue. Wesley, a 
trained attorney, wrote, “I don’t know what states’ rights means legally…. The state has no 
right to discriminate against Negroes or to put any restriction on Negroes’ privileges or 
ability to go where they want…. No state has the right, under the Constitution, to make 
any distinction based on color.”59 For him, Constitutional principles made legal recognition 
of race verboten.  Thus the editorialists of the Informer wrote in commemoration of 
Thanksgiving 1953: “An era is dying and a new era is slowly coming to life for the era of 
repression of Negroes is on the way out and one of raceless equality is certainly being born 
before the eyes of all who have eyes to see.”60 The editorialists claimed, that this vision of 
democracy was “at the core of the perennial Negro agitation and complaint.” They 
continued, “It is the beginning, and the end, of the Negro struggle. Once it is recognized and 
met without subterfuge or reservation, or unworthy and unchristian rationalization…. Then 
will the Negro struggle dissolve. This ‘Negro goal’ is essentially an American goal.” But if 
Americanism and democracy were laudable, it was only because the two were equated with 
individualism. The editorialists concluded: “It [the ‘Negro goal’] is squarely in line with 
American political and social philosophy as outlined in the constitution of the United States” 
wherein “race is not a factor in citizenship” and the “rights of citizens and individuals” was 
stressed.61 
Wesley himself could not divorce American democracy from individualism. On 
November 7, 1953, he reported that he had started re-reading W. E. B. Du Bois’s Souls of 
Black Folk. He praised the preeminent American sociologist and reminisced on his 
experiences in college when he and his peers debated over the political philosophies of Du 
Bois and Booker T. Washington. Wesley said that Du Bois’s “courageous” writing and 
political stance “proved prescient” and impressed upon his subscribers to read it. The 
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remarkable failure of American capitalism that resulted in the Great Depression, coupled 
with consistent legal disappointments on civil rights questions, compelled Du Bois to 
recalibrate his politics toward scientific socialism.62 Wesley expressed confusion, 
disappointment, and “disgust” at the idea that Du Bois was turning “Red.” The only way he 
could rationalize Du Bois’s apparent swing to the left was in “imagin[ing] that he dares to 
support some of these crazy movements because he has the courage to deliberately want to 
embarrass the government in its practices of discrimination.” Wesley could not imagine that 
Du Bois’ prolific writing, with its strong democratic vision, could come from a man that 
could “ever really be a Communist.”63 For Wesley and many Americans during the Cold 
War, any conceptualization of society that failed to center the individual as the atom in 
which the rights of “Man” inhered was undemocratic and un-American.64 Thus, the eventual 
solution to social sicknesses caused by racism was the veneration of the individual and the 
eventual deconstruction of collectivist solidarities. This state of reality would, of course, be 
raceless. 
Wesley’s desire to see a future wherein color did not determine a person’s life 
chances existed in tandem with his presentist commitment to racial identity politics. Wesley 
valued the individual as the central unit of society, which could have potentially been at odds 
with his calls for racial solidarity, especially when it came to economics. Though Wesley was 
not a separatist, the Informer frequently implored blacks to “‘buy Negro,’ even at the 
expense of sacrifice on your part.”65 However, this was not an appeal to racial solidarity for 
its own sake. The editorialists noted: 
The Negro individual owes it to himself… to support Negro effort whenever he 
can. He owes it to himself to ‘buy Negro’ as often as possible, and even to go out of 
his way to do so.... This is not an appeal to prejudice. It is an appeal to reason. On 
the basis of prejudice Negro businessmen are not entitled to preferential treatment 
from Negroes since prejudice itself is wrong. On the basis of reason they are 
entitled to such treatment, and should be given it as often as possible.66 
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The individual’s stake in patronizing a black-owned business was that “every rich, every 
powerful Negro individual is an asset to the entire group.”67 Of course at least some of the 
motivation on Wesley’s part could have been self-interest; buying Negro would mean 
supporting the Informer and the businesspeople who led its staff. But this logic had a long 
tradition and was perhaps most reminiscent of Booker T. Washington’s and Marcus 
Garvey’s, especially when the editorialists wrote: “It seems doubtful that Negroes as a 
group can ever achieve full non-racial acceptance as long as they remain an impoverished, 
poverty-stricken group.” Thus, what appeared to be racial chauvinism, the editorialists 
claimed, was actually “realistic” and essential. Moreover, “prejudice,” by which they 
appeared to mean discrimination on the basis of race, was inherently anti-American because 
race itself was an undemocratic construct. However, insofar as race existed and actually 
oppressed peoples, these groups could create networks of solidarity. The end goal, though, 
was not to help “the race” in perpetuity as an essentialist collective. Rather, Wesley and his 
team hoped to see black people become individuals. Thus, the Informer resolved the tension 
between individualism and collectivism by arguing that solidarity functioned to correct 
existing discriminations and was necessary only insofar as Americans discriminated against 
each other on the basis of race. Visions of a color-rejecting future, then, did not compel 
black Houstonians to be color-unaware in the present. This was “realistic,” rational, and 
pragmatic.68 
 In the 1940s, Wesley reasoned that civil rights leaders’ best bet for making gains was 
to “avoid an ‘open attack’” on Jim Crow in order to prevent white backlash. He argued that 
black anger and impatience would spark recalcitrance in white liberals and “the white 
establishment.”69 Throughout the early 1940s he literally bought into the NAACP Legal 
Defense Fund’s (established in 1940 by attorney Thurgood Marshall) work as one of three 
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major funders of the group’s eventual and successful challenge to the Democratic White 
Primary in Texas—Smith v. Allwright (1944).70 This type of work was congruous with 
Wesley’s philosophy in the 1940s; he advocated gently chipping away at Jim Crow with 
calculated moves to secure the inclusion of the individual—in his case, the Negro 
individual—into the American body politic, where said individual would be able to employ 
democratic means to ensure that all of ze’s rights were protected. Wesley “hammered away 
repeatedly and insistently on the same theme,” historian John Egerton notes. That theme 
was an unwavering desire for black people to have “a role—in combat, in the workplace, in 
the national scheme of things.”71 
Though he had been pivotal to Smith v. Allwright, arguing with fellow attorney James 
Nabrit in the initial cases, and although he was publicly and financially supportive as the Legal 
Defense Fund argued Sweatt v. Painter (1950), Wesley’s formal relationship with the 
organization ended in 1947 when he quit the NAACP.72 When Texas legislators attempted 
to avoid admitting Heman Sweatt into the University of Texas School of Law by creating 
Texas State University for Negroes (TSUN, now Texas Southern University), Wesley 
appeared titillated at the idea of such an institution being at the disposal of black law 
students and the black Texas community writ large. However this did not proscribe nor 
was it an obstacle to integration in his view. In a letter to Marshall, Wesley explained his 
concern that the “chances are 90 to 10 that the Sweatt case will be moot before you can 
get to the Supreme Court,” and argued that, if the case did fail, Texas’s black population 
would nevertheless benefit from a well-funded, well-resourced school until a new 
desegregation effort could be taken up. For Marshall, however, TSUN would be just another 
Jim Crow institution.73 
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A disagreement in approach and predicted outcome sparked this rift. Charles 
Hamilton Houston and Thurgood Marshall had adopted Nathan Margold’s strategy to attack 
segregated schools by forcing southern districts to honor Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) and 
equalize school funding and teacher pay, thereby making racially separate schools fiscally 
unfeasible. This was Margold’s “end-run on segregation.”74 Wesley, however, did not see 
this as a tenable plan for public education in general, and argued that the struggle for 
equalization of funds for black schools should be distinct from the battle against segregation. 
He attacked both Marshall and Lulu B. White, director of the NAACP’s Texas branches at 
the time. He believed that black Americans who had to presently survive in a Jim Crow 
system could not afford to have all their legal resources thrown into a fight for 
desegregation, writing, “[I]nasmuch as we are separated, we should demand our right to 
equality.”75 
Certainly, Marshall and White were not against equalized funding and surely Wesley 
was not a proponent of segregation. However, where Wesley saw a feasible end—fair 
distribution of financial resources among schools of all racial groups—Marshall and the 
Defense Fund eventually wanted to see all of Plessy dismantled. The NAACP had legitimate 
concerns about how long it could sustain these localized court battles on limited funding. 
And by and by, the Legal Defense Fund was not simply trying to secure equal money for 
black schools; it was laying out a historical record of unequal funding to prove that separate 
had been unequal and that there was no good faith in Jim Crow. The rift between White 
and Marshall with Wesley grew, with Wesley printing some of his harshest critiques of the 
two in the Informer. Wesley defended his anger against the NAACP, saying he was not upset 
because Marshall and White disagreed with him but because they “accused him of 
supporting segregated schools.”76 Marshall equated Wesley’s thoughts, quite unfavorably, 
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with Booker T. Washington’s, condemning Wesley for accommodating white prejudice and 
being satisfied with “Jim Crow Deluxe”—what Marshall called “the easy way out.”77 
Wesley was not alone in his dissatisfaction with the Margold Strategy. Black 
Americans were deeply conflicted on whether equal funding or desegregation should be 
their immediate goal.78 Walter Vaught of Dallas, one of Wesley’s readers, sent a letter to 
the Informer, quite disturbed by the push for integration, writing, “If Southern white [people] 
are so mean, why do we try to associate with them?... We ought to stick together and build 
an empire of our own.”79 However, Wesley was not a separatist; his advocacy for separate 
institutions of professional learning, for example, was carefully qualified and contextualized.  
Neither Wesley, White, nor Marshall were opposed to desegregation as the 
ultimate outcome of the civil rights litigation that was moving through the courts in the 
1940s. However, Wesley, the self-described realist, was intent on pressing Marshall and the 
Defense Fund to not place all of its eggs in the integration basket, for not only was the 
outcome unsure, but also the Defense Fund’s national perspective did not duly account, he 
believed, for local particularities. The result could be unfavorable in the courts and the fight 
itself, if waged incorrectly, raised the ire of sympathetic white people. However, the 
NAACP had not come to its strategy for desegregation overnight. It was not until after the 
Second World War that the nation’s courts and inhabitants appeared ready to acknowledge 
the unfeasibility of separately and equally funded schools for white and black Americans. The 
victory in Marshall’s first major case, Pearson v. Murray (1936), forced the University of 
Maryland School of Law to desegregate after Margold’s strategy of using the equal 
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to challenge segregation proved successful.  
With the Margold Strategy in tow, Marshall envisioned the toppling of Jim Crow in 
education, for separate was “inevitably” unequal and therefore forever vulnerable to legal 
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attack. However, the NAACP also understood that it could not fund equalization suits 
across the country in perpetuity, and in 1952 determined that it should focus its energy and 
funds on overturning Plessy.80 The problem, then, was a misunderstanding that descended 
into ad hominem attacks exchanged in a series of private letters throughout the late 1940s. 
Wesley was not reticently accepting an “easy way out” and Marshall was not, as Wesley 
claimed, failing black communities and institutions by refusing to proliferate more 
equalization of funding suits.81 They both imagined themselves realists. Wesley recognized 
that schools as they existed still needed funding because the fight for integration, in his 
estimation, would be a protracted one. Marshall understood the financial and personnel 
situations the Defense Fund had to contend with and knew that funding equalization cases 
across the breadth of the Jim Crow South would simply be impracticable.82 
Whatever he lacked in knowledge about the financial straits of the Legal Defense 
Fund, Wesley knew much more about the immediate concerns of black schools in Houston. 
Even after the NAACP won Heman Sweatt’s case in 1950, in February 1953 the Informer 
reported that “the school administration knows about ‘horrible’ conditions existing in our 
schools.” The schools were “improperly” heated and drained, too many students were 
being assigned to classrooms built for a smaller student body, the desks were “worn out,” 
and the “sanitary conditions” of the buildings were deemed “insufficient.” The Informer 
noted that Sid Hilliard, representative of the Harris County Council of Organizations 
(HCCO), implored the HISD school board at its February 23rd meeting to give black 
schools a fairer share of the recently passed $10 million bond. He notified the board that 
lawsuits were being brought against it for persistent negligence regarding its duty to ensure 
that Houston’s segregated schools were equally funded.83 An editorial in the Informer 
praised HCCO and Hilliard for “sustained interest” in equalization as a “corrective 
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measure.” The column also admired that Hilliard made his statements in a public forum and 
“not behind closed doors where ‘deals’ can be made.” Hilliard’s approach was direct, but 
civil. It was reasonable and therefore the appropriate “American way” to force the board 
address the “school needs of Negroes.”84 
The HCCO and Hilliard continued their struggle into April. They offered the board 
until September to show considerable progress in fixing “Houston’s horrible schools.” 
Hilliard noted, “Our protest earlier this year was a conscientious effort to make school 
officials take note of these conditions and do something about them.” The school business 
manager assured the Informer that repairs were being made and Hilliard promised that the 
HCCO would re-inspect the schools for themselves to guarantee that there was proper 
heating, improved restrooms, better drainage, and sanitary cafeterias.85 When school began 
again in September, the Director of Colored Schools, Allen E. Norton, had received a 
“’new’ administration office” at an old school that had been condemned ten years prior “as 
a hazard to life and health by the Fire Department.” The Informer inspected the building and 
found “partitions” made out of a “heavy type of cardboard and wood type,” to divide spaces 
in the building. The floor remained unfinished and “the women’s toilet,” the paper reported, 
“shows its age through a coating of paint and the flimsy doors and walls which separate the 
stalls.”86  
The actual schools were in shabby condition as well. “The Houston Public Schools 
opened this week to enroll the largest number of students in the history of the community,” 
read an editorial. “Numbers, however, was not the really big news of the week. The big 
news was need.” A lack of space, both in classrooms and in outside play areas—areas that 
were quickly disappearing to make way for temporary structures to house more 
classrooms—exacerbated the challenges that black citizens faced in their unequal schools 
125 
 
 
the previous year. Large class sizes, the editorialist explained, “reduced teacher 
effectiveness” and stole some “value of the school program” away from “the individual 
student.”87 And though the Informer guessed that black parents would be willing to pay 
higher taxes in order to have their needs met, by November the paper read, “Negro voters 
would be more than foolish to increase the district’s tax take without some assurance that 
the inequality presently existing between Negro and white educational… facilities in the 
district will be speedily corrected.”88 They encouraged black voters to vote against the 
school board’s proposition for more funding until they were guaranteed a fair share of the 
pot.89 
The year of 1954 did not bring much improvement for black schools either. On the 
tenth of March the Informer reported that, “Half of the high first class at Crawford 
Elementary School was wiped out Wednesday [at] noon when a dilapidated ceiling of 
concrete plaster crashed on the floor.” The school was located in Fifth Ward on Jensen 
Drive. The Informer quickly noted a “correction” to the original story, saying, “The above 
paragraph did not occur. But it could have. Actually this is what happened. 37 pupils at 
Crawford escaped injuries by only a few minutes… concrete plaster and [the] steel wire 
ceiling of their classroom crashed five minutes before the 1st graders were scheduled to 
return from lunch Wednesday.” The brick building was twenty years old, unmaintained, and 
was being used to “absorb the pupils of Dunbar Elementary,” which had been demolished to 
make way for the new Eastex Freeway.90 
The Informer reported that parents were outraged and inundated the offices of the 
paper with phone calls expressing their grief and anxiety. One father, Archie Stevens, called 
to say, “I had a look at the room this morning. It was a mess. Now something ought to be 
done about this terrible thing.” The teacher, Thelma D. Thomas, reported that she had 
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noticed cracks in the ceiling but didn’t realize there was a structural risk because other 
classrooms were in similar condition. Her classroom, she claimed, had been “repaired” the 
previous year, probably as a result of Hilliard and the HCCO’s pressures on the school 
board and business manager, but apparently the promised improvements were not as 
thorough as they needed to be. Thomas said it must have been luck that spared her and the 
students; if it had been a rainy day they would have all been under the ceiling when it 
collapsed.91 
This near-catastrophe inspired another call to action. Hilliard was joined by fellow 
HCCO leader George T. Nelson at the March 22nd board meeting to “remind the Board of 
the critical conditions that exist in Negro schools.” They and black community members 
“demanded HISD stop ‘trifling around’ with Negro school children and provide them better 
facilities.” The Monday night meeting began at 7:30 and lasted for six hours into early 
Tuesday morning. Hilliard proposed, as he had in the past, that the school board build a new 
high school on land offered by Lamar Fleming, a wealthy merchant, in Third Ward located 
on Wheeler and Sampson near Texas Southern University. Though white Houstonians 
protested the site for a black school, arguing that would depreciate their home values, 
Hilliard and the Informer noted that it was “Negro area” by any measure. The Informer noted 
that a new high school on the tract would sit adjacent to the nearly 600 units of the all-black 
Cuney Homes public housing project, the growing campus of Texas Southern University 
(TSU), and the “Negro YMCA.” Additionally, the “immediate vicinity” was populated by 
black-owned homes and businesses and the “handful” of white homes south of the 
proposed site were quickly being “enveloped” by majority-black blocks. Indeed, by 1960, 
those white homeowners left Third Ward, as did nearly 70 percent of the residents of the 
all-white Riverside Terrace neighborhood south of TSU (see Map 11).92 Meanwhile, Hilliard  
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Map 11 Racial make-up of blocks in Third Ward surrounding the Lamar Fleming Tract, labeled by average property 
values in 1950. The inset map shows that the Census tracts in 1960 by race and labeled with the total percent of each 
tract occupied by black residents. The white residents who lived on the three blocks south of the Fleming Tract left 
the area by the end of the decade. 
showed that despite white people’s claims about the effects of black people on property 
values, since this section of Third Ward had become predominantly occupied by black 
residents home prices had increased for some homes by nearly three times their original 
cost over the course of three decades. Hilliard also pointed out that the petition submitted 
to the board on behalf of white residents who opposed building a new high school on the 
Fleming tract had far too many signatures to have come from the sparse number of white  
residents still living in the area, where white residents occupied only 55 units and black 
residents 143 units.93 
The board refused Hilliard’s logic and instead moved forward with a plan to build a 
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high school at the location of Dodson Elementary School, a tract of only seven acres of land 
just a mile and a half north of the Fleming Estate. In the meantime, old schools that had 
formerly been used for white students would be turned over to the department for 
“Colored schools.” Wesley pointed out what he saw as the conspiratorial hands of a racist 
school board, saying that there was no discernible reason for the board to avoid purchasing 
the land that Fleming made available for purchase except that it wanted to use those funds 
for white schools. Wesley noted: “There is no mistaking the fact that the people are angry. 
Even the women, who are normally the ones who caution against getting angry, are aroused,  
meeting, talking over the telephone, and projecting plans to fight what they count as an 
insult as well as a threat of irreparable injury to the education of their children.” He pointed 
forward to the five school desegregation cases pending a decision by the Supreme Court 
and optimistically noted that “whatever the decision,” the Constitution of the State of Texas 
would not allow for such gross inequalities in school facilities to exist. The Houston school 
board was opening itself up for legal bombardment and a desegregation order, given “the 
architect’s report that seven acres are not adequate” and a clear history that no white high 
schools in the city of Houston had been built on a mere seven acres in over two decades. 
Wesley concluded, “Negroes will be justified in insisting upon being permitted to go to the 
nearest adequate high school.” The school board was just being unreasonable in Wesley’s 
assessment. Jack Yates High School had already been unaccredited for reasons related to 
overpopulation, and this new high school would suffer the same fate. A school built at the 
Dodson sight would therefore “be no good and it would be wasted money.”94  
An editorial column made clear that such conditions were untenable under Plessy, 
and explained, “If inequalities exist in the schools it is the fault of the board and of the 
boards that preceded the present one…. When Negroes begin to recognize this the 
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foundation of progress in schools will be laid.”95 The Informer repeatedly encouraged black 
Houstonians to attend the Monday night school board meetings and demand better 
educational facilities and fairer distribution of tax dollars for their children.96 Protest or not, 
the school board refused to reverse its decision to dismiss the Lamar Fleming tract as a 
possible site for the erection of a new high school in the Third Ward until several months 
after the Supreme Court ruled against Jim Crow schools. By then, their discussion was 
merely a belated effort to provide black students with better educational facilities as a show 
of good faith so that the district would be able to maintain its pattern of segregation for as 
long as possible.97  
Wesley remained committed to the “rational” as the fight against Jim Crow moved 
forward. Like with the Lockwood Inn owner, when it came to the equalization versus 
desegregation debate, Wesley also diminished Marshall as a coward and “a shallow-minded, 
conceited man.” He concluded that Marshall was a “stupid man” and a “damned ingrate.” It 
appeared to Wesley that Marshall was playing political games with the newspaper 
publisher’s reputation, while failing to make a clear case for why the NAACP’s decision to 
demean the establishment of TSUN was the best plan of action. He demanded that Marshall 
come clean on whether he believed Wesley truly supported Jim Crow schools. “Why in 
two hells won’t you discuss that issue…?” he wrote. “Make up your mind and stop jumping 
and skivering [slivering?] and being evasive.” When Marshall proved unwilling to answer the 
critiques of the confrontational Informer publisher when challenged in person, Wesley wrote 
to the NAACP that Marshall “was not man enough to admit” that he was wrong in his 
misrepresentation of Wesley’s efforts, and that in doing so Marshall had proven himself a 
“coward.” He repeated the same in a letter to Marshall, copying multiple local and national 
NAACP leaders.98 For his part, Marshall’s critique of Wesley in a personal letter offered a 
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candid assessment of Wesley’s folly and lack of foresight in the school desegregation cases, 
writing, “You are not only unwilling to see other people’s sides of a question, but are a little 
careless with the truth.”99 Though the Informer would later laud Marshall’s many 
accomplishments in 1954, in both equalization and desegregation cases, Wesley’s early spat 
with the attorney demonstrated that his sense of manhood and, related to that, gendered 
obligation to the race was defined by what he viewed as rationality and pragmatism.100 
After Brown v. Board of Education had been decided in May of 1954, Wesley 
maintained that Jim Crow would be dismantled and that a color-rejecting democracy was on 
the horizon for Houston, but that black folks had to understand that “easy does it” and that 
“it isn’t necessary to pull our hair out” over “bitter, dyed-in-the-wool segregationists” who 
were slowing, and in many cases preventing, desegregation efforts in Harris County and 
across Texas.101 In the Dallas Express, Wesley encouraged black Texans “to go slowly and be 
cautious in selecting targets for desegregation,” pointing to incidents in San Antonio where 
black youths had desegregated pools and the city had shut them down. Each stand against 
Jim Crow needed to be carefully calculated. Like the NAACP’s approach to desegregating 
graduate schools before undergraduate institutions and public schools for children, Wesley 
suggested desegregation in spaces that did not lend themselves to white supremacist tirades 
against the coming tide of “social equality.”102 That is, he encouraged black citizens to fight 
for integration in spaces that were not perceived as intimate, such as in public libraries, 
parks, and golf courses. Leaders “should refuse any public statement but quietly keep… 
talking with people who control the parks and golf links.”103 Pragmatically, Wesley 
maintained that whatever plan of action worked in dismantling Jim Crow was good, but that 
some strategies would be more effective than others. Ironically, however, his pragmatism in 
this case seemed at odds with the moral commitments that undergirded his critique against 
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the owner of the Lockwood Inn.104 The relatively “radical” and straightforward assault on 
segregation as practiced by Marshall or performed by the temporary integration of a 
swimming pool were neither useful nor desirable approaches. Slow, steady civility was 
Wesley’s mantra in the late 1940s and early 1950s. 
Nevertheless, Marshall’s comparison of Wesley to Booker T. Washington was 
strained. Though Washington and Wesley shared similar values of economic uplift, Wesley 
was a newspaper publisher with a sharp tongue who did not depend on white patronage. 
Therefore, he frequently failed to spare harsh words for black or white people who fell out 
of his favor. His public voice was an extension of his gendered sense of self, and where 
courageous manhood demanded confrontation, he did not work to appease white people’s 
sensibilities. Liberal individualism, in which Wesley remained heavily invested, and the public 
sphere, the space in which Wesley worked, were built on the idea that men found 
legitimacy, as individuals with inherent rights, because of their capacity to reason as public 
actors.105 So, while the owner of the Lockwood Inn had been a “coward” of a man, Wesley 
saw himself as being realistic—reasonable—and therefore a man. Of manliness he wrote, 
“Men today do not possess their own souls, they let fear take over… to find a safe spot to 
stand during the storm. I believe a man ought always be in possession of his own soul, and 
that the only way he can be is always willing to do whatever is necessary to stand for the 
right and never to get away from it.”106 He surely did not see himself as soul-less and adrift 
at sea, and certainly viewed his position on the equalization issue as the best calculation. For 
him, the “necessary” would be constrained by context, possibility, and usefulness. He 
demonstrated that masculinity is constructed discursively—that masculinity is “multiple” in 
its possible expressions and that it morphs in different social situations. Though he 
rhetorically only represented himself as one type of “man,” the evidence suggests otherwise. 
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His aggressive approach to dealing with Thurgood Marshall was incongruous with his 
hesitant approach in the push for civil rights.107 Wesley staked his claim as a man through 
rationality, and positioned himself in opposition to the kinds of manhood represented in 
Marshall’s aggressive legal strategy, which he believed was “in absolute conflict with the best 
interests of black Texans,” the Lockwood Inn owner’s “cowardice,” and the integrating 
swimmers’ errant efforts—all of which he maintained were irrational.108 His understandings 
of manliness, then, were tempered by what he understood as civil, contextually appropriate, 
realistic, and reasonable. 
But Houston changed rapidly during the 1950s, and Wesley was not so stubborn as 
to refuse on principle to adapt to the city’s evolution. This rational man could transform his 
politics as context demanded, and following the Brown win, Wesley shifted his political 
posture and caught some Houstonians off guard. In 1956, Mrs. J. Edwin Smith, at a political 
rally held at Pleasant Hill Baptist Church, condemned Wesley for refusing to meet with 
white liberals, and argued that while black Houston’s white allies had not changed, it seemed 
Wesley had. Wesley agreed with her, writing in the third person: “Carter Wesley has 
changed, and SO HAVE THE TIMES!” He argued that what “we fought against in 1948, 
1950, 1952, and 1954” were battles won, and that the new struggle—the post-Brown 
struggle—was no longer against the law and tradition of segregation, but against “the die-
hard traditional segregationists, who are defying the law and the weight of opinion from the 
better thinking leadership of our nation.” His “raceless” vision for Houston’s future was 
coming to fruition, he argued, and there was evidence on the city’s golf links, public buses, 
labor unions, church sermons, and even some residential neighborhoods. “I hold that we 
have moved from the foot of the mountain,” he wrote, “to the plateau upon which all the 
rest of the American citizens stand.” If Mrs. Smith and the city’s white liberals expected 
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Wesley’s cooperation, they had to accept that his politics adapted to circumstance even as 
he maintained his commitment to the color-rejecting vision.109  
Wesley’s sense of what was rational prior to Brown had proven wrong: the 
desegregation suits had been successful and equalization suits were no longer necessary. His 
post-Brown rationality would also prove limited, structured as it was by his faith in 
Houston’s penchant for progress and his commitment to liberal individualism. Only four 
years after Sweatt had been decided, the Supreme Court decided on the school 
desegregation cases and overturned the separate-but-equal principle in public education. 
Thurgood Marshall’s deployment of the Margold Strategy proved effective.110 Yet, despite 
the Supreme Court’s order in Brown II (1955) that school districts desegregate “with all 
deliberate speed,” the Houston Independent School District resisted anything more than 
the pretense of ending its dual school system until, in 1960, a direct court order by Judge 
Ben Connally demanded the board’s compliance with the 1954 decision.111 
The intransigence of the school board aside, Houston exhibited its penchant for 
progress in other ways that encouraged Wesley to imagine a bright future ahead for all the 
city’s residents. He pointed out the growth and progress of the Texas Medical Center, with 
its new “tremendous number of buildings” that promised a healthy future for the city. Even 
Hermann Hospital “looks drab,” he said, in comparison to the “galaxy of great buildings” 
that had transformed the landscape south of downtown. He also pointed to expansive, 
newly-finished freeways that connected the city in a dizzying network of flyovers, feeders, 
and superhighways, including Highway 59’s cut through the Fifth Ward and the increasingly 
convenient Memorial Drive.112 And Houstonians in general, Wesley believed, offered more 
hope for his vision than did their elected school board officials. 
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Other black leaders in the city shared Wesley’s cautious optimism. Dr. J Reuben 
Sheeler, local pastor and chair of the History and Geography Department at TSU, believed 
that “the history of the United States has been a slow and painful realization of the 
implications of the Declaration of Independence.” His vision was for “a creolized society 
that is the result of mixture from everywhere,” in which all Americans were fully integrated 
“in every social, economic and political aspect of [the nation] from Watts to Washington.” 
However, poverty and discrimination threatened the very foundations of American 
democracy in the 1950s, as the country’s enemies used its racial and class divisions to 
highlight U.S. hypocrisy in international media, he argued. Sheeler hoped for non-violent 
social change in America, but acknowledged that “violence/rage is the American way.”113 
On October 7, 1957, during the annual banquet of the Negro Chamber of 
Commerce (NCC), Sheeler admonished Houstonians not to fall into that old American 
tradition of violence, pointing to events in Little Rock. He hoped for the best, but 
acknowledged, “Trouble over integration can occur in Texas; in fact, it can occur in 
Houston.” His vision, and the NCC’s vision, of fair economic empowerment in a “bi-racial” 
society, remained at risk of dissolution if the leaders of Houston did not proactively prevent 
violent segregationists from fomenting trouble in the city.114 Wesley, however, remained 
hopeful that Houston would again prove its penchant for progress, preferring to highlight 
that integration had happened peacefully in the most unexpected of places with proper 
leadership, including in Clinton, Tennessee, where, in 1956, white citizens rioted against 
school integration, but where some semblance of order had been restored. Moreover, he 
said, he expected “a tight little knot of states, consisting of the remnants of the ‘Solid South,’ 
Alabama, Georgia, South Carolina, Mississippi, and Florida to crack by September 1958,” as 
the courts would demand enforcement of the law.115 
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Wesley expected no less to happen in Houston. Indeed, he noted that despite the 
South’s infamous reputation for suffocating race relations, “at foundation there is better 
relationship between whites and blacks in Houston than there is in any other city of size in 
the South.” He acknowledged that a recent mayoral candidate had run on a segregation 
platform and that the KKK, the Minute Women, the White Citizens Council, and the HISD 
school board actively worked against racial progress in the city. However, he also reminded 
readers that “Negroes in Houston were the most stubborn in their efforts to get into the 
Democratic primary,” and that after they won Smith v. Allwright (1944), black Houstonians 
voted in the city “without interference.” The inclusion of black citizens on juries and jury 
commissions, the desegregation of golf courses, and the integration of bus seating all 
occurred without mob violence. “For me all of that comes around to the vote that was cast 
for Mrs. White,” he said, referring to the election of Hattie Mae White to the HISD school 
board in 1958. He wrote that her win was “final proof of my thesis that the people of 
Houston are at this instance more ready to endure, tolerate, or receive integration in public 
facilities, than is any other city of its size in the South.” Indeed, Hattie Mae White’s victory 
encouraged Houstonians and outside spectators to view the city’s race relations as a good 
omen for what was possible in a metropolis that was shedding the vestiges of Jim Crow.116 
Hattie Mae White had been a teacher before joining, as a politician in her own right, 
the fight against educational segregation.117  In November 1958, she was “the first Negro 
ever to be elected to the Board of Education of the nation’s largest segregated school 
district.”  Like Adair, she framed her work in gendered terms. The moral issue of racial 
segregation notwithstanding, White felt compelled into political action by the responsibilities 
of motherhood. Though members of the community saw her as a viable candidate for other 
influential positions, the Informer noted, “Mrs. White only wants to see her own children 
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grow without being bogged down by segregation laws.” Her sense of duty as a mother 
compelled her to act in ways that her racial identity alone had not. “It wasn’t until I saw my 
own children growing up under segregation that I really objected,” she explained. “I guess it 
is easier to accept injustice for yourself than for your children.”118 On the matter of racial 
integration, she said, “My only thought is that until you have people actually sharing the 
same experiences,” there could be no “equal opportunity.” Her vision was a school district 
where Houston’s racial groups came together and shared in the bounty of each other’s 
company and resources. 
White and her husband Charles, a local optometrist, had five children at the time 
she announced her candidacy, four of whom were attending Houston’s schools, and an 
eighteen-month-old daughter, Hattie Berenice, who they hoped would not have to face the 
same kinds of challenges her older siblings did by the time she was ready to enter 
kindergarten. Their eldest, Richard Wendell, was in the eleventh grade at Yates High 
School. Charlotte Anne, eleven years old, attended Miller Junior High School, which had 
been “converted from a white to a Negro school” two years prior, as black citizens pushed 
the southern boundary of Third Ward into the MacGregor area, and was in “the condition 
of disrepair and filth,” by the time it was reviewed by the United States Commission for 
Civil Rights only seven years later.119 Eight-year-old Susan Charles and five-year-old Mae 
Edwins both attended Blackshear Elementary School in Third Ward.120 
Though the Whites’ children made “remarkable records in school work” and were 
actively involved in their community, Hattie Mae argued, in terms of desegregation, that 
“harmony and cooperation are requisite if there is to be survival and survival is often the 
result of adequate education.”121 HISD’s policy of segregation, regardless of the individual 
successes of her own children within the system of Jim Crow, severely limited their life 
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chances. She argued, “There must be a common bond among us all to steer us away from 
that which would destroy our lives.” While vice, crime, and delinquency were also targets of 
her platform, and though she understood that “the school, the church, and the home” were 
all central institutions “to develop each individual to the most complete maturity,” White 
surely believed segregation restrained black children’s educational progress.122 
Carter Wesley supported White’s vision, endorsing her in his “Ram’s Horn” 
column.123 White citizens also publicly backed her. One Houstonian sent a check to the 
Informer, asking it to be passed on to Mrs. White’s campaign. The writer asked, “If there is 
anything that anyone thinks we can do to help other than what we are now doing among 
the people we can reach, I hope you will have them contact us.” Another white citizen 
maintained, “[W]e believe that Mrs. White is not only competent for the position on the 
school board but it is high time that the citizens of our community realize that 
representatives of every group of citizens ought to be on the school board.” The letter 
concluded by noting it was important for White to be on the board not only because of her 
“ability,” but also because racial representation mattered in and of itself.124 
The Informer lauded the fact that she managed to build a successful interracial 
coalition around her campaign “in Houston, a traditional southern city.” Indeed, the Informer 
reported, “Side by side Negro and white had worked shoulder to shoulder during the 
campaign” and “more than half of her votes were cast by whites.”125 Houstonians were 
somewhat behind the times relative to other business-oriented southern cities.126 
Nevertheless, white citizens were proud of themselves, Carter Wesley reasoned, because 
“they had measured up to the best of American citizenship in voting for this woman in an 
era when it still seemed suicidal.” If it failed to accomplish much else, the election of White 
“proved… to the nation that Houston does not belong with Georgia, Little Rock, and other 
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areas, lost in a fog of contention and rebellion.” Houston, though “southern,” was not quite 
that southern. “Here was the largest city in the South, in the middle of one of its tensest 
periods in race relations in our history,” Wesley reported, “cutting across party lines, racial 
lines, and religious lines not only to elect a Negro woman to the school board, but to give 
her the largest vote of any of the 11 candidates that were running in the three positions.” 
The city, in his estimation, “took the lead in the field of common sense in race relations 
throughout the South,” and assured the Houston community that interracial politics could 
be practiced there “without the fear of pogroms or retaliation.” Wesley applauded white 
liberals for finally finding their courage, and noted that even some white conservatives had 
taken to the ballot in White’s favor. He assured them that black Houstonians’ “faith in 
humanity was again restored to full measure.” Heavenly Houston, “already an industrial and 
banking leader of the South,” also became the region’s “leader in moral integrity and 
courage.”127 
The jubilance over White’s election became more measured very quickly. While 
White believed her election indicated that Houstonians were ready to integrate their 
schools, the Informer was a bit more hesitant, suggesting that citizens’ wishes had little to do 
with whether the school board would move forward with desegregation. “With five out of 
seven members of the Board vehemently against desegregation,” the paper maintained in 
late 1959, “Mrs. White is in no position to be a decisive force against segregation.” While 
her conservative colleagues argued they had been ordered to desegregate but not to 
integrate, she responded that they were indeed the same thing and white folks were 
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obfuscating the issue. Despite the uphill battle White faced, liberal  
Houstonians imagined the city a leader within the South toward racial conciliation. 
Watching White participate in the Board’s televised meetings “is like watching a little bit of 
the future,” William Peters wrote.128  
Hattie Mae White’s journey to the school board was not all interracial cooperation 
and Houston progressivism. In 1956, Hattie Mae White found herself compelled to organize 
toward the end of educational integration because, as she noted, “the so-called 
conservatives were in control [of the school board] and the White Citizen’s Council was 
active in Houston,” and this coalition of official and community power brokers was 
spreading propaganda to raise public sentiment against the Brown decision. Most white 
Houstonians staunchly supported keeping their schools segregated. In the summer of 1955, 
Jackson E. Logan, a seventy-four-year-old resident of the Heights neighborhood, and former 
government employee, wrote a letter to the Post, expressing his “disgust” at the perspective 
that integrating schools could be positive. Though he had not finished high school, Logan 
positioned himself as a constitutional scholar of sorts, arguing that “the Supreme Court of 
1896 was correct in its opinion that equal facilities satisfied the 14th Amendment to our 
Constitution, the present Supreme Court’s opinion notwithstanding.”129   
In 1956, when the White Citizen’s Council requested an hour of television time 
from HISD to make their case, so too did the Parent’s Council, of which White was a 
member. However, the Parent’s Council was a racially heterogeneous coalition, and at least 
one member suggested “that it was the responsibility of blacks to chiefly say why they 
should integrate the school system.” In response, White “organized a small group in [her] 
home” that also requested an hour’s worth of television time from the board. This new, 
unnamed group of concerned black citizens decided on a three-pronged approach to 
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convincing the public of the merits of their argument. They recruited Gloria Bradford, the 
first black student to graduate from the University of Texas School of Law, to discuss the 
illegality of continued segregation. Moses L. Price, pastor at the Greater Zion Baptist 
Church on Trulley Street in Third Ward, agreed to discuss the “moral aspects” of 
integration. The group also managed to secure the assistance of an unnamed medical doctor 
to highlight the economic issues surrounding the maintenance of Jim Crow schools. 
However, upon learning that the doctor’s medical association, which “was just beginning to 
admit blacks into its organization,” required any statements or articles made by its members 
to be reviewed before being publicized, the group understood that they would need a 
different spokesperson in order to protect the integrity of their message. White recalled, 
“[I]t fell in my lap to do it.”130  
A white woman named Charlotte Kraft helped White prepare her statement, using 
materials they had gathered from departments of HISD’s administration, as well as outside 
sources. Kraft and White were best friends; they labored together in the interest of 
integrating Houston’s schools, not only defying the political order of the day, but also the 
social one. Throughout this process and during her time on the school board White said 
that she called Kraft a “friend” whom she could disagree with, but whose “kind of 
assistance” she could not have done without. In their work together, they demonstrated 
that while the physical plants of white and black schools may have looked comparable to 
passers-by, black students suffered the negative consequences of thoroughgoing inequality: 
unequal library facilities; no swimming pools in black schools “except that it had been a 
school inherited” from white Houstonians; outdated and tattered textbooks; no 
accommodations for sports like golf, tennis, and archery for black students; and disparate 
teacher-to-student ratios, where white schools benefited from lower proportions. White 
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and Kraft also remained interested in the ways these inequalities were not just patterned on 
race, but also ethnicity and class: “it was also for the poor white children or Mexican 
American children” that they fought for integration.131 
That same year, after the social liberals faced resounding defeat in the school board 
elections, HCCO began soliciting White’s thoughts on a school board election run, but it 
was not until 1958 that she agreed to make the effort. Though there was some friction 
among community organizations, and particular antipathies between HCCO and the 
Houston Ministerial Alliance, White was able to garner broad support for her run. Christia 
Adair used her clubwoman connections to ascertain if black Houston was ready to support 
a candidate of her own, and worked with White as the campaign ratcheted up. Together, 
White, Adair, and others built an interracial coalition to support White’s run. An additional 
source of friction came from the Houston Association for Better Schools (HABS), a re-
imagined Parent’s Council following the 1956 election defeat. This organization would be a 
tighter coalition of concerned citizens than the Parent’s Council, for it would remain 
organized throughout the year rather than just in the interest of elections. The president of 
HABS, a white oilman, did not believe that Houston was ready for a black school board 
candidate. White, however, was convinced it was time. She had been an active part of 
mobilizing black voters and she understood the urgency of educational equality. 
Disagreement in HABS compelled them to avoid putting together their own ticket, leaving 
more space for White to campaign.132 
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White ran on the slogan, “For every child, in every school.” As a former teacher, 
she pulled on her knowledge of how schools work and what children needed to fashion a 
compelling, robust campaign. Though she opposed segregation, she believed that if 
segregation were to prevail, HISD was still mandated to provide every child “an equal 
opportunity to develop his capacity…” She recognized that schools that served the 
wealthiest Houstonians, like Bellaire High School, situated in the southwest suburb of 
Houston of the same name, and Lamar High School, located two blocks south of the 
mansions of River Oaks, were not left wanting. But the high schools which served poor 
white students and all minorities seemed always to face fiscal shortages when they 
requested updated facilities, and consistently lacked enough faculty who could offer courses 
outside of core subject areas that might expose students to new career paths. White’s own 
daughter only had access to two years of foreign language, no opportunities to learn 
languages like German, and no chance to take a calculus course.133  
Image 3 Printed election flyer to elect Hattie Mae White to the Houston Independent School District. “Elect Mrs. Chas. White,” n.d., 
Box 3, folder 6, Christia V. Adair Collection. MSS 109, HMRC, HPL 
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Fighting for equal opportunity at the level of the school was futile; White found that 
she faced opposition even from some black school principals who did not want to “disturb 
many waters.” Like black communities had done since the beginning of Reconstruction, 
parent-teacher associations in Houston “bought many of the things that the school board 
should have been providing for the children.” Indeed, throughout the South since 
emancipation black parents had to privately subsidize the public schools that served their 
children. Historian James D. Anderson explained,  “On the one hand, the process of double 
taxation and collective social action enabled them to improve tremendously the material 
conditions of their educational system; on the other, this same process was unjust and 
oppressive, and their accommodations to double taxation helped extend over them the 
power of their oppressors.”134 White anticipated Anderson’s insight, saying, “I thought you 
should pay taxes that would support the schools and all the children should have the 
supplies. At that time it was knowledgeable that black teachers did not get the same supplies 
for their children that white children got.” The practice of paying double—of essentially 
giving over tax dollars to educate wealthy white children and also paying extra in order for 
their own children to receive a pittance of the same quality of education—was one White 
“didn’t agree with.”135 
A racial cross-section of Houstonians agreed with her position and elected Hattie 
Mae White to the HISD board on the fourth of November. Two nights later the Whites’ 
children found a burning cross on their front lawn. Her husband made light of it after the 
fact, saying, “Since Monday people have changed my vocation to fireman. And I suppose that 
is true because my wife can feel assured that I will stay close to her and extinguish any other 
fires that come up so that she will be free to go about her work.”136 However, both he and 
the rest of the family must have been frightened at the possibility of continued white 
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supremacist violence. In December, Hattie Mae’s empty car was vandalized, the windshield 
demolished by gunfire from rifles.137 Houston was not as immune to racial violence as 
Carter Wesley had hoped.138 
 
ouston’s mainstream black leaders worked out their vision for what they 
called a raceless future with a thoroughgoing commitment to liberal 
individualism. At times, their approaches differed and brought them into 
conflict. Carter Wesley’s spats with Thurgood Marshall and Lulu B. White over whether to 
prioritize educational desegregation over equalization efforts were particularly bitter. He 
attacked Marshall as an “ungrateful, selfish, long son of a so-and-so” and a “coward.” He 
attempted to “refrain from expressing” his thoughts on the “dumbness of Lulu White,” and 
disparaged other local and state NAACP officials who sanctioned their misrepresentations 
of Wesley as a “measly gang” and “cheap blatherskites.” These ad hominem attacks did not 
merely reflect Wesley’s concern with the denigration of his reputation, but also the ways his 
conceptualization of manhood as rational, pragmatic, and honorable shaped his political 
strategies.139 
Some conflicts were less bitter, but no less troubled with tensions about what was 
understood to be feasible politics at a given moment. Hattie Mae White’s election bid 
seemed too audacious for many white and black liberals who supported the Parent’s 
Council and HABS. They believed it was too risky to have a black candidate run for office, 
though they relied on a coalition that included black voters. And Adair’s tenure as Houston 
NAACP Executive Secretary was not without its struggles. In 1954 Houston’s NAACP 
suffered internal political struggles, including one in which Lulu B. White, among other local 
NAACP members, pressed to get her removed from her position by the National Office. 
H 
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White, for example, wrote that board members of the Houston branch were “all tired of 
Adair” but that “none of them have the courage to fire her.” However, both Hattie Mae 
White and Adair believed it their obligation as mothers in/of “the race” to build interracial 
coalitions that defied the precepts of Jim Crow and that would ultimately help to undo its 
legal foundation.140 
Whatever their differences, the city’s mainstream black leaders shared a belief that a 
liberal individualist, raceless future could be realized in “Heavenly Houston.” However, 
despite their frequent critiques of structural inequality, black Houstonians’ philosophical 
commitment to individualism was also prime discursive space for their white counterparts 
to develop ahistorical counterpoints to accusations of racial inequality and demands for 
structural solutions.141 Discourses about crime were particularly well-suited for undermining 
black people’s critiques. Indeed, black leaders themselves oftentimes framed problems that 
faced black communities—unemployment, overcrowded homes, and overexposure to 
certain types of crimes—as consequences of segregation. Yet, they would still argue that 
crime reflected an individual’s moral failings and, even more dissonant with their structural 
interpretations of racial inequality, would charge the “Negro race” had a responsibility to 
address “Negro crime.”142 
The individualist vision of a raceless future, then, was already vulnerable to dismissal 
when blackness and criminality were co-articulated. As Houston’s leaders managed to 
topple Jim Crow in various institutional settings, a bourgeoning social system emerged in its 
place—nascent, but highly adaptable. The color-rejecting vision of black Houstonians would 
not be accepted by white segregationists, whose identities and philosophies evolved and 
adapted to black people’s individualist claims. They learned to reconcile their individualism 
with their racial chauvinism by becoming color-evasive. This transformation precipitated a 
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new way of ordering society racially. Whereas Jim Crow proscribed and prescribed, legally, 
what kinds of public spaces were accessible to people of color, the new racial order 
conceded that such interdictions were contrary to the American value of liberal 
individualism. The old system exalted whiteness, unapologetically. The new system honored 
only the raceless “individual.” On the one hand, this was a win for civil rights activists. On 
the other, because this individualist ideology was anti-structural, it meant that white 
Houstonians who desired to resist racial progress could repel change based on their 
individual right to avoid social contact with others, for whatever reason. That “reason” was 
often bounded up in questions of sexuality and crime.  
For civil rights politics that focused on equal opportunity in housing, employment, 
and education, the underlying philosophy of liberal individualism helped black Houstonians 
make convincing arguments to their fellow citizens and the courts. However, it proved 
detrimental to making progress on issues of crime. In the 1950s, as migration to the Sunbelt 
intensified and federal highway projects changed the structure of black neighborhoods, black 
communities in the city experienced disproportionately high indigence. Frustrated by the 
crimes that accompanied these circumstances, including murder, theft, robbery, and assault, 
black leaders expressed the need for more efficient policing and cultural transformation in 
black families. They decried what they viewed as a culture of depravity, even as they, nearly 
with the same pen stroke, pointed out the persistent disadvantages black Houstonians faced 
in housing, education, and employment. They acknowledged these structural issues, but the 
problem of crime remained, and for them it was most legible as a matter of individual moral 
failure. Criminality then surfaced as a specifically important discursive space in which non-
structuralist approaches to racial injustice reached their rhetorical limit and hence an 
important space for understanding how white Houstonians—in addition to their claims of 
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economic independence and property rights—justified the racial delimitation of 
neighborhoods. 
In a Time article lauded on the front page of the Informer for its exposé about life 
from a “Negro” perspective, black photographer Gordon Parks expressed the same hope as 
Wesley, saying, “You can’t walk around with your race piled on your back.” However, with 
“persistent doubt” he added, “Anyway, that’s what I tell my kids. Maybe I’m just bluffing 
myself.”143 Once civil rights activists could no longer claim that state action and law resulted 
in segregated schooling and inadequate facilities and funding across district lines, there was 
little rhetoric left with which to claim an enduring racial injustice. For Houstonians, 
individualism and market rationality were the philosophical undergirding of the court-
enforced “freedom of choice” plan in 1966.144 That is, racelessness, structured on the 
norms and terms of liberalism, was susceptible to co-optation by white citizens. Many of 
them, then, learned to frame their resistance to integration on the basis of individualism, a 
particularly useful philosophy for maintaining white supremacy when “Negro crime” could 
be blamed for apparent social inequality in its stead.  
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CHAPTER 3: GOD, SEX, AND DYNAMITE: TENSIONS IN 
WHITE HOUSTONIANS’ VALUES AND BELIEFS 
 
arl Dewey “Red” Davis interrupted the early morning tranquility in the 
neighborhood of Riverside Terrace on April 17, 1953, when he ignited four 
sticks of dynamite on the front porch of Jack and Dorothy Caesar’s home. 
Since the Caesars had moved into the neighborhood in 1952, white residents had been 
fighting to return the neighborhood to a white-only residential enclave. But Riverside 
Terrace had only been “white-only” in the sense that only people defined as “white” could 
own or rent property in the subdivision due to racially restrictive covenants developers had 
placed in property deeds. Since its development , however, the community had benefited 
from the movement of black domestic workers and servants across Blodgett Street, the 
street that marked its northern border with the predominantly black section of Third 
Ward. Some white residents even had black workers live in servants’ quarters on their 
families’ lots. This cross-racial co-dependence was one indication that Houston’s Jim Crow 
was not a project of complete racial separation, but one of structured intimacies.1 The mere 
presence of black Houstonians did not challenge that structure. Rather, when black 
Houstonians challenged the rules of interracial proximity and engagement—rules that 
generally benefited white people to the detriment of black people—white Houstonians 
exhibited a variety of behaviors that demonstrated their conflicted and changing beliefs, 
values, and attitudes regarding race and space in the Jim Crow South. Some respected the 
merit of black people’s civil rights claims, others responded by finding new ways to distance 
themselves from black people, and still others responded with violence.2 
C 
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Yet, contests over racialized space in Houston rarely erupted in widespread mob 
violence.3 Rather, white Houstonians systematically practiced what literature scholar Rob 
Nixon describes as “slow violence.” Defined by “delayed destruction,” slow violence is 
“attritional” and often “not viewed as violence at all.” 4 Racially discriminatory eminent 
domain practices, environmental racism, and infrastructural neglect were just some of the 
ways white Houstonians harmed black people and the spaces they lived in. Rarely, however, 
did black residents worry that their homes or churches might be bombed.5 Nevertheless, 
practices of slow violence illustrated how white Houstonians’ attitudes toward black people 
were quite typical of white supremacy, despite Houstonians’ contentions that they had 
better race relations than other cities, both southern and northern.6  
As “heavenly” as folks like Carter Wesley hoped Houston was, anti-black attitudes 
had shaped the city’s social geography and exposed many black people to premature death. 
Indeed, the bombing of the Caesars’ home highlights the symbiotic relationship in white 
Houston between anti-black prejudices and liberal individualist values. Many scholars have 
named this apparent oxymoron “colorblind racism.”7 They have argued that it emerged in 
strength in the 1960s and that it remains a pivotal component of racial formation in the 
United States today.8 However, the varied ways white Houstonians wrote about and 
responded to black people’s challenges to the spatial maintenance of the city’s racial 
hierarchy illustrates that this ideological struggle was already mature during the early Cold 
War period. Moreover, the Houston case illuminates what the concept of colorblind racism 
has heretofore failed to capture.9 Rather than being singularly “colorblind,” mainstream 
white Houstonians’ identity and racial politics were in flux through the middle of the 
twentieth century.10 
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White Houstonians responded variably to the arrival of the Caesars to Riverside 
Terrace. Some yielded to the property rights of their new black neighbors, afraid of what 
they perceived to be “Negro encroachment,” but wary of infringing on the property rights 
of another citizen. These people were in the minority, though. Most Riverside Terrace 
residents gave lip-service to the idea of individual property rights, but simultaneously 
demanded that the Caesars give up their new home as a show of respect to the general will 
of the white collective. Some, like Carl Davis, acted out in physical violence. Others tried to 
use obsolete and new legal avenues for maintaining racial segregation. Still others fled and 
found new homes elsewhere in the city and its expanding suburbs. In each case, white 
Houstonians found their value in liberal individualism at odds with their beliefs about the 
ways interracial relationships should be structured in the political economy of the city. Their 
attitudes, ranging from interest in the possibility of desegregation, to distress at the meaning 
of integration for their property values, and even to rage, performed in acts of terror both 
large and small, reflected the varied ways they reconciled those tensions. These varied 
values, beliefs, attitudes, and actions cannot be understood simply as colorblindness, nor as 
inevitable precursors to the rise of colorblindness.11 Rather, as black Houstonians contested 
the maintenance of racialized space in the city, white Houstonians found their values at odds 
with their beliefs, and developed multiple competing ideologies to reconcile those tensions. 
Some were color-rejecting; they opposed the social significance of skin color. Some 
wholly embraced that individualist ideal, while others accepted it except on the issue of 
exogamy. Miscegenation aside, they generally valued the American promise of equal 
opportunity to individuals. As a result, many believed that school desegregation was a moral 
imperative. Those who saw themselves as sober-minded moderates tried to evade the issue 
of historical racism. They hedged, saying they believed in equal educational opportunity but 
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insisted that each individual black person would have to prove ze’s merit. Other white 
Houstonians evinced color-valuing attitudes. They found ways to reconcile white 
supremacist, Negrophobic beliefs with liberal individualism, relying on biology and theology 
to rationalize the dissonance. They still believed that black people were created as white 
people’s social inferiors—that, when judged on the basis of individual merit, black people 
would always trail, as a group, behind white people. These beliefs were often rooted in a 
Christian cosmology, wherein Providence had preordained the Great Chain of Being, placing 
white people above people of color in the divine hierarchy. Whatever their position, white 
Houstonians never failed to at least pay lip-service to liberal individualism. Therefore, as 
disparate as color-valuing, color-evading, and color-rejecting approaches to the question of 
racial segregation were, Americans of all three sociopolitical dispositions shared a common 
language rooted in liberal philosophy. At this point of convergence discourses concerning 
crime and race were most effective at chipping away at the progressive possibilities of color-
rejecting visions for the future. Liberal individualism held such ideological power over white 
Houstonians that even those who embraced a structural understanding of racial inequality 
reverted to individualist explanations for crime. Thus, “Negro criminals” could be blamed 
for “Negro crime,” the entire racial group could be stigmatized as morally deficient, and still 
white Americans could argue that such an assessment reflected individual merit and was 
therefore consonant with liberalism.  
 
n 1924, sales brochures for a new subdivision called Riverside Terrace invited 
Houstonians to imagine building homes on land that had recently been dairy farms 
outside the city limits. The subdivision sat on the southeastern border of Third Ward 
and stretched down to Brays Bayou.12 The greater MacGregor community, which included  
I 
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Map 12 Boundaries of the MacGregor-area subdivisions on a current street map of Houston. 
the Washington Terrace, Riverside Terrace, and Riverside subdivisions, promised many 
“advantages” to new residents, including access to some of the district’s best schools. To 
protect property values, Riverside had numerous deed restrictions, such as the 
establishment of a lower threshold on the price of new construction and complete 
proscriptions against the establishment of property for commercial use. One such 
restriction was that “the property shall never be sold to any person other than of the 
Caucasian race.”13 Thorough restrictions, proximity to good schools and Hermann Park, 
and easy travel to downtown were all touted as opportunities. The restrictions were “only 
protective, not prohibitive,” and guaranteed homebuyers long-lasting value.14 
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When suburban development began to take off in the region in the 1920s, Houston 
was a much smaller city than it would be in three decades, but it had been growing rapidly 
since the beginning of the century due to migration and annexation. In 1900 the town was 
only nine square miles, and it was home to a little less than 45,000 residents. By 1920 its 
population had more than tripled and its land area more than quadrupled. In 1940, Houston 
was the nation’s second fastest growing metropolis, showing a 47 percent increase in 
population, reflecting a 32 percent rise in the central city and a 114 percent rise in its 
suburbs over the previous decade. Whereas in 1900 the city did not even rank among the 
top seventy-five largest cities in the United States, by 1930 it had the twenty-second largest 
population in the country, and by 1960 it had grown to be the nation’s seventh largest city.15 
The Houston Ship Channel helped transform the city into a population magnet. Its promise 
of prosperity, “due to its close proximity to basic minerals, innovations in transportation, 
increased trade, augmented economic revenue, and industrial development,” compelled 
investors and entrepreneurs to recruit black, white, and brown laborers from across Texas 
and the South in earnest since the channel’s completion in 1914. These recruitment efforts 
fortuitously coincided with the beginning of the Great War and the unprecedented 
migration of black Americans to the North and to growing cities throughout the nation, 
including Houston.16 
These migrants would find a city with well-defined racialized spaces. Houston’s 
residential landscape had long been demarcated by racial hierarchies. In April 1839 free 
black people were barred “from becoming residents” of Houston by the city council. This 
ordinance intended to curb the presence of a free black population, which white 
Houstonians argued was “a population… much worse than useless” and “addicted to vice 
and commission of petty crimes.” And where black labor was not easily exploitable, black 
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people were expendable. As early as the middle of the nineteenth century, Houston 
developed a system of segregation that favored white workers and white labor needs, and 
trafficked stereotypes about so-called black criminality. Granted, free black people may have 
been more likely to commit “crimes,” but perhaps only because there were certain kinds of 
crimes that only they could commit. Under the law, for example, they could expect to be 
lashed for using “insulting or abusive or threatening language” toward “any white person,” 
and were restricted from owning firearms, as well as from gambling, slave-owning, or 
preaching to enslaved people in private meetings. Because enslaved people provided more 
easily exploited labor than did a free class of black people, free black folk were dispensable, 
viewed as unable to “perform any productive labor.” Though free black people lived in 
Houston through the antebellum period, the city’s ordinance against their residence 
indicated that white Houstonians preferred white-only ownership of local space.17  
As black migrants settled in Houston during and after Reconstruction, white 
Houstonians with economic means worked to configure the city’s social geography in ways 
that were beneficial to them. William Hogg, Mike Hogg, and Hugh Potter, three Houston 
businessmen, began developing the River Oaks neighborhood as a suburb of Houston in 
1924. Originally named Tall Timbers, the community, which could thrive in part because of 
the rise of the private automobile, inspired the development of other subdivisions farther 
away from the core of the city where streetcars did not extend. Additionally, River Oaks 
benefited from express bus service—a first in Houston—that could carry residents to work 
and downtown shopping as well as cart domestic laborers from the core of the city to the 
west side estates. In the case of neighborhoods like River Oaks, developers were explicit 
about their intentions to maintain both distance and intimacy with an inexpensive black 
laboring class.18  
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As a counterbalance to the cycle of sprawl and decay witnessed in other American 
cities, Will Hogg, who was chair of the City Planning Commission of Houston in 1929, 
sought to manage the growth and maintain the quality of River Oaks by developing 
thorough deed restrictions for the properties in the neighborhood. These restrictions 
would attract wealthy buyers interested in making secure real estate investments ahead of 
an uncertain future. In addition to restricting where a house could be placed on a plot of 
land and where garbage cans could be located, the developers also ensured “desirability” by 
limiting the types of people who could move in. Though the minimum cost of $9,500 for a 
house and lot limited class heterogeneity in the neighborhood, deeds in River Oaks also 
came with racial restrictions to keep out black people. An unwritten “gentlemen’s 
agreement” was tacitly obeyed and prohibited selling property to other ethnic 
“undesirables” such as Jewish people.19 To maintain the desirability of the neighborhood, 
and “to produce, for the Houston citizen, of discriminating taste, a complete residential 
community in the most advantageous locality,” the River Oaks Corporation refused to 
knowingly sell land to non-white or Jewish homebuyers.20 
 Racial restrictions, however, were not a matter of denying black people any access 
to River Oaks, but was rather a way to create a “structured intimacy” between the wealthy 
white inhabitants of this new neighborhood and the black, working-class inhabitants of the 
well-established Green Pond and Fourth Ward. Will Hogg and the City Planning 
Commission, aware that municipalities lacked constitutional authority to practice racial 
zoning, proposed in 1929 that white subdivisions include racial exclusions in their deeds. 
They noted that while “negroes are a necessary and useful element in the population and  
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suitable areas with proper living and recreation facilities should be set aside for them,” they 
still represented a “problem,” and their residences should remain separate from, though in 
close enough proximity to white homeowners who would employ them.21 
The children of River Oaks profited highly from the exclusivity of their 
neighborhood as well as the inexpensive black labor that, in part, made that exclusivity 
possible. One wealthy family’s history illustrates this dependence on exploited black labor. 
Carrington Weems was born in a home at 3335 Inwood Drive in 1928. His great great 
grandfather was Mason Locke Weems, better known as Parson Weems, an “itinerant 
bookseller” and reportedly the first ordained Episcopalian priest in the United States. The 
elder Weems’s wealth had come from thirty enslaved people he inherited. While family lore 
 
Map 13 River Oaks Census tract in 1960, including HOLC housing securities reference map. 
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maintained that he “freed them immediately” upon receiving them, Weems actually 
maintained ownership of the enslaved people and gifted and passed them down to his 
children. One of those children, Frances Ewell Weems, named after her mother, gave birth 
to Benjamin Francis Weems, whose educational and economic privilege allowed him to find 
a career as a civil engineer, leaving the family’s Virginia plantation for work in Illinois in 1855. 
Benjamin Francis arrived in Texas in 1859. Shortly thereafter, the Confederate States of 
America seceded and Benjamin Francis joined Terry’s Texas Rangers, a volunteer regiment. 
After serving in the Civil War, Benjamin Francis returned to the tiny town of Houston 
where he built a house near Main Street, using his considerable slave-based wealth to have 
Tiffany & Company come from New York to decorate the home. In 1900, he entered into 
banking. His wealth allowed him to send his children to the best schools—his oldest son, 
Fontain Carrington Weems, attended Princeton University and Wharton Ewell Weems—
Carrington’s father—attended the University of Virginia and then the University of Texas 
Law School. The two Weems sons had prestigious careers. At J. P. Morgan in New York, 
Fontain Carrington became a pivotal part of the team “to settle all economic reparations in 
Europe” after the First World War. For his Weems’ work, J. P. Morgan gifted Fontain 
Carrington a coal mine in West Virginia, further adding to his wealth. The younger Wharton 
Ewell, named after Major General John A. Wharton of Terry’s Texas Rangers, had been a 
captain in the segregated air force in World War I, and upon returning to Texas established 
what would become the largest law firm outside New York. By the time Carrington Weems 
was born, then, his predecessors had transformed their ancestors’ slave holdings, education 
afforded by segregated institutions of higher learning, and a nationwide racially 
discriminatory job market into remarkable careers and noteworthy wealth. That wealth 
gave the family entry into exclusive spaces like River Oaks.22  
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The young Carrington Weems benefited immensely from this family history through 
the opportunities that came with his childhood neighborhood. He recalled of River Oaks: 
though it was smaller than it is today, it was still “impressive.” He and the children of the 
neighborhood played in broad streets and used undeveloped land to play baseball and 
football. He attended River Oaks Elementary School before transferring to the private 
Kinkaid School, which was located nearby on Richmond Avenue. For ninth grade, his 
parents enrolled him at the private military school Schreiner Institute (now Schreiner 
University) in Kerrville, Texas, before having him complete his high school career at The 
Taft School, a private boarding school in Connecticut. His elite education prepared him to 
attend Rice Institute and the University of Houston before he completed his bachelor’s 
degree in Mechanical Engineering at the University of Colorado in 1952. His well-connected 
family gave him access to Houston’s business leaders such as Oveta Culp Hobby, Herman 
and George Brown, Gus Wortham, and Jesse Jones, among others. From the 1920s through 
the 1950s, Carrington recalled, “These guys ran Houston.” With his lineage and such 
connections, he very quickly established a career as a real estate developer and oil investor. 
He and his wife live in River Oaks today, having built a grander house there than the one he 
had been born in.23 
The Weems family history was one example of the way white Houstonians benefited 
from a dizzying history of the exploitation of black labor and the ways the management of 
racial space could allow white people to hoard the city’s best environmental, institutional, 
and social resources for themselves. Weems’s neighbors were among the wealthiest, most 
influential people in the city. His segregated schools allowed him an outstanding educational 
pedigree. Black people, forced into a split labor market by employment discrimination and 
racially exclusive labor organizations, often did the underpaid and unacknowledged work 
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that made white capitalist prosperity possible: they shoveled for white brick masons, carried 
for white millwrights, cleaned for white industrialists, and breathed the toxic paint fumes for 
white car manufacturers. In River Oaks, they worked as domestics that sustained a 
luxurious quality of life for the families there. Black labor and the presence of black people 
were integral to the creation and maintenance of their “white” space. The racial restrictions 
that helped define River Oaks as a sure investment, then, structured that relationship with 
very strict terms, such that the vast majority of its capacity for wealth-building could only be 
relayed to white people.24 
Developers created exclusive, white-only subdivisions all around Houston during the 
economic boom of the 1920s.25 Situated on the northwest edge of Rice Institute and near 
the wealthy Shadyside neighborhood, Southampton was developed on one hundred sixty 
acres by E. H. Fleming & Company as “a community of beautiful homes, harmonious in 
every detail…” with the established and affluent neighborhoods of Edgemont and West 
Edgemont. They promised a “desirable environment” and a neighborhood defined by 
“permanen[t]… exclusiveness.” Investment in Southampton, they argued, was smart for a 
number of reasons. First, Houston was on the verge of rapid and continuous development 
and provided schools at relatively low tax rates. Its nascent medical industry showed signs 
of future growth, and its climate and proximity to farms ensured access to the best produce 
at bargain prices year-round. Southampton, in particular, offered additional pleasures 
because of its juxtaposition to Rice Institute. The school’s “unusually handsome” buildings 
and its perennial construction “enhanced” the value of buying a home in Southampton. 
Close enough yet “distinctly removed from the commerce life and atmosphere of down-
town,” Southampton would prove a profitable investment for homebuyers, and a space in 
which to raise their children in a “beautiful community.” Residents there learned to ensure 
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the “preservation of their homes” and neighborhood through conscious efforts to 
“enforce… the tough restrictions established at the start” of the community.26 
These white-only developments appeared all over the southern and western parts of 
the city. Samuel Fain Carter and the Fain Carter Home Building Company developed 
Glendower Court south of River Oaks and west of Shepherd Drive as a small subdivision 
with 141 lots in 1925.27 In 1924, potential residents were invited to tour “Home Beautiful,” 
an example of the kinds of homes the Fain Carter Home Building developers invited for 
construction on available lots. Home Beautiful was an “achievement in modern English 
architecture,” and “proclaimed one of the most attractive moderate priced homes ever built 
in the city.” It included six rooms, an attached garage, and nostalgic English design. Carter’s 
Second National Bank would provide financing to qualified buyers. And like many of the 
neighborhoods that would eventually come to make up the Upper Kirby neighborhood, 
Glendower Court could boast to be a retreat just outside the city’s western limits, away 
from the crowding and bustling of downtown, but close enough to remain conveniently 
situated. “Surrounded by other high-class neighborhoods and River Oaks Country Club,” 
the subdivision promised “unusual beauty and refinement,” as well as exclusivity and 
permanence. Modern conveniences of telephone service, sewage systems, running water, 
and electricity were guaranteed, and streetcar service would take residents from Shepherd 
Drive to downtown. Also like its neighboring subdivisions, Glendower Court came with 
“restrictions” to “protect” each buyer’s investment. If neighbors needed any further hints as 
to the racial demography of the new subdivision, they need only look at its proximity to all-
white schools.28  
Both there and in Southampton, developers promised homes worthy of such 
protection and argued: “Real estate is the basis of all wealth…” The reality on the other 
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side of this claim, however, was diminishing opportunity for black people to own property 
in Houston. These could be a result of explicit or implicit racial restrictions in real estate 
transactions that limited where black people could shop for and buy homes. It could also 
result from reduced opportunities for black homeowners to transmit wealth across 
generations, for anti-black prejudices depreciated the value of black-owned homes in the 
marketplace without regard to the quality of those homes or their neighborhoods. In places 
like Southampton and the other communities that made up Boulevard Oaks, racial 
restrictions remained printed in legal documents even into 1960 and in River Oaks’s deeds 
until 1985, where documents maintained that “[n]one of said lots shall ever be sold… 
rented or acquired by any person other than that of the White or Caucasian race.” And 
into that decade, most of Houston’s census tracts remained highly racially segregated—
where white or black residents made up more than eighty percent of a tract’s population.29 
Families who moved into Riverside Terrace, then, understood that they would have 
access to some of the most beautiful streets in the city with all the modern amenities they 
might desire, including gas and water service, concrete sidewalks, good drainage, and ready 
access to some of the city’s best recreational, educational, and business establishments. One 
former resident noted, “The people moving in were the up-and-coming people: the 
merchant, the industrialist, the professional, and oil people...” They created a “very nice 
neighborhood” where “families knew each other, lived next door, wandered in and out of 
each other’s homes.” One white woman remembered, apparently despite the restrictions 
against non-white residents, that Riverside “was such a wonderful, heterogeneous mass of 
humanity, and it couldn’t have been a more wonderful place to really bring up your children 
and enjoy yourself and to feel like you made a place for yourself.”30  
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That heterogeneity was white ethnic diversity. Many remembered only rarely seeing 
or interacting with black Houstonians who were not their own domestic laborers. Or 
perhaps on an odd Sunday, while children might have spotted and watched a black 
congregation perform a baptismal ceremony in Brays Bayou for its exciting “singing and 
wailing.” The relative absence of black people in white residents’ memories is odd. Riverside 
Terrace shared its northern border with the predominantly black Third Ward. Texas 
Southern University (TSU) was established only a few blocks north of Saint Mary’s Catholic 
Church, which still sits at Ennis Street and Rosedale Street, a cultural center for many white 
Riverside residents. Everything north of Truxillo was a “totally black area.” Riverside 
Terrace’s residents, then, likely understated how much they interacted with black 
Houstonians. The invisibility of black residents in their recollections likely reflects the 
paradoxical invisible ubiquity of black live-in and commuting workers. White residents were 
not only likely to see black people on a daily basis; they were also liable to recognize which 
black people “belonged” in Riverside Terrace and which ones were unfamiliar.31 
In terms of interracial strife, despite living in such “close proximity to a solid black 
community,” one Riverside resident remembered, “there were never any problems in those 
days.” Indeed, the relationship between Third Ward and the wealthy neighborhoods of 
MacGregor, just like the relationship between Fourth Ward and the wealthy River Oaks, 
could be characterized as a lop-sided symbiosis. One resident explained: 
There was a black settlement not too far from Riverside, just like there’s a black 
settlement not too far from River Oaks. They were dotted around the city. The 
black settlements being near white residential areas was not a bad thing because in 
so many cases the blacks worked as domestics for the whites and it was convenient 
for the blacks and it was convenient for the whites. So I mean it was natural.32 
As long as black Houstonians did not violate the rules that defined their “place” relative to 
white people’s needs, Houston could indeed boast that its race relations appeared 
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“heavenly.” However, following the Shelley decision and the Caesars’ arrival to Riverside 
Terrace, this “natural” economic and spatial relationship was broken. Terror followed. 
In 1952, Jack Caesar, who ran Caesar Brothers, a company that traded cattle that 
worked out of the Port City Stockyards, asked his white male secretary to purchase a home 
in Riverside Terrace for him. The Caesars were not the first black family to move into 
MacGregor; the president of the Negro Chamber of Commerce, Rodney Hoggatt, had 
moved his family onto Alabama Street in Washington Terrace prior, and several black 
families lived “unmolested in garage apartments” in Riverside Terrace’s alleyways “for as 
many as ten years.”33 Despite having the capital, and despite the fact that racial restrictions 
in deed covenants were no longer enforceable in courts, Caesar faced considerable 
obstacles in buying a home outside the city’s black neighborhoods, but remained committed 
to moving his family into superior housing than what was available to most black 
Houstonians. Caesar made it clear that he did not buy the home to gain proximity to 
whites. He noted, “You couldn’t find nice homes nowhere but in that neighborhood.”34 His 
wife, Dorothy Caesar, confirmed this sentiment, saying, “We had no interest in being 
neighbors to white people, we were only interested in finding a house we wanted…. This is 
the house we wanted.”35 His secretary purchased a home at 2202 Wichita Street in 
Riverside Terrace through a real estate agent, after which, for a fee, he transferred the 
papers to Caesar.36 
The Caesars moved into their new seven-room home on a spring night in 1952. 
One white neighbor remembered how odd it was to suddenly find black neighbors on 
Wichita who seemed to emerge only once the night shadows disappeared: 
Well, nobody normally moves into moves into a new house or their new house in 
the middle of the night unless there are very extenuating circumstances, so they 
must be doing it for a reason—the reason in this case being that they were black 
and they were moving into what was still an all-white neighborhood. It did provide a 
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lot of panic and it immediately started people worrying about the value of their 
homes going down, et cetera et cetera, and would it be safe to continue living 
there…. I don’t know I was just stunned. It came up so fast, and you know—in the 
panic and the excitement of the moment the reaction is violence. Violence. They 
shouldn’t do that. They should move in in the daytime like everybody else does, you 
know.37 
Another woman who lived directly across the street from the Caesars remembered 
how quickly rumors spread: Riverside Terrace residents assumed the Caesars were “very  
wealthy,” that they “owned some nightclubs on Dowling Street,” or that they were funded 
by the NAACP to force integration. The only things most Riverside residents could know 
for sure were that the Caesars were quiet and rarely made themselves visible, departing 
from and arriving to the home through a rear driveway and spending most of their time out 
of public view. Despite any evidence that the Caesars were a threat to community stability, 
“people were really miffed because they felt that the neighborhood would not be the 
same.”38 
The MacGregor area remained mostly quiet during the initial months following the 
Caesar family’s occupation of their new home. Caesar recalled, “I guess I was in there about 
three months or longer, and they thought—cause everybody in the neighborhood had some 
of the richest homes being taken care of by Negro chauffeurs, maids, and things, the people 
was gone for months—so they thought that’s what we were doing.” The terror began, he 
believed, once the neighbors realized he and his wife were permanent owners.39  
The Caesars had good reason to consider they might become victims of more than 
petty harassment, but they appeared confident that Houstonians, white and black, would 
not tolerate mob violence. In the same year the Caesars moved to Riverside Terrace, a 
group of “hoodlums, or bigots, or just plain fools” threw stones into a black family’s home, 
“and made threatening telephone calls to the owners.” Houstonians responded swiftly:  
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municipal authorities and law enforcement roundly condemned the acts of hatred and 
“more than five hundred persons, white and Negro, rushed to the aid of the victim, offering 
to stand around-the-clock watch over the property.” The Informer praised Houston, 
believing the reaction was undoubtedly an exception in the “Southern pattern.” Changes in 
the city’s population, as well as the decreasing social acceptability of explicit forms of racism 
among the white middle class, compelled “average white readers” of Houston’s dailies to 
“have more and more tendency to see their fellow Negro citizens and neighbors in much 
the same way they see themselves and resent unfairness practiced against them in the same 
way.” Fair treatment on the basis of individual merit, the editorialists proclaimed, was “the 
American way—the better way.” Houstonians appreciated their city’s version of racial 
“tolerance” and bemoaned violent actions that threatened to destabilize what they viewed 
as harmony. Yet, they did not have to believe in integration or universal human equality in 
order to respond aversely to white supremacist actions that threatened to mar the city’s 
reputation as a peaceful business magnet.40 
One month later, the Informer was again reporting on white terror against black 
homeowners. Carter Wesley wrote that the Caesar family was “being systematically 
harassed by the white citizens” of Riverside Terrace. The pettier acts included crank calls 
for ambulances, police officers, firemen, taxicabs, and food delivery. More frightening were 
the “milling groups of men and women around the property,” threats by phone call, and 
“offers” to “buy the Caesars out” of their home. These incidents got little or no attention in 
the city’s non-black press outlets, and the citizens of Houston failed to organize themselves 
to defend the Caesars. Instead, Wesley complained, the police allowed the harassment to 
continue and did “nothing to protect these people in their home.”41 Like most Americans in 
the middle of the twentieth century, Wesley probably believed homeowners were justified 
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in using deadly force to protect their property.42 However, he also understood that if the 
Caesars did “kill some of these people on their land,” the act would precipitate police 
brutality and outrage on the part of white Houstonians, as officials “would be running all 
around like chickens with their heads cut off, blaming every Negro in the world for ‘causing 
trouble.’” He warned Houstonians to proactively condemn the agitators before the city 
began to resemble Dallas, a city disgraced in the early 1950s by bombings at black 
residences.43 
Wesley also took aim at “the average white citizen,” who viewed the movement of 
black citizens into “white neighborhoods” as “encroachment.”44 He informed them that 
black folk were not invading white neighborhoods, nor were they forcing themselves into 
white communities, but rather white residents, “because of improved economic conditions,” 
were leaving their old homes for even better ones. Moreover, he pointed out, white owners 
knew they could sell their homes to black citizens above the value of the home, and so 
were motivated by profit to “induc[e] and invit[e] Negroes to buy” from them. Wesley 
argued that “contrary to the assumption that Negroes were pushing into white 
neighborhoods, it was the whites who were pulling Negroes into the white neighborhoods.” 
But white Houstonians did not face harassment for these actions; residents “wouldn’t dare 
encroach upon the white man’s right to move where he pleases, and sell his property to 
whom he pleases.” Wesley called on city officials and “those of the men who from behind 
the scenes really run this town” to protect the rights and peace of black homeowners.45 
With no faith that the Houston Police Department, city leaders, or community 
members would come to their aid, the Caesars entered into negotiations with the Greater 
Riverside Terrace Homeowners Association (GRTHOA), a group of white residents led by 
neighbor Sidney Smiley that offered to buy the house from the Caesars. The homeowners 
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association was created after the Caesars moved in to “keep Negroes out of Riverside 
Terrace.”46 GRTHOA managed to collect a little over $13,000 for the purchase of the 
home; the Caesars were asking for $30,000.47 The Caesars’ lawyer, Jack Ginsburg, who was 
attempting to negotiate with the white group, reported threats against his life and against his 
home. Nevertheless, he remained committed to the Caesar’s cause, saying, “I am a citizen of 
the United States and have lived in Houston 40 years.” He said that the “organized 
hoodlums” attacking the Caesars were “worse than Hitlerism or Communism.” Ginsburg 
attempted to gain the support of several law enforcement agencies, including United States 
District Attorney Brian S. Odom, but Odom “white-washed the whole thing” and “failed in 
every respect” to “uphold the Constitution.”48 
The Caesars were further demoralized when it appeared Rodney Hoggatt, president 
of Houston’s Negro Chamber of Commerce, was attempting to get the family to reduce 
their asking price in favor of the white group. Mrs. Caesar explained that, in addition to the 
$26,000 (or $235,000 in 2016) they had paid for the property—about $3,000 more (or, an 
additional $27,000 in 2016) than the average value of homes on the block—the family had 
also invested money into the interior of the house and had ordered custom furniture made 
specifically for the home’s architecture. These were among the expenses they would have 
to shoulder if they reduced their price.49 The family eventually agreed to sell the home for 
$28,250, but GRTHOA failed to raise the money to buy it from them.50 
The Caesars’ troubles did not seem to discourage other black Houstonians with the 
means from hunting for quality homes in formerly white-only neighborhoods. Mattie 
Marcher Hilliard, a nightclub owner, moved into 2412 Wichita Street and declared she had 
“no intentions of moving,” despite the threats she and the Caesars received.51 After moving 
in, Hilliard found the sidewalk in front of her house “lined” with “morbid, angry, anxious and 
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even sympathetic stares from crowds of white people,” some of whom prevented her 
furniture from being delivered. Smiley, of the homeowners association, believed that buying 
out both families was impossible, and thus stopped negotiations. He said, “Nature will take 
its course,” in regards to the future of Riverside Terrace, which in the context of his other 
remarks, the Informer interpreted as a promise of violence. Smiley, for his part, understood 
that inciting mob violence was not socially acceptable in Houston. Indeed, he condemned 
the violence in other cities and said that the Shelley decision was “a good law,” but held that 
black citizens “should not buy in neighborhoods where they are not wanted.” Though he 
valued the individual rights of the Caesars to own the property, he still believed that they 
should relent to the desires of a white majority.52 
White Houstonians like Smiley half-heartedly embraced the Constitutional principle 
of equal protection and did not imagine themselves as racists. Smiley understood that black 
folks in Houston needed better housing, but argued that no black person should move into 
a white neighborhood without first getting the approval of their potential neighbors. For 
Smiley the issue was not “segregation or racial,” but that “white people ‘just don’t want 
Negro neighbors.’” He also believed that the relationship between neighbors was an 
intimate one, and believed black folks should delay neighborhood integration, suggesting 
they wait until “the time comes when they can say, ‘I can sit down beside you on the bus,’ 
before they try to live door to door with white [people].” The Informer reporter, apparently 
befuddled by this statement, asked for clarification. Smiley reasoned that “white people do 
not want to live next door to Negroes [as] an issue of ‘biological phenomena.’” While white 
residents later explained that their greatest fear was whether their new black neighbors 
would have the wealth to maintain their homes and stay in the neighborhood, the Informer 
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believed that Smiley’s comments revealed a deeper concern: white fear of interracial sex 
and marriage.53 
Aside from an incident on New Year’s Eve when the Caesars’ roof was littered with 
fireworks, the family lived without physical attacks on their property until April 1953. 
According to fifty-one-year-old Carl Dewey “Red” Davis, George Howell, fifty-six-year-old 
insurance company owner and vice president of the GRTHOA, had been hiring him for 
various jobs for about three weeks. Howell, an ex-convict who had been in federal prison 
for committing fraud, called Davis, also an ex-convict with a five-year suspended sentence 
for attempted murder, into his office one afternoon and instructed him, “I want you to blast 
that nigger house across the street” for $500. Three weeks prior to the attack on the 
Caesars’ home, Davis went to Rosenberg to buy dynamite. He turned over the material to 
Howell who prepared the four sticks for detonation. On the week of the twelfth of April, 
Howell announced that he was ready to go through with the plan. On April 16th Davis left 
his room at the Standard Hotel, located downtown, caught a bus toward Riverside, and then 
slept in the back seat of a car until about four o’clock on Friday morning. He explained, “I 
took the dynamite out of the car and walked across the street (Hutchins Street) from the 
Howells’ house to the niggers’ house. I stopped on the steps of the niggers’ house and lit 
the fuse. I set the dynamite near the pillar and walked off.”54 Christia V. Adair, executive 
secretary of the Houston NAACP, received a call in the darkness of the early morning. The 
voice on the other side gave her the frantic news: “Mrs. Adair, they have burned down Jack 
Caesar’s home.”55 
Incidences of high-profile interracial violence were rare in Houston, even when it 
came to residential segregation. Adair remarked, “[W]here Dallas and other southern cities 
were having fires and bombings and murders and killing, we had one incident.” Upon 
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learning of the attack on the Caesar 
residence, Adair called Mayor Roy 
Hofheinz’s house and asked his wife to 
inform him of what she thought was the 
total destruction of the Caesars’ home 
and shared with him Caesar’s address in 
Riverside Terrace. Hofheinz visited 
Wichita Street and told the chief of police 
that he wanted the case solved 
immediately.56 
The dynamite exploded on the 
Caesars’ front porch at 4:17 AM and 
resulted in about $1,000 worth of 
damage, blowing out “chunks of concrete 
from the pillar,” bursting through a French 
door, ripping apart window panes, and 
dislodging parts of the roof. Sleeping in 
two bedrooms at the rear of the home, the Caesars and their guests Ruth Phillips and Edith 
Johnson were unharmed. Startled from his sleep, Jack Caesar “snatched up a .38 caliber 
rifle” and inspected his house. Even as Dorothy Caesar called the police, two patrolmen 
who had been two miles away were already on their way, having heard the explosion from 
their location at Tuam Street and Fannin Street in what is now Midtown. Patrolmen J. W. 
Biggs and A. J. Crow arrived to find a completely dark neighborhood and mostly vacant 
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streets. Young men from the University of Houston fraternity house next door to the 
Caesars watched as Wichita Street became a crime scene.57  
The Informer called the bombing “the seeds of a reign of terror” and “senseless 
hate,” lambasting the perpetrators as “essentially psychopathic.” Whereas the community 
had seemingly determined that it needed to be shielded from Negro encroachment, the 
Informer argued that their greatest fears should be reserved for such lawless people as the 
bombers. The editorialists at the newspaper wrote, “Society needs to be protected from 
the machinations of such human Satans so that it can outgrow the emotional roadblock 
standing in the way of the development of a just and Christian social order.” Reserving no 
animus for the “warped minds” of white supremacists, the Informer maintained that “strict 
enforcement of law is the only answer” for all racial hate crimes.58 
Donald Caesar, Jack and Dorothy’s son, who always made a point to drive past his 
family’s house when he was leaving work and heading back to Texas Southern University 
where he lived and attended classes, learned about the attack when he arrived on Wichita 
Street and saw the commotion.  He and the family seemed to have faith in law enforcement 
despite that the Houston Police Department had done nothing in the past when the family 
reported threats. While the protection of a black family was not necessarily motivating, 
“Heavenly Houston’s” image was at stake. “We knew that something had to happen for us 
to—for actually the climate in Houston to remain the same as it always had been,” Donald 
Caesar said. “Houston, had always, fortunately enough, relent[ed] to blacks when they were 
repressed—and blacks would ask for something and put a lot of pressure—they would 
respond.”59 
Night Chief Hobson “Buddy” McGill interviewed the Caesar family, who shared with 
him details of suspicious activity they had noticed around the neighborhood. Assistant Police 
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Chief George Seber called the FBI for assistance and instructed one of his detectives, John F. 
“Jack” Heard, to take charge of the case. Heard, who would eventually become police chief 
and sheriff, as well as a mayoral candidate whose campaign would not shy away from 
Negrophobic rhetoric, recalled his part in the investigation: 
…George Seber, who really assigned me personally to it, just said, “Heard, get on 
this and clean it up quick.” Well the damage to the house was what I would have to 
call of a minimum nature. It was not damage that was gonna shake the entire house 
to pieces or blow up, say, fifty percent of the house. I think the purpose behind this, 
quite frankly, was just to the scare the hell out of the Caesars, to intimidate them 
and run them out of the neighborhood. The primary suspects in this particular case 
was a man by the name of Howell, who was a local resident, lived right around the 
corner, actually, an insurance man who resented blacks moving into the 
neighborhood—I mean, everybody knew this. And the second was a man by the 
name of Davis, Red Davis, who was kind of a street character. He had served time 
in the penitentiary. He had been arrested and been held a number of times. He also 
worked for the Howell’s as a handyman. The Caesars were extremely cooperative 
through this whole thing. Mrs. Caesar, for example, had noticed the so-called 
handyman Red Davis… as raking leaves in one spot too long. He had been to their 
house… two or three times.60 
Other residents of Riverside were unhelpful. Despite reports that folks at the police 
department, located four miles away in downtown on the 400 block of Caroline Street, had 
heard the explosion, and that “police dispatchers were flooded with calls from a three-mile 
radius,” neighbors just two blocks away from the Caesars consistently denied hearing any 
explosion at all. A Chronicle reporter confirmed that even he had heard the explosion at his 
residence, some eight blocks away.61 
With the neighborhood seemingly calm, even if blatantly unhelpful, Jack Caesar went 
to work, attending an auction sale for his cattle business.  By nine o’clock in the morning, 
“the house was surrounded with whites—many whites,” according to Donald. They mulled, 
“made threats,” and only after they grew weary, “disbursed.” When he returned home and 
learned that his white residents remained less than amiable, Jack Caesar made efforts to 
protect his family. Other black families had found themselves forced to produce the same 
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kinds of defensive posturing, including Ossian Sweet, a black doctor in Detroit whose home 
was attacked by his new white neighbors. Sweet and his friends, who had holed up in the 
house with guns, ended up facing murder charges for fighting back against a mob that had 
terrorized them and stoned his house. In the process, he lost his health, his livelihood, and 
his family. Things played out differently in Houston. Although Caesar had several black 
cowboys around the perimeter of the house “with rifles and shotguns,” Caesar and his 
neighbors did not use guns to settle their disagreement.62 
Lee Haywood Simpson, local minister and president of the Houston NAACP, 
announced that the bombing was “the work of the devil,” but hoped Houstonians would 
“keep a warm heart and a cool head” as the investigation went underway. Still anxious, the 
Caesars continued to host friends at their home who could help protect them against the 
white terror in their neighborhood, should that moderate Houstonian temperament 
dissipate. One black woman, who had been a young girl at the time, recalled the tension in 
the house, even as she remained somewhat oblivious to the threat she faced while her 
father visited with the Caesars: 
It was like a big party. I was a kid—real young—and there was a lot of food and a lot 
of people and there were a lot of guns. There were blankets to the windows and we 
were told as children not to go to the front of the house in the living room because 
that’s where the bomb had been thrown. I remember the Caesars had a little dog, 
and I was playing with the dog, and the dog ran into the living room and I ran in back 
behind it. My father was very angry and one of the few times when my father 
spanked me was then because I had disobeyed him—primarily because he was 
afraid.63 
That day she may have learned some of what it meant to be black in Houston and in 
America—to be at risk of white terror for trying to realize the American dream. The adults 
were certainly aware that they would have to maintain, as a group, a strong line of defense 
against white supremacist violence in order to secure their individual rights. 
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Mayor Hofheinz’s vigorous response, Adair believed, helped maintain the city’s 
relative calm. He told Chief of Police L. D. Morrison Sr. that he “didn’t want the sun to go 
down without the culprits apprehended,” and Adair testified that “before sundown, three 
men were in jail.” Lack of neighborhood cooperation notwithstanding, detectives searched 
the Howell residence, where Mrs. George Howell also denied hearing any explosion, and 
found evidence of explosive materials, and also found Davis’s car title, which established the 
connection between the two men. They arrested Davis later that evening at his room at the 
Standard Hotel. He admitted his role, but Howell denied any involvement. “This whole 
situation is ridiculous,” he claimed.64 Howell refused to take a lie detector test and posted 
bail shortly after his arrest. When the press questioned Howell about his connection to the 
man from whom Davis purchased the dynamite, he responded, “It has to be a coincidence.” 
Howell maintained, “I’m being framed on this. I’ve never heard of dynamite.”65 Facing off 
against Davis, Howell asked, “Red, did you tell these men that I told you to buy the 
dynamite?” Davis shrunk into himself, responding, “Well, you’re one of the main ones,” 
suggesting a larger conspiracy than anyone in Riverside cared to admit.66 
The bombing of the Caesar residence prompted many Houstonians to articulate 
their visions for the future of race and racialization in Houston and America. Under Carter 
Wesley’s leadership, the Houston Informer consistently publicized and editorialized about the 
bombing of the Caesars’ home and the subsequent criminal trial. The editorialists at the 
newspaper praised Houston’s law enforcement and Mayor Hofheinz for quickly solving the 
act of terror, believing that after the prosecution of Red Davis and George Howell, “a major 
chapter in Houston residential history will probably be closed.” Houston’s criminal justice 
process would be a testament “to the sanctification of the rule of law which makes our 
civilization possible.” Informer editorialists also noted their pride in Houston; it had once 
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again proven that it was not of “the South” like similarly situated cities.67 Additionally, 
Wesley himself often took aim at the broader issue of residential segregation and 
admonished Houstonians to obey the law and respect the rights of white and black citizens 
to sell and buy real estate as individual capitalists. Houston’s efforts to protect a black family 
against white terror, however belated, encouraged the vision of a raceless future wherein 
individualism would one day supplant the old tribalism of race.68 
For their part, white Houstonians did not submit easily to the revolution the 
Caesar’s move threatened to precipitate. Forming a new organization, the “Citizens 
Committee of Riverside Terrace and Other Areas,” they called together the area’s white 
residents to discuss how they might prevent “further encroachment and depreciation of 
property value.” Of course from Wesley’s perspective, there was no “encroachment,” but 
rather financial transactions between home sellers and home buyers. And while these black 
home buyers paid higher prices for their new homes than white buyers would have to—up 
to “two to three times the value of the property” according to Wesley—the value of homes 
in the neighborhood continued to depreciate. This was not a purely economic phenomenon, 
Wesley surmised, but rather a social and psychological one. “The only depreciation,” he 
argued, “is in the mind of the guy who thinks that he is superior, and imagines that his 
property depreciates because a Negro moves next door.” Wesley dismissed such racism as 
“poppycock,” as white Houstonians’ failed to apprehend that, by paying such exorbitant 
prices for homes in their neighborhoods, black homebuyers could raise the market value of 
the communities they moved into. But loathing and dread on the part of white residents 
remained a crucial barrier to seeing potential benefits to ending residential segregation.69 
The bombing compelled many white Houstonians to express their beliefs concerning 
residential segregation, and their beliefs were often in tension with their values. M. Gabriel 
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Nahas, Davis’s defense attorney, claimed that he “like[d] Negroes.” However, during the 
trial he “made an appeal to prejudice” to the all-white, all-male jury, in a last-ditch effort to 
rationalize the attack on the Caesars, arguing that if a black family decided to be his 
neighbors he “would be forced to move out.”70 This dread of black neighbors was prevalent 
and resonant. One woman, who, as a little girl, lived across the street from the Caesars, 
remembered that the bombing frightened her family so much that they moved away in 
response: “My family’s reaction after the bombing was fear. My parents were very upset. 
And I know my mother was very frightened. And it was shortly after that that we moved.” 
However, Jack Caesar told the press that even prior to the bombing that selfsame family 
had been aiming to sell their home to a black family and real estate agents had been showing 
the home to potential black buyers daily.71 The bombing had not motivated white flight; 
intransigent Negrophobia had. White Houstonians valued individualism and its relationship 
to property rights, but they also believed that society had to be spatially managed to 
maintain beneficial distances and intimacies between racial groups. When the Caesars 
threatened to undo that safe spatial equilibrium, the affective responses—fear, disgust, and 
rage—compelled a variety of actions. Davis and Howell, and perhaps other conspirators, 
reacted with violence. Most others, however, attempted to negotiate a buyout while many 
fled. Black Americans, in occupying the least-valued racial category in the United States, 
found themselves members of a caste that, in and of itself, engendered “anxiety among” 
white Americans, so much so that regardless of class status, black Americans would remain 
unwelcome in white neighborhoods.72 This anxiety was often expressed in economic terms, 
but it was rooted in concerns about sexuality and racialized beliefs about criminality.73 
When it came to the management of race, white women’s wombs were the most sacred of 
spaces. 
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eorge McCelvey, staff member of the Rice Thresher, the student newspaper at 
Rice Institute in Houston (now Rice University), visited the home of Heman 
Sweatt in 1948 to discuss the man’s educational predicament. At the time, 
Sweatt’s attorneys were representing him in a lawsuit against the University of Texas at 
Austin for its refusal to admit him into the law school. He explained that despite his losses 
in the lower courts, he believed his case had done mostly good, making all Texans more 
aware of the “discrimination and discrepancies within our educational system.” Sweatt 
believed the tide had changed for the South. Similar challenges to state universities had met 
with success for black applicants, including Donald Murray’s September 1935 admission to 
Maryland State University’s School of Law and Silas Hunt’s January 1948 admission to the 
School of Law at the University of Arkansas. It was only a matter of time before Sweatt v. 
Painter (1950) would deal a national blow to segregation in graduate and professional 
programs. On December 4, 1948, McCelvey penned an article detailing this conversation 
with Sweatt.74 
 Coy W. Mills, principal of Jefferson Davis High School in Houston and Rice alumnus, 
was “very much surprised” to read the feature on “Negro Sweatt (Mr. Sweatt to you).” In a 
letter replete with anti-black disgust to Thresher editor Brady Tyson, Mills asked three 
questions. First, he wanted to know the “purpose” of the story. Second, he asked about the 
“policy of the Thresher” in regards to the question of integrating Rice. And lastly, he 
demanded to know, “What will be your attitude if Sweatt or another Negro is admitted to 
Rice and tries to date the Co-eds, perhaps your best girl friend or sister?”75 
 Assistant editor, Robert McIlhenny, replied that the feature on Sweatt was a “part of 
a series of articles on educational opportunities in the Houston area,” and that the effect of 
G 
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segregation on black Texans’ educational opportunities was “integral” to understanding 
education throughout the South. McIlhenny stressed that no student admitted to or 
attending Rice should be granted “special privileges” on any basis outside of individual merit. 
On the issue of dating, he succinctly explained that the “personal and private lives” of his 
fellow students should remain free of intrusion or restriction by the Institute. Lastly, 
McIlhenny inquired why Mills penned his initial letter, suggesting that Mills wrote his 
“questions” with only one set of acceptable answers in mind.76 
 Mills’s response revealed as much. “I could not force myself to believe,” he said, 
“that the Editor of the Thresher was in favor of admitting Negroes to Rice Institute.” And 
still unsatisfied with McIlhenny’s responses, he presented five more questions to Tyson, 
three of which suggested the editor and his staff should be removed or resign from their 
positions because they appeared, to him, unqualified for their jobs. The other two questions 
stemmed from his regarding MicIlhinney’s answer about dating across the color line. This 
time, he demanded a “direct” response with either a “yes” or a “no”: “Would you be 
opposed to a Negro student of Rice dating your best girl friend [sic], sister or other co-
eds?” He also wondered if the editor would be amenable to having a black student assigned 
as his roommate.77 
 Tyson replied in the Thresher, writing, “I am not sure why the question was asked, 
but here goes.” The editor tersely noted that he would not oppose having a black 
roommate living with him. He said that he would “definitely oppose, or at least feel very 
hurt” if a black student “got a date” with a family member or a personal friend, but that he 
nevertheless would “never attempt to dictate” who or how they should date. As for his co-
eds at Rice, he remarked, “It is none of my business.” Tyson openly wrestled with the 
tensions between his values and his beliefs. The former respected the rights of individuals to 
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make their own choices without compulsion. Yet, while he seemed to believe in the 
inherent equality of all people, he maintained an aversion to interracial dating. For folks like 
Mills, the inferiority of black men was apparent, and they did not deserve to attend his alma 
mater nor should they have the opportunities to date white women. Tyson, however, 
struggled with reconciling his belief in social equality with his understanding that endogamy 
was just how things should be.78 
Black Houstonians who watched this debate play out in the school newspaper found 
hope in those tensions. William V. Houston, president of Rice, assured Tyson and his 
readers that their debates concerning desegregating the Institute were “entirely academic,” 
because the school “was founded and chartered specifically for white students.” Therefore, 
he concluded, “The question of admission of negroes… is not one for administrative 
consideration…”79 The student editors at Texas Southern University’s (TSU) Herald 
sardonically suggested that Houston’s terse response to the issue was an indication that 
Rice’s students should “clam up,” lest they raise the ire of the Institute’s executive. 
However, TSU students did not care much for President Houston’s deferment of the 
question of integration to the school’s charter, writing that the school faced “the age-old 
conflict between what is legally right and what is morally right.” They felt that integration 
was inevitable because Rice’s students were willing to face the moral dilemma before them, 
and trusted that the existing dissonance between ideals and laws could not withstand the 
test of time.80 Indeed, for students like Tyson, a future where color did not determine 
student eligibility for admission to a school like Rice was inescapable, and if not 
accomplished during his time as a student, it would be realized when he and his classmates 
assumed leadership roles following graduation.81 
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Indeed, at least some white college students throughout the South looked forward 
to a future unburdened by Jim Crow for themselves and their black counterparts. The 
editorial team at Rice Institute’s Thresher reprinted an editorial from The Toreador, the 
student newspaper at Texas Technical College (Texas Tech) in Lubbock, which stated, quite 
plainly, that segregation was a problem that was going to be solved voluntarily or by force—
that the only remaining question was when a resolution would be reached. They pointed 
out that nearly seventy percent of students at the University of Missouri (UM) voted that 
they would like to see Missouri’s segregation laws repealed, and the student council there 
passed a resolution saying they wanted “qualified negro students” to have the opportunity 
to enroll at UM and other state schools. They acknowledged that the existing alternative for 
black students, Lincoln University, was inadequate and unequal.82 
The editorial staff at Texas Tech maintained that they did not necessarily agree with 
a wholesale commitment to immediate integration, but they did imagine themselves and 
their generation of students more disposed to solving the problem of the color line. 
Idealistically, yes, they believed that integration was important for fulfilling national and 
individualistic principles of “equal rights for all of us regardless of race,” and they shamed 
the nation for having “failed to deliver the goods” thus far. Those liberal hopes of a young 
generation notwithstanding, many white Americans refused to reconcile individualism with 
their beliefs about “Negro crime” and “Negro bucks” and the threat these presented to 
what they understood as white people’s safety and the white race’s sanctity. Indeed, while 
some like Tyson turned to Christianity to argue for the full equality of people—or at least 
men—others saw a mandate within their Protestantism to prevent any so-called race-
mixing.83 
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A few months prior to the Thresher letters, in mid-August 1948, at a convention in 
the Sam Houston Coliseum, located downtown, the States’ Rights Democrats launched 
their national campaign against federal encroachment on local and regional issues. Their goal 
was to “wrest the 127 electoral votes in 11 states of the traditionally solid south from the 
National Democratic ticket.” There, Governor Strom Thurmond of South Carolina and 
Fielding L. Wright, governor of Mississippi, were formally nominated as candidates for 
president and vice president, respectively, for the 1948 U.S. presidential election.84 Though 
Thurmond, in this crowd a “moderate,” tried to keep the conversation focused on states’ 
rights even he could be aroused to seek the fever pitch and boisterous approval of a white 
supremacist audience. (Of course, states’ rights in the South maintained Jim Crow through 
surreptitious traditions and explicit laws, including the maintenance of the poll tax, which 
poor black southerners struggled to pay.) He shouted to the crowd, “There’s not enough 
troops in the Army to force the southern people to break down segregation and admit the 
Negro race into our theaters, into our swimming pools, into our schools and into our 
homes.”85 
On August 29, 1948, Brady Tyson wrote a letter to Thurmond. Like many 
Houstonians, Tyson’s perception of his city was that it was one, not only of prosperity, but 
also of progress. He felt that the convention had been “marred by the injection of the racial 
question,” and pointed to the ads that warned white Southerners of “Negroes in your 
churches, in your schools, in your colleges, in your swimming pools, [and] in your beauty 
shops” if Thurmond and Wright were to lose the election. Most troublesome for 
Democrats, Tyson contended, was that eventually the “Christian” sensibility of Southerners 
would make the racial antipathy of the states’ rights campaign so noxious that even such 
ardent supports of states’ rights, such as himself, would turn their backs on the Dixiecrats. 
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He believed that segregation was “morally wrong,” and the South would eventually, “thru 
education… return to the principles of Christian brotherhood.”86 Democracy and 
Christianity were intimately tied in the minds of many Houstonians, including Heman  
Sweatt, who noted that integration was not an issue of “abstract agitation,” but was rather a 
moral crisis that the nation had foisted upon itself. Integration was necessary and “purely in 
line with our democratic ideals,” he maintained. “I think it violates no Christian principles 
and I firmly believe that the full respect for the individual is, and what he is able to offer the 
community and the nation will eventually come.”87  
Rather than colorblindness, Brady Tyson typified a color-rejecting vision for the 
nation’s future. For him, belief in a racial hierarchy was inconsistent with his Christian 
convictions. This tension reflected a long liberal philosophical tradition within Christian 
Protestantism that placed the individual and the freedom of will at the center of the faith’s 
soteriological project.88 Thus, racial progressives often expressed a desire to reject the 
notion that skin color had any social value. Tyson’s vision, however, was not blind to 
history. He and his editorial staff recognized long-lasting disadvantages on the basis of race, 
and believed that white Americans had to consciously confront their racist beliefs in order 
to realize a more equal society. 
Many, however, saw the state of racial inequality as evidence of black racial 
inferiority rather than white oppression. Their belief in a “just world” helped them reconcile 
Tyson’s moral dilemma within themselves. Through a “Native Protestant ideology,” white 
Americans made “propositions about human nature and society that” allowed them to 
“interpret complex human problems and take action” in ways that benefited them. These 
propositions rested on the veneration of individualism, the valorization of meritocracy, the 
virtuousness of property ownership, and the vigilant practice of a Protestant work ethic  
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(“self-control, self-sacrifice, and restraint”). The centrality of these values to the 
maintenance of freedom and democracy was expressed by one writer to the Post who 
complained that Americans had become too dependent on each other and the government 
in the New Deal era. F. G. Swanson, a resident of Tyler, Texas, argued that co-dependency 
represented a “disintegration of moral fiber in all groups” throughout the nation and firmly 
believed there was no “Biblical, moral or ethical” impetus to “provide other than for those 
in reasonably honest need.” Swanson’s anti-communist tirade foreshadowed the limits, in 
terms of charity and justice, of colorlessness in a discussion about correcting a tradition of 
racialized (dis)advantage. Prosperity, in whatever form, was evidence of good Protestantism. 
Black people’s socioeconomic status was, therefore, all they had earned.89 
A few days later, Thurmond replied to Tyson’s letter. He assured the young editor 
that “while the segregation issue is of course of vital importance in the South,” the 
fundamental issue was federalism—that, according to him, the national government was 
overreaching the bounds of its powers in interfering, not only with the segregation issue, 
but also “police power, control of the ballot, and regulation of all internal matters.” 
Thurmond acknowledged that the South was not a monolith when it came to the institution 
of Jim Crow, and made clear that he opposed integration because he believed it was 
antithetical to the “welfare of both white and colored.” And he emphasized, regardless of 
his personal opinions, despite the fact that as governor his opinion could shape the 
immediate policy and destiny of South Carolina, each state should decide what to do about 
segregation. A federal decision, he concluded, would be unconstitutional.90  
Despite Thurmond’s protests otherwise, however, the States’ Rights Democrats 
“relied on racism and the fear of desegregation to arouse white passions.”91 John Ed Pearce, 
a writer for Louisville, Kentucky’s Courier-Journal, contemptuously bemoaned Thurmond’s 
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obfuscation, arguing that he and his fellow Dixiecrats had “no honest concern” for states’ 
rights. “The issue,” he wrote, “is Nigger.”92 This being existed in the imaginations of white 
folks who were committed to controlling “everyday geographies” and maintaining their 
cultural “landscape,” which was not static but “a process… a cultural practice that 
represents and enacts popular ideas” about where black and white folk belonged.93 Pearce 
explained this white imaginary further: 
Not Negro; not the 14,000,000 citizens of our democracy who are trying to raise 
themselves to a higher standard of life and living through the equal rights and 
opportunities guaranteed them by our Constitution.  Not the people who are 
striving against disheartening odds to take a decent, respectable place in society, 
despite the efforts of those who object to their differences in skin coloration. 
The issue is not the Negro, the human being who exists and struggles.  It is Nigger, 
that non-existent creature which lives only in the hate-filled minds that conceived 
it.  The word is never spoken, yet it hangs in the air, sweaty, rancid, brutish, hulking 
and menacing, bespeaking the fear and ignorance of the minds that bore it.  On the 
platform Mr. Thurmond and his fellow traveler shout of Americanism, our way of 
life, the right to choose one’s associates, Communism, Reds.  But they mean 
Nigger.94 
The “Nigger” was where white folks like Thurmond located their hatred and their fears, and 
the site from which they reified, by way of law, custom, and violence, the “possessive 
investment in whiteness”—that privilege by which they could secure certain rights for 
themselves and, without apparent contradiction, deny those selfsame rights to people of 
color. Indeed and increasingly in the post-War era, whiteness, as possession, was a matter 
of “space as property” and “space as social imagination”—of symbolic and physical real 
estate—which differentiated darkness from whiteness, wilderness from civilization. Those of 
Thurmond’s ilk, then, could maintain their commitment to individual, private rights with 
little cognitive dissonance, having convinced themselves that the “Nigger” was real and 
fundamentally “not-quite-human,” and therefore, not an individual. The “Nigger,” as a 
symbol of unbridled sexuality and crime, was the black image in the white mind.95 
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Tyson’s opposition to Jim Crow on the basis of his own Christian sensibility raised 
the ire of many of his peers and readers, because even when those respondents tentatively 
acknowledged the democratic rights of black Americans, when it came to the issue of social 
equality, they saw black folks, not as individuals, but as a group. Tyson penned an editorial 
explaining that he was in favor of admitting black graduate students into Rice, but noted that 
he did not anticipate a mass migration of black students to the school because many were 
not Rice-caliber applicants. That is, historical wrongs had to be corrected, but black 
students still had to prove their individual merit. In response, Lycurgus Cleburne Christian, a 
local attorney and son of a Confederate soldier, wrote to Coy W. Mills, and copied to 
Tyson, a letter castigating the Thresher editor. Following a brief rant about carpetbaggers 
“who know absolutely nothing about the Negro” and who demanded “SOCIAL EQUALITY 
between Southern Whites and Negroes,” Christian expressed exasperation that “a student 
at Rice Institute, right in our midst” could be an integrationist, and “doubt[ed] whether or 
not students are actually being EDUCATED at Rice.” While willing to admit a constitutional 
guarantee to political, religious, and economic equality, social equality, as far as Christian 
was concerned, was off of the table. The sixty-seven-year-old lawyer argued that the 
Reconstruction amendments were “illegally adopted” and only remained because 
“intelligent, and advised, Southern Whites” allowed them “in order to preserve the peace.” 
Nonetheless, they and “our better-class Negroes” understood that social equality was 
“merely a PRIVILEGE,” not a constitutional guarantee. Indeed, even some white Americans 
were not the social equals of their white brethren, he noted, pointing out that those who 
tended toward criminality were not welcome in his home.96  
Christian’s non-sequitur descent into a discussion that equated criminality with 
transracial social equality presaged the heart of his argument. He certainly knew that there 
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were no laws against romantic or sexual relationships between the “criminal-minded” and 
other white Americans and he never suggested that there should be. (Similarly, Riverside 
Terrace residents had apparently been unbothered that Carl Davis and George Howell both 
had criminal records and had no concerns about the potential effects of their presence in 
the neighborhood on their property values.) Instead, interracial sex monopolized the space 
in Christian’s letter. Social equality was a particularly “insane” demand for white 
supremacists because it meant, at its worst, “miscegenation,” which Christian and those like 
him believed “violate[d] the law of both God and Man.” Transitioning from legal practitioner 
to fiery preacher, Christian proclaimed: 
The Divine command was “Go forth and re-produce your KIND;” it was not “Go 
forth and re-produce HYBRIDS.” The beasts, birds, and even the insects, recognize 
and obey this Divine Law, and violate it only when compelled to do so by Man, for 
breeding and scientific purposes. Man—and only Man—is sufficiently ignorant, and 
presumptuous, to even attempt to do so.”97 
Switching from preacher to biologist, Christian further explained that “hybrid” races 
suffered moral and physiological deficiencies, tending toward extinction, pointing to the 
sterile mule as an example. The writer asked: “Do these ‘nit-wit’ advocates of social 
equality, between Whites and Negroes, believe themselves superior to our Creator in 
wisdom?” If so, “blasphemy,” he claimed.98 
Other white Houstonians expressed much of the same sentiment after Brown v. 
Board of Education was decided in 1954. In 1955, during a Constitution Day banquet in 
Houston, speakers declared to the audience that “the concept of non-segregation counters 
God’s law and is the latest attempt to replace democracy with totalitarianism in America.” 
Their understanding was that integration denied Americans the right to choose their 
associations, though it was clear that the Americans they had in mind were only white 
Americans. Thomas P. Brady, Circuit Court judge in Mississippi and “noted states’ rights 
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advocate,” addressed the diners, saying, “If God had wanted one species on earth he would 
have created him—God saw fit to segregate the races.” Like Christian, he viewed black 
people as fundamentally, phylogenetically distinct creatures in the Great Chain of Being.99  
White Christians managed to both deny and acknowledge the human equality of 
their black neighbors without a hint of irony. Roberta A. Morrison, a white Afrikaner 
transplant to Pasadena, Texas, confessed, “All of us are equal in the sight of God, yes—but 
it seems that anyone but a child would realize that there is no other equality, socially, 
economically, physically, or any other way—even within the white race, or any other race 
for that matter.” Employing a Native Protestant ideology, Morrison claimed that “the white 
race” had “earned its progress and standard of living by thousands of years of hard work,” 
and was disgusted by the “Communist” suggestion that “blacks in Africa… straight from the 
bush” should be treated as the equal of white people when their standard of living was “at 
least a million years behind the times.” To be sure, Morrison clarified, she did not hate black 
people, and indeed, her family had “always employed colored domestic help” and provided 
for them a better standard of living, through wages, room, and board, “than most Northern 
wives.” Nevertheless, if black people were to be judged on individual merit, they had proven 
for centuries their unequal status to white people. Likewise, Dorothy Hansen, a housewife 
from Missouri who lived with her husband, an immigrant from Denmark, in the Magnolia 
Park neighborhood of Houston, noted, “We grew up loving Negroes, but we never thought 
about going to school with them. There’s going to be a great deal of dissention in the 
South.” And, R. H. Winans, a mechanical engineer who lived in the all-white town of West 
University Place, enclaved but not annexed by Houston and situated near Rice Institute, 
noted after Brown was decided: “There ought to be other ways of helping the colored folk 
than by living with them, going to church with them, and having them in our schools.” This 
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was not an issue of racial antipathy, not a denial of black humanity, nor a moral or religious 
quandary for Morrison and other white folks who saw themselves as good, reasonable 
people; it was just a matter of fact that “‘apartheid,’ or separation” was natural and 
inevitable.100 
But, like her ideological compatriots, Morrison eventually exposed her underlying 
beliefs about black people, and they had nothing to do with individual merit. “When 
segregation is abolished in the schools,” she wrote, “miscegnation [sic] is sure to raise its 
ugly head, sooner or later.” She asked, “What could possibly be so morally ‘right’ about 
mixing races and filling the world with halfbreeds?” Hence, her commitment to American 
individualism and “earned” white supremacy appeared to reach its limits. The question of 
interracial sex and marriage, which she raised of her own accord, re-inscribed racial 
groupings as real and natural, and revealed her own possessive investment in a supposed 
white racial purity. It also reflected how much space the “Nigger” as a sexual creature 
occupied in white imaginaries.101 
This is why “liberal thinking” white folks like Brady Tyson disgraced tried and true 
segregationists like Lycurgus C. Christian. For Christian, people like Tyson stood on the 
side, not of black folks who “possess better sense,” but “a comparatively few lecherous-
minded Negro ‘bucks’ consumed by a burning desire to consort, and inter-marry with 
White women.”102 The discursive option to describe black men as “ravenous, unscrupulous, 
and sexually out of control” beasts was socially-embedded in Christian.103 Despite his 
presentation of himself as a rational man, he still believed, as did his forbears, that black skin 
was a “disease”—a discoloration that acted as nature’s stamp on the hypersexual and the 
savage.104 Christian maintained that despite the threat of the “Negro buck,” and “despite the 
fact that hundreds of White Southern women were brutally raped, and in many cases 
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murdered, by the Negro brutes during 1947, only ONE Negro rapist was lynched in the 
South.” This was evidence that white Southerners had progressed, and that indeed, the 
racial liberals needed to convince black men to stop attacking white women, rather than 
continue their clamoring for anti-lynching legislation. He believed that the United States had 
made progress toward the equality of black folks since slavery, noting that they had already 
achieved “100% religious equality” and were “rapidly acquiring equal political and economic 
rights.” Social equality, however, was an “insane” demand and an affront to the divine order. 
Christian valued individualism and white supremacy and used the image of the black criminal 
as a way to reconcile his prejudice with that universalist ideology.105 
John A. Clark, a reader from Coleman, Texas, who wrote in much more moderate 
terms, nevertheless expressed the same anxieties as Christian. While lauding “the Negro” 
for “improving wonderfully… for a number of generations,” and predicting their continued 
progress—though he did not precisely define what he meant by that—Clark cautioned 
against taking extreme positions that would “pit the White Race against the Negro Race in a 
fight” where both would face casualties. He asked Tyson to be wary of “agitators,” a loaded 
term during the Second Red Scare, and certainly a loaded term in general for southern 
segregationists who were still seething over the “War of Northern Aggression.”106 
Prior to Clark’s interjection, Alfred Groner, a staff writer for the Thresher, had 
written a piece arguing “that segregation is unjust, outmoded, and un-American,” and he 
praised his fellow Thresher contributors for their progressive stance on “this race question.” 
Here, the moderate Clark began to sound much more like Christian. Tearing down 
Groner’s idealistic conception of what it meant to be American, Clark leaned on history, 
saying, “Now let’s be honest about this question—does History back you up in that 
statement[?]” He believed the contrary: “[S]egregation has always been what the American 
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people wanted, and what they still want—that is, the red-blooded type of American.” 
Though he admitted that Jim Crow “may be unjust,” it was only so “to the extent that it 
deprives the Negro of educational opportunities he should have.” But such limits were a 
necessary evil, especially, it seemed, in the case of undergraduate education, where 
“rooming with Negroes” meant, in his understanding of the expressing, sharing “the same 
double bed together.” “Rooming,” he was sure, would lead to “intermarriage.” 
Condescendingly, he implored Groner and other “good people” to stop “mis-directing” the 
progress being made toward educational equality for black Americans, believing that 
although facilities were not equal across the board, over time the nation had proven—to 
him—its commitment to equal educational opportunity. America simply needed more time. 
Sure, all black people were not being given a fair shot, but Clark expressed relief that his 
daughter, a senior in high school, was “not going to room with Negroes” when she 
matriculated to college.107 
Parker J. Parker, a black man who wrote to the Thresher, scoffed at the likes of 
Clark’s “half-hearted” admission that segregation was unjust. Pointing to the elite schools of 
the northeast—“Yale, Harvard, Cornell, Rutgers, and Dartmouth”—Parker argued that 
integration was not only possible but the only model of “real democracy” in education. He 
challenged Tyson to take a strong stand against the anti-miscegenation camp, saying that 
anti-segregation necessarily “include[d] intermarriage and cohabitation,” and that if the 
editor was unwilling to honor this measure of social equality then both his position and the 
Constitution were hollow. Parker noted that there were “several thousand colored GI 
babies” in Europe who were loved by their mothers, and that if the South could embrace 
such a democratic posture, black folks who had migrated to Harlem and Chicago would 
return and re-infuse the southland with their human capital. Equality, he pressed, could not 
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be achieved by improving existing or establishing more “colored schools,” but rather by full 
societal integration, where black doctors and lawyers could build interracial clientele, where 
the captain of the Rice football team could be black, where “if a white girl associates with 
colored boys in class, in the gym, on the tennis courts etc., why couldn’t she go to a dance 
with him.” True equality, Parker argued, would not kowtow to racialized sexual anxieties, 
but it was indeed sexual anxiety that figured prominently in the backlash against Tyson.108 
The gendered terms with which the likes of Christian and Clark discussed integrated 
undergraduate education betrayed perhaps their greatest fears as white men in the Jim 
Crow South. The questionability of their stances for educational and economic equality 
notwithstanding, both men ultimately saved their strongest, lengthiest commentary for the 
issue of interracial sex and marriage. Perhaps they believed economic and educational parity 
were truly possible in a segregated society; the totality of their inner beliefs remained 
illegible. However, their words revealed that they understood “the Negro” to be male and 
sexually threatening, even if, apparently, enticing enough to attract willing white women. 
Black women were rendered invisible across all of the dialogue by white liberals and white 
supremacists. And it was not that white men of their kind were opposed to educational 
opportunities for women; indeed, their central contention was that integrated schools 
would be unsafe places for women like Clark’s daughter if black men were allowed to 
enroll. Thus, their antipathy toward desegregation and their abrogation of black women 
were not manifestations of mere misogyny, but a sexism co-constructed with and co-
articulated by anti-black racism. Their fear of black men, or perhaps more accurately, the 
intense dread they felt at the idea that white women would enter consenting, long-lasting 
romantic relationships with black men, was the quintessence of their pro-segregation stance. 
Race, gender, and sexuality conflated to render black men dangerous—and in this case not 
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because they were prone to rape white women—but because consenting interracial 
relationships could precipitate the end of white racial purity, which was bound to the 
wombs of white women and only white women. Sexual freedom, at least one sociologist 
warned the Houston public, was “menacing to our internal security,” and the morality of 
any sexual behavior was to be determined by its potential harm to “community,” “family,” 
and “yourself.”109 
These men did not share the same concerns, it seems, about black women 
integrating schools, although presumably they did not believe there was space for black 
women at places like Rice either. The rule of hypodescent, the “convention ‘that considers a 
white woman capable of giving birth to a black child but denies that a black woman can give 
birth to a white child,’” meant much less need for anxiety surrounding interracial sex 
wherein white men and black women were the partners, consenting or not.110 Their 
interracial liaisons neither threatened white racial purity or white men’s exclusive ability to 
transverse all spaces without social sanction. The silences surrounding black women and 
white men in these conversations spoke to the open secret of southern cities—that, as John 
Henry McCray of South Carolina explained, it was “a commonplace experience for many of 
our women in southern towns is to [be] propositioned openly by white men.” If rebuffed, 
some white men were willing to demand “forced intimacy.” Sexual violence perpetrated by 
white men against black women occurred with “alarming regularity” through the 1950s. 
White evasiveness of this open secret notwithstanding, for black Southerners, the violent 
sexual assaults of black women by white men rendered “the fight of the ignorant white 
South against school desegregation… childishly futile.”111  
Carter Wesley agreed, calling out “segregation’s double standard.” White men, in 
Houston and throughout the South, could escape indictments, convictions, and even charges 
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of rape when black women were the plaintiffs. Meanwhile, “if a Negro looks at a white 
woman, when the wind blows up her skirt… all of the daily papers and white leaders 
deplore the beastiality and depravity of the Negro race.” He demanded that white men hold 
each other accountable for assaults on black women, take responsibility for their own 
sexual impropriety, and acknowledge their own sexual desires, while he also implored white 
women, who he noted were “ordinarily… fair and courageous,” to join in solidarity with 
“the colored woman” and “demand punishment for those who wrong her.” Implying white 
men wholly incapable of policing themselves beyond a fault, Wesley assured white women 
that their freedom was bound up with those of black women. He concluded: “This the 
white woman of the South must recognize… she must act to protect womanhood from 
fiends, [and] she must also be color blind as to whether the woman violated is white or 
colored.” Wesley’s vision of justice resurfaced; it was one in which the skin colors of victim 
and assailant did not predict a judicial outcome better than the facts of the case. He 
summarily dismissed the sexual anxieties of white men, and demanded higher visibility to the 
issues that concerned black women. His plea to white women was particularly daring, as he 
demanded they defy social expectations and extend the sanctity of womanhood that had 
been bestowed upon them to black women as well.112 
White anxiety surrounding black men’s and white women’s sexualities helped 
segregationists rationalize their group-wide prejudices against black people. Rice student 
Bob King wanted Tyson’s readership to know that the majority of its students would 
actually agree with the likes of Christian and Clark, not the newspaper editor. He wrote 
that while he respected Tyson, he did not appreciate that Tyson was using the newspaper 
to “impress” his “viewpoints” on the student body, nor did King like that Tyson was leading 
the Thresher’s wider readership to believe that integration was desired by the majority of 
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Rice’s students. He demanded that Tyson answer Mills’s questions about interracial dating 
forthrightly, charging that the editor had been “elusive” and disingenuous. So, King decided 
to offer “true insight upon Mr. Tyson’s beliefs,” retelling the story of how Tyson and 
another student had taken him downtown to meet Charles A. Shaw, executive secretary of 
the Watchtower Life Insurance Company, “one of the leading insurance companies in 
Texas,” owned and founded by black Houstonians. “The purpose of this trip,” King 
editorialized, “was to influence me.” He learned that Shaw was “1/32nd negro,” that he had 
reasonable arguments against segregation, but that he also held the, to King, untenable 
position that interracial dating, marriage, and child-rearing should be matters of free 
association. King recalled: “Mr. Tyson agreed verbally.” While King “strongly desire[d] equal 
rights in all respects for the negro and white races,” he was both “appalled and saddened” 
that Shaw and Tyson would even suggest the possibility of social equality. Much like 
Christian, where he could not legally justify his opposition to “miscegenation,” King turned 
to religion, believing that racial separation was a sacred matter, and that any opposition to 
racial purity “seems very disrespectful to our maker.”113 
Thus, some white Houstonians promulgated a color-valuing stance toward 
integration. At a time of intense anti-Communism and the valorization of “the individual,” 
white Houstonians who opposed integration therefore articulated their disdain for social 
equality by employing a number of interconnected rationales. Color-valuing, forthright white 
supremacists simply disavowed the equality of black folks, believing that there was 
something less than human about black folk as a matter of divine law. Less extreme ideas 
posited the full equality of all people in the eyes of Providence, but contended that that 
equality did not extend into the social and physical worlds. Such color-evasion posited that 
the races had earned, in meritocracy, whatever their group place had been located. While 
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color did not necessarily define the intrinsic worth of a being, color could—and did—define 
each individual’s place in society. Some white Houstonians rationalized their belief in the 
moral imperative of racial segregation with their liberal individualist values by relying on 
economic arguments, foregrounding their concerns as property owners. However, their 
class-based justifications were never divorced from racial logics and were often sustained by 
the same sexual anxieties that inspired the rhetoric of folks like Smiley, Christian, and King. 
Ultimately, these fears reflected beliefs wherein black people were inherently 
dangerous and criminal. In response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of 
Education (1954), Governor Allan Shivers of Texas solicited letters from the public 
concerning how he should address the issue. Hundreds of letters poured in from all across 
the state from anxious white residents. Helen A. Hunt’s letter explicitly stated the tension 
many Americans were trying to reconcile in this Cold War period: “My belief in our U.S. 
Constitution is unshakeable, yet I find it difficult to accept in fact that undeniable and truthful 
right of equality of all men.” She explained that she could “never” overcome her personal 
prejudice against black people, despite recognizing that they should be guaranteed equal 
access to opportunities as citizens of the nation. She suggested a plan for gradual 
desegregation starting in the first grade and then moving up the grade levels each year, so 
white children learn to see black people as equal and the “six-year-old piccaninny” will not 
have “absorbed much of the Negroes’ lowly standards.” Even here, in the letter written by a 
woman with a self-reflective understanding of her own prejudice and no explicit references 
to biological difference or theological mandate, the specter of immorality and filth among 
black people lay on the surface of anti-black discrimination.114 
But if Mrs. Hunt held her beliefs and values in tension with one another, other white 
Houstonians and Texans learned to reconcile them. On the progressive side, which 
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accounted for very few of the letters, the reconciliation was simple: one had to abandon 
white supremacy in order to honor their values. Mrs. Wilma Lindsey explained that she had 
lived in other parts of the world and had learned that segregation was provincial and tribal. 
It was a stain on Texas, she said, likening it to Georgia and Mississippi. But Lindsey’s opinion 
was in the minority among white Americans of the time.115 
Most writers to Shivers were like V. P. Lance—not explicit biological racists, but 
certainly opposed to social equality. Like Lance, they would start their letters with the 
recognition that: “A negro is a human.” But being human was not enough. They needed to 
be real Americans—they needed to have spilled their blood for the Republic from its 
inception and earned their place as citizens. Black Americans had not done that, he insisted. 
Instead they had been “made citizens” by “our ancestors,” Lance argued. And now they, like 
Frederick Douglass, had gotten an inch and taken an ell. Political equality he could stomach, 
but the social equality that desegregation threatened to bring was “a sign of us being 
railroaded.” For Lance, Black people could be human, if human meant they were of the same 
species as white folk. But they were not a nation worthy of the name.116 
Many writers held the same opinions as Russel E. L. Middings, a married café owner 
from Dallas with two years of high school education. He turned to theology and the Bible to 
justify segregation. “God made a wolf, it is an animal,” he explained. “God made a sheep, it 
is an animal. Can you keep them in the same pen? Yes, if you want to destroy the sheep.” 
The case Middings made was not exactly the same kind of theological one prevalent in the 
nineteenth century. He claimed that black people were indeed human just as white people 
are human, but the former was predatory and the latter was like prey. He continued: “I 
have respect for the negro. I am his friend, if he will let me be, but I do not intend to bunk 
up with the negro…. This is not prejudice. It is obeying the law of nature—GOD…” 
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Middings certainly believed himself sober-minded and showed no evidence of embracing the 
kind of scientific racism that brought about many of the horrors in World War II. But he 
also was not “colorblind,” even as he departed from the kind of eugenicist white supremacy 
that pervaded the early decades of the twentieth century. Though he was in practice a white 
supremacist, in his mind he understood that the races were simply different. The wolf was 
no better than the sheep, and vice versa. But they were different, he maintained. And so he 
could claim, without a hint of irony, that he held no prejudice against black folk, insofar as it 
was not prejudicial to avoid a natural predator. Even here, however, we can see the implicit 
argument that black people were a danger to society—that they must be kept away from 
white people—that the solution to the problem of black danger was more segregation.117 
 Middings reached the same conclusion as Jack Connelly, then, though the logic in 
their two letters was quite different. Connolly typified those die-hard white supremacists of 
yore. He viewed black people as less-than-human, “just one step ahead of an ape.” Like 
Middings, his argument immediately invoked the image of black danger. “Look at the recent 
rape cases in Texas,” he argued. “They prove my saying that they are one step ahead of an 
animal in most cases.” But even Connelly tempered his tone, even as he referred to “negro 
blood.” “A few of them,” he learned, “you can trust.”118 White feelings toward black people, 
then, were quite complicated. They could detest the group but respect select individuals. 
They could believe the myth of the black male rapist, but still hire black men to chauffeur 
their wives. They could believe that black people were filthy, but hire black maids to clean 
their homes and feed their families. The economic desires of white Americans, the luxury of 
cheap black labor, and persistent negative stereotypes about black people gave rise to these 
paradoxes and gave shape to the structured intimacies that defined Jim Crow societies. 
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 As disparate as the logics in many of these letters were, a common thread followed 
through them: fear of black danger. One writer made the odd claim that black people were 
not religious—despite that one of the firmest and long-lasting stereotypes about black 
people was that they were intensely religious, if not overly superstitious. The sentiment 
here, however, was picked up in another letter, where a mother wrote, “It’s not the color 
of the Negro’s skin, but the color of his soul, blacker than his skin, that is the greater 
menace.” The menace referred to a tendency toward vice, sexual impropriety, filthiness, and 
criminality. Writer John Brougher explained, invoking vital statistics, that black people had 
proven that they had low moral standards. “The Mexicans,” he explained, were once also 
ostracized by the white population. But they had proven the ability to keep their children 
clean and taught them a firm moral code. Black parents, he argued, including black teachers 
and black churches, failed to love themselves and their children. They trafficked in moral 
degeneracy. Were black people created this way? Were they biologically predisposed to 
criminality? Or were they shaped culturally toward self-destructiveness? For Brougher, 
these questions were moot.  For him, the facts were the facts and black people had proven 
themselves unworthy of social equality with the white race.119 
 Similarly, a writer who did rely on religion to make his case initially eventually found 
it useful to reference crime data to prove his point. This anonymous writer explained that, 
“When anyone tries to tell us there is no difference between the white and the negro, he is 
trying to undo what God has done.” Invoking racial difference rather than white supremacy, 
the writer briefly switched gears: “Most negroes are good people.” There he seemed to 
acknowledge individuality among black people and a willingness to judge them as persons 
rather than a group. But, a few sentences later, he claimed, “[B]ut there is still some 
improvement for them yet… To adjust themselves as a whole.” Then, like so many others, 
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he summoned the discourse of black crime, “In the city of Atlanta in 1953, there were 74 
homicides… 70 of the 74 was negro killed negro.”120 Across the board, then, whether they 
were biological racists, cultural racists, theological racists, or any odd combination of the 
three, white Americans who believed that segregation was central to the maintenance of 
societal order found their explanation in the problem of what they then called “Negro 
crime.” 
 
n the aftermath of World War II and in the cauldron of Cold War politics, Americans 
across the nation vocally renewed their commitment to liberal individualism. But, for 
many white Americans, their value of individualism was at odds with their belief in 
white supremacy. I tease out this tension in the 1950s to develop a more complete, though 
admittedly fragmented image of white racial thinking. Though black Houstonians during the 
time often spoke of their “raceless” vision for the future of America, their white neighbors 
were not quite ready for that dream. Instead, they held their beliefs and their values in 
tension until they learned to reconcile them. Variably and in various ways, they used 
religion, nature, biology, and culture to rationalize a world wherein race still functioned as a 
caste system but individual merit supposedly determined each person’s status in life. 
However they worked through this tension to create synergy, it seemed the constant 
thread was the image of the “Negro criminal” as evidence of the need to maintain the 
American caste. 
Color-valuing beliefs had several components. The two most obvious were 
biological and theological racism, and they were often, though not necessarily, co-
constitutive beliefs. Biological racism allowed white supremacists to reconcile their 
individualist values with racial inequality by noting the inherent differences between the so-
I 
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called races. Theology gave racial pseudo-science a divine stamp of approval. The third belief 
was about racial criminality. By the 1950s, the conviction that black people were more 
criminal than their white counterparts was only tentatively tied to biology in the minds of 
many white folks. While some would certainly point to “Negro criminality” as evidence of 
black people’s biological inferiority, often they preferred to use crime statistics as 
justification for segregation, rendering the state of racial science inconsequential. Ironically, 
this “scientific” explanation for black inferiority created a space where biological and 
theological racists could find common ground with racial progressives.121  
Twenty-one-year-old Charles Tighe, a Rice Institute basketball player, wrote at 
length to Tyson about his hopes for desegregation. He believed that regardless of where the 
majority student body opinion stood on desegregation in 1949, compared to students a 
decade prior there would be strong indications of progress toward a more racially-inclusive 
sentiment at Rice. Indeed, by 1953, when students were first surveyed regarding integrating 
Rice, fifty-seven percent polled in favor of desegregation, and in 1961 undergraduates voted 
2:1 and graduate students 4:1 in favor of excising the university charter of its racial 
restriction.122 Tighe noted that, for himself, the “segregation dilemma” was an 
unconscionable one, rooted in prejudices “inflicted” on children by their parents and 
teachers, dating back to racial slavery and perpetuated by contemporary systemic 
discriminations.123  
Like many in the middle of the century, Tighe maintained that laws could not change 
people’s personal discriminations, and thus believed progress toward an integrated society 
would “take place gradually and only by constant work.” He pressed white Americans to 
take on the task of doing that work, arguing, “From a Christian viewpoint he [the black 
person] is undoubtedly our equal.” And from a secular perspective, the Constitution 
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“theoretically” guaranteed all black Americans “the rights, privileges, and duties conferred 
on each ‘citizen.’” For white Americans, religious or otherwise, “the real most important 
change must come from within the individual” as a result of “calm, objective thought.” They 
would unlearn the belief that “the average Negro child isn’t as capable as is the average 
white child [strikethroughs in the original text].” Black folks did not suffer from biological or 
physiological deficiencies, but rather from a dearth of opportunity, and this, he wrote, “is 
not his [black people’s] fault, but ours!” His sentiments were congruent with the color-
rejecting political philosophies of civil rights leaders like Christia Adair and Carter 
Wesley.124 
But, Tighe then went on a tangent and brought up the subject of crime. “If a Negro 
steals, he should be put in jail,” he argued. The same was true if a white person stole. “But 
the difference,” he wrote, “…is that the member of our own race is given a chance to live 
as an honored member in our society, while the Negro is denied this chance and in effect is 
judged guilty without chance of a trial.”125 Like other Houstonians demonstrated, an 
understanding of systemic inequality could bring a certain level of nuance to a conversation 
about how to treat people who were fundamentally disadvantaged in American society, but 
color-rejecting philosophy was still steeped in liberal individualism and this limited the kind 
of creative reasoning polemicists could deploy in favor of structural fixes. Even if a lack of 
opportunity could explain many incidences of crime in black Houston, Tighe still believed 
the individual perpetrators should be incarcerated after a fair trial. Though he looked 
forward to an America, a Houston, and a Rice where freedom of association was not limited 
by color, though he had a certain grasp on the realities of the historical and structural 
disadvantages black Americans faced, and though he was “sure” that black citizens must be 
granted equal opportunity, Tighe’s principles were still fundamentally shaped by a 
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democratic Christian ethos where individuals were responsible for what he perceived as 
choices, regardless of the circumstances which informed or even forced those actions. 
Eschewing color, then, could also mean ignoring how crime itself was socially constructed 
and how black people were socially positioned to be made into criminals, especially when 
they contested racial boundaries. The case of a working black man named Johnnie Lee 
Morris, who contested white space on a city bus, would elucidate the limits of political 
positions rooted in individualism in black Houstonians’ fight for racial justice.  
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was a backlash to civil rights gains, then, Freund argues had already been a developed part of white 
identity politics before 1954. Moreover, he contends, this colorblindness cannot be understood as simply 
obfuscation of an old racism, but was a deeply held commitment. Any apparent racial prejudice on the 
part of white citizens—at least those ones who honestly believed themselves colorblind—was, from 
their perspective, “market-driven reason” with regard to protecting their property interests against 
depreciation that, for whatever reason, seemed to follow wherever black folk moved and lived. Freund, 
Colored Property: State Policy and White Racial Politics in Suburban America, 8 (quotes). 
In contrast, returning to the apparent exceptionalism of the South, and focusing on the life and career of 
James J. Kilpatrick, historian William P. Hustwit argues that alongside a real commitment to small 
government and individual freedom, conservatives like Kilpatrick maintained a thoroughgoing 
commitment to white racial supremacy, though in muted terms. Kilpatrick, a nationally syndicated 
conservative columnist in the 1950s through the 1970s, had been an ardent segregationist in the 1950s 
and grew in notoriety by reasoning in his column that Virginia had an obligation to interpose itself 
between the federal government and individual citizens following the 1954 Brown v. Board decision. He 
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also argued that southern states should form a coalition, all of them enacting the doctrine of 
interposition to defy any court orders to desegregate local schools. While he maintained that “the 
Negro race, as a race,” demonstrated a fundamental anthropological inferiority to white people, he 
sought to appeal to moderate sensibilities by focusing on issues that were less tainted by the most 
blatant white supremacist rhetoric: individual rights, meritocracy, interposition, and small government. 
William P. Hustwit, “From Caste to Color Blindness: James J. Kilpatrick’s Segregationist Semantics.,” 
Journal of Southern History 77, no. 3 (2011): 650 (quote). 
By the end of the 1950s, however, realizing that interposition could not withstand the federal court’s 
power, Kilpatrick altered his position, and in 1961 expressed that he could acknowledge and respect the 
successes of individual “Negroes” who demonstrated that they were “decent, well education [sic], 
intelligent, and perfectly respectable men and women,” insofar as they did not demand social 
“intermingling” with their white counterparts. In his transition from a racism committed to black 
“inferiority” to a racism defined by a belief in fundamental racial “difference,” Kilpatrick was beginning to 
articulate his commitment to “colorblind” individualism. In private, however, he admitted that this was 
more a discursive change than a transformation of conviction, believing that by changing the language he 
could avoid charges of racism. Throughout the 1960s, Kilpatrick articulated his newfound theory of racial 
difference more fully. In effect, he judged black people “as a race,” and then pointed to the “individual” as 
responsible for self-uplift. He expected black people, “as a race,” to prove themselves worthy of equality 
to white people, while he remained wholly convinced that each individual black person was responsible 
for making that happen. He remained oblivious to the ways his expectations conflicted with each other, 
for he maintained racial prejudice against “the race,” but did not believe that prejudice in any way 
impeded the progress of black individuals, and moreover, maintained that the successes of a few 
individual black folks were not indicators of the possibilities for the entire racial group. Ibid., 651 (all 
quotes). 
By the 1990s, Hustwit argues that Kilpatrick and the nation’s conservatives had successfully folded in this 
“colorblind” approach to racial difference and racial inequality into their other commitments for small 
government, free market capitalism, private property, and “equal opportunity” (i.e., anti-affirmative 
action). Thus, Kilpatrick indicated for Hustwit that conservative colorblindness was “reactionary”—a 
response to social and political changes in the nation that not only ended de jure segregation, but also 
made blatant white supremacy unpalatable. Ibid., 664 (first and second quotes), 669 (third quote). 
Matthew Lassiter’s Sunbelt Majority also focuses on the South, but like Freund, Lassiter appreciates the 
intersections of racism and classism in ways that Hustwit does not. Lassiter agrees with Freund that 
colorblindness was not, for many white southerners, a hastily constructed disguise for the unpalatable 
biological racism of the past. Like Freund, he argues that transformations in whiteness as identity began 
in the 1940s. He notes that this was not a “backlash” to civil rights gains, but rather a response to 
“fundamental transformations” in the American demographic, political, and social landscapes. The mass 
migration of black and white folks from the rural South to the booming economies of Sunbelt cities and 
their rising suburbs issued a direct challenge to the one-party system that had monopolized southern 
politics since the advent of Jim Crow voting restrictions and coming of age of the white primary. Second, 
the rise of suburbs (possibly through the federal funding of exclusively white residential communities, 
Lassiter points out) coincided with civil rights gains and changing social attitudes about race. White 
Americans learned to see their middle class ascendance as a result of their individual hard work and 
merit and their investment in property that they would call home a matter of earned privilege not to be 
circumscribed or trifled with by the federal government. They chose to create and live in white 
neighborhoods, they reasoned, because it was a sound economic investment. Color prejudice, they 
contended, was not a factor in their decision-making. Finally, then, this transformation of identity, which 
Freund had so brilliantly demonstrated had occurred in the North, had also taken place in the South 
prior to the civil rights gains of black Americans following 1954, and was already primed for collapse 
under a broad conservative umbrella that wed colorblindness, meritocracy, and individual property rights 
under one anti-big government umbrella. Lassiter, like the aforementioned scholars, does not concede 
that “racial prejudice simply disappeared from middle-class values,” and rather maintains that the 
emergence of a new way of thinking hinged on “the establishment of structural mechanisms” that made 
it possible for white Americans to create, anew, exclusive white spaces. Lassiter, The Silent Majority, 3 
(second quote), 4 (third quote). On black disenfranchisement in the South, see Gunnar Myrdal, An 
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American Dilemma, vol. 2: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy (New York: McGraw-Hill Book 
Company, 1964). 
In his study of Atlanta, Keven M. Kruse agrees with Lassiter and Freund that “the white backlash” was 
not an exclusively Southern phenomenon, nor was it without pre-civil rights movement precedent. 
However, he does contend that race and space were central to white conservative anger in Atlanta—
that as black Atlantans successfully gained access to public spaces that had once exclusively belonged to 
white folks, “white southern conservatives were forced to abandon their traditional, populist, an often 
starkly racist demagoguery” for “color-blind” individualism that allowed them to take advantage of the 
color-coded structural relationships emerging between urban centers and their suburban satellites. 
White flight was indeed reactionary, “freedom of choice” a language that could appeal to “suburban 
segregationists” who viewed themselves more as isolationists intently protecting their individual rights 
against federal dictatorship and their property investments against “undesirable” elements. Kruse, White 
Flight, 128 (first quote), 6 (second quote), 266 (third quote), 245 (fourth quote), 248 (fifth quote), 244 
(sixth quote). 
Notwithstanding some disagreement about whence colorblindness emerged and how it interacted with 
conservative commitments to small government, historians, sociologists, and other scholars have 
developed a long list of the detrimental effects of colorblind individualism on non-white, and particularly 
black Americans. These include, but are not limited to, racialized mass incarceration, persistent 
educational segregation and racialized achievement gaps, residential segregation patterns wherein white 
buyers get greater access to newer and better housing stock, disproportionate exposure to 
environmental hazards, racially disparate voting rights restrictions, and mass unemployment and 
underemployment. Even when black Americans share income parity with their white counterparts, the 
historical and social science literatures still reveal that black Americans and their children suffer with 
respect to each of these social, political, economic, and environmental factors. These researchers 
emphasize the structural nature of this inequality, highlighting the ways it has and continues to limit the 
life chances of black Americans. They also urge scholars and lay readers to understand that this 
structural inequality is not only immune to being resolved by colorblind individualism, but is sustained by 
it.  
10 This chapter addresses the “mainstream,” which included what we would now call liberals, moderates, 
and conservatives. Despite their disagreements, white Houstonians in each of these political orientations 
would not have suffered the kind of surveillance, ostracization, or stigmatization that socialists suffered. 
That is, while New Deal Democrats, for example, remained unpopular among many white Houstonians, 
the city’s “reactionary community” targeted groups and persons they believed to be working with or 
compromised by communism. Because one of the animating questions here is how white Americans 
managed to adapt to the civil rights claims of black Americans, rooted as they were in liberal 
individualism, this chapter works to tease out how liberal individualism worked in tandem with evolving 
racial formation schemes. Thus, while a study of white communist racial identity evolutions remains to be 
completed—it is doubtful that white leftists did not practice racial identity politics despite their 
disavowal of such politics—I focus on this mainstream because of its commitment to individualist 
philosophy. 
11 Social psychologists maintain distinctions between each of these. Values are those idealized and enduring 
standards by which people assess actions and societal conditions. Beliefs, closely related, though 
sometimes only tentatively so, are the assumptions and lenses through which people interpret the world. 
While a person may value liberal individualism, for example, they may believe that race is biological or 
that the world is inherently “just,” and that the conditions of marginalized people reflect their merit 
rather than their historical inheritances. Attitudes describe people’s affective dispositions. While they may 
believe in white supremacy, they may also value individualism, and therefore, may be disgusted by acts of 
racial violence, even as they remain disinterested in racial equality. Attitudes tend to mirror the 
predominant socially acceptable expression of widely held beliefs. Actions most immediately reflect 
attitudes more than beliefs or values, but are always influenced by a specific context. American ideals of 
individualism have long been in tension with sexism, racism, and classism, and thus Americans have always 
been struggling to find a racial project that satisfies their ideals and their status quo simultaneously. Dan 
Voich and Lee P. Stepina, Cross-Cultural Analysis of Values and Political Economy Issues (Greenwood Publishing 
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Group, 1994); Melvin J. Lerner, The Belief in a Just World: A Fundamental Delusion (New York: Plenum Press, 
1980). 
12 Riverside Terrace came to be, in Houston’s social geography, the city’s “Jewish community,” where 
wealthy and middle class Jewish citizens could find and build stately homes on large plots of land, after 
having been “barred from River Oaks and other elite subdivisions by the ‘gentlemen’s agreement.’” The 
gentlemen’s agreement was the tacit understanding among non-Jewish white folks that they would not 
sell or re-sell real estate to “undesirable” groups of people. Riverside was not entirely Jewish, but it was 
one of the few affluent areas where they could build and develop without “social restrictions.” Kaplan, 
“Race, Income, and Ethnicity: Residential Change in a Houston Community, 1920-1970,” 186; Jon 
Schwartz, This Is Our Home It Is Not for Sale (Houston, Texas: Riverside Productions, 2007). 
13 “Washington Terrace [Brochure],” n.d., box 2, folder 5, Houston Subdivision Collection MSS.0118, 
HMRC, HPL. 
14 “Washington Terrace [Brochure-2],” n.d., box 2, folder 5, Houston Subdivision Collection MSS.0118, 
HMRC, HPL. Developers understood that some buyers opposed the idea of relinquinshing their power 
to do with their property whatever they willed. Thus, such developers often added the cavaet that 
restrictions in their deeds were meant to protect property values and infringed on individual property 
owners’ prerogatives miminally and only insofar as it would maintain the values of all properties in the 
development. 
15 Houston trailed only behind Miami’s metropolitan growth, where white Americans had managed a 
massive land grab from Seminoles in the late 1920s and where black Americans and migrants from the 
Caribbean were arriving in large numbers during the Great Migration. Cities more often compared with 
Houston—Dallas and Atlanta—experienced 22 percent and 23 percent metro area population growth, 
respectively, from 1930 to 1940.  The third fastest growing metropolitan market was Washington, D.C., 
and while its 43 percent growth was 4 percent behind Houston’s, the District of Columbia and its 
suburbs added 290,544 people compared with Houston’s 170,151.  Arno H. Johnson, “New Census 
Shows City Suburbs Are Fastest Growing Markets,” Sales Management 31 (1940); Planning and 
Development Department, “Historical Population: 1900 to 2013 City of Houston,” n.d., 
http://www.houstontx.gov/planning/Demographics/docs_pdfs/Cy/coh_hist_pop.pdf; Statistical Abstract of 
the United States: 1999, 119th ed. (Washington, DC: U.S. Census Bureau, 1999), 871, 
https://www.census.gov/library/publications/1999/compendia/statab/119ed.html; Kaplan, “Race, Income, 
and Ethnicity: Residential Change in a Houston Community, 1920-1970.” On Miami see Connolly, A World 
More Concrete, 64–70. Houston had been growing rapidly in part as a result of the September 8, 1900, 
hurricane that devastated what was previously Texas’ fastest growing city: Galveston. Many investors and 
families abandoned the island and moved inland to Houston, which provided more security from flood 
surges than did the shores of the barrier island. Additionally, the Texas oil boom, which included the 
striking of oil at Spindletop in Beaumont in 1901, increased interest in the development of what would 
become the heart of the region’s economic infrastructure: the Houston Ship Channel. Prior to the port’s 
development, merchants in the east Texas area traded through Galveston. Traders and businessmen had 
been attempting to develop a port through Houston that could bypass the island’s port management 
since prior to the Civil War, complaining of the exorbitant “charges and losses” they faced doing business 
there. However, financing had remained a formidable impediment to the Houston Ship Channel’s 
development until the early twentieth century, when the city convinced Congress to invest in the 
completion of a twenty-five foot channel in 1910 by promising to pay one half of the costs and 
guaranteeing that the project would remained publicly-owned. Roy Montgomery Farrar, The Story of 
Buffalo Bayou and the Houston Ship Channel 1820-1926 (Houston: Houston Chamber of Commerce, 
1926); Don E. Carleton, Red Scare: Right-Wing Hysteria, Fifties Fanaticism, and Their Legacy in Texas (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 2014). 
16 Pruitt, “For the Advancement of the Race,” x; Pruitt, The Other Great Migration. 
17 Historian John Garrison Marks explains that in spite of the ordinance, free black folk continued to live in 
Houston. Despite many white Houstonians’ complaints about black non-productivity and criminality, 
many of them, especially those wealthier and more powerful, benefited from the domestic and service 
labor free black people provided. Free black people, Marks argues, bargained for space in Houston’s 
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urban economy, as they did in other cities across the South, and thus despite exclusion ordinances, 
remained part of the city’s sociopolitical fabric. “Old Colored High,” n.d., box 1, folder 7, Patricia Smith 
Prather Collection MSS.005, AAL at the Gregory School, HPL (first quote); John Garrison Marks, 
“Community Bonds in the Bayou City: Free Blacks and Local Reputation in Early Houston,” Southwestern 
Historical Quarterly 117, no. 3 (2014): 271  (second, third, and fifth quotes), doi:10.1353/swh.2014.0022; 
Alwyn Barr, Black Texans: A History of African Americans in Texas, 1528-1995, 2nd ed. (Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1996), 9 (fourth quote). Also, on the Houston ordinance and Texas laws governing free 
black people’s residency and criminal statuses, see Harold Schoen, “The Free Negro in the Republic of 
Texas, IV,” Southwestern Historical Quarterly 40, no. 3 (1937): 169–99. 
18 Kaplan, “Race, Income, and Ethnicity: Residential Change in a Houston Community, 1920-1970”; Cheryl 
Caldwell Ferguson, “River Oaks: 1920s Suburban Planning and Development in Houston,” Southwestern 
Historical Quarterly 104, no. 2 (October 1, 2000): 210; Bruce J. Weber and Charles Orson Cook, “Will 
Hogg and Civic Consciousness: Houston Style,” Houston Review: History and Culture of the Gulf Coast II, no. 
1 (1980): 21–38. 
19 The racial restriction said that “no property shall be conveyed to any person other than of the 
Caucasian race.” “River Oaks Corporation, Houston, Texas, Reservation, Restrictions, and Covenants in 
River Oaks Addition,” 1924; Cheryl Caldwell Ferguson, Highland Park and River Oaks: The Origins of Garden 
Suburban Community Planning in Texas (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2014), 202; Charles O. Cook and 
Barry J. Kaplan, “Civic Elites and Urban Planning: Houston’s River Oaks,” East Texas Historical Journal 15, 
no. 2 (1977): 29–37. These attitudes and explicit declarations of “white-only” space would continue in 
some wealthy white developments even into the 1950s. The Briargrove subdivision, established in 1954, is 
situated a little less than ten miles west of downtown Houston. It is bounded to the north by Woodway 
Drive, to the south by Westheimer Road, to the east by Briarmead Drive, and to the west by Briargrove 
Drive. “Briargrove,” Briargrove Property Owners, Inc., accessed May 6, 2015, http://briargrove.org/. The 
entire subdivision is less than five square miles. Although established after Smith v. Allwright, the Briargrove 
Development Company included in its deed restrictions the stipulation that: “No part of Briargrove shall 
be conveyed to, owned by, leased to, used or occupied by persons other than of the white or Caucasian 
Race, except that bona-fide servants of other races may occupy servants’ quarters.” They also mandated: 
“No garage or servants’ quarters shall be used as a residence except that the quarters may be used as a 
residence for servants actually employed on the premises.” Strict architectural and aesthetic 
requirements, alongside these racial restrictions, would ensure the desirability of the neighborhood. 
“RESTRICTIONS BRIARGROVE ADDITION SECTION 5 through SECTION 8,” n.d., box 3, folder 8, 
Houston Subdivision Collection MSS.0118, HMRC, HPL. Neighborhoods like Briargrove, in what would 
come to be “Mid West” Houston, remain heavily racially segregated. Dustin Cable, “The Racial Dot Map,” 
Weldon Cooper Center for Public Service, University of Virginia, July 2013, 
http://www.coopercenter.org/demographics/Racial-Dot-Map; “American FactFinder,” United States 
Census Bureau, 2010, http://factfinder.census.gov/. 
20 William C. Hogg to Mike Hogg, May 8, 1925, box 2J363, William Clifford Hogg Papers, University of Texas 
Archives, Austin, Texas; Robert M. Fogelson, Bourgeois Nightmares: Suburbia, 1870-1930 (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2007), 128; Ferguson, “River Oaks,” 192; Kenneth E. Gray, A Report on the Politics of 
Houston., vol. 2 (Cambridge, Mass.: Joint Center for Urban Studies of the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology and Harvard University, 1960). 
21 Report of the City Planning Commission, Houston, Texas (Houston: The Forum of Civics, 1929), 25, 
https://www.hathitrust.org/. 
22 Carrington Weems, interview by Mike Vance, August 9, 2006, Houston Arts and Media Oral Histories. MS 
524, Woodson Research Center, Fondren Library, Rice University; Harold Kellock, Parson Weems of the 
Cherry-Tree (New York: The Century Co., 1928); “Benjamin Francis Weems,” Weems Collections, n.d., 
http://weemscollections.com/benjamin-francis-weems; Texas Historical Commission., “[Historic Marker 
Application: M. L. Weems House],” 1991, University of North Texas Libraries, The Portal to Texas History, 
texashistory.unt.edu; crediting Texas Historical Commission, 
https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth460548/. 
23 Oveta Culp Hobby was the powerful editor of the Houston Post. Her husband, William P. Hobby had been 
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governor of Texas, 1917-1920. Gus Wortham owned the powerful American General Insurance 
Company, and Jesse Jones served as U.S. Secretary of Commerce in the 1940s. Herman and George R. 
Brown owned the influential Brown & Root construction company as well as the Texas Eastern 
Corporation, which transmitted natural gas. The “others” were Robert E. “Bob” Smith, an oil and real 
estate investor, James Abercrombie, an iron works developer, and Judge James Elkins, influential lawyer 
and banker. As noted in the first chapter, these people comprised “8F,” the city’s true power brokers 
between the 1920s and the 1950s. Joseph Pratt, “8F and Many More: Business and Civic Leadership in 
Modern Houston,” Houston History Review 1, no. 2 (2004): 2–7, 31–39; Weems, interview; “F. Carrington 
Weems - Honors, Achievements, Awards and Publications,” Weems Collections, n.d., 
http://weemscollections.com/. 
24 Glenn Feldman, The Irony of the Solid South: Democrats, Republicans, and Race, 1865-1944 (Tuscaloosa: 
University of Alabama Press, 2013), 198; Michael Keith Honey, Black Workers Remember: An Oral 
History of Segregation, Unionism, and the Freedom Struggle (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2000). In fact, black domestic labor was so valuable to white River Oaks families that in 1953 when 
Houston Transit Company bus drivers’ harassment of black riders began to prevent black workers from 
arriving to work on time or at all, “several prominent River Oaks women” protested the company.  
“River Oaks Citizens Complain,” Houston Informer, September 5, 1953, 1. 
25 Houston remains highly segregated by race and class in the twenty-first century, and white families 
continue to occupy the most “desirable” properties in the city, especially considering those closest to 
the city’s several business districts. Over time, subdivisions like Southampton and Glendower Court, 
developed from muddy farmlands to blacktopped, manicured suburbs, have returned on their initial 
investments for property owners several times over. In 2010, the Southampton area ranked, along with 
the River Oaks area and the enclaved city of West University Place, as the only community where more 
than seventy-five percent of households earned more than $75,000 per year. In Glendower Court sixty-
nine percent of households earned more than that amount. Less than two percent of the residents in 
both Glendower Court and Southampton were black in 2010. These areas of wealth remain 
disproportionately white. See 2010 U.S. Census data. 
26 Those neighborhoods near Rice University form a larger community called Boulevard Oaks and are a 
part of the University Place super neighborhood. “Southampton [Pamphlet 1],” n.d., box 1, folder 31, 
Houston Subdivision Collection MSS.0118, HMRC, HPL; “Southampton [Map],” n.d., box 1, folder 31, 
Houston Subdivision Collection MSS.0118, HMRC, HPL; “Southampton [Pamphlet 2],” n.d., box 1, folder 
31, Houston Subdivision Collection MSS.0118, HMRC, HPL; Marshall Verniaud, Southampton: A Mini-History 
of the First 50 Years (Houston: The Southampton Civic Club, 1975), 1. 
27 Carter came of age in Sherman, Texas, a small town north of Dallas, before his family relocated to 
Houston in 1892 at the age of thirty-five. He had primarily been a lumberman until the Panic of 1907, 
when the New York Stock Exchange’s dramatic fall propelled several businesses and banks into failure. 
Seizing the financial opportunity opened by skittish bankers and merchants, Carter “sold his substantial 
lumber interests and chartered the eponymous Lumberman’s National Bank…” Over the next several 
years he “absorbed” Jesse Jones’s National City Bank, Central Bank & Trust, and American National Bank, 
and in 1923 changed the company’s name to Second National Bank. In the interim, he co-founded the 
Tryon & Carter lumber company and gave Houston its first skyscraper and Texas its tallest building: “a 
sixteen-story steel-frame and brick building on Main at Rusk,” proving to the city’s skeptics that Houston 
could safely reach new heights. Kate Sayen Kirkland, Captain James A. Baker of Houston, 1857-1941 
(College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2012), 192 (first quote), 200 (second quote); Kate 
McCormick and Kris Holt, Southside Place (Charleston, SC: Arcadia Publishing, 2014), 10; Betty T. 
Chapman, “‘Carter’s Folly’ Fooled Critics as First Houston Skyscraper,” Houston Business Journal, October 
1, 2006, http://www.bizjournals.com/houston/; Houston and South Texas: A Newspaper Reference Work 
(Houston: Houston Chronicle, 1921), http://archive.org/details/houstonsouthtexa00hous; Men of Affairs of 
Houston and Environs: A Newspaper Reference Work (Houston: W. H. Coyle and Company, 1913), 17, 
http://archive.org/details/menofaffairsofho00hous; “Carter Realizes One Big Ambition When Home Is 
Completed,” Houston Post, October 26, 1924, 25. 
28 “Houston Bank Devises Plan,” Houston Post, October 26, 1924, 25; “Invitation Issued To Houston People 
To Visit Building,” Houston Post, October 26, 1924, 25; “Glendower Court [Ad],” Houston Post, April 19, 
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1924, 13 (first quote); “Glendower Court [Pamphlet],” n.d., (second quote), box 3, folder 27, Houston 
Subdivision Collection MSS.0118, HMRC, HPL; “MAMMOTH AUCTION SALE,” n.d., box 3, folder 27, 
Houston Subdivision Collection MSS.0118, HMRC, HPL (third and fourth quotes). 
29 For a look at the referenced 1960 document, see the “1960 Renewal and Extension” PDF at “BOCA 
Deed Restrictions,” 1960, http://www.daveshine.org/BOCADeedRestr/BOCADeedRestrictions.htm. On 
River Oaks, see Ferguson, Highland Park and River Oaks, 202. 
30 These and the other quotes throughout this section from former Riverside residents, as well as the 
details of the Caesar house bombing, can be found in the documentary Schwartz, This Is Our Home It Is 
Not for Sale, unless otherwise noted. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
33 “Caesars Link Hoggatt In Home Deal,” Houston Informer, June 28, 1952, sec. 1, 10. 
34 Schwartz, This Is Our Home It Is Not for Sale. 
35 “Caesars Link Hoggatt In Home Deal,” 10. 
36 The property no longer exists at this address. As Riverside Terrace transitioned into a mostly black 
community, several blocks of homes were bulldozed to make way for Highway 288 in 1959. Chris Lane, 
“The Changing Face of Houston - Riverside Terrace,” Houston Press, October 13, 2014, 
http://www.houstonpress.com/arts/the-changing-face-of-houston-riverside-terrace-6394303. For more 
on patterns of racial discrimination against Riverside residents once the neighborhood racially transition, 
see Lawrence Wright, “Easy Street,” Texas Monthly, November 1982, 174–81.. 
37 Schwartz, This Is Our Home It Is Not for Sale. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
40 “Houston Comes Through,” 2. The editorial column did not identify the exact location of this attack, and 
the white press did not cover the story. The Informer likely reported on the story in detail in its Tuesday 
edition, but only the Saturday papers were available. 
41 Carter Wesley, “Negroes Harassed,” Houston Informer, May 21, 1952, sec. 2, 2. 
42 Stephen Meyer, As Long As They Don’t Move Next Door: Segregation and Racial Conflict in American 
Neighborhoods (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999), 3. 
43 See, for example, “Third Explosion Occurs While Couple Sleeps,” Houston Informer, July 13, 1950, sec. 1, 1; 
“Governor Refuses To Intervene In Bombing Of Negro Houses In Dallas: 25 Homes Bombed; No 
Arrests,” Houston Informer, July 15, 1950, sec. 1, 1; “Bombings In Negro Addition Terrorize Residents: 
Citizens Cry: How Long Will Our Civil Rights Be Ignored?,” Houston Informer, June 30, 1951, sec. 1, 1; 
“Negro Citizens Refuse To Move In Spite Of Bombs And Buyers,” Houston Informer, February 3, 1951, sec. 
1, 1. 
44 Carter Wesley, “The Real Responsibility,” Houston Informer, May 21, 1952, sec. 2, 2; on “encroachment” 
see Schwartz, This Is Our Home It Is Not for Sale. 
45 Wesley, “The Real Responsibility,” 2. Historian Nathan Connolly points out that black property owners in 
Miami also benefited from price gouging black renters. The artificial constraints of a racist housing 
market on black residential choice created opportunities for white and black real estate agents to form 
unholy alliances that capitalized on black poverty, overcharging black people for homes and failing to 
deliver repairs and services. This was likely the case in Houston as well, where a study on housing in 
1948 revealed that since 1940 “16,000 new dwelling units” had been built in the city, with only “1,791 for 
nonwhites.” Forty-five percent of all black homes in the city were assessed as “substandard.” At 1420 
Mason Street in Fourth Ward, Rufus Baldwin testified that the lot had “one house with four rooms and 
the landlord has cut that house in half in two and getting $22 a week for four rooms.” Sid Hilliard 
testified that similar situations existed in black areas throughout the city, noting: “I can give you an 
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instance where some of my people have rented houses from some of the builders at $5 a week. They are 
three-room apartments. Recently those people they rented the house from instead of renting it for $5 a 
week they would either have to share their three rooms or their rent would be raised to $12.50.” One 
woman, he noted, “had to move out of her house and make room for two other families to move in 
because she wasn’t able to pay that kind of rent” as the job only paid $20 per week. Study and 
Investigation of Housing: Hearings before the Joint Committee on Housing Eightieth Congress, First Session, 1616, 
1648–49. Also see Connolly, A World More Concrete. 
46 “Mrs. Mattye Hilliard Buys Wichita St. Home,” Houston Informer, July 12, 1952, sec. 1, 1. 
47 Jack Ginsburg, “Atty. Ginsburg Writes To Atty. Percy Foreman On The Jack Caesar Case,” Houston 
Informer, August 16, 1952, sec. 1, 1, 10. 
48 “Caesars Link Hoggatt In Home Deal,” 1, 10. 
49 Ibid. Inflation calculations reflect purchasing power and are provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistic’s 
Consumer Price Index calculator. 
50 Ginsburg, “Atty. Ginsburg Writes To Atty. Percy Foreman On The Jack Caesar Case,” 1, 10. 
51 Wesley expressed amusement at Hilliard’s unexpected wrench in the neighborhood association’s plan to 
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CHAPTER 4: TROUBLE ON THE BUS: MAKING THE “NEGRO 
CRIMINAL” AND KEEPING NEGROES IN THEIR “PLACE” 
 
essie Pavlicek had been an unwitting part of the action. October 11, 1951. It was 
a cool autumn Thursday in downtown Houston, nearly ten degrees below the 
average high for that time of year. Pavlicek and her seven-year-old daughter 
Kathryn were at Main and Preston and on their way to Foleyʼs department store, a popular 
shopping destination on the southern end of downtown. After letting her daughter board 
before her, Pavlicek walked up the steps to the bus and asked Houston Transit Company 
bus driver Florian Antone Nowak if his route would take them to Foleyʼs, but he seemed 
distracted. “Then at that time I saw a negro standing [in] the aisle talking to a big white 
man,” she recounted. Trouble. Nowak demanded that the black man, Johnnie Lee Morris, sit 
down. However, the passenger refused, so the driver “handed him a transfer, and told him 
to get off the back way.” Everything was happening so quickly. The black man refused to exit 
through the rear of the bus and insisted on leaving through the front where Pavlicek was 
standing. It was then that she saw the knife. He pulled it out of his pocket, “raised his hand,” 
and “brushed the side” of Pavlicekʼs face with the blade. The woman grabbed her daughter 
and “stepped back down to the sidewalk.” From there she watched for a moment as the 
two men struggled on the bus. Panicked, she ran into a nearby business and asked the store 
personnel to call the police. She never did see the stabbing. By the time police arrived, bus 
operator Nowak had been fatally wounded and Morris had fled the scene.1 
There was no doubt, according to some Houstonians, that the yet unidentified 
“Negro” involved was “a murderer.”2 The Houston Transit Company and the local bus 
B 
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drivers’ union offered a substantial reward to any party that helped capture the assailant.3 
Indeed, many white Houstonians seemed automatically willing to disregard any of the unique 
details of the case; during Morris’s eventual trial, several venirepersons had been dismissed 
because they could not offer an acceptable answer to the question: “Do you believe a 
Negro has a right to defend himself against a white man to the extent of taking the white 
man’s life if the Negro believes that his life is in danger or that he will suffer serious bodily 
injury from the white man?”4 For white Houstonians who imagined that self-defense was a 
white man’s prerogative, Morris had to pay for the stabbing, which, regardless of the 
circumstances, was a crime. Nowak deserved justice. 
Morris’s eventual arrest also reflected white supremacist investment in property and 
space. Morris was initially captured for his rebellion against Texas’s anti-miscegenation 
statutes. He and his wife, a white woman he had married out of state, moved to Houston 
and shared a small apartment at 416 Saulnier Street, one of the many residences in Fourth 
Ward that would eventually be razed to make way for the Gulf Freeway. By breaking with 
Texas’s racial caste system, and doing so blatantly near the heart of the city’s business 
district, Morris had pushed beyond his circumscribed place. A bothered black sheriff’s 
deputy reported Morris and his wife, and the two were arrested, prior to any suspicion that 
he was Nowak’s killer. His interracial romance had resulted in his capture, and his act of 
self-defense against a white attacker placed him squarely in the crosshairs of a biased 
criminal court system.5 
Johnnie Lee Morris’s travails elucidated a limit of the color-rejecting vision espoused 
by Houston’s black leaders and their white allies. Earlier in the century, black attorneys had 
won several important Supreme Court cases challenging the open operation of racial 
prejudice in the nation’s criminal courts. The Supreme Court had been reinterpreting the 
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clauses in the Fourteenth Amendment since the late nineteenth century, and increasingly so 
in the twentieth century as black defendants in criminal trials raised issues of equal 
protection in their challenges to lower court procedures and decisions. Legal scholar 
Melissa L. Sanders argues that the nation’s courts increasingly construed the Fourteenth 
Amendment as a doctrine of colorblindness, despite that the framers’ intent was not to 
prevent states from acknowledging color or the historical consequences of racism, but 
rather to prohibit them from creating or maintaining castes based on color.6  
In some instances, and increasingly so after the First World War, the Supreme 
Court’s interpretations provided some relief to black Americans facing discrimination in 
lower courts. In Moore v. Dempsey (1923) and its series of Scottsboro decisions in the 
1930s, the nation’s highest court signaled that it recognized, in some capacity, that equal 
protection under the law was pivotal to individual self-determination. In Moore the Court 
decided that each of the twelve black farmers in Arkansas who had been convicted of 
murdering five white men during a riot had been denied due process. The lower courts had 
failed to investigate and acknowledge the defendants’ claims that the threat of mob violence 
surrounding the case prevented the administration of a fair trial. The victory followed the 
appointment of a defense team by the NAACP, and, historian Megan Ming Francis notes, 
that decision is pivotal “to understanding how and why the NAACP became a massive and 
successful litigation engine a few decades later.” Significantly, Moore was the first of several 
interwar-period cases wherein the Supreme Court reviewed, remanded, or reversed the 
decisions of lower courts in criminal trials. It began a pattern of practice wherein the 
nation’s highest court would redefine the meanings of equal protection and due process, 
neither of which had been written into the Constitution until Reconstruction. For Morris, 
this meant a trial devoid of mob violence. However, Morris’s trial was not absent of all 
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violence. His best witness disappeared during the early procedural filings in the case; 
Morris’s attorneys cited intimidation against her. Morris himself alleged that his confession 
was forced after sheriff’s deputies tortured him. And black reporters from the Informer 
noted that they had been refused access to Morris or his wife while the two were 
incarcerated while white reporters from the Post and Chronicle had been granted access to 
the jail and thus had been given the power to weave a narrative that would direct public 
opinion against Morris—including the opinions of those who might be chosen to sit on the 
petite jury.7 
About a decade after Moore, in Powell v. Alabama (1932), Norris v. Alabama (1935), 
and Patterson v. Alabama (1935), the justices ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment rights of 
Ozie Powell, Clarence Norris, and Haywood Patterson, three of the infamous Scottsboro 
Boys, had been violated. The legal saga was an important stage for the International Labor 
Defense, a communist organization, which battled for nearly five years with the NAACP 
over defense strategies and efforts in the cases. The nine young boys and men, ranging from 
ages twelve to nineteen, had been accused of raping two white women, Victoria Price and 
Ruby Bates, twenty-one years old and seventeen years old respectively. All of the 
Scottsboro boys were found guilty, and a jury sentenced all except twelve-year-old Roy 
Wright to death. In Powell, the Court reckoned that Alabama’s failure to ensure that the 
defendant had effective counsel was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process 
clause. In Norris’s appeal, the Supreme Court found that the systematic exclusion of black 
citizens from jury rolls by the State under the pretense of race-neutral statutes disregarded 
equal protection and due process. And for Patterson, the Court confirmed that such 
exclusion was grounds for a retrial.8 
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Legal scholars, recognizing that racial disparities still plague the American criminal 
court system, despite the rulings in the interwar-period cases, argue that each was limited in 
its scope and that, while none guaranteed that black Americans would receive equal 
protection, even if they received a “fair trial” by the courts’ standards, they did prime white 
Americans to “hide” racial discrimination “in the criminal justice system… behind 
discretion.” Indeed, constitutional law scholar Susan N. Herman argues that “fairness” was a 
standard manufactured by the courts and that the decisions in the Scottsboro cases 
eschewed the question of “equality,” which would critically consider the historical 
consequences of racial discrimination in court proceedings and case law as pivotal to 
ensuring due process. In the late twentieth century, the Supreme Court decided in 
McCleskey v. Kemp (1987) that empirical evidence of racial discrimination against black 
defendants in death penalty sentences was not enough to prove that the defendant, Warren 
McCleskey, had been personally discriminated against when he too was sentenced to death 
in Georgia after killing a white Atlanta police officer. If anything, legal scholar Michael J. 
Klarman argues, the Scottsboro and Moore cases set a precedent for mobilizing black 
communities to become active participants in an increasingly noisy civil rights agenda in the 
mid-twentieth century. However, insofar as legal impact was concerned, the cases did not 
necessarily yield greater procedural or civil rights for black Americans. “The most that 
Norris seems to have accomplished anywhere—and even then only in large cities in the 
peripheral South,” Klarman wrote, “was place a single black person onto an occasional 
jury.”9 
The Supreme Court continued to challenge explicit racial discrimination in the 
nation’s lower courts through the following decades in an effort to excise, from the criminal 
justice process, procedural errors that violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Of course, 
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getting prosecutors and attorneys to avoid making errors was not the same thing as 
ensuring black citizens received equal protection and due process, even if the trial was 
deemed “fair.” It meant, instead, that the agents of the court would evince no intent to 
discriminate against Morris on the basis of race. For Communist sympathizers in such 
racially charged criminal cases, the Supreme Court could take credit for taking “great care 
to instruct” lower courts on how to legally execute “lynch schemes” while restoring faith in 
the moral authority of the criminal court system. By the time of Morris’s trial, then, he was 
still subject to the racialized machinations of the Harris County Criminal Courts—a system 
that had adapted to the new normal in the Supreme Court’s application of the equal 
protection clause. The courts had learned to evade color—or at least had learned to appear 
to do so.10 
Johnnie Lee Morris’s case was a high-profile demonstration of how well the Harris 
County Criminal Courts had adapted to the Supreme Court’s rulings, how color-evasive 
white Houstonians managed to maintain a Jim Crow court as the 1950s began, and how 
black people’s commitment to individualism compelled them to concede that the decision in 
Johnnie Lee Morris’s case was “fair,” even though the practices and procedures of the entire 
trial were characteristic of segregation. Whether Morris’s attorneys could have convinced 
white Houstonians of his innocence with a structuralist argument remains uncertain, as 
there are few indicators that white Houstonians or agents of the courts acted in good faith 
in racially charged trials. However, it is clear that the defense team were true believers in 
liberal philosophy and law. Despite Morris’s guilty verdict in a case where black Houstonians 
were convinced of the righteousness of his actions and his right to self-defense, his black 
supporters resigned that he had gotten a “fair trial” in a Jim Crow court because of the 
apparent absence of mob violence and blatant appeals to racial animus. Morris’s case 
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revealed how racial tokenism, color-evasive peremptory strikes, and avoidance of explicitly 
racist appeals could provide a strong rheotrical defense for the all-white prosecutorial team, 
the all-white courts, and the all-white jury from claims of discrimination. Black Americans 
also legitimated that system by accepting, as evidence of progress, that Morris had at least 
been spared mob violence or legal execution. The case also functioned to make Morris a 
criminal and to authorize white people to determine the consequences for black people 
who forsook their circumscribed “place” in American society.  
 
or the first time in its history and in order to find Florian Nowak’s assailant, the 
Houston Police Department used television to spread information about a murder 
and to solicit information from Houston-area residents.  A hat found at the scene 
that had been purchased in San Francisco turned out to be critical evidence in the initial 
questioning of Morris. Houston's newspapers went into a frenzy after the stabbing of 
Nowak. The Houston Post ran several front page stories about the killing. Nowak had only 
been on the job for about three months when he was killed by “a ‘smart aleck’ Negro [who] 
was fired from a South End drive-in grocery because of his attitude, who then went to work 
for an attorney as a yard man.” The newspaper claimed that the unnamed attorney’s wife 
said that she gave the employee “a shirt similar to the one the slayer was reported 
wearing.” Despite this matter-of-fact description of the “slayer,” the Post did not have a 
name. It turned out that these reports were grossly inaccurate; Morris was a 
longshoreman.11 That is, despite not having much evidence about the suspect, white 
Houstonians and the white press had already been cultivated to see him as a working-class 
Negro who refused to stay in his place, complete with a sour disposition and a chip on his 
shoulder.12 
F 
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Johnnie Lee and Christine Morris had been married in Nevada and moved to Texas 
where their marriage transgressed the state’s anti-miscegenation statutes. On October 
14th, three days after Nowak’s stabbing, the two rested in bed in their Fourth Ward 
apartment. At 10:30 P.M., Harris County Sheriff C. V. “Buster” Kern, Captain Lloyd Frazier, 
and Deputies Paul Anderson and Alvin Baker (who was black and reported the Morris 
couple to Sheriff Kern) entered their home, “made them dress,” and arrested them on 
suspicion of miscegenation and vagrancy. While they questioned Johnnie Lee downtown, 
officers found a ticket stub from a movie theater in San Francisco in his coat pocket. Soon, 
they had extracted a “signed statement” from Morris “saying he had stabbed the bus 
driver,” and on October 17th, without having had any opportunity to consult an attorney, 
he admitted to the stabbing before Judge A. C. Winborn, arguing that he had acted in self-
defense. Officers then searched his apartment where they found a bloody undershirt, and 
with Morris’s directions, a jack-knife hidden “in a hole in the floor under the shower 
bath.”13 
Johnnie Lee was indicted for murder, officially charged with killing Florian Nowak 
“with malice aforethought…by cutting and stabbing him with a knife.” Christine was charged 
on a separate offense of miscegenation, despite her husband’s claim that she was “part 
Negro and part Czechoslovakian.” Officers denied that Christine was anything but white. 
Sheriff Kern made sure that Mrs. Morris remained unavailable to Informer reporters and 
NAACP representatives, including Christia Adair, all of whom continued to press county jail 
officials for the opportunity to talk with the incarcerated woman. Denied legal 
representation and a sympathetic press by a Jim Crow Sheriff’s Department, the Morris 
couple’s narrative remained shaped by the city’s white media.14 
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The city’s black press, under Carter Wesley’s leadership, remained cautiously 
defensive. “Heavenly Houston’s” black residents were aware that the relative tranquility of 
race relations in their city was tentative and based on their compliance to the demeaning 
protocols of Jim Crow “etiquette.” As Wesley’s Informer kept black Houstonians abreast of 
developments in the case, “arous[ing] the steam of more people than any other case of its 
type ever to happen in Houston,” Christia Adair began a fundraising campaign for Johnnie 
Lee Morris’s defense. For Adair, the case presented not only an opportunity for 
Houstonians to reckon with the vestiges of segregation on public transportation, but also a 
chance to acknowledge the ways Jim Crow allowed white men to regulate—or at least 
attempt to regulate—the sexual behaviors and desires of white women and black men. 
With a competent defense team, she believed the Morris case could deliver several victories 
for Houston’s black community. By dramatizing a case wherein “a white woman” was 
“happy with him [a black man] and wanting him,” Morris’s defense could undermine white 
men’s claims that black men had unrequited and insatiable demands for white women and 
were therefore a risk to those women. The case might also force an equal protection 
appeal, since Harris County’s criminal courts practiced a pattern of excluding black people 
from petite juries, and considered them “not qualified” to serve in cases of interracial 
violence. If the rest of Houston could understand the significance of Morris’s case as 
righteous transgression against Jim Crow segregation, then, Adair believed the NAACP 
would “prove that we had people in all walks of life that could not only serve on juries but 
could do anything.”15 
Black Houstonians rallied behind the work of Adair and the NAACP. Throughout 
the early 1950s, black citizens made frequent complaints about mistreatment by Houston’s 
white public servants. And in the aftermath of Nowak’s death, many of those citizens 
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reported “numerous incidents” of police officers “threatening [them] with the Morris case 
in their minds and the Morris case on their lips.” “Negro interest” in the case focused on 
getting Morris “a fair and impartial trial,” but with a sense that the outcome of Morris’s case 
would bear widespread implications for the entire community. A “fair trial” had a decidedly 
firm definition for Morris’s supporters. It could only be “the realization of a raceless 
democracy,” wherein “considerations of race” would be “effectively eliminate[d]… from 
actions of police and courts.” Such a trial would require an impartial jury that was willing to 
recognize that Morris had a legitimate claim to self-defense.16 
Lulu B. White, responsible for “revitaliz[ing] the Houston NAACP” in the late 
1930s, and her nightclub-owning husband, Julius White, were central to the fund-raising 
effort. Julius White asserted, “We believe there is more behind the scenes of this case than 
the newspapers are telling.” He speculated, “Johnny Lee was jumped on that bus,” and 
concluded that, “We are going to get a lawyer who will represent him fairly.” Over the two 
weeks following Morris’s arrest, the fund, which was officially set up to assure that Morris 
received his “fair trial,” was “steadily on the increase,” with donations from “every area in 
the county” and from black and white residents.17 
Two weeks and over $5,000 into the defense fund-raising effort, the NAACP 
retained the services of Henry Doyle, William J. Durham, and Thomas H. Dent, a trio of 
black lawyers who would later come to be known as the “3 D’s.” Dent was a graduate of 
Howard University’s law school and “the first Negro ever to be admitted to a southern bar 
group.” He was known for successfully obtaining a reversal of the death sentence of 
Herman Lee Ross, of Galveston County, in 1949 by successfully arguing that Ross had been 
denied due process because of systematic racial discrimination in the process of grand jury 
selection. Durham had been educated in the law offices of white attorney Ben F. Gafford  
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and arrived in Houston from his own practice in Dallas. He had gained noteriety through 
the Sweatt v. Painter (1950) case, where he convinced the Supreme Court, alongside 
Thurgood Marshall, of the unconstitutionality of the University of Texas’s segregated law  
school. Doyle had just graduated from the law school at Texas State University for Negroes 
in Houston the previous year as its first graduate and as “the first black graduate of any 
Texas law school.” He took the role of principal attorney to “ensure that Morris’s 
constitutional rights to due process and equal protection under the law… were enforced.” 
Morris’s case became a springboard for Doyle’s distinguished career as an attorney and 
 
Image 5 Attorneys U. Simpson Tate, Merrill Booker, William J. Durham, and Carter Wesley conferring. Date 
unknown. Michael L. Gillette, “The Rise of the NAACP in Texas,” Southwestern Historical Quarterly 81, no. 4 (April 
1978): 402. 
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judge. For now, however, this newly-hired defense team had quite a fight on their hands to 
disprove Morris’s guilt and save him from the electric chair.18 
While Morris’s defense team prepared for trial, the Houston NAACP went on the 
offensive against local communists who had expressed immediate interest in Morris’s case as 
well. Adair and others believed that getting Morris a fair trial included preventing 
communists from influencing public sentiment. Civil rights leaders and attorneys in Houston 
were well aware that association with communism would be a detriment to Morris’s case. 
Indeed, throughout the early 1950s interracial coalitions like the NAACP came under 
regular attack in Texas and elsewhere, where white Americans accused them of being 
communist fronts. In 1956, Adair, Durham, and attorney U. Simpson Tate would fight 
alongside Thurgood Marshall to prevent Attorney General John Ben Shepperd from winning 
an injunction against the NAACP’s operation in Texas. Adair recognized early on that 
Morris’s case could not be associated with “subversive” elements in Houston, where Minute 
Women, a national and influential anti-communist group with about 300 members in 
Houston in 1951, were actively and regularly releasing propaganda against all social liberals. 
White Houstonians tended to agree with anti-communist rabble-rousers that communism 
was the antithesis of democracy, freedom, and individualism. Association with communists, 
no less during the Second Red Scare, could damage the NAACP’s reputation among black 
and white Americans, and expose the organization, its leaders, and members to prosecution 
under the Alien Registration Act of 1940, which criminalized acts the United States 
government deemed “subversive.” More extreme conservatives, such as one East Texas 
mom whose son had been sent to Korea to “shoot Communists” in service of “God and his 
country,” suggested that Communists “here in our midst” be shot as well. From elsewhere, 
another mother, who reported that her son had defected from the United States military 
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and joined ranks with Korean Communists, claimed, “If they have really converted him to 
Communism maybe it would be better if they buried him.” Not all anti-communists 
suggested such dire wishes for the intellectual descendants of Marx, but “the majority of 
white Houstonians” respected and supported the kinds of anti-communist work in the city 
by groups like the Minute Women. And, importantly, Houston’s economic “power 
brokers,” who controlled municipal politics, remained committed to “the tradition of 
rugged individualism” that made communism anathema to their political philosophies. To 
present a compelling case, then, Morris’s attorneys developed a defense that remained 
consistent with the anti-communist sentiments of the time.19 
Indeed, the Houston NAACP sought to protect Morris’s case from the kind of 
allergic reaction it might produce if communists were allowed to control its narrative or be 
seen as its patrons. Jane Bolin, the first black graduate from Yale Law School and a board 
member of the NAACP, left the organization in 1950 because she believed these fears of 
being labeled communist were paralyzing the group’s ability to deploy its most “effective 
tactics” in attending to the needs of the “American Negro.” Others argued that black civil 
rights were intimately tied to women’s rights and labor rights—that the struggle for racial 
equality could not be won by attention only to those issues that affected bourgeois black 
men. But by and large, middle class black leaders in Houston viewed communist interest in 
the Morris case as a political liability.20 
Local communists’ narrative surrounding the case was critical of the NAACP and 
what it viewed as the organization’s failure to attend to the ways classism and racism limited 
the possibilities of a “fair trial” for someone like Morris. They sought to expose how “white 
chauvinism” worked to “stimulate bourgeois nationalism,” and that the “Negro 
bourgeoisie,” which included NAACP administrator Roy Wilkins and the National Urban 
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League organizer Lester Granger, were incapable of effectively providing for defendants like 
Morris because they had “sold out to U.S. capitalism.” The communist message was that 
Morris was one target among many in “a sharp increase in discrimination and open terror 
against the Negro and Mexican peoples in Texas.” In addition to the raging problem of 
police brutality, Morris’s case demonstrated the particular impact wartime capitalism had on 
America’s racial minorities, especially in Texas, which experienced, more “than any other 
southern state,” industrial expansion. Morris, the communist magazine Political Affairs 
asserted, was caught in a “frame-up” after “defend[ing] himself against a white bus driver.”21 
Like their communist counterparts, Morris’s NAACP supporters in Houston 
believed what happened on the bus had been an act of self-defense, but they did not buy the 
seeming anti-American tirades of communists against capitalism and the American military. 
Yet, substantively, and in terms of what kinds of defenses could be articulated in a criminal 
trial, there was not much difference between the Houston NAACP’s and local communists’ 
understanding that Johnnie Lee Morris had been a victim of prejudice and discrimination on 
the bus. Both groups also comprehended that long-standing patterns of intimidation and 
violence against non-white public transportation passengers provided an important 
contextual frame for understanding Morris’s claim to self-defense. Likewise, black 
Houstonians blamed the incident on “white arrogance,” and viewed “segregation as the 
cause of it all.”22  
Nevertheless, in complete opposition to communist interpolation in Morris’s legal 
defense, Christia Adair made it clear that “if the [NAACP] heads the fund raising for Morris, 
contributors and solicitors would be safeguarded from the brand of Communism through 
the use of NAACP receipt books and a careful screening of solicitors.” This was all the 
more pressing because District Attorney Sam Davis had already implied that he “expect[ed] 
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a group of Communists out of New York” to get involved with raising funds for Morris’s 
defense.” Leaving no room for confusion about the constituents standing behind the 
NAACP’s efforts, the Informer affirmatively reported that they were “swamped” with 
interest in the nascent defense fund by “people of both races who are known not to be 
Communists.”23 
While fighting to diminish the visibility of communists in defense of Morris, the 
Informer also took aim at American racism. The editorialists questioned if communism 
“represented the most serious present threat” to the United States. The writers argued, 
“There is another force quite as sinister, quite as subversive, quite as reactionary, quite as 
destructive, quite as hysterical, and much more dangerous to the realization of American 
goals.... [I]t is a force as unAmerican in its conceptions and goals as communism itself.” 
Segregationists who deployed McCarthyite red-baiting tactics to maintain the racial status 
quo, while “true enough” in their anticommunism, were “also opposed to the realization of 
the visions and hopes of the vast majority of Americans in many spheres.” If communism 
was the antithesis of liberal individualism, Jim Crow was its bosom buddy. For the Informer, 
neither of these could be congruent with the American ideal. Carter Wesley co-signed such 
a view with his own commentary, writing, “The Negro is some man. At the same time that 
he fights off communism stubbornly, he has to fight the demagogue and the racial 
supremacist of his own country doggedly.”24 
 Both communism and racism, then, were antithetical to American individualism for 
mainstream black Houstonians. Their color-rejecting vision, “one of raceless equality,” was 
also a demand for “justice regardless of race.” True “Americanism,” the editorialists at the 
Informer opined, was “a broad term meaning love of the country and belief in the merit and 
righteousness of the national ideals.” It was the “antidote to communism,” the “approach to 
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society that takes into account individual merit without prejudice created by wealth, or 
position, or race.”25 The color-evading courts were well-equipped to satisfy the low bar of 
appearing not to inject racist appeals before the Jim Crow jury. 
Attorney Henry Doyle’s first successful step was in getting the court to order a writ 
of habeas corpus, where he and Morris would be able to present evidence that Morris had 
been unlawfully detained since October 14th by Sheriff Kern without bond. Morris appeared 
before the court for this hearing on November 7th. Doyle argued that although Morris 
faced a murder charge, the defendant was nevertheless “entitled to reasonable bail.” Getting 
a favorable decision proved not so easy for Doyle. District Attorney Sam Davis’s witnesses 
testified that Morris had committed “‘cold-blooded’ murder.” One witness admitted that 
Nowak “pushed” Morris, but qualified the narrative by saying the assault was “not hard.” 
Doyle believed that testimony was enough to reasonably doubt the murder charges, but 
Judge Winborn, and later the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, decided against Morris’s 
protestation that he was illegally detained. Both courts denied him bail. The first argument, 
an implicit claim to black people’s right to self-defense against white assailants, had failed.26 
The lawyers tried another tactic. Attorney Dent accused the Harris County 
Sherriff’s Office of illegally taking evidence from Morris’s residence at 417 West Dallas 
Street on the date of his arrest. Dent claimed that “between 9:30 P.M. And 10:30 P.M” 
while Morris “was in his home... conducting himself in a peaceable and law-abiding manner 
and not violating any laws of the State of Texas,” deputies entered Morris’s apartment 
without consent. While Morris was ostensibly breaking the state’s miscegenation laws, a 
point which Dent chose to dismiss, the attorney maintained that Morris had not committed 
any felony in the deputies’ presence and was not a flight risk. The officers, without just 
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cause or a warrant, violated Morris’s Fourth Amendment rights and subsequently found 
evidence of Nowak’s murder that should no longer be admissible.27 
To make matters worse, they argued, in addition to the illegal detainment and the 
illegal forced confession, Morris had been “whipped, beat and struck” by two deputies, Alvin 
Baker and Red Williams, in the early morning hours before sunrise on December 15th in 
order to extract information about the location of the knife. Baker had joined Leo Busby as 
the “first black deputies hired by the Harris County Sheriff’s Department” just a year prior. 
Baker and Busby would develop unsavory reputations among black Houstonians for 
questionable conduct throughout their service.28 Following his arrest, Morris remained in 
police custody where officers questioned him “continuously” for three or four hours until 
about three o’clock in the morning. Dent claimed that Morris was subjected to threats of 
“physical violence,” as police sought to extract a murder confession out of him in the case 
of Nowak’s slaying. Morris admitted to signing “some form of written instrument” with 
police, though he claimed not to know what “the contents” of the document were in the 
present or at the time of the signing, because according to Dent, “[Morris] was in such 
mental state of mind that he could not comprehend the meaning of the language used in said 
instrument.” In short, Morris’s “free agency had been destroyed and his will power over 
come” by the police officers who had instilled purportedly mind-numbing fear in the 
accused.29 
Building on his success in the Ross case, Dent moved to quash Morris’s indictment, 
collecting evidence that demonstrated that the all-white Grand Jury Commission appointed 
by the “duly elected qualified” Judge A. C. Winborn, who was presiding over Morris’s case, 
was only one collection of jurors in a “purposeful, systematic, and intentional” pattern of 
exclusion that kept black residents in Harris County from the commission over the course 
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of more than forty years. Drawing on argumentative language in the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Norris v. Alabama (1935), Dent presented that of the “31000 male citizens” above 
twenty-one years old in the county, “more than seventy-five percent... were intelligent 
citizens, and were able to read and write the English language.” He pressed that these men 
were “eligible to vote” and were not indicted or convicted of any felonies “at any time.” He 
concluded, “But, notwithstanding all of the foregoing facts, [Judge Winborn] in the selection 
of said Grand Jury Commissioners included only white citizens... and excluded from the 
[Commission] all members of the Negro race and of African descent on account of race and 
color.” Within the forty years preceding Morris’s trial, only four black men had been chosen 
to participate as grand jury commissioners. As a result of this “deliberate... exclusion and 
limitation” of black grand jurors in criminal cases involving black defendants, he argued, 
Morris’s indictment was necessarily a violation of the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment according to precedent set in Carter v. Texas (1900).30 
Criminal District Attorney Sam W. Davis denied all of Dent’s allegations and 
conclusions. The D.A. argued that “at all times the District Judges of Harris County” have 
been aware “that a great proportion of the population” of the county “was composed of 
members of the negro race,” and that the judges’ decisions in appointing members of the 
Grand Jury Commission were based solely on the judges’ collective desire “to have a fair, 
honorable, representative group of qualified citizens.” It just so happened that Winborn had 
exclusively chosen white men, but if they were individually qualified and completed their 
work in a way that was “fair,” Davis saw no violation of equal protection. He also noted that 
all members of the jury commission were “instructed” that they “not discriminate” when it 
came to the selection of grand jury members, but instead create a grand jury that was 
representative of “a cross-section of the qualified citizens of Harris County.” Davis also 
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noted, since May 1939, “[P]ractically every grand jury has contained a member or members 
of the colored race.” He also recorded that there were “two members of the colored race” 
on the grand jury that true-billed Morris’s indictment.31 The Supreme Court’s precedent in 
equal protection cases allowed for state prosecutors to point toward this kind of tokenism 
to illustrate a lack of discrimination. It also illustrated the ways white supremacy had always 
depended on a class of black people to protect white interests. Longstanding historical 
patterns of all-white grand and petite juries could be abrogated seemingly with any evidence 
of a show of good faith on the part of district courts to not exclude black jurors. In 
Houston, this practice took the form of appointing token black members to grand jury 
commissions, which appointed grand juries that were then monopolized by white men. 
Indeed, courts became adept at not excluding as a convincing alternative to affirmative 
inclusion.32 
With this logic, Winborn overruled Dent’s motion and the Court of Criminal 
Appeals agreed, writing that Norris v. Alabama was “not authority” because it did not directly 
address racial discrimination in the selection of grand jury commissioners. The court 
presented itself as hand-tied by a lack of precedent, writing in its opinion: “We are aware of 
no case from the Supreme Court of the United States holding that an indictment in a state 
court may be invalidated solely because racial discrimination, within the meaning of the 14th 
Amendment, had entered into the selection and organization of the jury commissioners.” 
Judge Winborn and his two predecessors, Langston King and Frank Williford, all of whom 
were called as witnesses before the appellate court, testified that “it had never been [their] 
purpose” to “discriminate against any particular race or in favor of any particular race” in 
selecting their grand jury commissioners. Nevertheless, neither King nor Winborn were 
able to certify that they had ever chosen black citizens to sit on their grand jury 
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commissions. Williford had appointed all of the four black men who had served as 
commissioners since 1928. When this issue was appealed to the United States Supreme 
Court later in Morris’s trial, Texas attorney general John Ben Shepperd argued that there 
was no precedent regarding racially biased selection of grand jury commissions and opined 
that if they allowed for a reversal of the lower court’s decision a slippery slope of racial 
discrimination lawsuits at every level of the trial would bombard the courts. The State 
Supreme Court sided with Shepperd. The courts effectively decided, then, that black people 
did not have a right to privacy, did not have Constitutional protections against unreasonable 
search and seizures, did not have a right to a trial by a jury of their peers, and could not use 
a pattern of historical discrimination against their racial group as evidence of discrimination 
against individual defendants.33 
Selection for the petite jury began on December 10th and continued into the 12th. 
Two hundred Harris County residents had been summoned from the voter rolls by the 
court’s special venire. Jury selection was complete by the morning of December 13th, but 
the result was less than desirable for the defense. At the time, both the defense and the 
prosecution were entitled to fifteen peremptory challenges, wherein they could strike 
potential jurors without cause. Out of the two hundred citizens called to the jury pool, 
eleven of them, or about 5.5 percent, were black.34 Willie Johnson had been immediately 
struck. The note left next to her name in red ink indicated that she was “female colored.” 
Just “female” would have sufficed given that women were not permitted to serve on juries 
in Harris County at the time. The fact that Johnson’s race was specified at all betrays the 
prosecutor’s intent to exclude all black citizens from the final jury. According to Dent, 
District Attorney Davis exercised eleven of his peremptory strikes to remove all members 
of “the Negro race” from the jury. Though Davis could have justified some of his strikes on 
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account of some of the potential jurors’ opposition to the death penalty, the court failed to 
require him to explain why he did not want any of the stricken black citizens on the jury. 
Meanwhile, the prosecution used zero peremptory strikes against the one hundred eighty-
nine white potential jurors. Out of that number, they excused only two with justification: 
one for admitting to having already fixed an opinion in the case and the other for opposition 
to the death penalty.35 
Dent immediately filed a motion to quash the trial jury. He argued that Sam Davis 
and special prosecutor Spurgeon Bell, both white men, had “deliberately, intentionally, 
purposefully, and systematically” excluded the possibility of having any black jurors “on 
account of race and color” alone. The defense attorney pressed that the district attorney 
and all attorneys working with him were “performing a governmental function,” and were 
therefore especially beholden to Constitutional provisions of equal protection and due 
process. Dent maintained that this was not an isolated event: the exclusion of black citizens 
from the petite jury in Morris’s case “was done under a custom, system and practice 
inaugurated, promulgated and followed by Sam Davis... and his predecessors in office” for 
“more than forty (40) years.” The motion narrowed the claim, specifying that Dent was only 
interested in looking at petit juries in criminal cases where black people were the alleged 
assailants in cases with white victims. The State had systematically excluded black 
venirepersons, despite when those “members of the Negro race on [the] special venire… 
had met all of the qualifications for jury service and had given no answer or answers to any 
questions... which gave [Davis] the right to challenge said prospective juror or jurors for 
cause.” Although all women were excluded from serving, occassionally a black woman with 
a first name associated more closely with men, like “Johnnie,” might be called and, upon 
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arrival, dismissed. In sum, the State had carefully and purposely crafted an all-white and all-
male jury of twelve.36 
Anticipating the argument that black jurors had been both summoned and 
interrogated, that mixed-race juries were not a legal requirement, and that the peremptory 
strike relieved attorneys of the burden of justifying their strikes, Dent countered with a 
historical argument against tokenism. He pointed out that until the 1940 Smith v. Texas 
Supreme Court decision, Harris County criminal district attorneys “pursued a custom and 
practice of excluding every member of the Negro race... called for jury service in a criminal 
case.” The Supreme Court found that such a practice violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Nevertheless, Dent pointed out, the custom had not been changed; the all-white jury 
outcome remained a central feature in these criminal proceedings with alleged black 
assailants and white victims. The chicanery practiced by the district attorney should not be 
excused, Dent argued, saying: 
[The same] custom and usage has been followed and was followed in this case under 
the guise of calling said Negro jurors and after said prospective jurors had answered 
every question propounded to them by the Criminal District Attorney and his 
associates... such answers being of such nature and substance as to give... no cause 
to challenge said Negro prospective jurors for cause. 
The district attorney nevertheless dismissed all black venirepersons as potential jurors, and 
Dent argued, this was on its face a matter of racial discrimination. The practice of 
questioning black venireperson was theater—merely “token compliance,” or better yet, “a 
semblance of compliance” to the Supreme Court’s ruling, a “formality” meant to circumvent 
the substance of the equal protection clause.37 
Morris’s defense team pointed to evidence of racial discrimination in the selection of 
the jury in the case at hand. One example was in the voir dire examination of Jesse Mills, a 
black, fifty-six-year-old Harris County resident who swore before the court that he had no 
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fixed opinion of Morris’s guilt or innocence, that the race of the defendant would not sway 
his opinion, and that he had no conscientious scruples with the death penalty. Black 
Houstonian Sherman Holmes also swore before the court that he would not oppose 
convicting a deserving man of death. Both of these men and other black men in the jury 
pool who were not opposed to capital punishment were excused by Davis without cause. 
The defense believed this adequately proved that the district attorney was using his 
peremptory strikes to create an all-white jury and maintain the courtroom as a white space 
that defined black place.38 Despite this wealth of evidence, in which one hundred percent of 
potential black jurors were denied a seat in the court for no stated reason, Dent’s argument 
would not stand in a court committed to evading the issue of group discrimination. 
The district attorney swiftly and succinctly responded to Dent’s allegations of racial 
discrimination in jury selection. First, he said that there were thirteen black men present for 
interrogation. Eight of them, he said, disqualified themselves: one had already determined 
Morris’s guilt or innocence and the other seven did not support the death penalty. The 
remaining five “were excused by the representative of the state through the exercise of 
peremptory challenges authorized by the laws of the State of Texas.” This was the only 
reason for the exclusion that the D.A. was required to offer. Furthermore, he contested, 
there existed no “system to intentionally excluded members of the negro race from service 
on the jury” and that several “members of the negro race” had served on juries in criminal 
cases over the past ten years, “though the exact number is not recalled at this time.” Even if 
his unrecalled statistics were true, the D.A. sidestepped Dent’s particular claim about cases 
involving black assailants and white victims. Without anything more than a scribbled 
sentence, the presiding judge overruled the motion. Another argument, this time about the 
257 
 
 
ways court cases like Morris’s demonstrated the willful flouting of the rights of all black 
citizens was practiced by the so-called American justice system, had failed.39 
Despite repeated challenges by Morris’s defense team, the Harris County Criminal 
Courts had evolved and adapted to the challenges they raised against its historically 
patterned procedures and practices. White county judges stood before appellate-level 
judges and testified that they had not systematically excluded black people from grand jury 
commissions, and convinced them, if they needed persuasion at all, that there was no legal 
precedent to reverse on error any case where, apparently by the luck of the draw, only 
white men had managed to secure seats on such commissions. Besides, they argued, each 
commission’s job was to choose the grand jury, and the Harris County commissions had 
selected four black members to the jury in recent cycles. If there had been a pattern of 
discrimination in the past, they reasoned, it was clear that the courts were no longer 
engaging in such practices. Though the defense lamented this as tokenism, they could not 
develop an argument that the appellate court would accept. The same was true in the case 
of color-evasive peremptory strikes. The prosecution had all the tools it needed to create 
an all-white jury without having to answer questions about intent, motivation, or effect. In 
the eyes of the court, Morris was under no threat of being treated differently because of his 
race. As an individual, he would be seen by a group of individual peers who happened, as it 
were, to be white.  Whether cases like Morris’s demonstrated a pattern of racial 
discrimination in jury selection, where a black assailant had assaulted a white victim, was 
moot. The challenge that the defense team faced and could not overcome was that they 
were raising a claim of civil violation against the rights of all black people to be equally 
considered for jury duty and were attempting to do so within the context of a criminal case 
involving what they identified as damages to an individual client. 
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As Doyle, Durham, and Dent’s pretrial motions failed, racial tensions remained high 
in the city, especially in the days preceding Morris’s arrest and indictment. Frank Morrison, 
the man with whom Morris initially shared words while boarding Nowak’s bus, reported 
receiving death threats over the phone. A mysterious caller allegedly told the witness, “You 
are next.” Bessie Pavlicek claimed that she received “six calls within 40 minutes” on the 
night after the killing.  Another Houstonian, working at a hat shop where Morris had 
supposedly purchased two hats in recent days, reported answering her phone to hear a 
“voice that sounded like that of a Negro woman.” She asked, “What do you know about 
the bus driver being killed?” The hat salesperson responded, “What do you want to know?” 
The alleged call ended with the woman saying, “I’m warning you,” followed by the click of 
the handset returning to the receiver. The hat salesperson reported receiving another 
mysterious phone call later that day from someone who “sounded like a white man.” When 
questioned about other reports of threats by telephone to witnesses in the Morris case, 
District Attorney Davis told the press, “I won’t say how many witnesses have been 
threatened, but we have assured every one subpoenaed that they will have complete 
protection.” The Chronicle claimed that “more than half the witnesses, many of them 
passengers on the bus, have been warned to leave the county.”40 
The staff at the Informer found these reports laughable, writing that, “The intimation 
that Negroes are intimidating and threatening these witnesses is tragic and altogether 
foolish.” Gesturing toward a long history of their legal vulnerability to exploitation and 
abuse by white people, the editorialists at the Informer asked: 
Since when have Southern Negroes begun to intimidate Southern white [people]? 
The shoe is actually on the other foot. The real truth is that Houston Negroes have 
been intimidated [to] no end by intemperate whites as a result of the unfortunate 
[Morris] affair. This intimidation began the day after the murder when a Negro 
postman was threatened with a knife.... It has been continued and spread since that 
time, having been taken up by no less potent a force than the members of the police 
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force itself.... Ludicrous stories of intimidation (obviously the work of crackpots or 
troublemakers, if true) and accompanying grandstand protection plays can do 
nothing toward guaranteeing a fair trial in the case.41 
When a delegation of black Houstonians representing five of the city’s civic organizations 
approached Davis about the reports in the Chronicle and Post about threatening phone calls 
to witnesses, the D.A. failed to offer an explanation as to how the names of the subpoenaed 
witnesses could have been known by anyone outside of his office. It seemed to black 
Houstonians that the district attorney had found a way to stoke the flames of racial fear 
without making racialized appeals directly before the court.42 
Carter Wesley blamed Davis for these “harum-scarum” stories. He sarcastically 
wrote about white people “yanking their telephones out, moving out of town, and seeking 
the protection of the district attorney’s office with fear in their hearts.” The Informer 
publisher asked, “Since when did white Texans become such cravens? Not only can no 
telephone voice run white men out of their homes in Texas, but people with guns can’t run 
them out.” The newspaper, instead, highlighted the fact that black citizens were victims of 
irrational white Houstonians, who were now running a story about an unnamed black man 
and woman who had been fired from their jobs by a white employer after the woman had 
been baited into a heated exchange over the Morris case by the boss. Black leaders in the 
city called for an end to what they claimed were false stories about black residents 
intimidating white people and pointed toward the more immediate, observable racial 
problem surrounding the case: increasing police brutality, which threatened “Houston’s 
prestige and good reputation.”43 
Meanwhile, threats against Morris’s sole black sympathetic witness seemed to be far 
more real. As the December trial date neared, the attorneys learned of an eyewitness 
named Laura Dell Dickson, a resident at 3114 Campbell Street in Fifth Ward. They believed  
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Image 6 The press in the city, both black and white-owned, printed images and stories that 
highlighted black people’s decorum around the trial, arguing both implicitly and explicitly 
that black Houstonians would not be incited to violence as a result of this case. For the 
white press, these images were less about salvaging the dignity of black Houstonians but 
rather presenting Houston as an exceptional southern city where a racially charged case 
could be peaceably tried in a court of law. Houston Chronicle, December 10, 1951, Sec. A, 8. 
 
her testimony was “material evidence necessary for [Morris’s] defense” and that the 
substance of her account would maintain that “a bus driver and a fat white man were 
beating a colored man; that when the colored man went to get off the bus the driver kicked 
the colored man down; that the colored man did not cut the driver until after he was 
kicked.” Morris’s counsel told him about Dickson, and afterward Durham applied for a 
subpoena to have Dickson delivered to the court to testify. However, the Sheriff’s 
Department was unable to find the witness. Despite the value this potential witness had for 
the defense, Judge Winborn was unwilling to delay the trial and proceeded without 
Dickson’s presence. Alvin Mitchell, an acquaintance of Dickson, testified that he had spoken 
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to Dickson on December 10th and that she had indeed told him that Morris was attacked 
by Nowak and an overweight white man. Mitchell said that Dickson “was afraid to come to 
the court because she was not going to be hurt, for they had already threatened Julius 
White.” Dickson told Mitchell she would “stay out of the way until the trial was over.” She 
never did make it to present her own testimony before the court.44 
Morris’s trial was swift.  The charge of the court was given to the jury on December 
14th, and they returned the verdict on the same day. Specifically, the charge ordered the 
jury to determine if “Johnny Lee Morris, did with malice aforethought kill Florian Antone 
Nowak by cutting and stabbing him with a knife.” If the jury was convinced that Morris’s 
testimony did “excuse or justify the killing,” the defendant was not guilty of murder. Murder 
was a voluntary act that required a sentence of death or imprisonment for not less than two 
years. To determine if murder was committed with “malice aforethought,” the jury would 
have to be convinced that Morris was of sound mind and intended to kill Nowak. If the jury 
believed that Morris was guilty of murder but not with malice aforethought, then they could 
not assess a penalty of more than five years of imprisonment. Murder without malice 
aforethought came about from the “immediate influence of sudden passion arising from an 
adequate cause, by which is meant, such cause as would commonly produce a degree of 
anger, rage, resentment or terror in a person of ordinary temper sufficient to render the 
mind incapable of cool reflection.” Thus, if the jury believed or had reasonable doubt to 
believe that Morris was provoked to the point of having his emotional and mental state 
altered, he would not be guilty of murder with malice aforethought and should receive the 
lesser sentence.45 
The charge of the court also specified the circumstances for acquittal. If the jury was 
convinced of Morris’s recounting of the events on the bus or maintained doubts about the 
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circumstances which led to the stabbing, Morris could not be found guilty. In particular, if 
the testimony that Morris had been unlawfully assaulted or was about to be unlawfully 
assaulted by Nowak, with or without the assistance of Morrison, so much so that Morris 
believed, regardless of the actual circumstances, his life or body was at risk, he was to be 
found not guilty of murder at all. The jury would have to be convinced “beyond a 
reasonable doubt” that Morris did not have any legitimate claim to self-defense in order for 
the murder charge to stand.46 
By the order of Judge Winborn, the jury would have to assess the evidence as to 
whether the stab wound inflicted by Morris was the actual cause of Nowak’s death. 
Attorneys Dent, Durham, and Doyle objected to this charge directly, arguing that “there is 
no competent testimony... that the alleged injury sustained by [Nowak] was the cause of his 
death; and there is no evidence from which any legal deduction can be made” about the 
injuries. Moreover, they argued, “The only testimony before the Court and jury at this time 
is that a knife, which was not described in evidence, could produce such wound; that there 
is no testimony before the Court and jury as to what organs of the body of [Nowak] were 
injured, or the extent of such injures.” Furthermore, the only evidence available in regards 
to the stab wound itself should have produced reasonable doubt as to the severity of the 
wound, given that the “only legal testimony” in regards to the wound was made by “Justice 
of the Peace Thomas M. Maes, to the effect that he did not probe the wound, and he did 
not know the depth of said wound.” In all evidence concerning the case, none existed that 
sought to prove that Nowak was actually killed by Morris’s knife or that the stabbing was 
the cause of death.47 
The substance of Maes’s testimony, in fact, had only been that the three wounds on 
Nowak’s person “could have been inflicted by a knife.” Moreover, while several of the 
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prosecution’s witnesses testified that Morris stabbed Nowak once in the neck, there was 
“no legal testimony in the record” which accounted for the two other alleged stab wounds. 
The defense counsel believed that to charge the jury with determining whether the stab 
wound killed Nowak was the same as “lead[ing] the jury to believe that there is legal and 
competent evidence in the record showing the cause of the death of [Nowak],” evidence of 
which simply had not been presented by the State. Winborn overruled most of the 
objections, though he did modify one of the court’s charges. Instruction “#10” had included 
language which explicitly stated Nowak had been cut; Winborn modified it by handwriting 
the nonrestrictive clause “if he was cut.” Despite the defense’s efforts, foreman of the jury 
H. E. Logan signed his signature under the handwritten verdict and the jury returned to 
court. On December 14, 1951, Morris was guilty of murder with malice aforethought and 
assessed life in prison.48 
The defense counsel immediately went to work on an appeal and filed a motion for 
a new trial on January 30, 1952. They argued that the selection processes of the Grand Jury 
Commission and the grand jury members systematically excluded black citizens and thus 
violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Additionally, Dent, Doyle, and Durham charged the 
prosecution with willfully and purposefully using his peremptory strikes against the black 
venirepersons who had not disqualified themselves from jury service. The defense also 
remained troubled over the absence of Laura Dell Dickson, whose testimony they 
maintained had been of important material substance to the defense. The defense claimed 
they hired a private detective to locate Dickson and that she “could not be located” 
because “said witness had been intimidated and was in hiding.” The defense objected to the 
inclusion of Maes’s testimony, claiming that the qualifications of the Justice of the Peace to 
examine a bodily wound had not been established and that no evidence had been offered 
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that could help determine the type or size of knife necessary to inflict the damage alleged to 
have been observed on Nowak’s body. The other testimony relating to the stab wounds, to 
which the defense objected in open court, was that of eyewitness Frankie Lee Dickey. She 
claimed to have seen the wounds but also admitted not knowing the depth or width of the 
injuries. Such testimony was not evidence that the alleged stabbing caused Nowak’s death; 
at the very least, Dickey’s memory was not sufficient to establish Morris’s culpability in 
Nowak’s death beyond a reasonable doubt. This amounted to “speculative testimony,” not 
“expert opinion.” In short, according to Morris’s defense team, the guilty verdict had been 
returned by the jury “without any legal evidence in the record showing the cause of death 
of [Nowak].” The defense threw every technical claim they could muster at the court, 
perhaps hoping a new trial would afford Morris a friendlier jury. Winborn overruled the 
motion on February 2nd without comment.49 
Morris would lose his final legal battle on May 4, 1953, when the Supreme Court 
denied the Writ of Certiorari submitted by his attorneys, after the Texas Court of Criminal 
Appeals had already dismissed all of the defense’s objections.50 A black man still did not have 
the right to protect himself against a white man in Houston—certainly not to the point 
where a white man’s life could be taken without consequence. White supremacy 
transformed Morris into a criminal. That is, crime and criminality are not objectively defined, 
but rather subjectively decided—and sometimes capriciously so. Participants in criminal 
court cases determine whether an act of homicide counts as justifiable self-defense or 
criminal murder. In Morris’s case, they had decided that he had committed a crime. 
Nevertheless, that Morris’s life had been spared was a victory unto itself for the defense 
team and black Houstonians, if not an indicator that the all-white jury was not entirely 
convinced that the defendant’s actions were unwarranted by the circumstances.51 
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As Morris was escorted out of the courtroom, he passed by his wife Christine 
Morris. She kept her gaze straight ahead. When asked by the press about the verdict, she 
replied, “It was a fair trial. The verdict didn’t surprise me. I thought he might even get 
death.” Sid Hilliard also responded, saying, “The Southern people showed less prejudice 
during this trial, and they showed a definite tendency to be fair. But I didn’t expect the 
sentence to be that severe after hearing the testimony.” It was a hollow victory that 
demonstrated the limited legal toolbox which black defense attorneys could draw on to 
challenge discriminatory practices that gave the appearance of fairness. These limitations 
were inherent in a criminal court system that had been learning to adapt to such defense 
efforts since the late 1920s. The court’s color-evasive tokenism and the district attorney’s 
uncontestable peremptory strikes were antithetical to the vision of raceless equality that 
black Houstonians had imagined for their city. But racial tokenism and exclusion went hand-
in-hand in a “raceless” system dedicated to maintaining white supremacy. In these 
apparently color-rejecting ways, color-evading criminal courts could effectively remain white 
spaces with the privilege of defining racial place.52 
Johnnie Lee Morris had received all but a fair trial in a Jim Crow courtroom, yet his 
attorneys and his supporters suggested that his sentence, sixteen years of which he served 
before being paroled, functioned as an example of Houston’s ability to cast aside prejudice 
in its courts. Black Houstonians were Americans through and through, and their 
commitment to liberal individualism was no less prevailing than among their white American 
counterparts. That commitment—coupled with the exigencies of everyday living, no 
doubt—is precisely what primed Morris’s black sympathizers to accept the court’s decision 
as valid. They, as much as white Americans, needed to believe that black Americans 
received fair treatment in the nation’s courts and throughout society. In his presidential 
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campaign in 1952, Dwight D. Eisenhower described “equality of opportunity” without 
regard for race as the “unfinished business of America” that needed to be secured for black 
Americans lest the nation’s hyposcrisy provide opportunities for “any group” to “betray the 
freedom of each of us.” Political scientist Ralph Bunche stressed, “We Americans have built 
a society in which every individual, whatever his race, creed or national origin, has a vital 
stake” and that while the United States had many “shortcomings,” the “more enlightened” 
among the citizenry had been correcting them. He wrote, “I have a simple faith in 
democracy as a way of life and in the unshakable devotion of the American people to it.” 
These kinds of pronouncements, practiced by white and black Americans, reassured them 
that fairness was an intrinsic element of American political philosophy, even if it was not 
always practiced. Their collective resignation to the jury’s and the court’s decisions in 
Johnnie Lee Morris’s case, indicated by their celebration of the defense team’s victory in 
convincing the all-white jury to spare Morris’s life as well as the lack of protest, agitation, or 
sustained discussion that followed that celebration, showed that black Houstonians were 
willing to take an inch to perhaps gain an ell later. Inadvertently, however, their silence 
functioned to re-legitimate a criminal court system that actively denied the legal claims and 
civil rights of black defendants and the wider black citizenry. And Doyle, who was credited 
with saving Morris’s life, witnessed a marked “increase” in his clientele following his 
“victory.”53 
  
enerally, white and black Houstonians did not live together—though, when 
they did, as was the case with Johnnie Lee and Christine Morris, it was illegal. 
They did not share the same “neighborhoods,” even when they occupied the 
same census tracts. Each group understood the (in)visible lines they must cross to move 
G 
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from one racialized space to another—whether a street, a highway, or a bayou. By design, 
white and black neighborhoods existed all over the city, rubbing against each other. Black 
neighborhoods were often surrounded on all sides by natural barriers, white residential 
areas, industrial pockets, or undeveloped space. In this relationship, whereas whiteness 
made a space desirable, blackness marked it with negative stereotypes. In white folks’ minds, 
blackness made space squalid, undesirable, and prone to criminality, and in turn, these 
understandings of black space could tattoo all black people likewise. 
 Segregation, therefore, remained critical to the criminalization of black people. As 
one white man in favor of residential integration in Baltimore lamented, white prejudices 
against black people started with and were perpetuated by practices of racialized spatial 
segementation, saying:  
Acceptance of Negro families would be much easier for our people if we had less 
commuting to and from work by car. You have to drive through deteriorated 
districts where the residents are one hundred per cent Negro. This sorry picture is 
hard to shake, even though the [black] family a few doors down the street has no 
relation to it, other than the color of their skin.54 
Black Americans had been making similar arguments for a long time, noting, at the end of 
World War I, for example, that “[s]ensational newspaper publicity about crimes of Negroes, 
unpunished lawless acts of white persons against Negroes, misunderstandings, [and] fears 
and suspicions of the two races” were grounded in the fact that these groups “live almost in 
two separate worlds.” Confined to relatively small neighborhoods in the nation’s expanding 
metropolitan centers, “Negroes are neglected in public schools, public sanitation and health, 
fire and police protection and other public facilities,” while those black spaces remained 
accessible to the pleasure-seeking “red light element” of white people. These inequities 
were rooted in “restrictions on property rights,” which was the “origin” of “much of the 
antipathy toward” America’s black citizens. The racialization of space, therefore, 
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precipitated the criminalization of race, and together these two compelled the 
criminalization of space, a process which became reinforced by the meting out of color-
evasive justice in the Harris County Courts.55 
This dynamic would play out again in a high-profile crime committed in Houston in 
1959. Twelve-year-old Billy Bodenheimer was robbed, raped, and murdered near his home 
in Montrose, a collection of mostly- or all-white small city neighborhoods that had 
previously been suburbs, situated between the heavily black Fourth Ward and the deeply 
wealthy River Oaks. The Houston Police Department arrested seven black teenagers and 
young adults for the crime, many of them residents of the Green Pond area, where the 
luxury-oriented River Oaks Shopping Center strip mall and $300,000 to $400,000 
townhomes now stand (see Map 15). The young black men apparently confessed to the 
crime, but eventually alleged that police forced those false confessions under duress. The 
brutality began immediately after the police arrested them. They noted that, before they 
were taken to the police station, the officers took them to the old shack where Billy 
Bodenheimer had been killed and placed them in the icebox where the boy had been found 
because they “wanted these niggers to see the ghost of that white boy.”56 
At least one postal service worker, a white man, hinted that the confessions might 
not be true, saying, “I just don’t see how that many Negroes could do anything in this 
neighborhood and not be seen.” Surely, he reasoned, everyone knew that black people did 
not casually stroll west of Taft Street and into the adjacent white community without being 
marked as out of place, especially on the traffic-heavy West Gray Street, where the attack 
occurred.57 Additionally, skeptics pointed out that in recent weeks a white man who had 
been previously charged with attempted rape was suspected of actually raping a twelve-
year-old boy in the neighborhood. Nearby, a young black girl had recently been found too, 
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“raped, strangled, and bitten” in a park in similar condition to Bodenheimer.  Moreover, just 
a few days prior, a twenty-five-year-old white man reportedly attempted to abduct two or 
three young white girls in the area.58 
Black Houstonians unfamiliar with the residents of Green Pond were unsure about 
the “‘yes-we-did, no-we-didn’t’ suspects,” but they nevertheless expressed contempt for the 
police investigation, noting that the Houston Police Department did not investigate, with 
any semblance of fervor, the murder of Mattie Louis Mitchell, a young black girl who had 
been killed only just over a month prior in similar circumstances.59 For their part, the black  
residents around West Clay supported the young men’s revised testimonies. At least four 
of them went on the record claiming they saw the young men boxing in the yard of another 
teenager until “it was almost dark,” and thus could not have been responsible for the crime 
that occurred in daylight over a half mile away.  Indeed, nearly thirty people were involved 
in or were spectators of the neighborhood boxing match and could corroborate their alibis. 
Confessing that she “positively saw the boys boxing,” Mrs. Frances Hollins believed “the 
boys are a victim of circumstance.” Additionally, Arthur Breitkreaux, a white man, assured 
police that he “positively saw” at least two of the young men boxing where they had 
testified.60  
Some white Houstonians expressed disbelief in the police department’s version of 
things, noting the ways the white residents of Montrose would have noticed roving black 
teenagers out of place. Indeed, about ninety percent of the census tract where 
Bodenheimer was killed was white. Nevertheless, many white Houstonians, predisposed 
toward believing black people were especially prone to criminality, remained convinced that 
the young men had committed the crime. Some anonymously promised the Bodenheimer 
family that the “niggers will get what’s coming to them.” They swore to bludgeon any black 
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people who crossed their paths to death with a baseball bat.61 This threat of violence was an 
ever-present cog in the machine of social control that determined where black people lived 
and could live, worked and could work, and play and did play. 
While the majority of violent crimes in Houston were intra-racial, with over ninety-
four percent of all homicide victims in Houston between 1958 and 1961 killed by someone 
of the same racial categorization, interracial crimes—especially when the alleged assailant 
was black and the victims were white—compelled many people to demand a hardening of 
the lines that divided black space from white space.62 Indeed, following Bodenheimer’s 
murder and crimes like it, “segregationists” tended to demand “more segregation,” and 
Americans in general demanded “stricter laws… and greater punishments.” Doris 
Bodenheimer, Billy’s mother, “strongly resent[ed]” these proposed solutions to alleged 
interracial violence, saying she opposed “condemn[ing] the whole Negro race because those 
boys have been accused.” The Informer agreed, maintaining that these so-called solutions for 
interracial crime would only “salve consciences, themselves warped.” And because they 
exacerbated rather than addressed the problems of concentrated poverty and racial 
segregation, these responses would always fail to “prevent recurrence” of crimes big and 
small.63 Racial segregation, both the Informer and Bodenheimer repeatedly expressed, was 
intrinsically linked to the intergenerational impoverishment of entire communities, since it 
both denied poor black Houstonians equitable access to municipal resources and 
“confirmed” negative stereotypes against and legitimated bias toward black people as a 
group—a group whose environments were always bound up in white imaginaries with 
squalor and crime. 
When white segregationists in Houston thought of black space, they didn’t envision 
the impressive homes of doctors like J. B. Covington in Third Ward. They did not 
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acknowledge the economic vitality black entrepreneurs and workers provided for small 
business districts across the city. They did not see the resilience of black folks in the face of 
municipal neglect. Instead, they saw squalor, an excuse to turn black neighborhoods into 
toxic dumps. They saw muddy streets and homes that doubled as firetraps—excuses to 
demolish the “slums” to make way for white residential development and highway 
construction. They understood, consciously or not, black spaces as “racial-sexual frontiers,” 
justification for their heavy-handed containment. Even in the absence of official crime data, 
they saw criminal spaces, which justified police harassment and abuse. And throughout the 
1950s black Houstonians witnessed the consequences of the criminalization of the spaces 
where they had been compelled to live. This “new type of segregation,” justified by “black 
criminality” and amenable to liberal individualism, would keep most black Houstonians 
segregated from the material and symbolic resources they would otherwise need to fulfill 
the vision of a color-rejecting future. And detrimentally, the reinforcing practices of racial 
stigmitization and spatial marginalization would overexpose black people to a discriminatory 
criminal justice system and limit their life chances.  
Inadvertently, then, black Houstonians’ resignation to the Morris verdict and 
sentencing confirmed the Jim Crow court’s conclusion that he was indeed a criminal, as 
were other black people who were tried and found guilty like him. Cases like these only 
provided additional evidence to support the notion that black people were 
disproportionately responsible for crime in Houston and minimized black people’s very 
important and biting critiques of systemic discrimination. Though Morris’s case was an 
anomaly—most often people committed crimes near their homes, the places they shopped, 
and they places they played, and thus, in a segregated city, most often victimized people of 
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the same racial group—the verdict against him confirmed stereotypes about the entire 
racial group for those who were susceptible to believe them.  
And while black writers addressed the issue of stereotyping all black people as 
criminals, they also contributed to a societal consensus that maintained the courts as the 
rightful arbiters of right and wrong and that demanded the “Negro community” shoulder 
responsibility for the actions of black people. Just like other Americans, black Houstonians 
believed committing a crime to be each individual’s choice, and demanded that criminals be 
tried and punished. However, the individualist epistemology they used to understand crime 
did not square well with their awareness of systemic discrimination in southern courts, nor 
was it congruent with a color-rejecting vision for criminal court procedures. Because of 
their ardent embrace of individualism, many black writers in the 1950s failed to consistently 
argue that crime was a structured response to social, political, and economic constraints, 
and therefore not best understood as individual moral failings. Black and white Americans, 
then, often both failed to critique the nation’s shortcomings when they contributed—some 
perhaps unwittingly so—to a discourse that failed to challenge the link Americans had 
constructed between blackness and criminality. 
 Black writers asked, for example, “Is it that Negroes prefer… vice and gambling to 
run rampant in the Negro community?” But they seldom inquired about the economic 
circumstances that might have compelled these activities, and even less often confronted the 
question about how “the segregation system” created “the Negro community” in the first 
place without also including some critique of individual morality. Instead, for example, the 
Informer highlighted that “too large a percentage of the lawlessness and crime with which all 
big cities are afflicted originated with Negroes.” The editorialists lamented that in 1952, 
according to the Houston Police Department, “63% of the murders committed in Houston 
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were committed by Negroes who comprise only 22% of the population.” The editorialists 
demanded that greater city resources be used to police and punish criminals in black 
communities.64 They argued, again, that crime was a problem of individual failings, but 
managed, at the same time, to also reinscribe the collective “Negro community” as culpable 
in each black individual’s moral decay: 
The stark fact is that there must be far too many Negroes without proper regard 
for the sanctity of human life, far too many without basic self control, far too many 
lacking in discipline and moral character. Neither judges nor police can be of much 
value in strengthening the moral fibre [sic] of a people. This must come from 
within…. The basic need of the Negro community of this city is a return to the 
moral values of another day, a turning away from the glitter of gaudy show and 
public acclaim of cheap characters who have buldgeoned their way to financial 
competence through operation and support of shady enterprise.65 
That discursive space, unique to the issue of criminality, provided an especially powerful 
opportunity for white folks to close ranks around free-market meritocracy and against race-
conscious liberalism. That is, this confounded rendering of individual-as-group “Negro 
crime” was highly exploitable in a culture that valued individualism but that also believed in 
black inferiority. White Americans had long devised ways to impute the characteristic of 
criminality to blackness—for example, manufacturing criminal statistics that “proved” black 
people were prone to criminality by arresting them for and charging them with crimes at 
disproportionate rates. While they therefore did not need black Americans to voice similar 
concerns about “Negro crime,” then, white citizens in Texas and beyond used the words of 
black people and stereotypes of black criminality to justify discrimination against them.66 
 Even as black Houstonians attempted to build toward a raceless future for their city, 
their white neighbors repeatedly demonstrated an ability to reconcile the tensions between 
their value in liberal individualism with their racialized understanding of crime. Those white 
Americans who were predisposed to believe that such a thing as “Negro crime” existed and 
was a menace saw criminality as related to blackness. Indeed, “black criminality had become 
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the most significant and durable signifier of black inferiority in white people’s minds since 
the dawn of Jim Crow.” Black leaders’ espousal of individualism failed to effectively contest 
the association of blackness with criminality in white imaginaries. The criminal courts, then, 
were a critical site for the exploitation of the limits of black folks’ color-rejecting vision, and 
certainly, those in Harris County demonstrated the ways in which courts, as white spaces, 
had learned to adapt to black folks’ civil rights gains.  
The alternative, however, is not necessarily that Morris’s defense team could have 
argued a more convicing case if they had called out the stereotype of the “Negro criminal” 
or if they had been able to successfully argued that historical, systematic discrimination 
against black people as a group prevented Morris from receiving a fair trial. Perhaps white 
Houstonians would have refused to even engage such a defense. However, the impact of the 
verdict and black Houstonians’ ultimate acceptance of it was similar to the consequences of 
the Scottsboro cases: the court maintained its legitimacy as the arbiter of morality and 
criminality, even as it openly refused to excise racial discrimination from its proceedings. 
Whether they accepted such outcomes because of the exigencies of living their own lives, 
because they believed in the legitimacy and therefore the finality of court decisions, or 
because they feared state violence—or any other number of reasons or combinations of 
theses—the impact was ultimately the same: a racially discriminatory system remained 
fundamentally unchallenged and a black man had been made into a criminal by a Jim Crow 
court and his life handed over to the state. The “new type of segregation” that Henry Allen 
Bullock warned black Houstonians could emerge followed the same syntax, using 
individualist rationales to explain white evasion and exploitation of black people and spaces. 
Indeed, racial segregation witnessed a net increase in the city over the remaining half of the 
twentieth century, the effects of which often manifested as crime among the most 
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vulnerable and economically exploited members of Houston’s black communities. Racial and 
economic segregation, as Doris Bodenheimer poignantly argued, would inevitably yield 
results that would devastate families and communities. But young white children like Billy 
did not often bear that burden the most heavily; black Houstonians suffered that weight.67 
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courts, and that the best the justices could imagine was a trial procedure that did not make that 
discrimination totally apparent on its face. Michael J. Klarman notes that the Norris case did not yield 
greater protection for black Americans, that southern courts had already been working to systematize 
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their own definition of “fairness” prior to federal intervention, and that regardless of the Norris decision 
or the increasing standardization of practice in the nation’s lower courts, because of their economic 
vulnerability, many black Americans simply could not afford a trial that was truly fair. Karlan, “Race, Rights, 
and Remedies in Criminal Adjudication”; Klarman, “The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal Procedure.” 
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CHAPTER 5: CRIMINALIZED SPACE 
 
ociologist Walter R. Chivers published an examination of “the Negro delinquent” 
in 1942 where he explored the “social pressures and their attendant agents” that 
acted as “the sculptors who chisel out” the young criminal. He began by arguing 
that black Americans did not constitute a “racial group” by sociological or anthropological 
definitions.” Instead, they were a “conflict group” that “act[s] as if they are a race because of 
the circumstances” of their historical lineage and contemporary circumstances, namely 
slavery and racial discrimination. Those conditions, he argued, overexposed black people to 
poverty, for while not all black people were poor, given the “prevailing concepts of the 
‘Negro’s place’” in American society, they were forced to live in or adjacent to economic 
poverty, both in the physical world and symbolically. As in Houston, Chivers noted that in 
New York, Memphis, Chicago, and Atlanta, the spaces where black people lived were 
defined by disproportionately high “unemployment [and] underemployment” as well as 
“exorbitant rents, inadequate housing, police brutality, economic exploitation, poor schools, 
indifference of political administrators, discrimination, and segregation.” All of these, in fact, 
were forms of economic exploitation that primed black youth to engage in activities defined 
as “crime” in order to escape the “fatalism” and “economic despair” that dared to snuff out 
their chances to make better lives for themselves.1 Thus, impoverished black neighborhoods 
suffered overexposure to certain types of crime, specifically theft and violent crime. And 
while all black neighborhoods and different spaces within black neighborhoods did not 
witness high rates of criminal activity, because of the popular association of blackness with 
criminality, all black neighborhoods suffered the same stigmas and their consequences.2 
S 
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 How exactly did crime limit the life chances of black Houstonians in segregated 
communities? How were these limits constrained further by vectors of gender and 
sexuality? A data set that compiles all of the crimes reported in the Saturday edition of the 
Houston Informer from 1950 through 1959, as well as a sample of crimes from the Houston 
Post for the same decade, allows for a visualization of when, where, and what types of 
crimes were reported in the newspapers. Far more useful than city-level statistics on crime, 
this data set comprises of vignettes of people’s lived experiences, and a snapshot of how 
Houston was constructed spatially and racially within the popular press. The Informer tended 
to focus on crimes in black neighborhoods, where black people were most often 
perpetrators and victims. The Post reported crimes that were committed by white 
Houstonians and that victimized white people with much more frequency. When mapped, 
these data points illustrate that criminal activity could occur anywhere in the city and be 
perpetrated by people from a variety of social and economic backgrounds. However, 
because of the ways the press functioned as a public space, the stories consistently 
suggested that crime was an effect of blackness, and the Informer in particular, and ironically, 
contributed to the discursive mapping of black neighborhoods as dangerous spaces. 
In addition to providing evidence for the ways crime limited the life chances of 
segregated black Houstonians, the sources—newspapers—are also a site of inquiry. 
Newspapers played a significant role in the ways readers understood their local spaces in 
relation to multiple scales of society, from the neighborhood to the city, from the state to 
the nation.3 The final question, then, is what social geography of Houston did the press 
produce and how did Houstonians, lay people and in city government, respond? Newspaper 
reports were inherently selective and often sensational, curated for mass consumption. 
When they reported crime, the frequencies of types of crimes reported did not correlate 
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with official crime data. Official crime statistics offered a picture of a far less dangerous 
Houston than the newspapers’ pages suggested. Moreover, the Post noted the racial identity 
of crimes when committed by black people, but did not practice the same racial marking 
when white people committed crimes. Together, both the Informer and the Post suggested a 
reign of terror in black neighborhoods, with little attention to the ways that crime was not 
structured around neighborhoods or census tracts, per se, but rather around commercial 
and recreational drags. In doing all of these things, the newspapers contributed to a 
criminalization of black space. 
Therefore, mirroring what other historians have found in cities like Chicago and 
Baltimore, white residents of Houston “expected to see moral decay in the African-
American community, undertook policies that forced vice activities into African-American 
neighborhoods, and then saw prostitutes, numbers runners, and petty criminals there, which 
confirmed their belief in the moral shortcomings of African Americans.” Criminalized space 
and the people therein were viewed as unredeemable, and thus the folks who endured 
elevated conditions of crime were themselves marked as criminal and isolated from the 
symbolic and material resources needed to protect them from violence. Houstonians 
variably responded to the issues in black neighborhoods with neglect, contempt, and police 
brutality rather than police protection, further exacerbating the racial and gendered 
consequences of segregation on black Houstonians.4 
The social delimiters of gender and sexuality exposed black women—including those 
who were not what are called “ciswomen” today—to increased geographies of risk. Most 
scholars who study violence against black women focus on the ways domestic labor in white 
homes or exposure to authoritarian police placed black women at risk of physical and 
sexual assault.  This was certainly true. However, some black women were not even safe in 
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their own homes. Without proper police protection or municipal resources, black women 
who suffered and survived intimate partner violence were least likely to be recognized as 
“true victims” in a misogynistic society that was already suffused with justifications for 
masculinist violence against women. Black men were viewed as particularly brutal, despite 
that neighborhood and economic distress explain statistical differences in the so-called racial 
disparity in rates of domestic assault.5 Black women in Houston, however, endured 
increased risk of suffering the consequences of racial segregation, economic exploitation, 
and ubiquitous misogyny, with few opportunities for relief in a criminal justice landscape that 
habitually undervalued black lives.6 
 
lack spaces” were first imagined and maintained by white people with the 
means to define where black people would live and where they could 
not. But these spaces were not merely where black people lived; 
negative neighborhood conditions, resulting from segregation, limited black people’s life 
chances. As was true in cities around the country, white residents in Houston who were 
already more inclined to generalize about black people than to see black people as 
individuals believed “poverty and crime were not simply violence, but ‘Negro crime’ and 
‘Negro poverty,’” which were defining features of the black “race.” Thus, urban “white” 
newspapers, when they did focus on black life in the nation, often privileged “crime [as] by 
far the most important single category of Negro news…” Such was the case in the Post 
during the 1950s, where most stories about black people involved crime, and where, after 
the gruesome rape and murder of Billy Bodenheimer, the editors participated in the 
condemnation of the accused black youths by presenting the police narrative as the 
authoritative truth on the matter. The fear of “Negro criminality” often compelled the 
“B 
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phenomenon of residential white flight, while it simultaneously attracted white people to 
black neighborhoods for illicit recreation.7 As Gunnar Myrdal recorded: 
Partly because Negro neighborhoods are slum areas and partly because Negroes are 
supposed to be masters of sensuous pleasure, Negro neighborhoods are frequented 
by whites who wish to do something illicit or immoral. White criminal gangs in 
Northern cities often have their headquarters in Negro neighborhoods. White men 
come to Negro neighborhoods to find both white and Negro prostitutes…. All 
sorts of tastes, including those which are regarded as immoral and perverted, are 
catered to in Negro sections. Illegal selling of narcotics is much simpler in Negro 
neighborhoods. The owners of these enterprises are practically all whites, although 
the ‘entertainers’ and subordinates are often Negroes.8 
White Americans in the middle of the twentieth century were simultaneously fleeing and 
fueling crime in black neighborhoods, confirming for themselves the dangers and potential 
pleasures of “Negro criminality.” 
As spaces became defined as “black” in white imaginaries, then, they also inevitably 
became criminal spaces, both because white people’s actions toward these spaces 
precipitated concentrations of material deprivation therein and transformed black spaces 
into marketplaces for white consumers of various “vices.” For the former, while poverty did 
not necessarily have to translate to higher rates of crime, it did signal a lack of access to 
resources. Among those missing resources was protection by (and from) police officers, 
who had a long history of arresting and harassing economically impoverished Americans at 
higher rates than wealthier ones, thus inflating crime and arrest statistics among those 
under-protected populations.9 One of sociologist Rose Helper’s respondents in her study 
on real estate brokers’ practices in Chicago revealed the attitudes of white folks that 
encouraged these police actions: 
There are very fine Negroes, but there is a tough element that follows them. If a 
neighborhood is white, and a Negro walks down the street, you have the right to 
question him on what he is doing there. But, if Negroes are living there, you can’t 
distinguish between an owner and a prowler. White people don’t want their women 
raped, their houses broken into, their cars stolen.10 
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These same beliefs motivated white flight from Riverside Terrace when the Caesars moved 
in. As one former resident reported, the Caesars, however genteel they were, represented 
an inevitable threat: the arrival of the “undesirable element” into Riverside. As another of 
Helper’s informants noted, “Most colored people look dangerous. They scare you when you 
look at them. They scare you when you’re not used to them. Even to me they look 
dangerous at times, just to look at them, and I’m used to them.”11 Thus, whether they had 
committed crimes or not, and despite their intentions, black people could rarely occupy 
spaces without making those spaces dangerous, at least as far as white imaginaries were 
concerned. These associations of blackness with danger also persisted despite whether the 
white observer viewed themselves as progressive on the issue of race relations. 
These imaginaries were produced and reproduced in Houston’s media publications. 
The Post and the Informer told different stories about crime in Houston. There was little 
overlap in the stories each paper reported, and, when visualized spatially, the two 
newspapers produce dissimilar maps of crime in the city (see Map 16). In the Informer, crime 
only appears to happen in great quantities in black neighborhoods. However, in the Post, 
crime is much more widely dispersed, though the spatial pattern points to a focus on crimes 
near the city’s core and less attention to outlying areas. In terms of the types of crimes 
reported, the Informer and the Post had minimal differences. Neither reflected the Houston 
Police Department’s (HPD) official tabulation of crime occurrences for the decade (see 
Figure 2). While homicides and other forms of murder accounted for less than 1 percent of 
all crimes in the city for the decade, they accounted for about 17 percent of crime coverage 
in both newspapers. The same was true of recorded sexual assaults, where they comprised 
only one-tenth of a percentage of crimes tabulated by HPD, but nearly 6 percent of the 
stories covered by the newspapers. The vast majority of crimes in the city were property  
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Map 16 Comparison of the quantity of crimes reported per Census tract in the Informer and the Post. 
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crimes (96.7 percent), which in the newspapers included thefts, burglaries, vandalism, and 
breaking and entering. These received somewhat more attention in the Post (35 percent) 
than the Informer (22.6 percent). Crimes that involved non-fatal, non-sexual assaults were 
also relatively infrequent according to HPD, comprising less than 3 percent of their figures. 
However, in the Informer they accounted for nearly 32 percent of reported crimes, and in 
the Post nearly 21 percent. Other types of crime not included in HPD’s measures, such as 
non-violent offenses like drug possession or trafficking, gambling, driving under the influence 
of alcohol, vagrancy, and possession of firearms figured significantly in newspaper coverage 
accounting for about one-fifth of the total crimes reported in both publications. In sum, the 
newspapers nearly mirror each other in the proportion of types of crimes reported. They 
differed in their attention to property crimes versus non-fatal, non-sexual physical assaults, 
with the Post giving greater attention to assaults on property. These differences in attention 
may have reflected the ways whiteness and property ownership were co-constructed in the 
postwar period. The Informer’s overrepresentation of physical assaults suggested both higher 
rates of assaults in those areas of the city with higher and denser rates of unemployment, as 
well as lesser degrees of privacy and home ownership, as many of these assaults took place 
in public spaces or in rental units where neighbors might observe them and call for help.  
Whereas the newspapers reported types of crime in similar proportions, the Post 
tended to tell stories where white people were victimized and the Informer focused on 
incidences involving black victims. The Informer’s local reporting predominately covered 
black neighborhoods. Therefore, the overwhelming majority (96.3 percent) of victims of all 
crimes reported in the Informer whose racial categorization could be determined were 
identifiable as black. The Post, meanwhile, reported crimes in which 80 percent of the 
victims were identifiable as white (Table 2). 
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Group Informer  Post  Total 
Black 1663 96.3% 90 12.3% 1753 
White 51 3.0% 587 80.1% 638 
Spanish 
surname 9 0.5% 47 6.4% 56 
Asian 4 0.2% 9 1.2% 13 
Table 2 Victims of all crimes by racialized group, by newspaper 
While both papers reported on crimes in about the same number of neighborhoods (the 
Informer covered sixty neighborhoods while the sample from the Post covered fifty-nine), 
they differed somewhat on which neighborhoods received the greatest attention (see Table 
3). The Informer covered Houston’s largest black neighborhoods closest to the city’s core 
more often than did the Post, which focused its coverage geographically on the center of the 
city and in areas with higher proportions of white residents adjacent to majority black 
neighborhoods. The Fifth Ward bucked this trend, ranking first and second in the Informer 
and Post, respectively, for number of crime stories covered in the newspapers. This 
probably reflects Fifth Ward’s proximity to downtown, its significantly higher population 
count than its rival counterpart (the two main census tracts in Fifth Ward had nearly 35,000 
residents, whereas those in Third Ward had a little over 27,000 residents in 1960), and, 
likely, its higher rates of crime compared to other areas of the city. However, the Post did 
remain consistent in its racialized pattern of story coverage even in Fifth Ward, where the 
largest plurality of crimes it reported on were committed by people identifiable as white (46 
percent).12 
But while Table 3 may suggest entire neighborhoods or census tracts experienced 
higher rates of crime throughout, the reality was that most crime tended to be 
concentrated on main drags with commercial establishments that attracted people for 
shopping, drinking, and dancing. Almost 54 percent of the assaults reported in the Informer 
occurred on fewer than 70 streets out of a possible 718 streets where any assaults were  
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20 Neighborhoods with Highest Counts of Crime Reported, by Newspaper 
Rank Informer Crime reports Post Crime reports 
1. Fifth Ward 634 Downtown 266 
2. Third Ward 525 Fifth Ward 102 
3. Downtown 252 
Washington Avenue - Memorial 
Park 
98 
4. Fourth Ward 180 Magnolia Park 89 
5. Acres Homes 139 Heights 79 
6. 
Washington Avenue - Memorial 
Park 
93 Near Northside 65 
7. Sunnyside 64 Midtown 62 
8. Independence Heights 56 Third Ward 58 
9. Trinity - Houston Gardens 51 Fourth Ward 47 
10. Near Northside 45 Second Ward 47 
11. Clinton Park Tri-Community 37 Montrose 44 
12. Heights 33 
Denver Harbor - Port 
Houston 
40 
13. Magnolia Park 21 Lawndale - Wayside 32 
14. Eastwood 17 Eastex - Jensen Area 29 
15. Harrisburg - Manchester 17 Independence Heights 29 
16. Eastex - Jensen Area 16 Macgregor 28 
17. Macgregor 15 Southampton Area 27 
18. Midtown 15 Golfcrest - Bellfort - Reveille 23 
19. Pleasantville Area 14 Greater Eastwood 21 
20. Settegast 14 Almeda - Southmore 20 
Table 3 Twenty neighborhoods with Highest Counts of Crime Reported, by Newspaper. Bolded neighborhoods are those that did not 
make the top 20 in the other newspaper. 
reported. These streets (e.g., Dowling Street, Lyons Avenue, West Dallas Avenue, Jensen 
Drive, and Liberty Road) were main drags, clustered with dining and nightlife establishments 
that served black Houstonians. While physical assaults reported in the Post also tended to 
occur on main drags with commercial establishments, the top reported streets in that 
newspaper were mostly in downtown (e.g., Main Street, Franklin Street, Texas Avenue, and 
Fannin Street). A few reflected the main drags in other areas of the city (Harrisburg 
Boulevard in Harrisburg and Navigation Boulevard in Second Ward). That is, while at the 
neighborhood level places like downtown, Third Ward, and Fifth Ward may have seemed 
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wholly crime-ridden, street-level analyses reveals that crime clustered on particular streets 
rather than across the breadth of neighborhoods, and that the kinds of streets they 
occurred on did not vary by the racial make-up of the neighborhood. Nevertheless, entire 
areas could become defined by the kinds of mental images shaped by newspaper stories, 
producing for black neighborhoods such cultural markers as Fifth Ward’s nickname, “the 
Bloody Fifth.”13 
Aside from which racial groups received the most attention, one of the most 
significant differences between the two papers was where within the paper the stories were 
most often published. The Post was a daily published by the highly influential Hobby family. It 
sought to appeal to the professional and business classes both within Houston and around 
the nation. Its journalism, then, was less provincial than the Informer’s, which reported on 
national and international events with less frequency—usually received from the National 
Negro Press Association. Instead, the Informer dedicated most of its ink to events in 
Houston and cities close to home, namely Dallas, San Antonio, and Galveston. Thus, the 
Informer’s appeal would have been limited, to a significant degree, to a Texas-based 
readership and a mostly black audience. And as a bi-weekly, it had to compel readers to 
consider its news, however old or fresh, worthwhile. Thus, to attract readers and 
subscribers, the Informer not only reported more crimes per issue than the Post did, it also 
gave them greater prominence and sensational headlines (see Figure 3). The vast majority of 
crimes reported in the Informer appeared on either of its most visible pages—the first or 
last pages (in some issues the last page was 20, in others it was 24). These accounted for 
nearly 74 percent of all reports. Another 9 percent appeared on page 10, often the final 
page of the Informer’s first section and the page on which the majority of the front page 
stories would conclude. While the first page of the Post covered 275 crime stories—the 
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largest count of any of the Post’s pages—these composed less than 20 percent of the total 
crimes reported in the paper. That is, the Informer privileged crime reports, but the Post 
exhibited no such marketing preference through crime stories as regularly. 
Consequently, the Informer acted as a public space in ways that the Post did not in 
the middle of the twentieth century. It was a location where black people could read about 
and discuss their lives in their neighborhoods. This included stories about the cultural 
vibrancy of black communities: activities at local churches, productions at schools, sporting 
events at Texas Southern University, civic club gatherings, neighborhood beautification 
projects, and local and national politics. But the Informer’s decision to privilege stories of 
crime, while tucking these less sensational stories in the paper’s internal pages, could have 
the effect of heightening the sense that black neighborhoods were best defined by the 
dangers they presented rather than the resilience under economic exploitation and 
residential segregation that the other stories represented. As criminal justice scholar Derek 
J. Paulsen explained, newspapers, given their prominence as a source of information in the 
middle of the century, probably had “the single greatest impact on public perceptions and 
fear of crime.” He argued that the “skewed public perceptions” produced by journalism, 
incongruous with actual rates of crime, would be reflected in the attitudes and actions of 
those exposed to the newspaper. Readers and passersby who took note of the “black” 
newspaper’s cover stories probably learned to “avoid traveling to certain areas… in 
Houston” and likely believed black people were simply prone to commit the most heinous 
types of crime. In its defense, the Informer hinted, at least once, that its intention in 
publicizing these stories was not merely to gain readership, but also to impress upon people 
that “Negro life in Houston is cheap.”  That is, they wanted their stories to convince black 
Houstonians to stress upon each other the value of black life, and they wanted to compel  
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the Houston Police Department to investigate and “punish” criminals who targeted black 
people. The noblest of intentions notwithstanding, the overrepresentation of sensational 
crimes and the use of labels like “Bloody Fifth” and “Pearl Harbor” to describe black 
neighborhoods contributed to public perceptions of black neighborhoods as criminal spaces 
or abandoned warzones. Meanwhile stories in the Post and the Chronicle that highlighted 
“Negro criminals” while never noting “white criminals” certainly contributed to 
Houstonians’ sense of the racialized criminal geography of their city.14 
But it was the Informer that publicized the most and the most often about “Negro 
crime,” and in doing so, trafficked in what historian Barbara Fields and sociologist Karen 
Fields call “racecraft.” One of the consequences of this persistent, if unwitting practice of 
“writing race into crime” was to provide documentary justification for the abuse black 
Houstonians suffered at the hands of police officers, white and black, who terrorized their 
communities with impunity, although this practice itself should be understood as a 
consequence of the racial stigmatization and spatial marginalization imposed on black people 
by white people in the first place. Certainly, readers thought police violence was necessary 
for maintaining order in the city.15 
Indeed, contemporaries believed that black Houstonians committed more crimes 
than their white counterparts in the middle of the twentieth century. In 1938 Houston’s 
Acting Chief of Police Dave G. Turner’s first words to investigators working with Gunnar 
Myrdal were: “Well, niggers commit more crime than white people.” These beliefs prevailed 
in the following decades. In the 1950s, the Informer castigated black families and churches for 
failing to dutifully instill black children with the moral fortitude to resist the “glitter of gaudy 
show” of “the successful racketeer, the money-made preacher, the unprincipled teacher, 
[and] the successful scoundrel” who demonstrated alternatives to the kind of respectable 
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hard work middle class black folk believed was necessary for uplift. In 1960, Mayor Lewis 
Cutrer developed the Negro Law Enforcement Committee, comprised of twenty-two black 
leaders, to “study the high rate of murder among Houston Negroes,” noting that “80 per 
cent of the murders in Houston involved Negroes.” Since most crime was intraracial, this 
likely meant that black Houstonians disproportionately accounted as offenders and victims 
of violent crime. And Houstonians were not alone. Black people around the country shared 
these sentiments, reflecting on the “Negro crime rates” in their respective cities. For 
example, William O. Walker, publisher of the Cleveland Call and Post, argued, “If Negroes 
could populate schools at the same rate that they do jails we would be the best educated 
people in the world.” Such influential publishers and policy makers argued a multi-pronged 
approach to dealing with the problem of so-called black criminality: a refashioning of the 
moral fiber of young black people, increased policing—though “this is not to say that a cop 
on every corner is needed,” the Informer cautioned, just that “the presence of more officers 
in the general community is worth-while”—and harsher sentencing for intraracial crimes. As 
“corrective action,” the editorialists at the Informer believed this would encourage people, 
both interpersonally and institutionally, to value black people’s lives.16 
These contemporaries were certainly addressing a troubling phenomenon: 
heightened levels of crime that disproportionately affected black people. However, they 
were engaging in racecraft. Racecraft describes the ways people are disciplined into an 
episteme wherein they understand race not as a consequence of social structure, but as a 
primary cause of sociopolitical difference—this “they” referring to all those, historically and 
currently, who have inherited a racialized society. Fields and Fields provide a helpful 
example: 
The shorthand transforms racism, something an aggressor does, into race, something 
the target is, in a sleight of hand that is easy to miss. Consider the statement “black 
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Southerners were segregated because of their skin color”—a perfectly natural 
sentence to the ears of most Americans, who tend to overlook its weird causality. 
But in that sentence, segregation disappears as the doing of segregationists, and 
then, in a puff of smoke—paff—reappears as a trait of only one part of the 
segregated whole.17 
“Negro crime,” then, even as just a phrase, is produced through racecraft, suggesting that 
“Negro” can be a modifier of “crime.” As Khalil Gibran Muhammad argues, this practice of 
“writing crime into race” and writing race into crime, especially through crime statistics, 
served to justify the continued marginalization of black people from American political life 
through the 1940s. During Jim Crow, “black criminality,” Muhammad notes, “had become 
the most significant and durable signifier of black inferiority in white people’s minds,” 
confirming, indeed, that black folks were unfit “for modern life.” This was certainly the logic 
of Texan segregationists after the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board, who claimed, 
“[T]he fact remains that the Negro’s crime and illegitimacy rates are everywhere so vastly 
greater than those of the whites that these statistics have an alarming impact on the minds 
of parents” who did not want their children “thrown into rather intimate contact with 
colored boys and girls.” One retired Houston teacher feared that if integration caused white 
students to “learn to like [black people] better” the entire white race would “go to the 
dogs.”18 
 In 1957, Richard Dilworth, mayor of Philadelphia, in an effort to dissuade interracial 
violence in his city, “criticized ‘constant reiteration about Negro crime.’” He explained, 
“There’s no more crime—in fact, there’s less crime—in low-income Negro districts than in 
low-income white districts. There just happens to be more low-income Negro districts.” At 
least on its face, the statistical evidence suggested that black people were rabid criminals, 
but, at least for Philadelphia, the mayor argued, this was misleading. For him, the problem 
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was economic inequality rather than race.19 Many Houstonians reasoned the same was true 
for their city. One reader wrote to the Informer: 
I keep reading from time to time that Negroes commit more murders than anybody 
else in Houston. Somehow I don’t believe the picture is complete, if one just takes 
the total number of murders committed by any race. Are our poor housing, our lack 
of healthy and proper recreation centers, both combining to drive our people more 
into beer taverns…?20 
Editorialists in the newspaper noted the poor living conditions of black people across the 
country as the nation’s black population transitioned from being primarily rural to majority 
urban and argued that the mass expansion of “low-income Negro ghettos” were a 
consequence of structural inequality, including those maintained by patterns of “the flight of 
segregation-minded white [people].” They succinctly summarized their argument this way: 
“Negroes are not the creators of these conditions, they are the victims of them.” 
Americans gave increasing attention to this way of framing the problem of crime in black 
neighborhoods over through the 1960s, as the Liberal Consensus solidified, though historian 
Elizabeth Hinton argues, because of their prevailing anti-black prejudices, liberals failed to 
execute a War on Poverty that would ultimately ameliorate these conditions, and instead 
manufactured an apparatus that more likely to harass, surveil, abuse, arrest, and incarcerate 
young black Americans than to train them for skilled employment or otherwise produce 
jobs.21 
 However, even these more structuralist articulations of crime risked committing 
what Muhammad calls “writing crime into class,” and they were definitely often interpreted 
as such.22 That is, as the twentieth century progressed, biological racism fell out of favor, 
and color-evasiveness ascended, class-based explanations of crime found a productive 
ideological partnership with cultural racism. Namely, rather than interpreting structuralist 
arguments for the causes of crime as critiques of the systems that produced those 
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conditions, people often instead rearticulated them as critiques of people living in poverty 
and what they—the critics—identified as the “culture of poverty.” Responding to these 
facile interpretations, Gordon Blaine Hancock, writing for the Associated Negro Press, 
informed readers that no scientific studies justified a belief in either a racial or cultural link 
to an objective standard of “morality.” He doubled down on the argument that race was a 
consequence rather than a cause, writing, “This column has often contended that the Negro 
is just what the white man made him! If he had made a better Negro, he would have had 
one. The present Negro is a creature of the white man’s creation and that the prejudiced 
whites would stigmatize their own creation is unbelievable.” Hancock masterfully exposed 
the machinations of racecraft and demanded Americans, black and white, revisit the 
historical causes of black people’s poor living conditions and over-exposure to crime.23 
 Yet, even as black folks in Houston and around the country developed rhetorical, 
scholarly, and political strategies for undermining the racialization of crime that threatened 
to keep them marginalized from American sociopolitical life, they also had to contend with 
their material reality. Namely, black communities suffered from crime and stigmatization in 
ways that white communities—specifically the non-impoverished ones—did not. Because of 
segregation, whether poor, middle class, or wealthy, black Houstonians lived in elevated 
geographies of risk compared to their class-equivalent white counterparts, who secured 
homes in neighborhoods that were less densely populated, more residential in landscape, 
and without racial stigma.  
Whether “black people” committed more crimes is a question produced by 
racecraft. But some people marked as black, just as people of any so-called race, did commit 
crimes. Yet because “[t]he process of segregation raises the probability of intra-group 
conflict not only by virtue of its power to generate proximity and intimacy, but also by 
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virtue of its power to reduce respect for the areas that are segregated into deteriorated,” 
black communities faced heightened risks of exposure to criminal activity and under-
protection. Indeed, these consequences were all the more real for people marked as black 
because they often happened in relatively densely populated, segregated spaces that served 
a population that was spatially marginalized—not by choice, but by force. Residents of Third 
Ward, Fourth Ward, Fifth Ward, and increasingly Sunnyside and Acres Homes often read 
about their neighborhoods as hotbeds of violent criminal activity on the front pages of the 
Informer. And crime in these areas, caused variably by “unemployment, poverty, hunger, 
inadequate housing, [and] educational problems,” among other factors—all with their roots 
in racial stigmatization and segregation—significantly impacted the life chances of 
“nonwhite” Houstonians, in terms of a range of health outcomes and premature death by 
homicide in the middle of the twentieth century.24 
The pattern in Houston did not differ from other places. Crimes committed by black 
people against other black people were treated with greater leniency than crimes 
committed by black people against white people, if they were treated at all. One black 
Houstonian noted, “A Negro can kill another Negro and if he has the right lawyer he can 
come clear, but if he kills a white man he’ll be electrocuted. If a white man kills a Negro he 
usually gets out of it without any trouble.” Thus, rather than focusing on protecting black 
people, whose neighborhoods did suffer some of the highest rates of violent crime in the 
city, “many white policemen typically acted as if it were their duty to keep black folks in 
‘their place’ and make them stand in fear.” These patterns of practice toward black 
Houstonians would continue into the 1960s and through the twentieth century, and, 
according to U.S. House of Representatives member Craig Anthony Washington, earn the 
city and its police department “the dishonorable distinction of leading the Nation, and 
307 
 
 
perhaps the world, in police misconduct, complaints, and litigation,”  defined by a failure to 
honor “its responsibility to protect all its citizenry.”25 
 In 1940, Charles A. Shaw, of the Watchtower Life Insurance Company, wrote to 
Walter White, secretary of the NAACP, about “the victimization of Negroes by police 
thugs in Houston.” White had received a letter from a white businessman in Houston about 
the brutality he had witnessed and had written Shaw for further enlightenment. Shaw 
responded, saying, “It is true that the police department of the city of Houston has been 
charged, and in a number of instances, proved guilty of brutal impositions on colored 
people…” Shaw opined, with Carter Wesley, that evidence suggested that too many of 
Houston’s police officers “were former convicts and the lowest type of poor whites,” 
suggesting that these kind of white people in particular received some particular 
psychosocial benefit when they attacked black people with impunity. The original letter to 
Shaw from the anonymous white businessman suggested as much, when he claimed, “Our 
police force in Houston is recruited from the cattle rustlers from the Panhandle, Oklahoma 
and Arkansas.” He continued that Houston’s “tough police” appeared to “take delight in 
beating up colored citizens for the gun it gives them.” Using poor white men as a scapegoat 
for violent white supremacy was probably an oversimplification, but physically violent 
interracial strife in Houston did often involve working class people, as in the case of Johnnie 
Lee Morris.26 
 Wesley did not shy away from publishing testimonies of police brutality, throughout 
the 1950s, perhaps because he had suffered his own unprovoked run-in with the police in 
1940. Driving near Spring, Texas, on a trip between Dallas and Houston, two highway patrol 
officers “greeted” Wesley “with licks”—that is, they attacked him on the road. They 
claimed that Wesley had waved to a man in a passing car. Writing to fellow attorney 
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Thurgood Marshall, he explained, “No, there wasn’t any woman with him, so there was no 
question of mashing.” Mashing was the slang equivalent of flirting or making amorous 
advances. He denied waving at anyone at all or having any trouble before the officers 
stopped him. However, when he was finally released he had been charged with “resisting 
arrest,” and had several injuries to show for it. “My jaws are swollen up like somebody 
having the mumps,” he reported, “and my lips are cut clear through where those babies 
kicked me after they got me down.”27 Wesley, then, understood the lengths that officers 
were willing to go to cover their unlawful arrests and assaults, and how simply being black 
could be enough provocation for the police to attack. 
 The overwhelming majority of the eighty-two cases of police brutality reported in 
the Informer in the 1950s occurred in the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Wards, where black 
Houstonians were most densely compacted and closest to downtown. They were often 
attacked by police for petty reasons. One black man, James Burns, was beaten by white 
officer W. H. Rankin on May 30, 1950 after the officer arrested him for “jay walking” on the 
200 block of Hamilton Street. On June 20, 1950, two black teenagers, Michael Thomas and 
Angelo Simon, were “cursed and beat… in the stomach and on the legs,” with one of them 
sustaining injuries on the mouth as well before being handcuffed and taken to the police 
station downtown. The young men had been watching a show through a hole in a fence at 
the Lyric Theater at the Public School Stadium in Third Ward before heading off, when the 
officers stopped them on the street and “accused them of stealing radios out of parked 
cars.” Thomas, only thirteen years old, had been riding his bike when an officer stopped 
him, Simon, and Simon’s girlfriend, who had been at the Lyric Theater with them, to ask 
“what he was doing.” Thomas told the officer that he was “inspecting the back tire of his 
bike.” Now joined by his partner, the officer forced the teenager into a driveway and the 
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two insisted to Thomas that he had stolen radios and demanded he show them where he 
had them stashed. Thomas and Simon alleged that the officers continued beating them as 
they drove them to the police station. They were “released when the special officers said 
they did not have anything against the boys.” The officers told the young boys to “account 
for their bruises by telling their parents they got them by ‘falling down.’” The officers 
apparently received no reprimand. The Informer also reported, on the same day, the case of 
Leslie Jones, a fifty-year-old resident of Fourth Ward, who claimed that “two police 
officers,” one white and one black, “beat him on the porch of his residence,” just a few days 
prior to the young men’s arrest. Jones was unaware of what provoked the attack, other 
than that he was trying to enter his own home while the police were talking to another 
resident. However, by the end of the ordeal, he found himself picking peas and hoeing 
vegetables on a “pea farm with his eyes almost closed from bruises” from the beating, after 
he was unable to pay a “$10 fine on the charge of drunkness.”28 
 Understandably, then, black Houstonians maintained little trust for the police 
officers who seized their neighborhoods. They often found that the narratives they heard 
from their neighbors regarding encounters with police contradicted the stories police told 
when justifying their actions. In May 1952, a group of about thirty citizens, led by Sid 
Hilliard, petitioned Houston City Council “to investigate and take steps toward preventing 
future abuse and beatings of persons questioned or arrested by” the police. While black 
Houstonians had been enraged by acts of brutality for some time, the recent case involving 
the drowning of Ruben Holiday, a black man in police custody, proved to be too egregious 
to simply add to the tally. In February of the same year, Holiday had been arrested on a 
“disturbance charge” and was in the custody of two white officers, M. M. German and D. F. 
Scott. The officers claimed that they placed Holiday in their patrol car, and on the way to 
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the police station, they stopped at the lake to let him relieve himself since “there were [no 
restrooms] available for Negroes.” Then, they claimed, he “ran into the lake and drowned 
in an attempt to escape.” The family doubted the officers’ tale, noting that it was dubious 
that Holiday, who had “served in the navy for four years and was an expert swimmer,” 
would have drowned in a lake, much less one like Dodson, which was more a marsh that 
neighborhood children regularly traversed and fished in safely.29 
 Black men, then, seemed fair game for persecution by officers, whether those 
officers were white or black, and regardless of the severity of crime for which the black 
person stood accused. Sometimes, as was the case with Jones, an accusation did not even 
need to precipitate the harassment. While on his way home from work in Fifth Ward, two 
patrolmen stopped brakeman A. R. Collins just before five o’clock in the morning. He had 
been walking down Hardy Street “when the two officers cut their car over on the wrong 
side of the street and drew up to the curb and threatened him with abusive language and to 
get his -- off the street.” The officer in the passenger’s seat was “slumped over in the seat as 
if he were asleep,” Collins recalled, while the other, “who spoke to him smelled of alcohol 
and talked like he had been drinking.” Black Houstonians expressed great unease when they 
learned of this incident and others that preceded it, telling the Informer that “the officers 
have indiscriminately begun to abuse people on the streets.” In one instance, a black man 
gave the Informer an eyewitness account of a “Negro handcuffed in the back seat” of a 
parked patrol car “being held by one officer while another officer on the outside of the car 
was beating the prisoner through a window of the car with a flashlight.” Several business 
owners in the area corroborated the witness’s story, and none knew what eventually 
happened to the man.30 
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 Often these encounters, which followed petty accusations, resulted in serious injury 
or death. In March 1955, Hosea Harris Jr. was taken by police “for allegedly crossing a 
downtown street on a red light.” The traffic officer who cited him—Harris claimed for 
crossing on a caution rather than a red light—had treated him fairly enough until two other 
officers arrived and escalated the situation by “pushing him [Harris] around.” The three 
officers seized him and beat him “without reason, causing him to lose two teeth.” The 
officers, as was standard, “denied” the assault and instead claimed that the young man had 
resisted arrest and had “jumped on the three of them.” In another case, Elmore Haywood, a 
thirty-seven-year-old working class man, “was severely beaten” on September 11, 1955. 
While sitting in a black-owned barbecue spot on Liberty Road in Fifth Ward, talking with 
the owner Eugene Barnett, Haywood was approached by two officers who asked his name 
and searched him. Another officer arrived shortly thereafter and accused Haywood of 
“calling people over the phone, cursing them.” They arrested and removed Haywood from 
Barnett’s Barbecue. Later that evening, Haywood arrived at the Jefferson Davis Hospital 
with a “cut over one eye,” as well as a lacerated liver and pancreas. The Homicide 
Department reported “no record” of the beating.31 
 While the justifications officers gave for their brutal behavior—that is, whatever 
crime they  alleged had taken place in a particular case—were not always clear, the function 
of keeping black Houstonians in their “place” remained consistent. In this way, police 
brutality resembled American racialized lynching, where black victims of white terrorism 
were often attacked even when they had been accused of no crime but had stepped out of 
their prescribed “place” in the social hierarchy. Verdell Phillips, a black American Second 
World War veteran, claimed that a white officer, B. H. Terral, “beat and arrested him on 
traffic violations” at the start of the new year in 1955. Philips claimed that he was backing 
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out of his driveway in Houston Gardens, a black neighborhood that had been subsidized and 
developed by the Suburban Resettlement Administration under the New Deal, when he 
heard Terral yell, “Back on across the road, Nigger.” Phillips disobeyed, realizing that the 
officer could give him a ticket for driving across the street in reverse, so he pulled back into 
his driveway. The officer blocked his car in, exited his patrol vehicle, and begin beating the 
twenty-three-year-old. Afraid for his life with Terral threatening to pull out his gun, Phillips 
“ran around the back of the house with the patrolman in pursuit.” The officer fired a shot 
into the ground, frightening the fleeing man. He caught Phillips, threw him to the ground, 
“and started beating him again.” This time the officer “was trying to cock his gun to shoot 
me,” Phillips claimed, so he wrestled the gun away from the officer. With the tables turned, 
the officer requested his gun back, claiming he was “not going to do anything, but just 
wanted to talk” with Phillips. Phillips “returned the gun and entered his house,” only to be 
followed by the officer who “broke his back door down… and came into his house, firing 
another shot which hit the washing machine.” Phillips recalled the persistent cop saying, 
“G—D--- Nigger. I ought to shoot you.” The bizarre interaction de-escalated once more 
when Phillips managed to take the gun from the officer again, who then begged for his 
firearm, reportedly saying, “I love colored people.” After he returned the gun a second 
time, another officer, J. H. Robbins, arrived and arrested Phillips, placing him in a patrol car 
where Terral continued to beat him on the way to the police station. A neighbor confirmed 
the details of Phillip’s account to the Informer, at least as things had transpired in the front of 
the house where she could see. Terral claimed differently, saying that Phillips tried to flee 
when he asked him to pull over. When asked if he called Phillips a “nigger,” the Informer 
recounted that he “replied tersely, ‘He might be a nigger.’”32 
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 This kind of verbal degradation often accompanied police violence against black 
people, and functioned to configure black people as less valuable humans than white folks in 
white imaginaries. In 1959, Dewey Havnott, a thirty-seven-year-old resident of Sunnyside, 
submitted a notarized statement to the Informer, claiming that police officers told him, 
“Nigger, we want you to run so we can shoot you,” as if he were an animal they were 
hunting for sport. He had been sitting in his truck, “about 1:20 a.m…. waiting for his wife” 
who worked for a janitorial service about twelve miles away from their home. Just before 
he could exit his vehicle, “the larger of the two officers” who had approached him, “got 
ahold of his arm and snatched him out of the truck,” and then both began to assault him. 
Havnott refused to run from the officers, though he expressed shock and trauma that he 
had been attacked because it was his first run-in with police officers at all. He worried that 
the officers “got a thrill out of the way they treated him more than anything else,” and that 
they enjoyed “continually refer[ring] to him as ‘nigger.’” Despite calling him a “bad nigger,” 
the officers refused to put Havnott in handcuffs, probably, he inferred, to encourage him to 
try to run away. Eventually, they booked him downtown for having a prohibited knife in his 
truck that he said he had salvaged from the trash eight months prior and had forgotten 
about. When Havnott’s wife arrived to collect him, she was glad to find him alive.33 
 John Broussard also fortunately escaped death. Patrol officers Ralph Wood Jr. and 
William Vicar claimed they had arrested Broussard on an auto theft charge, off of Jensen 
Drive in the Fifth Ward area in October 1951. At the time, black Houstonians were still 
incensed by the arrest of Johnnie Lee Morris and raising money for his defense. Wood and 
Vicar claimed that Broussard attempted to assault one of them, had escaped the police 
vehicle, and ran. They claimed they “shot him in the back ‘as he whirled around,’” because 
he had “come up on them with a grass scythe.” An anonymous witness told the Informer 
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that Broussard was shot and then beaten by police afterward. Another witness said she 
watched and heard as Broussard pleaded to the brutal officers, “Please don’t kill me, I was 
just trying to help my sister.” The “gang of police” handcuffed him, according to the witness, 
and told the frightened man, “Shut up boy.” The officers attempted to coax a confession out 
of Broussard at the scene, but he refused to admit that he had attacked any law 
enforcement personnel. The Informer reported that, “Both the witnesses said that Broussard 
lay for a long time before an ambulance was called,” and that it was possible that emergency 
medical personnel may have been present when initial police backup arrived but that it “may 
have been a white ambulance.” Broussard was eventually transported to a hospital, where 
he recovered.34 
 Ephron King Jr. was not so lucky. King’s mother, Edna Slater, declared to the 
Informer that police officers “went into my son’s house and murdered him.” King lived in 
Fourth Ward with his common-law wife’s twelve-year-old son, who was a witness to the 
encounter. Officers R. L. Crane and Leslie McGee claimed that they were following up on a 
report of two men in an altercation on Crosby Street, when they found King with a knife in 
his hand arguing with another man on a front porch. According to their statements, they 
ordered him to drop the weapon “and he refused,” after which they attempted to arrest 
him. He resisted, they said, and when Crane “tried to get on the porch, [he] lost his footing 
and slipped and the man ‘swung at him’ with the knife.” McGee countered, saying he chased 
King into the house, where both officers “grabbed King,” causing him to lose the knife. 
Somehow, the man “jerked free,” found the knife, and threatened the officers with it. 
Shortly thereafter, the officers shot and killed him. King’s mother doubted the veracity of 
the story, saying that King was “partially paralyzed on the left side,” that “he had not been 
able to do heavy work in a long time,” and that “he often visited her and she gave him 
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financial assistance.”  The son-in-law suggested that Slater’s concerns were valid, noting that 
officers shot King not because he threatened him, but rather overreacted to King’s attempts 
“to pull his paralyzed left hand out of his pocket with his good right hand.”35 
 In rare incidences officers might be charged with a crime for their violence against 
black Houstonians, but all-white, all-male juries did not exhibit any particular desire to 
protecting black citizens. In June 1954, Tom C. Pickens, an officer who had been with the 
Houston Police Department for about three years, killed Ira Williams, a thirty-two-year-old 
resident of Fifth Ward. Williams had been attempting to “escape from the Oriental Grocery 
store,” where he had been accused of theft. The officer claimed that Williams “tried to stab 
him in the face with a sharp polished instrument” both in the store and after he had 
managed to get outside. Williams claimed self-defense for the fatal gunshot. Two witnesses, 
however, testified that Williams had never had a weapon in his hand, and the autopsy 
revealed that the bullet had entered into Williams’ back rather than his front. Despite being 
charged, however, Pickens was not found guilty and reportedly continued his career as chief 
of police in a small town west of Houston. Such was the culture of the Houston Police 
Department. When black Houstonians met with Chief L. D. Morrison two years prior to 
present a petition against brutality, Morrison “scolded” them and made “no promises” 
regarding investigations of their claims.36 
 The assaults against black men by police reflected black men’s particular, 
disproportionately greater exposure to violence in public in general. But, while black men 
likely suffered physical police violence more often, black women still accounted for more 
than one out of every four incidences of brutality recorded in the Informer for which race 
and gender details were included. And, as had been true with Carter Wesley, class status 
and education could not insulate black people from police assaults. In December 1950 Ethel 
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Woodard, “underwriter for the Golden State Life Insurance Company,” reported that she 
was “manhandled” and subjected to “vulgar abuse” by city traffic officers after a fender 
bender. A white taxi driver hit her car as she, her two children, and her mother drove 
down Almeda Road, likely on their way home to Third Ward. She recalled that when the 
officers arrived on the scene, “she was caught by the shoulders and shoved over to the 
officers’ car” because she “insisted on telling her version of the accident.” The officers 
“yelled” at Woodard’s mother, Aline Matthews, when she “jumped out of the car” and 
questioned why her daughter was being arrested. One officer responded, “You get on back 
into that car!” When they arrived at the police station, the arresting officer explained to the 
lieutenant that Woodard had been arrested for refusing to follow orders, and also noted, 
“Some other old nigger woman jumped out of the car and ran over there. I guess it was her 
mother.” The lieutenant seemed to be amused when Woodard spoke up against the racial 
epithet, asking her, “Don’t you like to be called a Negro—aren’t you proud to be a Negro?” 
The officers placed her in a cell with a phone and told her to call for someone to “get her 
out.” While in the cell, she overheard an officer say to a jail matron, “I have a damned old 
nigger gal down here that don’t want to be called a nigger… should have whipped her 
G..D..A.. you know what to do.” Fortunately for Woodard, her stay in jail was short, as her 
fiancé arrived to post her $25 bond shortly thereafter. She learned that she was being 
charged with a failure to “move on.”37 
 Woodard said that “she had never before witnessed anything like” the kind of abuse 
of power the officers demonstrated, though, like many black Houstonians, she noted, “I 
have heard of it.” She managed to leave the ordeal legally unscathed in January 1951, as the 
charge against her was dismissed in municipal court following delays because her arresting 
officer refused to attend. The judge admitted that the arresting officer had wrongly 
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imprisoned her, and affirmed her right to have her version of events recorded in an accident 
report. Another black woman who had also been falsely arrested in a rooming house she 
operated also found her case dismissed in the same court. However vindicating these 
outcomes may have been for the black public who showed up to support the women and 
had been preparing a campaign against police brutality in their honor, the arresting officers 
were not reprimanded by the court, and systemically, police violence against black women 
was not challenged.38 
 While Woodard certainly did not escape her ordeal without some emotional scars, 
other black women endured physical bruises as well. Evelyne Bradley, an eighteen-year-old 
expectant mother, had to seek treatment “for both mental and physical conditions” 
according to her doctor at the Houston Negro Hospital after her encounter with officers. 
On May 18, 1952, Bradley was taken from Jefferson Davis hospital by police officers for 
unnamed reasons, but perhaps because she “might have been acting abnormally,” due to her 
mental health condition. She spent four hours in custody, at which time her husband, an air 
corps member at Ellington Field military base arrived and paid her five-dollar bond. By the 
time of her release, however, she had been “strapped down and beaten” by one of the jail 
matrons, and her doctor told Informer reporters that she had sustained “bruises on her back 
and legs that could have been caused by a lash.” When questioned about the incident, at 
least one police official passed the buck to another division of the department.39 
 As was true with black men, just being a black person in public exposed women to 
unscrupulous police officers. Houston police officers arrested a twenty-year-old Woman in 
the Air Force (WAF) downtown near the intersection at Congress and Austin streets 
where she was waiting for a bus to take her to the Heights neighborhood. She had just 
gotten her hair done and was heading to a friend’s house to prepare for an affair at the 
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YWCA when the officers drove by, one asking her out of the window of the vehicle, “Say 
nigger, what are you selling it for?”40 The woman recalled the incident for the Informer 
investigator: 
I did not answer. They backed their car up and yelled at me again with vulgar 
language asking if I did not know how to answer a question.  They got out and 
grabbed me by the hair and swung me around and cursed me. They twisted my arms 
and bent my fingers. I could not help myself and I screamed until some people came 
out to see what the trouble was. But there was nothing (the people) could do. The 
officers put handcuffs on me and pushed me into the car.41 
She said that when they arrived at the station, the arresting officer was unprepared to 
report why she had been brought in, and spontaneously said, “Well, let’s see, just book her 
for hustling.” When they learned that she worked at Ellington Field, they ridiculed her, 
saying women only worked on the military base “to have men,” and proceeded to ask her 
“if I did not have enough men on the base and had to come to the streets of Houston.” 
Despite the Informer’s interest and the potential involvement of the NAACP in the case, 
Chief L. D. Morrison, who had ordered the investigation into the bombing of the Caesar 
house, said that “as far as he could see there was no case against the officers.” Prominent 
black church folk of Houston repudiated the officers’ claims, testifying that the woman was 
“a perfect ideal of fine womanhood.” While the “charges” against the woman were not filed 
by the department, neither were the officers disciplined for their actions.42 As the WAF’s 
case demonstrated, black women were objects, simultaneously, of white men’s sexual desire 
and antipathy, and therefore were never safe in public, especially when the people who 
were employed to protect them were their predators. 
 In a similar case, two white police officers raped a twenty-one-year-old black 
pregnant woman in their patrol vehicle in 1953. She had been at Club Matinee when the 
officers “took her… on the pretense of arresting her.” After they had her seized in their 
car, they informed her “they wanted to become intimate with her.” Doctors at Jefferson 
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Davis Hospital confirmed that she had been assaulted. Upon hearing the story, Houston’s 
NAACP, led by Christia Adair, the Harris County Council of Organizations, headed by Sid 
Hilliard, and the National Council of Women, directed by Anna Harris, a black Fifth Ward 
activist, reproved the grand jury which acquitted the officers. The Informer feared that 
“Texas’ famous one-sided justice has proved itself champion again.” The officers resigned 
from their posts, although Chief Morrison and Assistant Chief Seber assured reporters that 
they had not asked the officers to do so.43 
 Though black women suffered particular risks because of their oftentimes unwitting 
social location at the frontier of interracial sexual liaisons, black male police officers could 
also be a danger to black women and communities. One Houstonian confirmed for 
researchers that “Negro policemen have a poor image in the eyes of Negroes,” and a 
survey of 383 black Houstonians revealed that they felt the types of abuse they suffered 
from black and white officers were the same.44 In June 1952 Gaudy Horn, thirty-one years 
old, was arrested by two black officers, William Perry and “Dykie” Henry, on a “failure to 
move” charge. She left the ordeal with a broken jaw. Standing at the corner of Lyons 
Avenue and Hill Street in Fifth Ward, Horn had been conversing with “an acquaintance from 
Galveston… when the two officers ordered her and the man she was talking with to move 
on.” She said she did not hear the officers, but the man did and the two began walking. 
However, before she could take any more than four steps, she “was overtaken.” One of the 
officers “grabbed her right arm, twisted it back to the center of her back and began slapping 
her on the face and striking her with a flashlight.” Together, the duo “dragged her to a 
police telephone call-box,” where they summoned a police wagon driven by two white 
officers. Once she was thrown inside the vehicle, one of the black officers began “beating 
her through” the wagon’s window while cursing her and “demanding that she perform a 
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perverted sex act upon him…” The white men “got tickled and laughed” as Horn suffered 
the beating, and the black officer continued to entertain them until one of the white officers 
finally said, “That’s enough.” When the Informer investigated the incident, Horn was still 
“unable to move her lower jaw,” and could only speak through clenched teeth through her 
six-week recovery. Despite witnesses testifying that Horn had neither assaulted the officers, 
resisted arrest, nor used vulgar language toward them, Perry maintained that he “slapped” 
Horn “because she bit him…” This seemed enough to satisfy the curiosity of the 
department.45 
 Mary Emma Johnson could not suffer the indignity of assault without trying for some 
compensation for her pain, specifically because the injuries she endured made it impossible 
for her to support her nine-year-old daughter. With attorney Francis Williams by her side, 
the Fifth Ward resident explained that the department needed to compensate her for her 
injuries. She was sitting at a buffet on October 1, 1950, when a black police officer “came in 
and told her, ‘Come on let’s go…” Startled, she asked the officer why she was being 
removed and he grabbed her by her right arm, “twisted her arm backward, lifting her from 
her seat and breaking her arm” with such force that she “heard the bone crack…” A 
bystander called an ambulance, as the officer refused to acknowledge her cries that he had 
broken her arm. X-rays at Jefferson Davis Hospital confirmed that her humerus had been 
broken and that her right hand would be paralyzed as a result. Despite a surgeon’s attempt 
to restore the use of her hand, it remained unmovable. Forced into unemployment, the 
woman could only collect twenty dollars from the Harris County Welfare Department and 
mostly relied on friends to support her and her daughter.46 
These assaults against black women greatly angered the black public in Houston. 
One writer to the Informer raved: “Who are Negroes’ protectors? What are we paying poll 
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taxes, city taxes, county taxes for? Tell me, where is our money going? For the laws to help 
molest our women, if they are considered people? No, there are no women in our race.” 
Violence against women cemented for black people, it seemed, even more than violence 
against men, how very little worth their lives carried in the minds of police officers and 
white people in general. Though some white women wrote into the Informer after the rape 
of the Fifth Ward expectant mother, explaining that they too had been recently assaulted by 
police, in general white Houstonians did not extend public displays of sympathy or empathy 
toward black female victims of police brutality. The editorialists at the Informer derided 
these actions and attitudes with fervor, writing, “Abusive conduct to a woman, coming from 
an officer of the law, seems to us as inexcusable as anything could possibly be.” Treatment 
of black women, then, became the litmus test by which black folk could measure how much 
white people valued their humanity. For, within this gendered logic, if an agency couched in 
a rhetoric of chivalry could not make itself protect the womanhood of these black people, 
they could not be expected to act as honorable men otherwise. Insofar as white Americans 
considered there to be “no women in the Negro race,” letter-writer C. R. Johnson opined, 
then black women were “not human beings” in white people’s thoughts or practices.47 
Neither white nor black men had a monopoly on misogyny, and the violence police 
officers and white employers directed against black women did not represent the limit of 
risks black women faced in a segregated society. Indeed, these only exacerbated the general 
patterns of violence against women in American society for black women, since black 
women were made increasingly vulnerable without access to economic and municipal and 
county resources—namely a police department, sheriff’s department, and court system that 
was not dominated by white men—that could protect them from violence in their own 
homes.48 That is, gendered violence by loved ones could be more severe for black women, 
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who were racially segregated, economically exploited, and viewed as “not human beings” 
because of their racial location as black, their gendered location as women, and their 
geographical location in “criminal spaces.”  
One measure remarkably consistent across both the Informer and the Post was the 
proportion of victims of crime by sex (see Error! Reference source not found.). When the 
sex of the victim was included in the stories, in both the Post and the Informer men made up 
six out of every ten victims of all crimes, and women only about four of every ten. These 
numbers are commensurate with crime data even into the twenty-first century, where the 
Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) record that men are about 60 percent of all victims of 
violent crimes, and women just above 40 percent. When disaggregated to look specifically at 
victims of intimate partner violence, family violence, or violence committed by a stranger in 
the context of public harassment (excluding incidences of rape by a stranger), women jump 
to 85 percent of victims in the Informer and about 90 percent of victims in the Post. These 
numbers, too, are consistent with BJS data in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, 
where women typically account for about 86 percent of the victims of these types of crime, 
and men only circa 14 percent.49 Thus, the newspapers likely captured, with a measure of 
accuracy, insofar as the standard is official statistics, the gendered impact of crime in 
Houston during the 1950s. 
The stories of violence against black women recorded an important aspect of the 
lived experiences of some women. Although the stories usually accounted for one or two 
incidences in the life of a particular woman, when the woman’s voice broke through the 
newspaper reporter’s or the police investigator’s narrative of the event, these women often 
revealed weeks, months, years, and decades of abuse at the hands of loved ones—fathers, 
step fathers, boyfriends, husbands, and paramours—as well at the hands of those ex-lovers  
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Figure 4 Proportions of victims of crimes by sex, when reported, by newspaper. 
and ex-spouses whose abuses they tried to escape by severing their relationships. They also 
revealed that women could be victimized at any time—although with less frequency—by 
random men, on the street or at a café, who demanded black women’s attentions, and 
when rebuffed, acted out in violence. 
Between 1950 and 1959, 263 incidents of domestic violence or street harassment violence 
against black women appeared in the Informer. Physical assaults, which included assault to 
murder, assault with a weapon, and aggravated assault accounted for sixty-three percent of 
all incidents (see Figure 5). Murder comprised another thirty percent. However, black 
women were sometimes the persons charged with the particular crime being reported in 
the newspaper. For instance, in my counting, if a woman was charged with the murder of 
her abusive husband, I included that in my dataset as an incident of murder, rather than the 
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provoking crime of assault. In other, fewer instances, a black man might have been killed by 
a black male in-law seeking to protect a mother or a sister. Thus, while black women 
accounted for 100 percent of the reported victims of rape, vandalism, arson, attempted 
rape, and breaking and entering, in other instances they retaliated and were charged with 
the particular crime reported in the Informer (see Figure 6). This was true in about one-sixth 
of the threat of assault cases, about two-thirds of the physical assault cases, nearly half of 
the murder cases, and fully half of the justifiable homicide verdicts. All in all, while black 
women sometimes retaliated against their assailants, the majority of these newspaper 
reports suggest they often suffered assault with little reprieve until, it seems, they were 
driven to kill their assault perpetrator. 
Younger women were more likely to experience violence than older woman, 
especially those in typical child-bearing or child-caring years (see Figure 7). The vast majority 
of these women were victimized by their husbands, who were reported as six out of every 
ten assailants (see Table 4). Former partners, married and not, accounted for about fifteen 
percent of the men who victimized black women. Predictably, because of the positive effect 
of racial segregation on the rate of endogamy, black men accounted for 257 of the 258 
assailants of black women where the racial category of the assailant and the victim were 
discernible.50 Additionally, almost seven out of ten of these victims of violence shared a 
residence with their assailants. Fifth Ward (see Map 17), one of Houston’s predominantly 
black neighborhoods, which suffered from economic exploitation, municipal neglect, and 
police brutality, serves as a visual microcosm of this phenomenon.51 The Informer reported  
twenty-three events involving violence against women there. Those twenty-three women 
lived in the Ward, as did twenty of their assailants. The women shared residences with  
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Figure 5 Proportion of crimes reported in incidents involving domestic violence and street harassment against black women in the 
Informer. 
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Figure 6 Proportion of black women who were victims (i.e., the party not charged) of the reported crime in instances of domestic 
violence or street harassment against black women in the Informer. 
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Figure 7 Number of black women and men in each Census age group, when recorded, at the time of each incidents' 
reporting in the Informer. 
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Unspecified involved 11 5% 
Parent 2 1% 
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Unrelated (street harassment) 12 5% 
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Total 232 100% 
Table 4  Black women's relationships to their assailants, when reported, in the Informer. 
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eighteen of these assailants, and were victimized in their own homes in almost one out of 
every three attacks. 
Some men seemed to think any provocation they could muster was an excuse to 
harass the women they lived with. Clifford McGee stabbed his wife Bessie McGee because 
“she was away when he got home.” Torras Franklin felt justified in killing his wife Vivian 
Booker Franklin, claiming that he murdered her because “she told him she had ‘another 
man,” and that she attacked him. Dorothy Jean Bean’s husband brutally beat her in their 
home when she objected to his bringing a dog to their residence. She admitted to peace 
officers that “she was afraid to return home” and wanted to “file charges and seek a divorce 
from her husband.”52 
Yet, neither filing charges nor divorce were guaranteed safeguards against scorned 
male partners. Mack Coy Moses arrived at the home of Williar Alma Moses—his ex-wife—
unwelcomed and unannounced. Entering the front door “without knocking,” he told Mrs. 
Moses that he was “moving back in.” She thought he was joking, and allowed him to eat 
dinner with the family. However, when he attempted to shower, she called her lawyer and 
the two men proceeded to argue over the phone. Later that evening, Mrs. Moses’s ex-
husband “crawl[ed] through a bedroom window” and shot her before committing suicide. In 
another case, Myrtle Lee Jackson’s common-law husband Silles Nealy stabbed her in public 
with no reported motivation. Though she reported the incident to police, a week later he 
stabbed her again, this time in their home. Asking for the state’s intervention in domestic 
affairs angered men whose own masculine identities were likely wrapped up in desires for 
autonomy from obligations imposed by either the state or their romantic partners. Marion 
Wilson demonstrated this masculine anxiety when he “tackled” his nineteen-year-old wife 
Geraldine in her maternity dress, “telling her she had better stop going to the probation 
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department” where she had complained of “his failure to support his child.” It remains 
unclear if the probation department successfully protected Geraldine Wilson from her 
husband, why Marion Wilson was on probation, or if his failure to provide financial support 
to his child was due to unemployment.53 
 Even when they did not share homes with their partners, many black women were 
not safe behind the doors of their own apartments or houses. In several instances, angry 
and drunken partners would force their way into closed doors or crawl into open windows 
to attack these women. The motivations were not always clear. Sometimes the attack was 
precipitated by a quarrel over money or accusations of infidelity. At other times, the men 
blamed their actions on alcohol. But, consistently, when a woman demonstrated autonomy 
by locking her front door and telling an angry partner or ex-partner to leave her be, the 
rampaging man would become more determined to make his way inside. Such was the case 
of thirty-four-year-old Bernice Churchwell, whose unmarried intimate partner, Ira Lee 
Turner, cut open her screen door and barged into her house before beating her with no 
reported motivation. James Devine, surly because his wife had separated from him, showed 
up at her residence unwelcome, then “jumped on her and hit her with a chair.” She ran into 
her bedroom to grab a pistol and shot a bullet through the door to scare him away. The 
incensed man left, went to his brother’s home, and returned to Mrs. Devine’s residence, 
brandishing a .410 single barrel shotgun, apparently unperturbed that the couple’s children 
were inside the home with his wife. The family ran out of the house and into a yard. When 
police finally arrived, James Devine was charged simply with “rudely displaying a firearm.” 
Danger was even more imminent for Florence Smith, also separated from her husband 
Robert Lee Smith. The couple had been apart for nearly six months when he knocked on 
the door of her home. “When she saw that he had a gun,” the Informer reported, “she 
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didn’t let him in.” The frightened woman, who explained that “she didn’t know why her 
husband had done this,” hid as he shot six bullets into her bedroom and kitchen.54 
Violence could also occur in automobiles, both parked and moving, taverns and 
cafes, and public streets. Twenty-seven-year-old Ruby Robinson shot her husband Eugene, 
forty-one years old, after he attempted to stab her while driving during an argument in 
which they accused each other of being unfaithful. Despite two witnesses in the backseat 
who corroborated Mrs. Robinson’s account, the young woman was charged with assault to 
murder. And Ollie Dean Brooks, thirty-five years old, finally had enough of her husband’s 
mistreatment when she followed her husband, Otis Hall, thirty-nine, to a café down the 
street from their home, and stabbed him. Mrs. Brooks “explained that her husband had 
mistreated her so much before that she was afraid of him.” A few nights prior, she 
reported, Hall had “struck her with a stick and twisted her arm.” On the day of the 
stabbing, in March 1955, she said that Hall threatened her with a knife and commanded her 
to have abandoned the home by the time of his return. Driven by fear, and probably also 
rage, Mrs. Brooks retaliated against her husband, perhaps the only way she knew how.55 
Less often, but no less mortally endangering, were the chance encounters black 
women had with street harassers—strange men who demanded their attentions in random 
public encounters. Elizabeth Maddox and her friend ignored the advances of a group of men 
as they walked down the street in a neighborhood just north of Fifth Ward. Angered by the 
rebuff, the men stalked them down the street and eventually caught up with them. Ms. 
Maddox said one man grabbed her by the arm. As she struggled to escape his grip, he 
punched her several times in the face, “loosening several teeth.” Mamie Johnson, twenty-
two years old, was also attacked by a man whom she refused to entertain. Clyde Moore 
struck Mrs. Johnson, whose husband was at work, and snatched “some of her hair” out of 
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her scalp because she refused his offer to drink a beer with him. Likewise, Tommy Jones 
“used” thirty-four-year-old Lucille Wilson “as a punching bag” when the woman refused his 
advances at a local drive inn. Yet, even when the women attempted to entertain these 
street harassers, they could find themselves victims of men’s violence. Ernestine Batiste 
obliged Johnny Jefferson, who offered her a drink outside a lounge close to her home, but 
when she got up to leave afterwards he followed her to the door of the establishment and 
called her “dirty names” before he “pulled a pistol, and hit her several blows to the head.”56 
The indignities black women faced were therefore multiple and in no ways limited to 
Houston’s predominantly white spaces. No location appeared wholly unthreatening to 
marginalized women living, working, and playing in a society that both devalued their 
blackness and their womanhood.  Certainly, black women sought police protection, but 
often learned that their complaints would not be taken seriously by officers. Madeline Scott 
ran to a police officer in Houston’s Third Ward, desperate for protection from a man, 
George Washington Robinson, who had been beating her on the street. The officer ignored 
her plea, telling her to file an official charge downtown. Only moments later did the officer 
finally intervene and arrest the man when he saw Ms. Scott being dragged in public by her 
neck.57  
Thus, many black women did what they could to avoid police officers, who 
represented other forms of danger to them when they were not being outright negligent. In 
1953, Carter Wesley noted that black Houstonians were incensed at the case of several 
white police officers who were no-billed on charges of rape against a black woman by an all-
white, all-male jury. This decision “put a tarnish on justice in the minds of a great many 
Negroes in this community,” Wesley remarked, “which will go with those Negroes through 
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life.” He continued that the decision “left so many women feeling as if they are unprotected 
entirely on our streets.”58 
For this reason and probably others related to their economic and physical 
vulnerabilities, many black women avoided filing charges against their husbands and partners. 
Victims of personal crimes frequently do not report offenses to the police because they fear 
retaliation by their assailant, downplay the significance of the offense, or believe the police 
would offer no relief. Black women have historically been, and continue to be, even less 
likely than other population groups to seek help from the police when they are assaulted. 
As women who are victims of male assaults, they were often blamed for attacks against 
their own persons. As black women, they were often compelled by a “cultural expectation 
of keeping their business to themselves,” as well as the demands of so-called racial solidarity 
to refuse to air black communities’ dirty laundry. If black men were stereotyped as violent 
and dangerous, black women had an obligation to protect “their” men from continued 
stigmatization by keeping assaults by black men a secret. These black women may also have 
understood that seeking help from the state might increase their risk of death, given that 
they were often offered little or no protection even after they filed charges against their 
abusers. Additionally, as black women, they were not understood to be “true women.” 
Longstanding and flatly false stereotypes about black women’s supposed biologically 
determined, insatiable sexual appetites had prompted Americans and their courts to see 
black women as undeserving of redress when violence, sexual or otherwise, was committed 
against them. And women were thought to bear responsibility for the “moral” state of their 
racial groups, stereotypes about black criminality and promiscuity also suggested that black 
women were to blame for the “denigration… of the entire race.”59 As not-quite-women, 
then, black women were often regarded as aggressors rather than victims when they 
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interacted with the American “justice” system. They may have also feared, simultaneously, 
that “Negrophobic” police officers would “overrespond” to calls for help by meting out 
incommensurate punishments, such as premature death, to black men.60 
Without the ability to rely on state resources, as illustrated earlier in Figure 6, many 
black women retaliated against their assailants, sometimes to the point of killing them, 
whether in rage, fear, exhaustion, or all three. However, when they protected themselves, 
black women also placed themselves at risk of a heavy-handed court system that frequently 
refused to see them as victims. Luiener Garrett, owner of Garrett’s Blue Room, was 
attacked by her husband, Fosier Garrett, at her business. After he threw a bottle at her, she 
shot him in the arm. When police arrived, Mrs. Garrett was charged with assault. Twenty-
four-year-old Verna Glenn was also charged with assault against her common-law husband, 
Otis Westbrook, twenty-six, when she answered his physical attacks by shooting him. 
Elnora Brown was charged with murder after she killed her ex-common-law husband, 
Herman Brown. Three weeks prior to the June 1959 incident, Mrs. Brown had “terminated” 
her marriage because living with her ex-husband “became unbearable.” She reported that he 
“beat her several times, shot at her twice, and always accused her of having affairs with 
other men.” She testified that she lived in fear of his attacks, and sought help from a 
neighbor, asking her to call the police if the man returned and she signaled distress. When 
Brown forced his way into her apartment that evening, moving threateningly in her direction 
with a wrench, she shot him. When the police arrived, they arrested Mrs. Brown. Even 
when witnesses corroborated black women’s claims of self-defense, police would still 
immediately arrest and charge them, as was the case with Shirley Ann Freeman. Robert Lee 
Harris “started to beat” his common-law wife and “advanc[ed] on her with a knife.” 
Witnesses testified that Mrs. Freeman “begged him not to come up on her, but he kept 
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coming and she shot him.” She, too, was charged with murder. Although many black women 
who retaliated with violence against their partners were no-billed by grand juries, this may 
have reflected what Carter Wesley had referred to as the cheapness of black life in 
Houston, where crimes against black people were not taken seriously by courts.61 
Escaping abusive relationships through other means was not always successful, 
either. Though some black women attempted to flee abusive relationships, flight was not 
always a successful cover from persistent ex-partners. Because their families often lived in 
the same neighborhoods as their abusers due to racialized residential segregation and 
because a long history of economic exploitation left many black women without the 
necessary resources to leave abusive spouses or migrate independently on a whim, when 
many fled they could not go very far. When Ruby Lee Robinson attempted to get away from 
her abusive common-law husband, she absconded to her sister’s residence. A week later, 
the angry Ray Robinson broke down the sister’s door and threatened his wife with a knife. 
She was charged with murder after she shot her attacker three times.62 
The quest for economic independence could insulate some women from abusive, 
patriarchal relationships. But, while some black women were able to establish brick-and-
mortar businesses in order to provide for themselves and their families in an age of legal 
stratification of jobs and careers by race and sex, others managed their own “economic self-
reliance” through sex work. While interracial sex remained a strong taboo through the 
middle of the century and beyond, black sex workers found markets flush with demand in 
cities throughout the country, including Chicago, New York, Pittsburgh, San Francisco, and 
Houston. Though Houston’s vice districts had been dismantled earlier in the twentieth 
century, in the 1950s the city, like historian Kevin J. Mumford describes was true in Chicago 
and New York, had “interzones.” These were spaces wherein people across racial, gender, 
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and sexual spectrums produced cultural forms and patterns of social interaction that defied 
hegemonic norms. These spaces also served as interracial sex markets, a frontier where 
black women could commodify the taboo of interracial sensuality. As historian Cynthia Blair 
explains for Chicago, in Houston, too, the actions of white folks—to consume and police 
black sex workers as a “titillating if dangerous commodity”—had the effect of transforming 
black spaces into “sexualized and criminalized territor[ies].”63 
Black women’s sex work, in Houston and elsewhere, could be a kind of 
entrepreneurial work that freed such women from underpaid domestic labor or potentially 
overbearing romantic relationships with men who might use their economic position to 
demand a girlfriend or a wife’s subservience. However, sex work was not free of its own 
risks. Venereal disease and physical violence at the hands of pimps, johns, or “bawdyhouse” 
proprietresses were dangers these workers had to contend with. Additionally, these 
women were often treated as outcasts by “respectable” black folks and as criminals by 
municipal authorities. Thus, while sex work presented a line of flight from certain social and 
economic constraints, it was still a kind of work available to black women because of (rather 
than in spite of) the racial, gender, and sexual hierarchies that had long limited their group 
socioeconomic mobility. As historian Tera Hunter explained, whether in domestic labor or 
sex work, “White Southern domesticity at nearly every level of society was built on the 
backs of black women.” Thus black women’s employment “options” were always the 
consequence of constraint.64 
The Houston informants for Gunnar Myrdal’s American Dilemma never failed to 
address that a market for interracial sex prevailed in Houston. H. T. Brooks noted, “I know 
where there are some colored prostitutes who cater to white men.” Ira B. Bryant remarked 
that you could read stories in the press “about white insurance men being robbed” in black 
336 
 
 
neighborhoods, but left unsaid in the newspapers was that underlying “all of this are these 
sex relations between… white men and Negro women.” Freddie Collins likewise answered 
questions about sex relations in Houston by saying, “I have heard that there are some 
Negro women who live with white men. I don’t know any. Of course, there’s a lot of Negro 
women that just sell themselves to white men.” And Dr. C. T. Ewell, specifically discussing 
exogamy, noted that he believed while taboos prevented intermarriage, white people acted 
out in ways that revealed “not as much aversion to mixing as the people of the south like to 
try to make us believe.”65 
As they were in other cities, Houston’s interracial sex markets were situated in 
black neighborhoods, where white men could cross racial borders, geographically and 
sexually. Black middle class residents often resented that their economic capacity did not 
function in the same ways it did for white middle class folk, who were typically insulated 
from such environs. In 1958, the city’s vice squad “closed in” on one such “love nest” 
situated in one of the wealthiest parts of Third Ward. “Sugar Hill,” as the area was called, 
was informally composed of the neighborhood blocks on the eastern and southern sides of 
Texas Southern University’s campus. Professors, entrepreneurs, and students bought, 
rented, and built “palatial” homes on spacious plots of land, and home owners often 
participated in annual contests for the most beautiful gardens, which typically lined the 
borders between their green lawns and their brick houses. Like their white middle class 
counterparts, they fought to maintain the residential quality of their neighborhood through 
litigation against “encroach[ing]” businesses, meeting varying degrees of success. However, 
because of their proximity to some of the poorest neighborhood blocks in Houston and 
because interracial sex markets were not permissible in white neighborhoods, the black 
residents of Sugar Hill remained exposed to levels of petty crime associated with the 
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conditions of impoverishment, while their neighborhood was also a prime location for the 
siting of interracial sex houses.66 
When the vice squad arrived in Sugar Hill to raid the home of a twenty-nine-year-
old black man—a house that doubled as a brothel catering specifically “to white clientele”—
they arrested four people. On August 13, 1958, Robert Thomas Kane, a white man, asked a 
black taxi driver, Ernest Jackson, to help him find a black woman for sex. The driver picked 
up Inez Wilson, who agreed to the liaison for ten dollars. Jackson dropped the couple at the 
“love nest” address on Wichita Street, where shortly thereafter, on a tip, officers arrived 
and arrested Kane, Jackson, and Wilson, as well as another black man. While Kane was 
quickly released, the three black people were “held” for further “investigation.” Thus, 
patterns that existed elsewhere in the country were also replicated in Houston: white men’s 
consumption of sex across racial lines remained less egregious acts than those who were 
willing to supply services to meet those demands, and black neighborhoods, including 
wealthy ones, remained viable sites for “vice” to be sited in their communities in ways that 
were incommensurate with the income and professional characteristics of the residents. But 
whether in Third Ward, Fifth Ward, Sunnyside, Independence Heights, downtown, or 
traveling to and from work in River Oaks, black women remained vulnerable to white men 
who expressed sexual desire for black women. These men could molest black women, sex 
traders or not, with impunity.67 
As was also true in other cities, the interracial sex trade in Houston included gender 
variant workers and clients, and these workers were also overexposed to environs of 
violence and practices that specifically targeted them for criminalization. However, because 
of their rather non-heteronormative experiences with gender and sexuality, they were also 
exposed to additional geographies of risk over their life courses. In the 1950s, these 
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workers were variously called homosexuals, cross-gender, transsexual, or people who had 
undergone “sexual conversion.” The labels were often unclear and none of them were used 
across all platforms consistently; for instance, people who would identify as trans* today 
were sometimes called “homosexuals” or “female impersonators” in the Informer in the 
1950s. At other times the press would avoid such labels at all. But while  Americans debated 
how to label the increasingly titillating topic of “trans-sexuality,” especially following 
Christine Jorgensen’s 1952 public statement regarding her gender identity and gender-
affirming surgery, the reality was that many black people had long identified and behaved in 
ways that disturbed the hegemonic concepts of biological determinism, compulsory 
heterosexuality, and sex dimorphism. And many of these folks, often self-identified black 
women, but sometimes comfortably binary-defying gendered persons, were visible workers 
in Houston’s interracial sex market. Like other black women, they remained at risk for 
violence because of the nature of their work. Thus, for some, intra-community violence as 
well as violence as a way of life became unremarkable experiences.68 
In July 1957 Johnnie Mae lived in Third Ward on Sauer Street just a few blocks east 
of bustling Dowling Street with her roommates. She was a sex worker with a long criminal 
record, but with a much richer biography than her run-ins with the police suggested. She 
probably had a difficult time finding a job in Houston’s formal economy, since she called 
herself “a male” who had been “a female impersonator for 19 years” and identified herself 
strictly as a woman. She was probably not deemed fit for typical work available to black 
women, nor did she seem to desire the kinds of employment that prevailed among black 
men.69 Thus, sex work may have been her only option, and she may have learned to operate 
in that market at a fairly young age. 
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In 1937, when she was around seventeen years old, Johnnie Mae was sentenced to 
Gatesville State School for Boys in Coryell County, Texas, for unspecified reasons. Black 
juvenile “delinquents” disproportionately populated the barracks at the reformatory, which 
was less a rehabilitation school and more a “punitive” hold that resembled adult prisons. 
Children and teenagers could be sentenced for curfew violation, petty theft, or more 
serious violent crimes. Teachers there viewed inmates as “‘incapable’ of working at grade 
level because of innate deficiencies in intelligence,” and in 1936 “97% of white [children] and 
94% of black [children]” at the school “were working below grade level.” Thus, Gatesville 
resembled Texas’s other “prison plantations” rather than a reformatory, where “‘inmates’ 
rather than ‘students’” were forced to do hard labor under the heavy hands of “untrained 
staff as ‘guards’ rather than ‘mentors.’” Overcrowded and racially segregated into separate 
barracks and work spaces, black inmates bore the brunt of Gatesville’s penal practices and 
labor demands.70 
How Johnnie Mae came to her particular conviction about her gender identity also 
remains unclear. However, she began her life as a self-identified woman shortly after her 
arrival at Gatesville. Like other inmates, Johnnie Mae may have been the victim of sexual 
assault, and perhaps particularly targeted for assault because of her sexual and gender 
identities. These assaults could have been perpetrated by other children or by adult staff 
members. In 1944, “several boys” exposed the sexual coercions practiced by R. B. Johnston, 
official sociologist at Gatesville, in which they traded sex acts “in exchange for favorable 
work placements and accelerated release recommendations.” Any inmate, no matter their 
sexual or gender identity, could be targeted by such predatory adults who maintained 
unsupervised access to them.71  
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For girls like Johnnie Mae, the danger was even more imminent in a boy’s prison. 
Historian William S. Bush explains that at Gatesville: 
For boys, a “homosexual” diagnosis might come before or after a sexual assault; 
regardless, it signified physical weakness and emasculation as much as a supposed 
preference for other boys. To be designated a “punk,” remembered C.W. [an 
informant], was to be told that “you were small and everyone could run over you.” 
C.W. lived in the “punk dorm” reserved for “passive homosexuals,” all of whom 
were “smaller boys” but not self-identified homosexuals. The African American 
inmates who lived in the other “punk dorm” objected even more strenuously to 
their official diagnosis. One of them, J.H., insisted that he was a “dude” rather than a 
“punk.” To draw distinctions clearly, he mentioned “Slut,” a smaller boy to whom he 
attached the pronouns “her” and “she.”72 
Those inmates who did not perform masculinity acceptably were therefore additionally 
vulnerable to violence in a carceral regime that actively helped produce their stigmatization. 
In these prison spaces, the “punk” was “exploited as a female surrogate” by more dominant, 
and thereby more “masculine” figures. That is, Gatesville, and places like it, exposed girls 
like Johnnie Mae to rape and male ownership. Thus, physical, sexual, and emotional violence 
were likely familiar to Johnnie Mae by the time she emerged from Gatesville and eventually 
began her life in Oklahoma as an exotic dancer before she eventually moved to Third Ward. 
But before she left, Gatesville possibly shaped her as a violent actor in both the prison and 
after her release. Indeed, because of these patterns of educational, labor, and sexual neglect, 
abuse, and exploitation, District Judge Paul A. Martineau described Gatesville as “a terrible 
place where criminals are made.”73 
As an adult, Johnnie Mae certainly became involved in law-breaking activities. At 
twenty-one years old, she was sentenced to prison for three years “for sodomy on an 11-
year-old boy,” a term which she did not serve to completion.74 Johnnie Mae also became a 
repeat perpetrator of violence and a recidivist criminal. Though historians can only 
speculate why she turned to violence in her adult life, given the ubiquity of violence at 
Gatesville and against sex workers, Johnnie Mae was likely a young victim of violence and, as 
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research shows, children who suffer abuse exhibit similar forms of violence in their 
adulthood.75 In 1949 she was arrested for “cutting a man with a razor.” A few months later, 
in January 1950, she again found herself in the throes of the criminal court system, arrested 
for “’hustling’ men downtown,” and the following month for doing the same in the Fifth 
Ward. Later that year, she served three months for “assault with firearms.” In February 
1951, she was arrested for “vagrancy,” wearing attire described as “women’s clothes.” Later 
that year she was “arrested for prowling along streets,” once again for “vagrancy,” and then 
in June “for wearing women clothes.” She was arrested an additional six times between 
1953 and 1956 for “impersonating a woman.”76 
Johnnie Mae suffered the consequences of being an illegible kind of woman in a 
society that criminalized her body, as well as her gender performance and performativity. 
However, this stigmatization was apparently not so severe that Johnnie Mae and those like 
her were simply locked away from society for long periods of time. “Female impersonation” 
did not carry a heavy sentence, and the majority of Third Warders, their Christian moral 
objections notwithstanding, seemed nonplussed by the fact that gender variance and non-
heteronormative sexualities existed, publicly, in their neighborhood. At least for Johnnie 
Mae and the scant other trans* and gender-nonconforming black folks who appeared in the 
press, the communities they lived in did not seem to react violently to their presence, even 
if, like other Americans in the 1940s and forward, they became increasingly concerned with 
“sexual deviance” as a threat to national security.77 
 But in July 1957, Johnnie Mae was implicated in a murder, which did attract the 
attention of her neighbors and the Informer. The murder of William Henry “Red” Gill was a 
confusing tale. Peaches Victoria Hubbard, a “homosexual” and Johnnie Mae’s roommate, 
participated in the assault on Gill. “Peaches goes with women or men, and I believe that she 
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and Red were sweethearts,” Johnnie Mae explained. The two apparently “operated a 
prostituting ring, employing teenage girls,” but Gill had outstayed his welcome. Hubbard and 
Johnnie Mae conspired to “move Red out” for undisclosed reasons. Together, they attacked 
Gill. Johnnie Mae choked the victim and poured wine in his mouth while Hubbard assisted in 
restraining him. Leaving Gill in the apartment, allegedly unsure if he was dead or not, 
Johnnie Mae and Hubbard traveled a few blocks south to Elgin Street and “consumed liquor 
for several hours.” Hubbard returned to the apartment afterwards and “‘found’ the dead 
man and notified police.” Police found Johnnie Mae and arrested her for Gill’s murder after 
an inquest investigation revealed a crack in Gill’s hyoid bone, and having been told by 
“someone” that, as she recounted, “I kill men and have sexual relationship[s] with them.” 
She denied that accusation, saying, “I have never done anyone any harm, nor have I been in 
serious trouble before.” While in custody, Johnnie Mae was questioned for the deaths of 
two other men, one in Fifth Ward and the other in the Rice Military area, both of whom 
“associated with homosexuals and, when found dead, were naked.” She admitted later that 
she had killed ten other people in Oklahoma using the same method of “squeezing their 
necks and pouring wine down their throats to give the appearance of death during a 
drinking bout.” She ultimately received a thirty-five year prison sentence. The motivations 
behind why Johnnie Mae became a serial killer remain unclear, but her particular 
experiences as a young black person navigating a racially segregated, misogynistic, 
heteronormative society in which she was not guaranteed safe, constructive, and instructive 
places in which to develop undoubtedly played an important determining role.78 
 While Johnnie Mae may have experienced her greatest risks as a young person 
rather than as a sex worker, Obie Mills’s story demonstrated the dangers of being on the 
interracial sex market.79 Police arrested Mills on October 20, 1959, for the murder of Billy 
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C. Mahaffey, a twenty-year-old, 160 pound white man ze had stabbed. Mills was thirty-nine 
years old, a porter by day, and a sex worker by night.  The Fifth Ward resident lived in an 
upstairs apartment. When questioned by the press about his tenant, J. B. Busby explained 
that Mills was a fine resident who “always paid [the] rent,” and likewise Mills’s neighbor 
reported that ze had never been a “bother.” She continued, “One day I saw two women 
come out of the apartment across the way and I told a friend how well they dressed. But 
my friend told me, ‘They aren’t women. They’re men.’” The neighbor seemed unfazed by 
the apparent revelation, remarking that Mills “had the features of a woman, very smooth 
skin, and neatly dressed.” Aside from sex work, then, Mills did not seem to experience 
trouble with as much regularity as Johnnie Mae. Nevertheless, ze still encountered risk as a 
black sex worker.80 
 What transpired between Mahaffey and Mills on October 17th is unclear.81 When 
Detectives John Thornton and J. W. Kindred arrived at Jefferson Davis Hospital to 
investigate Mahaffey’s death they learned that doctors had already concluded the victim had 
died of a stab wound to the heart at around 11:00 p.m. When the ambulance found 
Mahaffey bleeding in his car at the site of a minor accident on Texas Avenue in Third Ward, 
he was already incapable of speaking and had also sustained scratches on his neck. Thus, the 
detectives had to construct a narrative by working their way backward through Mahaffey’s 
actions that day. They returned to the location of his green and white 1953 Ford sedan, 
described by outside reporters as “a section populated with run-down warehouses, shanty 
honky-tonks, and five-dollar-a-week rooming houses,” giving the sense that the warehouse 
district, just east of the glimmering towers of downtown, was a seedy place for 
unscrupulous activity. The quantity of blood in the suggested to the investigators that 
Mahaffey had not been stabbed inside. They found his wallet, including just over one dollar 
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in cash and his driver’s license, on the floor. They used the address on the license to find his 
rooming house at 1511 Jackson Street in downtown, about two blocks east of the 
warehouse district in Third Ward. Tenants and the landlady testified that the car’s 
description matched the one they knew Mahaffey to own, and that he “was not married and 
was considered… to be a quiet, hard-working young man who did not get into trouble.” 
They also questioned Mahaffey’s employer at a local radiator shop who assured the 
detectives that Mahaffey “was an easy-going young man who did not make enemies and who 
would go out of his way to avoid a situation which might result in a quarrel.” The detectives 
began imagining a scenario of foul play.82 
 Thornton and Kindred learned that Mahaffey had been seeing a “pretty, sixteen-
year-old girl” who “burst into tears” when the detectives told her of Mahaffey’s death. She 
had last seen him at 10:30 that night. They had shared a dinner with her parents before the 
two took a drive to price tires, though he did not buy any because, as she recalled, “He only 
had a dollar and a few cents with him.” The detectives then worked to trace Mahaffey’s last 
half hour, canvassing Third Ward for the next two days until they found “bloodstains on a 
gravel drive beside a warehouse seven blocks east” of where Mahaffey’s car and body had 
been found.83 
The following day, October 20th, the detectives came across Peggy McCloud (a 
pseudonym), while continuing their canvass of the neighborhood.84 She was a black woman 
who had been a high-end sex trader in Galveston before “circumstances had conspired to 
reduce her career.” She told the officers that a man matching Mahaffey’s and his car’s 
descriptions had picked her up at the corner of Dowling Street and Polk Street, and on the 
drive they negotiated a five dollar price for a sex act. However, when McCloud learned that 
the man she was now parked with in an alley could not pay, the two “had a little wrestling 
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match,” during which she scratched his neck before escaping the car. He chased her and 
they tussled again, before she finally managed to free herself. Now, the detectives 
understood: Mahaffey had been shopping for sex that night, and had made his way to Third 
Ward to get it. They questioned over thirty-five sex workers, all of whom had airtight alibis, 
but the investigation provided them with “a list of other streetwalkers” who had been out 
that night, including Mills, “who actually was a man with a long record for robbery” but 
apparently had only been charged once. Mills’s “specialty was to dress up in women’s 
clothing, wear his hair long and wavy, and pass himself off as a streetwalker,” according to 
the writers at Official Detective Stories. Mills finally confessed to the murder after all-night 
questioning, and police officially concluded that Mills had targeted Mahaffey for a robbery. 
According to them, when in the car, Mills demanded Mahaffey’s wallet at knife point, the 
billfold fell to the floor, and when Mills reached down to grab it Mahaffey “struck him and 
jumped out of the car.” Mills followed, stabbing Mahaffey in the driveway where his 
bloodstains had been found. The frightened assailant fled the scene, and Mahaffey returned 
to his car and “raced for help” before eventually crashing his car and bleeding to death.85 
Mills’s own testimony differed from the detectives’ narrative. As he had with 
McCloud, Mahaffey had solicited Mills for a five dollar rendezvous—though the Informer’s 
investigation revealed that his attempt with McCloud had occurred the night prior to his 
murder. Mills agreed to the payment, joined Mahaffey in the car, and parked at a warehouse 
around 2700 Texas Avenue on the northern end of Third Ward. Whether Mahaffey knew 
of Mills’s gender and sexuality were unclear. The Informer editorialized that it was the 
“discovery” of his “drastic error” that caused him to attack Mills with a knife, though the 
press has a long history of justifying violence against trans* and gender non-conforming 
people for their so-called failure to disclose their gender and sexual identities to men. The 
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Chronicle simply reported that Mahaffey “became angry,” perhaps for the same reasons he 
had with McCloud, who refused his advances once she realized the man could not pay the 
agreed price. This is a more likely explanation, given the popularity of gender-defying sex 
workers among white men in the section of Third Ward where he picked up Mills. 
Whatever the reason, Mills maintained that Mahaffey attacked zir with a knife. Mills 
reported that ze “jumped from the car and ran, but Mahaffey caught up with him when he 
lost one of his female shoes.” The two apparently struggled, the “husky radiator repairman” 
a looming physical threat. Finally, Mills got the upper hand and stabbed Mahaffey “to 
protect” zirself, before continuing to run away. Mills was convicted of the murder in 
December.86 
While it may have been true that Mills had a past of robbing men ze had agreed to 
have sex with, Mills’s own arrest record could not attest to the claim. However, because 
income was often unsteady for porters, and especially black ones, it was plausible that Mills 
engaged in both sex work and petty theft to supplement zir wages. Mahaffey’s character 
witnesses, who suggested he would never start a fight or be engaged in seedy activities, 
belied both McCloud’s and Mills’s narratives, and was at odds with the fact that Mahaffey 
had been shopping in Third Ward, specifically for sex with black streetwalkers. That he 
offered five dollars in both stories without the ability to pay suggested that he was willing to 
deceive sex workers and somehow escape them, perhaps through threats of violence, after 
receiving his goods without paying or by only paying a severely reduced price. Thus, while 
black streetwalkers, women and otherwise, may have been purveyors of certain kinds of 
violence and theft, they were also vulnerable as solitary workers left alone with men who 
could rob them of their labor, time, and perhaps even their lives. These workers were 
unrecognized by the formal economy, unprotected by a police vice squad that regularly 
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targeted them for arrest, and unwanted by the “respectable” class of black folk who viewed 
them—as sex workers—as a form of blight in the neighborhood. 
  
egregation, misogyny, and the racialized criminalization of space through media, 
police (in)action, and white Houstonians’ actions thereby had deleterious effects of 
all black Houstonians, and particularly those who resided in or played in its 
underserved neighborhoods at the urban core. Black people remained over-exposed to 
crimes that were incommensurate with their values and sometimes their income levels in 
these constructed spaces. Through the machinations of racecraft, white Houstonians, and 
even black folks who engaged the idea of “Negro crime,” made explicit and implicit 
arguments that black people, whether because of “biological” race or cultural degeneracy, 
had created these spaces. Thus, these criminal spaces were refractions of blackness or black 
cultural shortcomings. For white people, the logical conclusion was to contain black people 
in these geographies of their own creation through neglect when possible and force when 
necessary. 
Accordingly, police abuse remained a threat to black Houstonians, across race, 
gender, and class throughout the 1950s. Yet, black people in Houston were not anti-police. 
They maintained a firm stance against police brutality, demanding that officers be held 
accountable for breaking the law, while they also requested better policing of criminal 
activities in their neighborhoods. In short, they wanted the police to do their jobs. At the 
start of the 1950s, in response to the Woodard case and others, editorialists at the Informer 
lamented that the Houston Police Department had not yet matured into a professional 
service, and was still defined by “intemperance, abuse, and brutality” which served to 
“discredit” the department in the eyes of the public. They acknowledged that “the job of a 
S 
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cop is a hard one,” and that officers’ daily interactions with “irate citizens, injured citizens, 
[and] reckless citizens” might undoubtedly make police work frustrating. Nevertheless, they 
maintained, if officers were allowed to act without “courtesy and consideration,” their 
uniforms simply transformed them into “the strong-arm bully [rather] than the protector of 
society.” The following year, the Informer doubled down on these statements, saying that all 
Houstonians had to demand proper police treatment of black people, for it was 
“fundamentally” American to “desire… a police force that operates within the law and for 
the interests of the people as expressed by that law.”87 
 The Informer warned that if abuse was accepted against black Houstonians, police 
officers would eventually extend that brutality to white people as well. That is, they 
predicted that the kinds of leniency officers were granted in uniform had implications for all 
members of society, and that while black people would be particularly disadvantaged, they 
would not be the only victims. In 1952, the editorialists remarked on this phenomenon, 
writing: “We have warned that intemperance and abuse of power cannot be contained, that 
practices used among Negroes, Mexicans, and other defenseless minorities must, of 
themselves, spread to others.” Indeed, even white Houstonians had begun to complain 
about “police churlishness” toward them. In 1950, a spate of incidences between white 
police officers and white taxicab drivers nearly halted much of the city’s public 
transportation as the drivers began planning a strike on the city. White men who worked in 
interracial organizations could find themselves targeted, too, for suspicion of subversive 
activity. And like they did with black women, white officers exploited the power of their 
badges to solicit sex from white women. They would fight with other white men, especially 
younger white men from more affluent backgrounds than they, as they did in a brawl with 
two eighteen-year-old “pretty boys from the Northside.” In the rare event that an officer 
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was punished, as was true for Richard W. Ramos Jr. and Marshall Jenkins, who received 
indefinite suspensions for “unnecessary roughness in arresting a prisoner” in 1953, the 
officer could be reinstated by appealing the case to the Civil Service Commission. Jenkins 
had already won such a case after he had been fired for “drunkenness and conduct 
unbecoming an officer” in 1945. In another case of brutality against a white citizen, 
Lieutenant J. R. (Bob) Davidson was suspended for “striking a prisoner… in the jail booking 
office,” who had been brought in on a traffic charge. The officer, however, was not charged 
with assault.88 
 The Informer implored all Houstonians, regardless of race, to hold police accountable 
for all acts of brutality, but white Houstonians continued to identify with officers as they 
maintained images of black spaces as criminal ones and black people as a population in need 
of containment. While officers complained about the difficulty of their jobs and demanded 
that they be treated as heroes, the editorialists scoffed: 
Policemen who talk in terms of “respect for an officer” are making a fundamental 
mistake. They are due no special respect, as individuals being essentially servants of 
the public rather than its masters. The citizens owes his respect to the LAW, not to 
the persons who enforce the law. The shoe really fits the other foot—officers 
whose job it is to enforce the law are morally obligated to respect the rights of 
citizens as written in law, as much as citizens must respect their ways as ‘the law.’ 
The head of a police force must know these things, if the men under his supervision 
and direction do not. Being essential to the performance of the function, he should 
indoctrinate his men along these lines, and eliminate those who cannot follow this 
approach. Without such an approach the force is itself unlawful, unmoral, 
unjustifiable.89 
However, because officers experienced such great immunities from accountability for their 
abuse of black communities, the Informer reasoned, they could effectively operate above the 
law. And while they maintained deep hatreds for black people and their communities 
because of their “criminality,” widespread corruption within the Houston Police 
Department itself extended through at least the end of the twentieth century.90 
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 While the Informer professed that police officers had the “most important” job in 
American society, it maintained that Houston’s police department consistently acted 
antithetically to its sworn purpose. The editorialists hedged, noting that their critique was 
made “without animus” toward the police, nor was it meant to incite public disdain for the 
profession. Rather, referring to a specific case regarding an attorney being publicly assaulted 
by Harris County deputies in a court building hallway, they wondered, how would actual 
“prisoners fare in their hands?” Rather than blaming the officers, however, the Informer 
urged white Houstonians to look in the mirror and recognize that the abuses they accepted 
toward their black counterparts by dismissing charges of brutality, as members of the 
reading public and as jurors in brutality cases, they contributed to “police arrogance” and 
violence.91 Carter Wesley specifically noted 
When in the past Negroes claimed that they have been put upon and beaten by 
peace officers, there have been a great number of people who are inclined to doubt 
it. This public show of disregard for the law, for the dignity and responsibility and 
oath of the peace officers’ obligations and positions indicate how little chance the 
Negro would have for protection…92 
These critiques of police and white Houstonians’ lack of empathy for black people, however 
biting, stood harmoniously adjacent to black people’s demands for greater police presence 
in their neighborhoods. 
In June 1954, Chief Morrison left office following a scandal in which $85,000 worth 
of “dope” went “missing” from police headquarters. Jack Heard, the detective who 
determined the bombers of the Caesar house, would eventually be promoted to chief later 
that year, but prior to the announcement, the Informer published an editorial with advice for 
whoever the new hire might be. They wrote that they were “like all other Houstonians” 
and wanted to feel safe in their homes, neighborhoods, commutes, and jobs. “This 
community expects of the new chief,” they noted, “rigid law enforcement without regard to 
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race,” complaining that “in the past” crime in black neighborhoods had “often been allowed 
to flourish through police neglect to the detriment of the Negro community itself.” They 
demanded that no “racial considerations are even slightly involved” in law enforcement 
under the new director. When Heard came into office, he attended a meeting with the 
HCCO, wherein black Houstonians made specific demands regarding treatment of 
themselves as civilians and of black police officers, noting that officers should be held 
accountable for harassing them on the street and that black police should be granted the 
power to arrest suspects without regard for race. Heard said that he would make no 
promises, but would do what he could regarding police brutality. Additionally, he punted on 
the question of black officers arresting white civilians, saying no law prevented them from 
doing so—that it was a matter of “custom.”93 
  By 1959, black Houstonians could still not attest to any improvement in the policing 
practices in their neighborhoods or regarding their persons. For them, residential 
segregation still meant resource segregation. Undoubtedly, violence within and imposed 
upon these communities still manifested in gendered and sexualized ways. In March of that 
year, police brutalized forty-four-year-old veteran Neal Frazier, and, when confronted by 
the man’s family, initially denied that he had ever been in their custody. Mayor Lewis Cutrer 
acknowledged the attack, which occurred in the city jail, after an investigation appeared to 
confirm the complaint rather than the officers’ tale that they had picked him up after he had 
been “run over by a motor vehicle.” When Frazier’s family finally learned that he was in the 
hospital following the police attack, “it turned out that he had been beaten unmercifully and 
so as to be probably crippled the rest of his life.” Several other cases of abuse poured into 
the Informer that week, including one in which one of the Informer’s own employees had 
been beaten, arrested, and then released by a sergeant at the police station who dismissed 
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the incident as “a misunderstanding.” An editorialist at the newspaper wondered if police 
were becoming more violent and more heinous because of “racial hatred, probably due to 
the issue of integration.” The coming decade would confirm that speculation.94  
Police brutality, at the end of the 1950s was “increasingly annoying and frightening” 
for black Houstonians, who urged protection for their communities, but distrusted that city 
officials cared enough to ensure that police officers actually did their jobs. Moreover, these 
interactions encouraged antipathies between black Houstonians and white city leaders, 
threatening to ignite flames between police and black civilians that the city had never 
witnessed before. In the 1960s, with an increasingly frustrated black community demanding 
rather than requesting change in Houston, these antagonisms would materialize in protests 
across the city and reach a fever-pitch on the campus of Texas Southern University. 
 
 
1 In 1960, the predominantly black census tracts in Houston’s inner core (namely, Third, Fourth, and Fifth 
Wards) did not see any overrepresentation of the age group 15-24 that is often cited as having the 
highest rates of involvement in criminal activity. On average, about 13 percent of the population in Harris 
County tracts were within that age range. All of Houston’s predominantly black tracts fell within one 
standard deviation (0.03, or between 10 percent and 16 percent) of the mean. Only one tract 
(00380000), which housed Texas Southern University, was outside that range, but was still within two 
standard deviations of the mean (18 percent of the tract was between the ages of 15-24 there). Thus, it 
is unlikely that age structure alone could explain higher rates of crime in certain areas of the city. 
However, it is reasonable to assume that higher rates of unemployment and lower rates of formal 
education completion in these predominantly black tracts would have exacerbated the economic 
deprivation experienced by black youths. Youth unemployment data for the years of 1950-1960 in 
Houston, if it can be found, would be most useful in determining the veracity of this hypothesis.  (Except 
for Third Ward, black Houstonians’ high school completion rates for adults over the age of 25 fell 
outside the range of one standard deviation from the mean (where the mean was about 64% and the 
standard deviation was 19.8). Unemployment rates were also higher in these majority black tracts, all 
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14 percent of Third Ward’s tract 00370000 was employed in “Other” occupations, and this proportion 
was outside the range of two standard deviations of the mean. It's unclear, then, why this tract’s 
unemployment rates were more average than other predominantly black tracts. Fifth Ward’s tract 
0010000 also fit within the average range of one standard deviation. Black workers there enjoyed 
disproportionately higher rates of nondomestic service jobs—about 32 percent of those Fifth Warders 
worked in the service industry, whereas the upper limit of one standard deviation was 25.3 percent and 
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CHAPTER 6: “A MORNING OF UNBELIEVABLE HORROR”: 
THE POLICE SIEGE ON TEXAS SOUTHERN UNIVERSITY 
 
uring the early morning hours of May 17, 1967, Houston police officers 
rampaged through the three men’s dormitories at the center of Texas 
Southern University’s (TSU) majority black campus. Under the order of Chief 
Herman Short, hundreds of officers fired at least two thousand gunshots toward and into 
the dorms before bursting through the doors in riot gear with high-powered rifles and 
growling dogs in tow. They found undergraduate Fred Freeny inside one building and hit him 
two times with the butt of a shotgun in his ribs. A “trembling” young officer pressed a 
shotgun against Harold R. Hicks’ stomach, saying, “If you move I’ll blow your ‘got damn’ guts 
out.” Carlin Riley required stitches for the wound on his head and William Glaze had to 
recover from the dog bites on his hips. Morris L. English ended up with a doctor’s bill of 
$105.50 and an ambulance fee of $25, a total of about $940 today. Marcus E. Alford was 
called a “nigger” and a “bastard,” and Charles E. Criner only barely missed being 
defenestrated through broken glass. Against odds, however, the officers failed to kill any 
students.1 
The violence at TSU was not inevitable, though it was also not unfathomable given 
the history of the institution and the police department’s pattern of undisciplined and 
unrestrained brutality against black Houstonians. According to TSU’s Dean of Law Kenneth 
S. Tollett, the majority-black institution was “born in sin.” TSU had only become state-
assisted in 1948, after the Texas legislature was forced to recognize that there was no 
separate-but-equal school for black Texans to attend that rivaled the University of Texas. 
D 
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Conflicts between TSU’s first president, Dr. Raphael O’Hara Lanier, and its Board of 
Regents, appointed by Governor Allan Shivers, characterized its initial years of operation. 
Like other predominantly residential spaces in the city, TSU was designed as a black space, 
and suffered from similar forms of neglect and abuse. The school necessarily offered 
remedial courses because its pool of applicants largely consisted of students who had 
suffered “poor education… in segregated Negro public schools.” State money was hard to 
come by. “There are no counselors for the dormitories, the dean of men doubles as the 
dean of student life,” one reporter noted. An English faculty member admitted, “Much of 
TSU is veneer.” The library was “ill-equipped” for research, and “many of the courses listed 
and described in the catalogue year after year” were never actually offered. Though Carter 
Wesley had great hopes for the institution at its founding and bitterly disagreed with 
Thurgood Marshall and Lulu B. White about its worth, by 1953 he concluded that TSU was 
“not… a Negro school, but one dominated by whites, for the interests of whites, and 
contrary and against the interests of Negroes.”2 
In the early months of 1960, TSU students began challenging the status of their 
institution as a space for white governance. Following the example set by young civil rights 
activists who participated in sit-ins in Greensboro, North Carolina and in other southern 
cities that had become notorious for brutality toward black protesters, TSU students began 
staging their own demonstrations in Houston. Against the wishes of businesspeople, black 
and white, undergraduates loudly contested segregation at Houston’s cafeterias and train 
station. In response to TSU’s increasing visibility as an activist space over the course of the 
1960s, Chief Short assured white Houstonians that his department was “ready for ‘anything 
the Negro community can throw at them.’” He placed the “TSU campus… under 
surveillance by plain clothesmen often, as many as several hundred.” That number was likely 
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an exaggeration given the size and color of the Houston police force, though police spies 
definitely did work on campus to provide intelligence on student activism. That is, though 
legislators had intended to construct TSU as a space to inspire black people’s acquiescence 
to the Jim Crow status quo, it had become—for some students—a space in which to 
organize and out of which to challenge white oppression. Short and his police force 
attempted to stymie that growing trend by intimidating student leaders and using excessive 
force at sites of civil protest.3 
The students at Texas Southern University felt this white supremacist gaze on their 
campus, and chief among their demands to the city and the University administration was a 
request for the disarmament of campus security officers and an end to unwarranted city 
police surveillance of students. Many of TSU’s students had remained uninterested in these 
demands until the morning after May 16th. They were hardened liberal individualists, like 
most Americans. However, they realized a chink in the armor of their ideology when they 
faced a barrage of bullets from an army of police officers who saw them as threats to white 
power. Perhaps bright-eyed and optimistic about the nation’s future, students learned that 
merely being within black spaces could be enough to mark them as criminals. Simply being 
present criminalized even the white students on campus.4 
Segregation and the criminalization of race and space thereby precipitated one of 
the most heinous acts of mass police brutality in Houston’s history. As criminalized subjects, 
students found themselves treated as less than human—both interpersonally and legally. 
Their experiences leading up to May 16th exhibited the ways the criminalization of space 
hinged on racialization, state negligence, and state abuse. Some black Houstonians 
attempted to ameliorate that negligence and abuse through protest. Over the early weeks 
of May 1967, such attempts took place on TSU’s campus, as well as the Holmes Road 
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incinerator in Sunnyside, and the newly-integrated Northwood Junior High School in north 
Houston. The city’s responses to each of these protests and the communities wherein they 
took place exacerbated the distrust between black Houstonians and municipal officials. The 
city’s non-black press, unsympathetic to the grievances of black folks, encouraged readers to 
see protesters as criminals, and TSU students and Friends of the Student Non-Violent 
Coordinating Committee (SNCC) as particularly dangerous. These images confirmed, for 
white people predisposed to accepting them as truth, that black people and their spaces 
were dangerous and in need of containment.5 
The assault on TSU students was an act of terrorism in the service of white 
supremacy. In this way, despite its reputation otherwise, Houston was not unlike other 
southern cities that failed to desegregate peacefully. As one observer noted, “There was a 
reason for the show of force at TSU. The city administration was determined to 
demonstrate its ability to utterly crush any attempt by Negroes in the city of Houston to 
express their discontent.” Student testimonies exposed the severity of police negligence and 
violence toward them as residents of a criminalized space—a historically black campus that 
officers had been watching, occupying, and antagonizing for weeks. The violence at TSU 
represented a crisis for the city of Houston, which had for decades lauded itself as an 
exceptional city of racial progressivism. It highlighted the prevailing issue of residential and 
educational segregation and explicitly demonstrated the ways the racialization and 
criminalization of space could justify the continued “containment” of black people in a 
society where liberal individualism was coming to prevail over Jim Crowism.6 
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exas Southern University began as a teacher’s college in 1925 as an extension of 
Wiley College. For the first academic year, students attended classes at Colored 
High School on San Felipe Street in Fourth Ward. In fall 1926, classes moved to 
Jack Yates High School on Elgin Street in Third Ward to accommodate increasing interest in 
the training. The following year the Houston Public School Board provided funds to develop 
a segregated junior college system, providing a loan of $2,800 to help black Houstonians 
establish Houston Colored Junior College. By 1931, the growing institution received 
accreditation from the Southern Association of Colleges, and in 1934 the Houston School 
Board transitioned the junior college into a four-year institution, now named Houston 
College for Negroes. In need of a larger campus to accommodate its growing undergraduate 
body, consisting of about 1,400 students, and its new graduate program that was established 
in 1943, the college undertook a fundraising campaign. Mamie Fairchild, Third Ward 
resident, college graduate, and the widow of Watchtower Life Insurance Company founder 
Thornton McNair Fairchild, contributed to the building fund, which the school honored by 
naming its first building after her late husband. Anna and Clarence Dupree were also among 
the “prime contributors” for the first permanent building for the Houston College for 
Negroes, giving $11,000 to the project in 1946, one year after the Houston School Board 
ended its governing relationship with the school.7 
 Following Heman Sweatt’s legal challenge to the University of Texas for admission 
into its law school, in March 1947 Texas legislators introduced several bills “providing for 
the establishment, support, maintenance, and direction of a University of the first class for 
the instruction and training of the colored people of this State to be known as ‘The Texas 
State University for Negroes’ [TSUN] and to be located in Houston, Harris County.” In 
1951, the House passed representative John Bell Murphy’s bill to remove “for Negroes” 
T 
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from the name of the institution in response to requests made by “a delegation of students 
who went to Austin to petition” for the name change. That same legislation changed the 
school’s name to Texas Southern University. The legislature’s efforts to maintain 
segregation by showing good faith toward the Plessy separate-but-equal standard helped 
catapult TSU into what some accepted as “the best Black institution of higher learning west 
of the Mississippi”—an increasingly attractive and perennially growing school of higher 
learning for black Texans. In 1947, over two thousand students enrolled to attend the 
schools of Vocational and Industrial Education; Law, Arts and Sciences; or Pharmacy under 
the leadership of the University’s first president, Dr. Raphael O’Hara Lanier.8 
By 1966, TSU had built a walkable and compact campus out of what had formerly 
been pine forest (see Map 18). Bifurcated by Wheeler Avenue from east to west, academic 
buildings occupied the northern half of the campus and student housing and athletic 
accommodations the southern half. Most buildings were situated between Briley Street to 
the west and Tierwester Street to the east. Hannah Hall, the administration building, sat at 
the center of the main academic quad, flanked to the east by the school auditorium and the 
campus library. The massive science building stretched the remainder of the way toward 
Tierwester. What eventually became Lanier Hall Women’s Dormitory sat on the south side 
of Wheeler and at the corner of Tierwester. Bolton Hall for Women stood just further 
south at the corner of Blodgett and Tierwester. As was true at other black institutions, 
women at TSU “had to contend with… traditional views of gender roles,” and suffered a 
9:00 curfew. The women’s dormitories were separated from the men’s by the Student 
Health Center and the Student Union, a popular meeting place for residents and commuters 
alike. Lanier Men’s Dormitory and the Junior-Senior Men’s Dormitory stood just to the 
west of these. Jones Hall, the dorm for male athletes, stood just south of the men’s dorms 
370 
 
 
as did three cottages. A baseball diamond, track and football field, and Athletic Department 
were plotted west of these dorms between Wheeler and Blodgett and stretching to Briley 
Street. A fence along Blodgett Street and the southern portion of Tierwester kept the 
campus separated from the middle class homes south of the University. Another fence along 
Cleburne Street marked the campus as separate from the low-income Cuney Homes public 
housing project on the campus’s northern edge. Most often, then, people entered campus 
from the east and west through Wheeler Street. This remarkable growth within just twelve 
years reflected the efforts of campus administrators who, despite recognizing that TSU had 
been founded as a Jim Crow institution, believed it could be used in the interest of black 
Americans.9 
 Prior to his arrival in Houston, Lanier had been the Dean of Faculty at Hampton 
Institute (now Hampton University), dean at Florida A&M University, special assistant in the 
United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, and U.S. Minister to Liberia under 
President Harry Truman in 1946. Historian MaryBeth Rogers notes that Lanier “was easily 
recognizable as one of [the] Talented Tenth,” having completed graduate work at Stanford 
University and postdoctoral studies at Columbia University and Harvard University. He was 
also known and respected among black Houstonians, having served as dean of Houston 
College for Negroes during the Great Depression. Despite his remarkable educational and 
professional pedigree, Lanier still managed to “amaze” psychologists at the segregated 
University of Houston when, as the only black person submitted to their experiment, he 
“scor[ed] 3,000 words a minute in a remedial reading test” and “exceeded that of any 
person tested at the University” in 1954. Most black Houstonians who had an opinion about 
Lanier, then, looked upon him as a symbol of racial pride and welcomed his leadership at 
the University.10  
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Throughout Lanier’s tenure as president, historian Gary M. Lavergne notes that the 
legislature only “grudgingly appropriated funds to keep TSUN running in order to keep the 
University of Texas white,” refusing to provide Lanier with a budget to meet their supposed 
goal to establish a “first class” institution for the state’s black residents.11 The president also 
suffered repeated attacks by the University’s Board of Regents in 1953. Board member 
Ralph Lee, “an avowed and bitter Dixiecrat” according to Carter Wesley, claimed Lanier 
was “incompetent, cannot stick to decisions, is negligent, insubordinate to the board, and… 
some of his actions are not in accordance with good American principles.” Among other 
grievances, Lee opposed Lanier’s failure to notify faculty of their re-employment until two 
weeks prior to the start of the 1953-1954 academic year. Claudius William Rice, the owner 
of Negro Labor News, based in Houston, also openly expressed his distaste for Lanier’s 
governance. Rice and J. D. Moore, a local activist and minister, claimed that Lanier had lost 
control of the student body—that they had become unmanageable in the spring semester of 
1953. The Chronicle, which had been unfriendly toward Lanier since his arrival, amplified 
complaints against the president, writing that the campus had exploded after a faculty 
committee refused to allow the school auditorium to be used for a public discussion about 
Whittaker Chambers’ The Witness.12  
Lanier responded to Rice’s personal attacks by noting that he and Rice had worked 
well together when the former had been dean at Houston College for Negroes because as 
dean he had been able to use his influence to Rice’s benefit. However, after Rice failed in his 
bid to be chosen for the Board of Regents at TSU, he began printing damaging op-eds on 
the University president. The newspaper editor, Lanier claimed, “will print anything he is 
paid to print.” Like the Chronicle, Rice was “out to embarrass him [Lanier] at every 
opportunity.” Carter Wesley, Sid Hilliard, and Claude A. Barnett of the Associated Negro 
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Press used their ink to preserve Lanier’s reputation. Barnett implored Lanier to send him 
any updates on the politics surrounding his presidency, believing that “[p]lenty of 
misinformation can be spread about merely because those who know the truth do not 
present that side.”13 
Barnett also wrote directly to Ben Hawkins, the staff writer at the Chronicle who had 
written about the “unwholesome situation” of student protesters on campus. Sparing no 
words, he called the article “both misleading and wholly exaggerated” and lambasted the 
reporter for having no real interest in “pav[ing] the way for a greater and more progressive 
Texas Southern.” He claimed, “The Chronicle and Labor News are deliberately creating 
insignificant and petty situations, so as to confuse the Citizenry, spread distrust among 
students and faculty, and to elevate this unfortunate situation to such a high and depressing 
state until the President resigns to disgust” and pointed out that they had done all this 
without having once “proved nor attempted to prove” their “allegations.” Despite Rice’s 
and the Chronicle’s efforts to “destroy” the president and whispers in both papers that 
Lanier was a communist in both newspapers, by Wesley’s estimation, most black 
Houstonians remained strong supporters of the president. Sid Hilliard’s Harris County 
Council of Organizations (HCCO) and its forty clubs and groups “sent letter[s] of 
endorsement to the board of TSU, to Governor [Allan] Shivers, and to the local press” 
testifying that Lanier had “served [black Houstonians] faithfully and well and enjoys a rare bit 
of trust and confidence here and throughout the state as a leader.” Indeed, Wesley argued, 
the legislature’s tepid establishment of TSUN in 1947 would have met with greater 
resistance from black Houstonians if they had not hired Lanier, whose reputation and 
credentials commanded respect from white people and fostered admiration among black 
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people. Wesley suggested the Board “stop paying any attention to Rice’s cackling, because 
he is just eaten up with hatred of Lanier.”14 
In fact, despite protests otherwise and inadequate funding from the state, which the 
Informer believed would ultimately result in TSU’s demise, Lanier boasted several 
accomplishments as president. Under his leadership the University was “recognized as a 
Class A institution by the Texas Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools,” its Art 
program was regionally ranked, and its profile had grown among higher education 
professional associations. Students took ownership of the campus, literally taxing themselves 
in order to build a Student Union.15  The football program had advanced and was winning 
conference and national championships. Enrollment had tripled since 1947. And in further 
defense of their president, in the first week of June 1953 student government leaders also 
testified in letters to the Board of Regents that “there is no unrest or dissension” on 
campus and indicated their “full support of the actions of the president, Dr. R. O’Hara 
Lanier....”16 
 Nevertheless, on June 8, 1953, the Chronicle’s Ben Hawkins reported that Governor 
Shivers had ordered a probe into TSU’s affairs after the local American Legion “Negro 
post” requested that he make an “impartial investigation of conditions” at the University. 
Hawkins noted that the “campus has been the center of reports of faculty unrest and fear, 
plotting, and inefficient management” and cited multiple instances of students picketing 
downtown and on campus and multiple faculty “resigning in disgust.” The next day, 
however, the Chronicle reported that according to Board chair Mack Hannah, a successful 
black entrepreneur out of Port Arthur, Shivers had not yet ordered an investigation into the 
school. The governor did eventually order the requested probe in July, which would turn 
out to be both a waste of time and money.17 
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Image 7 C. W. Rice's Negro Labor News published this image of "typical headline reactions" in a full-page spread 
attempting to undermine black Houstonians' trust in Dr. Lanier. Negro Labor News, December 5, 1953, 5. 
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Following the early June articles, Wesley immediately tackled the Chronicle’s efforts 
to signal TSU as a dangerous space. In an editorial he titled “Conspiracies?” he asked 
whether there existed “a plan or a design by somebody to kill off TSU?” “Or,” he asked “is 
the plan or design to kill Lanier, with a willingness to kill the school to get Lanier?” He 
charged that the Chronicle had no evidence to back up its claims against the University 
president or the student body, attacks that it had been “regularly… hauling” at the 
institution “since 1949.” The Chronicle’s efforts to keep the attention of Governor Shivers 
and its desire to crack down on “any grave or dangerous unrest” ignored, in Wesley’s 
opinion, that the only threat that existed at Texas Southern was its mostly white Board of 
Regents—composed of five white and four black members. Indeed, the Board had been 
established by the Texas legislature and individually appointed by the governor as a failsafe 
to maintain control of the state-funded institution. Wesley concluded that any inefficiency 
on campus was the result of the Board’s auditor’s decision to take the financial office from 
the president’s administration and institute “dual control,” making all financial decisions 
subject to Board input and approval.18 Wesley’s frustration with the Chronicle’s attempts to 
defame TSU and the Board of Regents’ constant rebuttals of Lanier’s administrative and 
financial efforts led him to suggest out loud: 
I am beginning to think that it may be time for Negroes, who have been trying to go 
along with the establishment of TSU, to take up arms against the sea of troubles and 
by opposing them thus end them, or push them out in the open so we can see some 
heads and tails of them. Why don’t we join the NAACP and others who have been 
against TSU from the start, and put up the means to file a series of suits to enter the 
undergraduate schools of the University of Texas, on the ground that TSU has been 
made untenable and impossible for ever serving the Negro interests?19 
Wesley’s patience had worn thin. The conflict over Lanier’s administration had 
demonstrated for him, without any room for doubt, that as a space built in the interest of 
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white people and despite the best efforts of Lanier, his faculty, and his staff to transform it, 
TSU was another manifestation of white supremacy.20 
 In the early summer of 1953, a special board of investigators began “probing the 
state of affairs at TSU,” assessing whether claims of administrative incompetence, poor 
records-keeping, and retaliation against faculty members were evident. Twenty-five-year-old 
law student and war veteran Booker T. Bonner testified that several instructors had been 
let go for failing to be “yes men” and that students were often kept ignorant of the school’s 
financial state. But he still supported Lanier, noting, “[He] is a pretty good man as far as I’m 
concerned.” Indeed, most students seemed to appreciate “the Lanier administration, 
because the head of the school is a ‘student’s president.’” Lanier “tries to get everything the 
students want and need” a faculty spokesperson confirmed. Faculty members testified that 
there was “no general unrest” among them, but believed they should not be submitted to 
the insecurity of annual unemployment and argued that a tenure system needed to be 
introduced at the school. State auditor C. S. Niebuhr found that personnel files “were once 
‘in a pretty bad shape,” but that “progress [was] being made in correcting the situation.” 
Investigators concluded that the Lanier administration was neither negligent nor 
incompetent, and that each of the claims that had been leveled against TSU were 
unsubstantiated. Learning that “there is no unrest or turmoil,” the Board accepted the 
investigation committee’s report, which stated, “We want to emphasize that we find 
absolutely nothing evidencing any subversive or communistic affiliation or association by the 
administration and find no evidence of any subversive or communistic teaching at the 
University.” Dr. Lanier’s administration, the Informer said in its interpretation of the report, 
“was above reproach.”21 
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 Despite this vindication, Lanier only remained at the institution for two more 
academic years, tendering his resignation on June 8, 1955. The announcement by the Board 
of Regents hit black Houstonians invested in TSU “like a bomb, with stunning impact.” 
Citizens across the city speculated “the reason behind the resignation,” since there had 
been no public indication of any further dissatisfaction with Lanier’s administration. 
Nevertheless, after a “secret session” meeting among Board members, from which Lanier 
was excluded, he allegedly asked to resign, and they “immediately and unanimously” 
approved, offering him thirty days to vacate his University residence. Rumors of a 
conspiracy of subterfuge among two or three faculty members, the Board, and Dr. Joseph 
Pierce, who replaced Lanier as acting president, quickly spread. Claude Barnett sent a 
personal note, expressing his shock and wondering if Lanier might share an account of why 
he resigned to the press, but also praising him because “[t]hat Texas mustang was a tough 
horse to ride but it appeared you had tamed her.” By July, black Houstonians had still failed 
to learn why Lanier had resigned and his family had migrated from Houston to Miami, 
leaving leaders like Lulu B. White uncertain about whether the fight with the effectively 
white Board and their interests had ever truly been resolved.22  
The Board approved Dr. Samuel Milton Nabrit as TSU’s second president on July 
13, 1955. Immediately after Nabrit’s hiring, however, Houstonians expressed skepticism that 
he would have any more success than his predecessor had. “What chance,” they asked “has 
President Nabrit if [the] Board meddles?”23 Like Lanier, Nabrit had a formidable resume. He 
had been born into a large family with a seemingly insatiable collective desire for academic 
achievement.24 Like his parents and siblings, Samuel Nabrit fashioned a life of academic and 
professional prestige. He completed his undergraduate education at Morehouse College in 
1925 as “one of the first five bachelors of science” recipients from the institution. That 
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summer, he enrolled at the University of Chicago, taking courses there for two summers 
while working as head of Morehouse’s biology department during the academic year. In 
1932, after taking some time off to care for his sick wife, Constance Crocker, class of 1925 
valedictorian of Boston University, Samuel Nabrit became the first black person to receive a 
Ph.D. at Brown University, completing his studies in biology. He was also the first 
Morehouse alumnus to have received a Ph.D. anywhere. Working as a researcher in the 
northeast, the newly minted Dr. Nabrit earned a reputation as a bright biologist. In 1944, he 
studied at Columbia University’s Teacher College, in 1946 he and several colleagues 
established the National Institute of Science, in 1947 Atlanta University recruited him to 
become the first dean of its graduate school, and in 1948 he joined the Carnegie Foundation 
Faculty Grant-in-Aid Program. His teaching and research took him to New York, Texas, 
Belgium, and the Virgin Islands before finally landing him at TSU.25 
 In his early years as president of TSU, Nabrit focused on raising funds by building 
relationships with Houston’s business class and on increasing the academic profile of the 
University. Six months after Nabrit’s arrival, the Board of Regents voted to desegregate 
Texas Southern, and in the fall of 1956 the University admitted its first white students, 
though none enrolled at least until 1958. However, by the time of Nabrit’s resignation in 
1966—he left to accept President Lyndon B. Johnson’s nomination for him to join the U.S. 
Atomic Energy Commission—the University had just over 200 white students enrolled, 
about 5 percent of its student body. Nabrit believed that desegregation presented a 
challenge to formerly all-black institutions. White students enjoyed the advantages of well-
funded schools and updated materials for generations, and these circumstances yielded 
positive educational outcomes. Many black students did not enter college as prepared for 
advanced studies. “This illustrates the tragic fact,” he wrote, “that due to economic and 
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cultural differences which stem from dualism [i.e., “separate but equal” segregation], the 
average Negro cannot compete on equal terms with the average white student in our 
society.” In order to contend in the age of desegregation, schools like TSU had to learn to 
do more than compensate for the detrimental effects of “dualism” on black students. Nabrit 
therefore established a “‘rather rigorous’ freshman program” that functioned to “weed out 
a large percentage of those who enter first year.” Additionally, as a trained scientist, he 
focused his attention on improving the science programs, and boasted at the time of his 
resignation that “biology and chemistry” were the strongest fields at TSU and that, “If all 
Negro colleges in America were taken into consideration, Texas Southern would not be 
lower than sixth by anyone’s ranking.” Like Lanier, Nabrit contested what he felt was the 
Board of Regents’ undue power in handling University affairs throughout his time as 
president, but his relationship was much less fractious 26 
 Indeed, in 1960, when TSU students joined the student protest movement that was 
building up in cities across the country, Nabrit supported them with the tacit blessing of 
Mack Hannah, who quietly helped bankroll the student activists. The student protest 
movement in Houston began after police attacked Eldrewey Joseph Stearns, native 
Galvestonian, Michigan State University graduate, and law student at TSU in August 1959. 
The twenty-seven-year-old aspiring attorney was driving from his job as a waiter at the 
Houston Doctor’s Club when he was stopped by city police for a traffic violation. Instead of 
finding a driver’s license in his wallet, the officers found a photograph of a white woman 
with whom Stearns had been friends at Michigan State. Stearns suffered multiple beatings in 
police custody that night. However, dressed in “a suit, a bow tie, a shirt with French cuffs” 
and wearing “facial bruises,” Stearns attended the next city council meeting to air his 
grievances against the Houston Police Department, claiming that officers abused him and 
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“repeatedly” referred to him as a “nigger.” An investigation cleared the officers of any 
wrongdoing, but Stearns became a cause célèbre on campus.27 
 Angry students recruited Stearns as the leader of a protest movement in Houston 
inspired by those in Greensboro, North Carolina. Quentin Mease, head of the South 
Central YMCA at 3531 Wheeler Avenue in Third Ward, hired Stearns in February of 1960 
after he lost his job at the all-white Doctor’s Club as a result of the publicity he garnered 
following his city council appearance. Through Mease, Stearns’ social network grew to 
include a black business class that had long deferred to the now waning Houston NAACP 
on matters of desegregation. On campus that same month, the Baptist Student Union 
brought “restless students” together who were inspired by Stearns and “bothered” by the 
lack of protest activity in the city. One student, Earl Allen, noted of the group, “The notion 
of complacency and docility—that’s just not where many of us were.” William “Bill” 
Lawson, a young minister, arrived on that late night in March to find a large group of 
students waiting for him at the Union. They were going to protest, and they hoped to have 
an adult leader who could teach them non-violent civil disobedience.28 
 Lawson had come to Houston in 1955 after completing his Master of Theology 
degree from Central Baptist Theological Seminary in Kansas City to head the Baptist 
Student Union and to teach Biblical studies courses at TSU. Late, in 1962, he and his wife 
Audrey established Wheeler Avenue Baptist Church in Third Ward. Lawson was initially 
reticent to become involved in civil disobedience in Houston or to approve of such action 
for his students. On that late night in 1960, he admonished students, “You know that you’re 
messing your future up? If you get booked and go to jail, you may never be able to get a civil 
service job... you can’t serve your country. There’s a number of things you can’t do. Why 
would you take a chance like this?” They responded by telling Lawson “in no uncertain 
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terms they didn’t come asking my permission as to whether they could protest.” When 
Lawson again tried to convince them to remain compliant with the city’s status quo, the 
students walked out on him. In retrospect he recalled, “I still didn’t understand that a page 
in history had turned.” Their activism would eventually inspire his own later in the 1960s as 
he realized “the importance of community involvement” as well as what he would later 
understand as his Christian obligation to fight racism.29 
 Though the Houston NAACP and the Harris County Council of Organizations had 
accomplished much in desegregating many of Houston’s public spaces throughout the 
1950s—libraries, parks, and the Municipal Airport—many of its private businesses remained 
staunchly Jim Crow. TSU’s Progressive Youth Association swiftly changed that. They made 
their initial protest on March 4, 1960, at Weingarten’s Grocery and Deli, just seven blocks 
west of campus at 4110 Almeda Road. Stearns maneuvered to have local news outlets there 
to document the encounter when one hundred students converged on the store, either 
standing outside of it or sitting at its lunch counters. The press chronicled the conflict—
there was no violence, but store employees roped off the lunch counter and declared it 
closed. The next protest occurred at Mading’s Drugs lunch counter, located at the corner 
of Oakdale and Almeda, also in Third Ward. This time, the threat of violence appeared 
when a carload of Galveston white supremacists walked in, but who were deterred from 
acting out when a Houston police officer entered. On March 7th, however, “Heavenly 
Houston” received a shock. Four white men abducted Felton Turner, a twenty-seven-year-
old man as he walked near TSU’s campus. In a nearby wooded area they tied his hands and 
knees, beat him, and carved two rows of the letters “KKK” in his torso before telling him to 
warn the NAACP to stop agitating in Houston. Though police officers quickly investigated 
the incident, they never found the perpetrators.30 
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Image 8 “Flog and Carve KKK on Negro,” Jet, March 24, 1960. 
 
 The attack on Turner, however, did garner the attention of Houston’s business 
leaders and politicians, who were as embarrassed by this violent attack as earlier leaders 
had been by the bombing on the Caesar residence. City Council member Louie Welch 
suggested that local businesses simply remove their stools and tables and have people stand 
and eat at lunch counters to avoid any further issues about integrated dining. Meanwhile, 
Mayor Lewis Cutrer invited TSU students to his office, arguing that he “wasn’t going to 
tolerate” any further protests. The students walked out on his meeting, and on March 25th, 
they marched from TSU to City Hall to embarrass the city further during a visit from an 
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Argentinian ambassador to the United States. Singing as they circled the building, the protest 
group sent a small delegation of students inside City Hall to order food and drinks in the 
cafeteria. To their surprise, they were served, though white diners got up from their tables, 
leaving their trays and food behind. Welch walked in, got a meal, and ate at a table next to 
the students.31 
 Mayor Cutrer later announced that he would have student protesters arrested if 
they continued their insubordination. Houston Police Department Chief Carl Shuptrine 
“went on the air and indicated that they had violated no law and that the mayor would have 
to lock them up [himself] because [HPD] wasn’t going to.” In response, on April 7th, Cutrer 
called a thirty-seven-member biracial Citizens Relations Committee to determine what to 
do about race relations in the city. When nineteen members of the Committee voted in 
May that businesses in the city should desegregate, it was disbanded.32 
The Committee’s failure came just in time for students to execute a Mother’s Day 
protest, which was “phenomenally effective.” Downtown businesses, still the heart of 
Houston’s commercial life, felt the financial sting as black Houstonians boycotted them 
ahead of the holiday. The vice president of Foley’s, the city’s largest department store and 
biggest advertiser, called on Houston’s business leaders and press to discuss how best to 
handle the protest movement. His co-conspirators included Mayor Cutrer, Bill Wallace, the 
head of the Retail Merchants’ Association, Oveta Culp Hobby, owner of the Houston Post, 
John T. Jones, publisher of the Houston Chronicle and chair of the Houston Endowment, and 
Hobart Taylor, insurance entrepreneur and millionaire son of formerly enslaved Jack Taylor. 
Using their collective influence, these business leaders quietly commanded the simultaneous 
desegregation of all downtown businesses while also manufacturing a media “blackout,” 
wherein none of the city’s newspapers—including the black-owned Forward Times and 
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Informer (which relied on Foley’s advertising) reported on what was transpiring. Though 
their movement had been temporarily quieted by the news blackout, the students could see 
that less than six months after their first march, seventy businesses in downtown Houston 
had begun serving black patrons. White customers’ resistance was short-lived and 
ineffectual.33 
Then, on December 5, 1960, the Supreme Court decided in Boynton v. Virginia that 
segregation in public transportation was unconstitutional. This decision held that the same 
was true for restaurants located at bus terminals and rail depots that serviced interstate 
passengers. Thurgood Marshall brought the news to Houston in February 1961. On the 
25th of that month, student protesters arrived at Union Station (now Minute Maid Stadium) 
in downtown Houston, looking to be served at its coffee shop. The manager blocked their 
entry and refused to serve them. When they declined to leave he had them arrested—“the 
first mass arrests in the Houston protest movement.” The students “laughed about the 
whole thing,” even as they were fingerprinted and put into jail cells, believing that the 
arrests and press coverage would “revitalize the movement.” Local attorney George 
Washington Jr. used their arrests to raise money and awareness. With the help of the 
Congress of Racial Equality’s (CORE) Freedom Riders, the local protest movement 
successfully challenged Union Station’s refusal to serve black interstate passengers, and a 
month later the Interstate Commerce Commission ordered desegregation across the 
country.34 
The revitalized movement carried its weight into 1962, as Houston made a bid to 
become the home of the first major baseball team in the South. Quentin Mease set his sights 
on the state-funded domed stadium, which the former mayor and the dome’s loudest 
booster Roy Hofheinz referred to as the “Eighth Wonder of the World.” Mease threatened 
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another student protest if Hofheinz would not promise that the stadium would be an 
integrated facility. The pending protest threatened to embarrass Houston on an 
international stage, as TSU students prepared to create a blockade on both sides of the 
downtown parade that was celebrating Astronaut Gordon Cooper’s return from the last 
Mercury space mission. Hofheinz and his backers capitulated. Likewise, behind the scenes, 
Houston’s hotels and movie theaters “quietly desegregated” during a media blackout.35 
This quiet did not last through the decade. Several developments in the late 1960s 
changed the ways the city responded to student activism. Under Nabrit’s administrations, 
student activists could depend on the support of their University. Nabrit passed on vital 
information to student leaders. He also publicly promised the student body that he “didn’t 
intend to take any steps to interfere with their activities” and guaranteed that student 
protesters would not have to fear for expulsion under his leadership. However, students did 
not enjoy the same unfettered approval when Nabrit resigned in 1966, replaced by acting 
president Dr. Joseph Pierce. Pierce’s ascendancy to school leadership coincided with the 
arrival of SNCC to Houston, whose presence he did not welcome on campus. Moreover, 
by the late 1960s, the elite business class’s influence on city politics was waning.36 Mayor 
Louie Welch, though concerned with the city’s image to the world, was emboldened by his 
characteristically racist Chief of Police Herman Short to suppress black people’s unrest 
rather than quietly negotiate with them. Short, who was appointed in 1964 by Welch, was 
less likely to approach student activists with caution than Jack Heard. He viewed his 
Department as “standing between law-abiding society and some that were not quite so law-
abiding,” believing that black Houstonians who challenged the racial status quo were 
necessarily of a criminal element. Indeed, he maintained “surveillance files on prominent” 
black leaders, and when his officers were accused of being KKK members, he replied: “I am 
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not a Klansman, and I know of no police officer who is a Klansman. You can’t fault a man, 
however, for praising God, country, and obedience to law and order. That’s what we all 
stand for.” With a blatant racist at the head of the police department, a neglectful mayor, 
fractured civil rights leadership, and an unfriendly TSU administration, the late 1960s 
certainly represented different terrain for any black Houstonians engaging in civil 
disobedience.37  
Civil rights leadership in the city was also changing. Black Houstonians’ major civil 
rights victories in the 1940s and 1950s had come through court action under the leadership 
of middle class-dominated organizations—the NAACP and the Harris County Council of 
Organizations (HCCO). The media blackout had negatively affected the prominence of both 
organizations as younger activists looked toward direct action models as more legitimate 
forms of protest. Christia Adair was no longer running the affairs of the Houston NAACP, 
and the organization, which had been effective in fighting legal battles against desegregation, 
had not been able to adapt to black Houston’s (post)-Jim Crow struggles given its censure 
by the Texas courts in 1957.38 
In the stead of these former organizational powerhouses, SNCC, the Deacons for 
Defense, and the Black Power Freedom Army attempted to convince Houstonians and black 
people across the nation that massive resistance served the best interests of all black 
Americans. TSU students seemed ripe for recruitment. Former students and current faculty 
members who had witnessed or been directly involved in the nonviolent civil disobedience 
protests in the city in the early 1960s were still engaged in campus life and anti-poverty 
work in the latter years of that decade. Earl Allen was now the director of the Houston-
Harris County Economic Opportunity Organization (EOO), funded by President Lyndon B. 
Johnson’s War on Poverty initiatives. On May 16, the EOO merged with Houston Action 
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for Youth, another War on Poverty program focused on providing social services to 
Houston’s poor communities. The newfound Harris County Community Action Association 
(HCCAA) met at 2211 North Main Street, about five blocks east of the intersection of I-10 
and I-45 in Fifth Ward. The Association employed many activist-minded TSU students and 
created networks between Harris County’s far-flung impoverished black neighborhoods, 
which workers could reach by traveling across the highways that had devastated their 
residential predecessors in the inner core like Fifth Ward.39 
But the HCCAA was also populated by church leaders and community organizers 
from across the city who argued that “some of the people in other areas of town… don’t 
think TSU represents all the wisdom in the Negro community.” They opposed outsiders 
coming into their neighborhoods to impose social justice programs on their residents. They 
believed that TSU students did “represent the thrust of the young Negroes in the 
community, and we need to listen to them, but we are not ready to turn the direction of 
the [anti-poverty] program over to them.” For example, while the desegregation of 
downtown lunch counters certainly proved a win against Jim Crow for TSU students, this 
had little consequence for those residents in Acres Homes whose social and commercial life 
resided squarely within their north-northeast enclave. Importantly, though, HCCAA 
members also believed they needed to “be careful that TSU didn’t get left out as usual.”40 
TSU, then, presented a problem and offered a promise to black Houston’s new anti-
poverty leadership. The campus, while a constitutive part of Third Ward—and indeed, a 
party too of the many neighborhoods in Houston from which its students came and in 
which many of them still lived—also existed apart from the rest of the city. The 
“academically oriented” politics and grievances of the students did not capture the larger 
problems of environmental racism, vigilante violence, and political suppression that 
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communities in Fifth Ward, Sunnyside, and Northwood faced. Kelton Sams, a leader in 
Galveston’s 1961 sit-in movement and graduate of the University of Texas, impressed upon 
the Association that black Houston’s woes were “not centered at TSU.”41 But newcomers 
to campus, like Franklin Alexander, national director of the W. E. B. Du Bois Club, 
Frederick Douglass Kirkpatrick of the Deacons of Defense, and Lee Otis Johnson, who 
helped found the Friends of SNCC in Houston, brought with them the youthful vigor and a 
willingness to meet violence with violent resistance. Inspired by the anti-Vietnam War 
protests on campuses likely Berkeley, the anti-capitalist rhetoric of an increasingly popular 
Kwame Ture (formerly Stokely Carmichael), and fiery urban rebellions, this class of campus 
leaders found common ground with the neighborhood-based protests happening on the 
north and south sides of the city in 1967, and linked those struggles with the grievances of 
students on the campus. At times they were successful in convincing students at TSU and at 
the University of Houston to engage in activism outside of their academic enclaves, but 
many students resisted. That is, not only did black Houstonians sometimes leave TSU out, 
but TSU students, many of whom were not native Houstonians and not invested in the 
broader politics of the city, remained uninterested in what they saw as the unrelated 
grievances of Houston’s numerous black neighborhoods.42 
Thus, TSU was not unlike other black spaces in the city, where spatial isolation 
limited cross-community activism. So, although black Houstonians shared the grievances 
ofcommunities in Oakland, Newark, Detroit, and Los Angeles, their geographic dispersal 
into neighborhoods that were only tenuously connected by expansive highways and 
common racial grievances appeared to reduce the likelihood of a large, collective uprising.  
In Houston there was “no large one concentrated ghetto” and neighborhoods were 
characterized by “all sorts of little provincialisms.” One black activist noted, “[T]here are 
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fifth warders who wouldn’t come south of the bayou, there are third warders who wouldn’t 
go north of it.” TSU students, then, presented an opportunity to community leaders looking 
to bridge some of those geographic gaps. Students who lived outside Third Ward had 
connections with the neighborhoods they stayed in. Social justice-minded students on 
campus could be recruited to work in summer programs at the South Central YMCA and 
add numbers to smaller neighborhood-based protests. However, this movement of people 
was not reciprocated. Black Houstonians—even those Third Warders who lived next door 
to TSU—did not join the students in their on-campus protests, viewing those as issues to 
be governed within the institution rather than by the city or county.43 
Accordingly, a divide between the University and other black Houston communities 
placed the student resistance on campus more squarely within the context of campus 
rebellions rather than urban uprisings.44 Campus rebellions, while often precipitated by 
police brutality like the rebellions in Harlem in 1935 and 1943, Mobile, Alabama, in 1943, 
and Watts in 1965, were not commodity riots where locals converged on white-owned 
businesses and looted goods. At TSU and other campuses, vandalism was directly related to 
immediate protest needs: tossing food on the cafeteria floor to protest unhealthy dining 
standards, destroying street lamps to avoid police surveillance, and pelting police vehicles 
with projectiles to reclaim autonomy of campus space were not akin to the kind of 
spontaneous economic reprisals that black urbanites engaged in elsewhere. While their 
activism was certainly informed by urban uprisings and anti-war protests that had spread 
across the country in the mid-to-late 1960s, students on black campuses were most 
concerned with problems at their particular institutions and their activities tended to 
conform to their academic calendars.45 
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But while campus rebellions differed from urban uprisings, the law enforcement 
responses in cities across the country was quite similar. Following the Watts Rebellion, 
President Johnson’s Office of Law Enforcement Assistance (OLEA), established in 1965, 
provided “urban police departments with federal funds to increase their manpower, 
professionalize their force, and arm their officers with military-grade weapons” that Johnson 
believed “would make an immediate impact on crime rates.” In its first three years, the 
OLEA distributed the bulk of $22 million to local law enforcement agencies and in 1966 
granted $500,000 to fund “a comprehensive study of the ways in which scientific advances in 
defense and military contexts could be utilized by the police ‘soldiers’ in the War on 
Crime.” In Houston, law enforcement agencies had already begun a program of surveillance 
on “targeted low-income neighborhoods as a means to control unruly teens.” Following the 
student sit-in movement and the appointment of Herman Short as police chief, TSU figured 
as one such place in need of police “control.” Indeed, Lieutenant Mallie L. Singleton testified 
that he had placed two officers on surveillance duty at the campus in 1967 and the Criminal 
Intelligence Division watched Friends of SNCC members. One black man, a Vietnam 
veteran and enrolled student at TSU, worked as a spy for the police department 
“infilitrat[ing] Negro organizations.” The man worked with the Department to silence 
“black power” because “Negro extremists are ‘becoming increasingly active and a threat to 
tranquility.’” Though Houstonians could pride themselves on a relatively peaceful 
desegregation process in the early 1960s, as the decade wore on and the public bought into 
Patrick Moynihan’s notion of black people’s cultural “pathology,” an increasingly militarized 
police force, with the approval of an unsympathetic public, responded violently to black 
student activism in the city. While there were no live cameras and sunlight on the night of 
the siege on TSU, the hundreds of bullet holes and blood-stained floors and concrete 
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pathways indicated a state-sanctioned terroristic response to black civil rights activism in 
Houston that was certainly parallel to and just as devastating as Bull Connor’s firehoses and 
dogs in Birmingham just four years prior.46 
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Places of Interest 
1. Texas Southern University 
2. South Central YMCA 
3. University of Houston 
4. Jeppesen Stadium 
5. Weingarten’s 
6. Mading’s Drugs 
7. Union Station 
8. City Hall 
9. Groovey Grill 
10. Northwood Junior High 
11. HCCAA Headquarters 
12. Harris County Jail 
13. City Jail 
14. Doctor’s Club of Houston 
15. Riverbrook Missionary Baptist Church 
16. Worthing High School 
17. Hermann Hospital 
394 
 
 
 
  
0-3% 
3-6% 
6-11% 
11-22% 
22-44% 
395 
 
 
 
he Friends of SNCC faced an uphill battle in convincing Houstonians that they 
had something better to offer than the liberal individualism that been the 
ideology directing racial progress in the city. They argued against tokenism in 
employment and education, saying that it only obscured the “general picture of the political, 
economic, and social patterns” that perpetuated the “extant cornerstones of American 
society”—namely, “racism and exploitation of black people.” The individualism that 
undergirded the increasing appeal of tokenism in a post-Jim Crow Houston was quite plainly 
white people’s “tricknology.” In tokenism’s stead they offered “black power,” which would 
acknowledge the persistent significance of racism in American society and tackle it by re-
educating black people to understand that their destinies and possibilities were linked to 
one another. A black power epistemology would compel black people to resist police 
brutality with collective self-defense, increase black people’s political involvement in the 
judicial system, remove exploitative white businesses from black communities, and protect 
black women from white men. Indeed, no longer willing to accept the norms of polite 
Houston racial politics, wherein white people could freely abuse deferential black folks and 
wherein black college graduates fared worse in earned wages than white high school 
graduates, the Black Power Freedom Army called for a meeting at its office at 2024 Eastex 
Freeway in Fifth Ward. They encouraged black people to begin fighting back “in the street”: 
“If a honkey put [sic] his racist hand on you, try and break his damn arm.—break his damn 
neck—put some bottles on his ass.”47 
These bold rebuttals of white supremacy certainly garnered the attention of the 
Houston Police Department and the new administration at TSU. Black activists in the city 
suffered constant surveillance by the Houston Police Department, and at least one unlawful 
search of their office. A member of the Friends of SNCC reported that one day, likely in 
T 
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1966 or 1967, “two plain clothes white police caught me at the door and didn’t show me a 
search warrant or warrant for arrest.” Instead, one officer “show[ed] me his gun and told 
me to get out the kitchen.” For twenty minutes the officers proceeded to destroy property 
and assault those occupying the house where the SNCC office was located: kicking down a 
bedroom door, throwing “Lee,” possibly Lee Otis Johnson, against a wall, and pulling 
another man out of bed as they searched, apparently, for guns. Despite the harassment, 
SNCC members continued to make noise on campus and throughout the city.48 
The Friends of SNCC noted the ways white residents and black people wedded to 
institutions like TSU undermined them and their organizing by painting them as undisciplined 
militants. They also publicized their many grievances toward the City of Houston and the 
TSU administration. Leaders pointed out multiple incidences of harassment by police 
officers and their efforts to demand fair treatment by law enforcement officials over the 
year leading up to the conflict at TSU. They had protected a black woman who they found 
being “shoved around by two members of the Houston Police Department” near Houston 
Gardens. When the Texas State Highway Patrol in Livingston, about an hour’s drive north-
northeast of Houston, “brutally beat” four gospel singers from Houston in 1966, SNCC 
organized a march against police brutality and ran a letter campaign to Homer Garrison, 
director of the Texas Department of Public Safety. Opponents tried to intimidate them into 
silence from the beginning and until the end of their protest. When the Friends of SNCC 
met at the South Central YMCA in Third Ward to organize, “a dozen Klansmen” arrived to 
attack the students. Police “managed to persuade the Klansmen to leave”—the very least 
HPD could do to protect black citizens from racial intimidation.49 
Although the organization worked hard to undercut its reputation as a group of 
violent rabble-rousers, the failure of local police officers to duly protect black Houstonians 
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from white terror compelled its members to note the synergistic relationship between 
nonviolent civil disobedience and armed self-defense. Indeed, as inheritors of a long “black 
tradition of arms,” they also saw no conflict in equally prioritizing the tenets of non-violence 
and self-defense. Floyd Nichols, a supporter of the Friends of SNCC and an undergraduate 
at TSU, explained his position: “I don’t advocate violence, but I’m not going to let violence 
advocate me,” by which he meant that SNCC members were willing to respond with force 
in order to protect themselves and their dignity, but that violence was not the 
organization’s mode of operation for securing civil rights. If the state would not protect 
them, they would make their own safe spaces.50 
Unfortunately for SNCC, the administration at TSU also failed to make the campus 
safe for student activists. Mack H. Jones, a political scientist, taught at the university and 
served as the faculty advisor for the Friends of SNCC. His wife, economics scholar Barbara 
Ann Posey Jones, was also a faculty member during the academic year of the highway 
assault. Friends of SNCC, she recalled, had arranged its protest of the Highway Patrol on 
the same day that President Pierce was set to address the Houston Endowment to solicit 
financial support for the school. She recounted, “The president canceled his visit and the 
administration fired Mack” in order to prove “they had taken action against the 
‘inappropriate behavior of their students.’”51 
Students responded to Jones’s dismissal with disbelief and swift protest. For them, 
the administration’s action illustrated a lack of regard for academic freedom as well as the 
claims to “basic human freedom” that SNCC remained committed to. They hinted that any 
administrative or faculty member who had been involved in Jones’s dismissal were “Uncle 
Toms.” On Monday, March 27, 1967 the Friends of SNCC protested at TSU, complaining 
that the University refused to recognize them as an official campus group. Dean of Students 
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James Jones noted that the University would not acknowledge any student group that did 
not present, to him, an exact proposal of the group’s mission. Moreover, in the case of 
Friends of SNCC, they needed to prove “an established relationship with the chartered 
SNCC in Atlanta,” although why this was necessary remained unclear.52 
In addition to opposing the University’s refusal to recognize their group, Friends of 
SNCC also demanded the reinstatement of Mack H. Jones, the closing of Wheeler Avenue 
to public traffic, better cafeteria food, and an end to early curfews for female students who 
resided in campus housing.53 TSU’s proximity to UH made these demands all the more 
reasonable to SNCC members, who juxtaposed the two very different student life realities 
of each campus and made demands accordingly: 
Texas Southern University is an all-black college controlled by whites. Six blocks up 
the street is the University of Houston. Cops at TSU carry guns, cops at the U. of 
H. do not. The curfew for girls at TSU is 9 p.m., at the U. of H. it is 11 p.m. The 
food is better at the U. of H. Texas Southern offers no courses in the modern 
branches of engineering and technology…. Change the curfew hours to the same as 
on the white campuses. All disciplinary action [must] go through a student court 
whose powers shall be at least equal to that of the Dean of Students. Replace the 
present slop served in the cafeteria with edible nutrition. Increase all salaries of TSU 
and maintenance personnel to the level of white campuses. Remove Dean James B. 
Jones from the Draft Board…. Disarm the campus police.54 
The size of the protest reportedly grew to about 400 students, who attempted to force an 
academic boycott by barricading doors to academic buildings with wooden beams from a 
construction site near the Student Union. Sociologist Henry Allen Bullock arrived to teach a 
class, and students refused him entry. He reportedly “broke into tears,” saying, “If this is all 
my years of teaching has meant to you, it is the end.” Bullock left TSU in 1969 to become 
the first black professor in the school of arts and sciences at the University of Texas at 
Austin, although whether the student protest compelled this remains unclear. When asked 
to remove the beams because they presented “a fire hazard,” protesters complied, and, 
instead, students blocked entryways with their own bodies. When Dean Jones arrived and 
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requested that the students allow their fellow undergraduates to attend class, the 
protesters again complied, and by the afternoon classes resumed. Changing strategy, 
Frederick Douglass Kirkpatrick led about 175 protesters from the academic buildings to 
Wheeler Avenue. The group “marched back and forth along the street protesting its use as 
a public thoroughfare,” effectively shutting down the flow of traffic through their campus.55 
 As April turned to May, students’ frustrations with municipal and University 
negligence regarding their grievances met the usual excitement that fills college campuses 
near the academic year’s end. Students aimed to revel in each other’s company, but 
Wheeler Avenue often made their campus feel unsafe, especially because one of their most 
likely outdoor gathering spaces—a sunken patio pit in front of the Student Union—faced 
Wheeler. The street had already been a traffic nuisance, but increasingly it seemed, “some 
KKK” and other racist white people had made a habit of driving down the street, “throwing 
cocktails out of the windows and driving with a [Confederate] flag.” For the students, there 
was no other way to deal with the “individuals” who rode “up and down our campus yelling 
insulting remarks at us.” One student testified, “On several occasions we have had several 
white kids ride up and down the campus shooting guns in the air. This is why we want the 
street closed down.” Students responded by complaining to both SNCC leaders and 
University officials, but also by taking direct action.56 
Friends of SNCC’s initial boycott of classes and disruption of the traffic flow on 
Wheeler lasted until the 29th of March, when the group and the administration agreed to 
forestall any further protests until Friday afternoon, “by which time the administration was 
supposed to have reached a decision” regarding the students’ demands. On Monday, April 3, 
after the University denied each of their requests, Friends of SNCC resumed their boycott 
of classes, again barring entry into the academic buildings. Lee Otis Johnson, at the time 
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suspended from TSU but still active in Friends of SNCC, and Franklin Alexander, president 
of the W. E. B. Du Bois Club and currently visiting Texas, assisted Kirkpatrick in leading the 
protest. Kirkpatrick estimated that “as many as 1,500” students joined the protest, which 
included again blocking vehicle traffic on Wheeler Avenue. “At nightfall,” he recalled, “we 
held a street dance which attracted a huge crowd.”57 
Then, according to Kirkpatrick, on Tuesday, April 4th at about 1:00 in the morning, 
“police officers accompanied by FBI agents woke me up in the South Central YMCA where I 
was sleeping and took me to the Harris County jail.” They also arrested Alexander at the 
YMCA and were searching for Johnson. President Pierce had apparently signed a request for 
the arrest of the young men. The charges claimed that “the defendants met unlawfully and 
did thereafter seriously and publicly threaten to kill any police officer who might undertake 
to arrest any demonstrators.” After hearing of the arrests, several female students, locked 
in the dorms, “broke down the doors and left to join” an impromptu midnight meeting, 
where Trazawell Franklin, a TSU undergraduate and member of the Friends of SNCC, told 
the crowd the details of the arrest, but informed them that nothing could be done that 
night. Organization and protest, he assured them, would follow after a night of planning and 
rest.58 
Later that morning, President Pierce addressed students in a campus auditorium, 
inviting student organization representatives, “including Friends of SNCC, to discuss with 
me any grievances that may have.” He assured his audience that he and his administrative 
staff desired “to carry on a dialogue with students.” On April 10th, in a memo to the whole 
student body, he reiterated his call, noting that had had received “no response” to his open 
invitation. He therefore suggested creating a “Student Advisory Committee to the 
President,” comprised of nine democratically elected students. Students in the Colleges of 
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Arts and Sciences, as well as the Graduate School, and the schools of Industries, Pharmacy, 
Law, and Business would all select additional representatives. Each of the six dormitories on 
campus would also be able to select one representative each. The president’s committee 
would build close ties with the Student Council. Together, these representatives and 
organizations would help establish and sustain “dialogue” between the “very top echelon” of 
TSU’s administrative staff and students in an effort to “solve whatever problems that 
exist.”59 
Pierce may have predicted that students would have been uninterested in his 
request for “dialog,” since on the day of his meeting with the student body in the 
auditorium, Johnson “walked out of the assembly, announcing an immediate march to the 
county jail to demand” the release of Kirkpatrick and Alexander. The marching students 
made a pit-stop at the University of Houston, where they gathered about 200 sympathizers 
to join them on their push toward downtown. Before they made it to the jail, however, 
while walking down Holman Street, “about 20 helmeted officers armed with sub-machine 
guns and riot guns” arrested Johnson. The students, about 500 strong, continued their 
march without him. The vacuum left by the arrests of Kirkpatrick, Alexander, and Johnson 
inspired other leaders to take on the role of inspiring the students to stay. SNCC members 
Carl Moore, Douglass Wayne Waller, and Charles Freeman delivered speeches to their 
audience, while Trazawell Franklin kept the crowd alive by leading songs.60  
Charles Freeman had come to Houston from Port Arthur, Texas, in 1965 when he 
became “the first and only black undergraduate male” at Rice University. Freeman recalled 
feeling “isolated” on the campus and his academic performance suffered for it, resulting in 
his academic suspension from the University in January 1967. Freeman then matriculated at 
TSU where he quickly became a vocal presence, speaking at student protests and rising to 
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prominence in the Friends of SNCC organization. Floyd Nichols also spoke, assuring the 
crowd that their peaceful protest would secure the leaders’ releases, and that they need not 
do anything to provoke the three hundred watching police officers to violence. The 
students remained at the courthouse steps until “late into the following day” after an 
embarrassed President Pierce dropped his charges against the leaders. Assured of victory, 
the students finally returned to their campuses, although they later learned that the district 
attorney had filed additional charges against the men, which kept them imprisoned. On 
Friday, the court reduced the initial bonds of $25,000 to $1,000, which each of the men 
posted.61 
Throughout April and the first weeks of May, students continued a now regular 
ritual of throwing bottles and bricks at passing cars after being provoked by white drivers. 
HPD officers often resorted to temporarily redirecting traffic around Wheeler Avenue as a 
result of these protests. Trazawell Franklin and Charles Freeman joined in the revelry, 
providing the students with more ammunition from the trash cans behind the nearby 
Groovey Grill, at the corner of Wheeler and Tierwester. In recent weeks Franklin had often 
been reprimanded by Dean Jones, so before he could participate in the bottle-throwing 
Franklin recalled that several “SNCC brothers came and got me off the campus” in order to 
prevent the administration from blaming them for the disturbance. Nevertheless, the next 
day, Jones chastised Franklin, saying that he had proof the young man had been involved. 
The conversation ended bitterly, with Jones telling Franklin he should move off campus if 
the student was “tired of coming in his office,” and Franklin demanding a housing refund in 
order to finance that move. Jones agreed, though it would take about a week to process the 
money.62 
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On May 15, Charles Freeman arrived in the student coffee shop on TSU’s campus to 
alert students about problems black families were having at the newly integrated 
Northwood Junior High School, located on Homestead Road about 10.5 miles north and 
west of downtown. Rumors included claims “that a white teacher had jumped on a negro 
boy,” which riled up the crowd at TSU. However, the parents of black students at 
Northwood were distressed that their children had been suspended from school for the 
remainder of the semester for fighting with white students, while the white students had 
only been suspended for three days. One high school student testified that a teacher, Mr. 
Bill, “likes to put his hands on the girls’ chest[s].” When investigators asked, “Black or white 
girls?” she responded, “Colored!” Black students and parents had been enduring such unfair 
treatment by the administration at the school since the beginning of the school year. The 
families there led a protest, and when police officers arrived, Kirkpatrick and others warned 
“the police to not move against the picket line.” At the campus coffee shop, Freeman, Carl 
Moore, Trazawell Franklin, Bill Richards, Carla Collins, and five other students decided to 
get involved and rode to the north side neighborhood. However, when they arrived around 
2:00 in the afternoon they found that administrators had dismissed students from the school 
early and the protest had ended. Mrs. Wendell Thompson, a parent of one of the suspended 
students, invited the TSU students to her house, where they talked to her and some of the 
Northwood students to learn about the problems they faced and the plan for further 
protest.63 
After staying with the Thompsons for about three hours, Franklin and a few other 
students went back to campus and gathered in the coffee shop, where they snacked and 
played cards until 7:30 in the evening. Rumors started spreading that Johnson and 
Kirkpatrick had been arrested again, so Franklin, Collins, and Floyd Nichols went back to 
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the Thompson residence, where they learned the rumor was false. Several leaders, including 
Kirkpatrick, Johnson, Carolyn Banks, and John Morris were at the Thompsons’ house, 
strategizing about how to protect the black residents in her neighborhood. “They told us 
that K.K.K. had been shooting out there,” Franklin remembered, “and burned a cross in 
[front of] Mr. Batese’s house and he was frightened because he didn’t have no kind of 
protection.” That night, Nichols, Franklin, and two other young men stayed at the Batese 
residence as guards.64 
After an uneventful night, Franklin and the other TSU students took the Batese 
family’s elementary school-aged children to school and their daughter to Northwood. 
Unfortunately, their middle school-aged son had been one of the students suspended for 
fighting. He and other suspended boys stood by listlessly. The TSU students reconvened at 
the Thompson residence, learning that organizers had arranged for more TSU students to 
arrive for a protest at the junior high school. The plan was that Northwood students would 
lead the protest, and TSU students would “stand on the sideline and watch.” Expecting 
trouble given the terrorism they had been experiencing on campus and on the north side, 
several of the students at TSU planned to take guns with them to the protest, but eventually 
the female students convinced their male counterparts that they should leave their weapons 
at the Thompson house. When Franklin and the others arrived at the scene around 11:00 in 
the morning, police had already begun charging across Homestead Road toward the 
protesting youngsters. This time, the reinvigorated police force arrived with “riot guns and 
dogs.” Kirkpatrick remembered, “In infantry style, the riot squad and sheriff’s deputies 
advanced on the peaceful picket line, billy clubs and rifle butts swinging.” Officers arrested 
the entire crowd, including Kirkpatrick and Lee Otis Johnson. “Many were beaten up. All 
were roughed up,” Kirkpatrick reported. SNCC confirmed, “Many children and their 
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parents were thrown in jail because of their lawful concern for a better education for 
children and a safe space in which to live.” One man riding with Franklin in the car pointed 
out that “the police was hitting the Junior High School students all in the head.” Attempting 
to avoid the confrontation, the TSU students with Franklin began driving away from the 
scene, but before they could get far city police stopped and detained them until the county 
sheriff’s department arrived to cart them off to the county jail.65 
O. C. Brown, a student at TSU and a resident of Sunnyside, had also joined about 
twenty classmates and thirty junior high school students at Northwood. He estimated that 
about two hundred cops had arrived on the scene to quell the protest, and when he and his 
friends saw the police charge across Homestead Road to attack the protesters, they got in 
their car to leave. An officer stopped them at a traffic light, told them to get out of the car, 
and searched them. When Brown asked him why they were being detained, the officer said 
for “inciting a riot.” Brown denied that they had been involved in any riot, but another 
officer assured them that he had photographic evidence that they had been at Northwood. 
The police arrested the young men, but allowed the young women present to go. From the 
back of the police wagon Brown could see cops nearby “beating some of the juveniles”—
students from Northwood. One suffered a blow to his genitals from a police officer’s 
blackjack. He could also hear the repeated, though rather uncreative insults the officers 
hurled at the kids: “You damn niggers.” The wagon carrying Brown arrived at the Harris 
County Jail around 11:30. Altogether, officers had arrested about forty people at 
Northwood. Later that day, they each stood before a judge, pleaded “no contest,” and were 
eventually released at about 6:00 in the evening when civil rights leader Booker T. Bonner 
posted $1 bail for each of them.66 
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Douglas Wayne Waller, Lee Otis Johnson, and two other activist students had not 
been present at the Northwood protest. Waller was a twenty-one-year-old Vietnam War 
veteran who had enrolled at TSU and became active with the Friends of SNCC. When 
Waller arrived on campus from his sister and brother-in-law’s home, it was already 1:00 in 
the afternoon. He found Johnson and other students in the coffee shop discussing the 
arrests at Northwood and learned that his roommate Bobby had been among the arrestees. 
Waller agreed to travel north to see if he could help bail Bobby out. They found the 
Thompson residence packed with parents of arrested youth, leaders such as Kirkpatrick, as 
well as “a few of the girls from the campus”—probably those who had traveled to the 
protest with O. C. Brown. Many of the guests stayed at the Thompson residence until they 
learned of the protesters’ releases. Waller, Freeman, and Nichols—who arrived at the 
Thompson residence after visiting the county jail to see if he could get SNCC members 
released—among others, left the Thompson residence around 6:00 that evening when they 
heard rumors that a young child had been shot nearby.67    
They drove around for a bit, guns in hand, trying to find where the boy had been 
shot and by whom. Waller and Nichols had gotten into the habit of carrying guns with 
them.68 Nichols explained: 
On the north side there was a brick-throwing incident wherein a white man pulled a 
gun on me and this started me to getting ready to carry mine, but I didn’t report it 
to the police. Another one of my friends had a gun pulled on him on Wheeler 
where I witnessed it. Also on the north side, another man poked his gun [out of his 
truck] window. I later sawed off my shotgun and started carrying it. All this was after 
these guns were pulled on us.69 
Nichols had kept this gun with him on the night he and Franklin stayed at the Batese 
residence to protect the family there. It provided some sense of security, given the uptick in 
Klan attacks on black Houstonians and the inability or unwillingness of the Houston Police 
Department and Harris County Sherriff’s Office to provide adequate protection to black 
407 
 
 
people. It may have been his best option to carry his own firearm, but it also increased the 
risk of his arrest on firearm charges if he were stopped by police. Perhaps thirty minutes 
later, the group decided to return to campus, with Nichols and Waller taking a pit stop to 
purchase a gallon of wine. While they sat in a car in the TSU parking lot drinking, a female 
UH student, probably named Paula, came by and talked to them about another set of 
arrests that had happened in Sunnyside and plans for a meeting at Riverbrook Missionary 
Baptist Church in that neighborhood. The intoxicated group got back into their vehicle to 
travel southward, stopping at Worthing High School to speak to a crowd there before 
heading to the church.70 
Earlier that day on the south side of town, residents of rurban Sunnyside had been 
protesting the Holmes Road Dump, accompanied by student members of the University of 
Houston’s Committee on Better Race Relations (COBRR), Friends of SNCC members from 
TSU, and junior and senior high school students. It had already proven an environmental 
hazard, bludgeoning the community with persistent problems of “foul odors, smoke, rats, 
roaches and filth.” UH’s Daily Cougar noted that the dump was “located near schools, homes 
and a park in a predominately Negro area.” Earlier in the morning, a young black child, 
Victor George, drowned at the Dump, the last straw for residents who felt that their 
requests to shutter the Dump had gone neglected for too long.71 
Prior to the protest, Bill Lawson, now an emboldened activist, informed students 
joining in the protest that Sunnyside residents needed their support, because “what is 
happening to Negroes in Sunnyside can happen to Negroes anywhere.” Gene Locke, 
chairman of COBRR, joined Lawson at the protest, despite being warned that police would 
likely arrest everyone present. This turned out to be a fair warning. Locke reported that 
officers “snatched” him up and “forcefully manhandled” him “into a police car.” Officers 
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moved him and others to jail without telling them what crime they had been charged with. 
Only later did each arrestee learn that officers decided to charge them with “loitering” and 
that they each had to pay a twenty-five dollar bond for release. Participants told Kirkpatrick 
that “belligerent” white onlookers antagonized them as police gathered them for arrest, but 
none of them had been charged with loitering.72 
Around 6:30, after he arrived back on campus from jail, Franklin learned about the 
arrests at the Holmes Road Dump. He and Paula, from UH, figured that the arrestees were 
still in the city jail. The two ventured back downtown only to find that the protesters had 
been released. Back at TSU, they learned that organizers and protesters had reconvened for 
a meeting at a church in Sunnyside. He and Paula split ways. Back at the campus coffee 
house, Franklin attempted to find someone to chauffeur him to the church, but failed. He 
walked to the Dairy Cup nearby and noticed a “SNCC sister… named Thelda” in her car. 
She agreed to drive him to Sunnyside, where they found Waller, Nichols, Paula from UH, 
and Charles Freeman among others at the church. Lawson, however, was missing—among 
the arrestees who had not yet been released from jail. The meeting at the church had 
already ended and Waller and Nichols were still tipsy from their wine. Nichols had made an 
impassioned speech to the church crowd, admonishing them “to protect themselves with 
arms because they don’t know who might be shooting at them next.” After their speeches, 
the group had planned to go back to campus, so Franklin joined them on their ride back 
north. Nichols remained agitated through the trip. He kept his sawed-off shotgun nearby 
and “he was saying that he was going to kill a honkey tonight.” Franklin asked him to put the 
gun away, warning him that the police already had a target trained on his back.73 
Meanwhile, on campus, O. C. Brown, a student nicknamed Swahili, and another 
named Stanley Wright, among other activists, including Booker T. Bonner, managed to get a 
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ride back to the north side of town and stopped, probably around 7:30 in the evening, for 
food and planning at Mrs. Thompson’s. F. D. Kirkpatrick, Floyd Nichols, Lee Otis Johnson, 
and several other TSU students were there as well. While eating, the students heard 
gunshots. They went outside and Brown saw “these little kids, they were running, and some 
Klans were shooting on the other side of this park and so myself and a few more of the 
guys, I forget their names, I know them when I see them, we went out there so they fired a 
shot at us at the same time.” One man with Brown’s group pulled his own firearm and shot 
back at the Klansmen, who ducked between bushes until the police arrived. Mrs. Thompson 
had called the police to the scene, but they only took unsigned statements from Thompson 
and her guests. At Mrs. Thompson’s request, several of the TSU students agreed to stay 
with her through the night in order to protect her home against any “night riders” who 
might come by to terrorize her family. Other families of suspended students, including a 
Mrs. Virgie Eaton, also had TSU students stay with them for overnight protection. Eaton, 
unmarried and caring for three children—the oldest a nine-year-old boy by the name of 
Garlin who had been suspended from Northwood—noted that she had “high regard for the 
‘guys’” of SNCC as they “lifted” her during a difficult time.74 
Back at TSU, around 9:00 that night, Waller and Nichols had since split up—Nichols 
heading to the coffeehouse and Waller joining the growing crowd of students outside of the 
Student Union. Two campus officers joined the students there, discussing the rumors and 
reports coming from the north side and Sunnyside. Two HPD vehicles were parked across 
the street near the Science Building. Trazawell Franklin was among the crowd, discussing 
with campus police about his “experience in jail” and the treatment of black families by 
Northwood’s school administration. Unsure why a crowd was building, Nichols spoke with 
Sergeant William D. Butler, head of campus police, telling him that the students wanted 
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HPD “to move out of the way and go on because we were tired of people treating us 
wrong.” Rather than seeing police officers as protectors—even the black security forces 
hired by the University—Nichols saw them as a threat. Nearby in the coffee house, around 
9:30, an intoxicated Waller forced an altercation with an athlete named Maurice Hopson. 
Hopson and several other students were playing cards, and Waller expressed his disgust, 
demanding that they join him and other activists to plan another demonstration at 
Northwood. Like most students, Hopson did not see his interests as tied to those of black 
Houstonias’ struggles elsewhere in the city. Hopson told Waller “he did not have to fool 
with him and went on playing cards,” and that “the north side had nothing to do with him” 
at which point Waller “slapped him.” Hopson represented that contingency of black folks 
who did not agree with SNCC’s black nationalist vision, wherein the destinies of all black 
people were tied together. However, the full extent of his racial identity politics remain 
unknown. Hopson stood to retaliate, but Waller may have brandished one of three guns he 
had taken from the Thompson residence—guns others had left behind prior to the protest 
at Northwood—prompting Hopson’s friends to take him away from the coffee house and 
back to Jones Hall, the athletic dormitory. Waller left the building and joined the growing 
crowds of student outside of the Student Union.75 
The white press’s accounts of what happened next—the infamous “TSU riot”—
were chronologically confounded and initially relied wholly on police statements and 
accounts of news personnel who arrived on the scene later. According to these stories, at 
7:00 that evening, four officers of HPD’s Criminal Intelligence Division (CID), including 
white officers Robert G. Blaylock, James O. Norris, and black officers Albert L. Blair and 
Charles F. Howard, made their way to campus to keep track of any developments there. 
They observed about fifty students “milling around” in front of the Student Union at 8:15. 
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Two hours later, the crowd had tripled in size. A group of five students—John Parker, 
Trazawell Franklin, Douglas Wayne Waller, Floyd Nichols, and Charles Freeman—
“approached the crowd stating: ‘They killed a six-year-old child out near the Scenic Wood 
school [Northwood Junior High]. What do you intend to do about it?’” At 10:15, Waller 
threw a watermelon at Blaylock and Norris’s police vehicle. Newspapers eventually 
reprinted the rumor that it was a watermelon rind, though Norris’s initial description stated 
that an entire watermelon had “burst on the hood” of his car. Blaylock and Norris then 
arrested Waller, found three guns on him, and had a unit pick him up from Jeppesen 
Stadium at Wheeler Avenue and Scott Street. Around 10:40, when the arresting officers 
returned to campus and parked their car across from the Student Union, students began 
throwing projectiles—rocks, bricks, and bottles—at the officer’s cars. At 10:50, the four 
officers turned their two vehicles southward, so that their headlights would “illuminate” the 
front of the Student Center. Around 11:00, student “snipers” began firing from the Junior-
Senior Men’s dormitory and thirty minutes later a bullet from the second floor of the 
building injured Blaylock in the leg. At 11:35, “reinforcements” arrived, and officers 
continued to exchange intermittent gunshots with the snipers, judiciously firing only when 
they saw muzzles light up from the dormitory. Two hours later, at the request of 
Kirkpatrick and Lawson, the officers withdrew their vehicles from Wheeler Avenue and 
parked on Tierwester, to allow the two ministers to try to negotiate with students. The 
student snipers shot at Lawson as other students threw construction material into the 
street and set “asphalt barrels” filled with tar from a nearby construction site on fire. In 
response, Police Chief Herman Short ordered his offers to evacuate the men’s dorms on 
campus. As officers approached the dorms, they heard students destroying their own 
property inside. At 2:20 in the morning, student snipers wounded Officer Allen Dale 
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Dugger’s jaw and shot Officer Louis Kuba in the head. By 3:05, the officers restored law and 
order to the campus, and five hours later a doctor pronounced Kuba dead.76 This was the 
official story.77 
Student accounts, not widely publicized, painted a wholly different picture. Chester 
Logan, an undergraduate who did not live on campus but was present that evening, 
remembered the incident involving Douglass Waller and did not recall a watermelon—
indeed, none of the firsthand student accounts testified even the presence of a watermelon. 
The watermelon rumor seemed to be Blaylock’s idea of a racist joke that became canonized 
as fact in media reports. Instead, Logan recalled, as did other students, the altercation 
between Waller and Hopson in the coffee shop around 9:30. After Waller left the coffee 
house, Logan followed outside. Trazawell Franklin was talking to campus police officers and 
other students were becoming agitated at the presence of the two Houston Police 
Department vehicles. Finals season was upon the campus, and as at many schools, students 
at TSU had been gathering, leading up to the end of the semester to enjoy themselves and 
each other’s company, in what they called “The Pit” in front of the Student Union. This 
typical undergraduate activity, then, padded the number of students who were at the 
Student Union to discuss activism or express their disdain for the police. Professor Leon 
Hardy, who witnessed the events of the night from the beginning, testified, indeed, “that 
many, in fact most were there just for the excitement,” and continued, “Crowds like that 
are usual in front of the Union Building.” Charles Freeman estimated that nearly two 
hundred students were “in the area at the time.” Nearby, an intoxicated Nichols was 
passing a gun to another student when he released a shot into the ground. A student named 
Larry Johnson yelled, “Preacher, you almost shot my foot off.” Around 10:30 and 
interrupting his drunk friend, a student named David Minor grabbed Nichols and told him 
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that Kirkpatrick was waiting for him at the Thompson residence, at which point Minor 
drove Nichols off campus.78 
Sergeant Butler had started his night shift at 10:00 that evening. He noticed a crowd 
in front of the Student Union upon his arrival, and joined their numbers. He remembered 
that students had been discussing the arrests and unfair treatment of students at 
Northwood Junior High. While students became irate listening to these stories, he recalled 
that Waller came out of this coffee house and began spreading the rumor that a black child 
had been shot at on the north side of town, saying “someone would have to pay [for] it.” 
Hopson and several other athletes arrived—perhaps thirty of them, Logan estimated—from 
the athletic dormitory to the front of the Student Union where Waller was, ready to 
retaliate for Waller’s earlier attack. Waller “fired one shot and… dispersed the crowd,” 
though most students did not go very far and many quickly came back to the scene. Campus 
security guards and officers Blair and Howard speedily intervened and took Waller’s gun. 
Blaylock and Norris remained in their car for ten minutes while campus security argued 
with Waller. Some students in the crowd became frustrated with the rising tension, and 
Butler reported that some in the crowd “started throwing bottles and bricks into the street 
at cars.” Blair and Howard attempted to quell the students but failed. Waller, annoyed by 
the police’s presence, demanded that the cops tell him why they had parked on Wheeler, 
and Officers Blair and Howard “immediately ordered him to move on.” Waller refused, and 
Trazawell Franklin caught sight of Officer Blaylock “jump out” of his police vehicle and 
“cock his… gun.” The show of aggression angered observing students. The black officers 
stopped arguing with Waller, arrested him, and placed him in the back of their car. While 
detained, Waller asked to speak to the campus police, but Blair and Howard refused the 
request and assured him they could be trusted. At some point during the detainment, the 
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officers either found Waller’s two other guns or he turned them over. He later told officers 
that he had intended to distribute the guns to other students for self-protection, given the 
recent spate of violence against black people around Houston. At least one of the guns had 
recently been used in a robbery, which officers later charged Waller with. Shortly 
thereafter, Blaylock and Norris left campus with the prisoner and drove about three blocks 
east, where a police wagon picked up Waller and drove him downtown. Around 10:30, the 
white officers returned to their parking spot in front of the Science Building, across from 
the Student Union. Students responded by tossing rocks and bottles at the police vehicles. 
About this same time, Chester Logan said he began hearing gunshots. These, he guessed, 
had come from police officers, since some bullets were hitting the men’s dormitories. 
Undergraduate Willie Robinson witnessed the shootings first hand, saying that at this time 
only the police had been shooting, targeting the bottles that students had thrown on the 
ground and apparently also targeting those that were still flying in the air. The officers 
ducked behind their cars and called in reinforcements.79 
At least one student threw a firecracker onto Wheeler Avenue, according to 
Officer Williams, who, along with Sergeant Butler, had begun turning traffic around from 
traveling down the street, enduring student taunts that they were “nigger honkies” doing 
the bidding of their oppressors. Throughout the early part of the night, in fact, many 
students assumed that intermittent gunshots they had heard were firecrackers, “because 
there are a lot of pranks going around—always shooting fireworks.” For this reason, 
sophomore V. J. Hollins said he did not pay the noisy events of the night “too much 
attention.”80  
Thomas Turner, a third-floor occupant of the Junior-Senior dorm, noticed the 
crowd outside at 9:30 on his return from the library. “I could sense that something was 
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wrong,” he said, so my roommate and I stayed in our room, [but] went out on the veranda 
to see what was going on at different intervals.” About that time, Hollins remembered that 
“the street was just filled with… people just throwing bottles and bricks at passing cars,” 
and after another firecracker landed in the street, “one of the officers… started shooting.” 
At least one student in the Junior-Senior dorm responded by “shooting back,” the first 
volley of gunshots between officers and students that Hollins recalled. Between 10:30 and 
11:30, a bullet struck Blaylock, which one student retrospectively found ironic: “Oddly 
enough, the first police officer wounded in the melee was the same officer who was 
instrumental in provoking the entire incident” by aggressively brandishing his gun at 
Waller.81 
Down on the ground below, Trazawell Franklin joined other students who threw 
projectiles at street lights in order to reduce the police officers’ visibility. Other students 
threw a few poorly manufactured Molotov cocktails—small canisters of flaming gasoline—
on the street, while officers and students on the Junior-Senior dorm balcony exchanged 
intermittent gunfire. Richard Hurndon’s testimony mirrored those of other students, though 
with a few additional details. After Waller’s arrest, he noted that the two cops who had 
taken him returned, wielding their guns. Shortly after 10:30, four other officers arrived on 
the scene in unmarked cars. These cops parked their vehicles in the construction lot near 
the Student Union. Students continued to rock the officers’ cars with bottles and bricks and 
these four new arrivals responded by firing their guns.82 
Despite these confrontations, however, the campus was not in turmoil and the 
police were not confronting a riot. Throughout the early night, students uninvolved in the 
protests had been able to make their way through and across the campus. William Glaze 
returned to campus, probably just before 10:30 from an errand. He and his roommate 
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noticed “a group of students assembled in front of the Student Union Building.” He noted 
that “there seemed to be confusion,” so the two young men joined the crowd, seeking to 
learn what was happening. He too remembered that campus police were also standing 
around with the students. Then, at some point, probably close to 11:00, Glaze reported that 
he started hearing intermittent gunshots. Disturbed, he and his roommate vacated the 
Union and turned in at Lanier Hall for Men. They found their dorm matron, Mrs. Mattie 
Harbert, who told them “the best thing to do would be to go to our room and stay inside.” 
They followed her advice, and attempted to go to sleep, but “heard gunshots all through the 
night.” Finally, around 12:30 in the morning, or perhaps closer to 1:00, “we finally went to 
sleep.”83 
Many students had gone back into their dorm rooms around 10:00 when police 
officers first started shooting. Turner and his roommate were among this crowd and had 
turned in for the night. James Young, an undergraduate resident in the Junior-Senior dorm, 
left the campus library around 11:00 that night. As he crossed Wheeler Avenue, he noticed 
some youths gathered in front of the Student Union. An officer was standing in front of the 
students. Young thought nothing of it, “because 60 kids on the front is a usual occurrence 
these days.” He went to his second-floor dorm room, occasionally hearing a few rocks 
crash or bottles burst as he prepared for bed. However, “as the night grew longer” Turner 
and the residents of the Junior-Senior dorm continued hearing gunshots, and by 11:30, the 
gunfire was coming so rapidly and so often that the two young men moved to the 
bathroom. They stayed there until about 11:40, but had to vacate their beds again around 
midnight when the gunshots intensified again.84 
Likewise, Robert Allison Leroy Lewis Jr., an undergraduate and suitemate of 
Clarence Harper, remembered seeing police officers on Wheeler Street observing “some 
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fellows” who had gathered in front of and around the Student Union. “I don’t know what 
happened,” he testified, “but what I saw [sic] some fellows were shooting at the car parked 
in the street, shooting out the lights of the police car, and then, well, this continued for 
quite a while.” The first shot in this round was fired around 11:30, Young recalled. Initially, 
he said, these unidentified fellows were “throwing bottles and bricks at the policemen” and 
at some unspecified point in the interaction “the police shot a series of shots.” He claimed 
that as he peeked out of his dormitory door a bullet crashed through his window and flew 
“a couple of feets” near his head. Harper remembered the sequence of events about the 
same, adding that “the fellows started running” as police fired onto the campus. He and 
Lewis fled into their room, deciding that the bullet through their window was too close for 
comfort.85 
Carlyn Robbin, a resident in Lanier Hall for Men, had been studying for about two 
hours until he went to a friend’s room on the second floor to watch the television series 
“Have Gun—Will Travel” at 10:00. When the show went off, he and his friends watched an 
episode of “The Untouchables.” Hearing intermittent gunshots throughout, though, he said, 
“It had not bothered me,” suggesting that campus was not consumed by a riot but perhaps 
also indicating something about the frequency of gunfire or things that sounded like gunfire 
in the area in recent weeks. Afterwards, he visited another friend’s room where he played 
cards for about thirty minutes. At midnight, he and his friend went to shower, likely in the 
shared second-floor restroom. After about twenty minutes of bathing, Robbin returned to 
his room and went to bed, joining two of his three roommates. As the hour got closer to 
2:00 in the morning, “the shooting seemed to increase.” One roommate, on a top bunk, 
said he was “getting scared,” so he left the room and went to the dormitory basement. 
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Robbin and his other roommate stayed, although he admitted they too had “started to get 
scared.”86 
These students in the dorms did not know that the increasing calm they testified 
about after midnight and before the final barrage of bullets began had resulted from the 
efforts of F. D. Kirkpatrick, Earl Allen, Bill Lawson, and Robert J. Moody, all ministers whom 
student activists knew well. Lawson had only been released from jail at about 1:00 that 
morning. Chief Short had been keeping Mayor Welch abreast of the situation, and when the 
student resistance failed to quiet down, Blair Justice, a criminologist from Rice University 
and one of Welch’s advisers, convinced the mayor that it would be prudent to have adult 
leaders that the students would respect on the scene. The four ministers came to mind, but 
Lawson was still in jail and Kirkpatrick’s whereabouts were unknown. Justice called Samuel 
L. Price, the head of Houston Action for Youth and deputy director of personnel for the 
HCCAA. 87  
Price got in touch with Kirkpatrick who was with Allen at the Thompson residence. 
Kirkpatrick had already received two frantic calls from campus reporting that there was 
trouble afoot at TSU. The second call was more anxious than the first, with a young woman 
on the other end of the phone saying “that the cops was over there shooting at the 
students in the dormitory.” Believing the woman was pranking them, the folks at Mrs. 
Thompson’s turned on the radio, “and we heard they was really shooting over there.” 
Kirkpatrick left, making his way back to campus, as Mrs. Thompson and her guests listened 
to radio announcers attempt to relate the details from the scene correctly, though they 
frequently failed to do that. Meanwhile, on Eastex Freeway, officers had stopped and 
arrested Lee Otis Johnson, who had left Mrs. Thompson’s house earlier in the evening to 
take a lady friend home, and arrested him for “inciting a riot” at TSU. Floyd Nichols stayed 
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at Mrs. Thompson’s house that night, while O. C. Brown, a student named Larry from 
Northwood Junior High, and a TSU student named Carol spent the night at a Miss Spivey’s 
residence. They stayed up through most of the night, keeping abreast of the situation on 
campus by listening to the radio.88   
Meanwhile, Justice went to the city jail to procure Lawson, and rushed the minister 
“to campus in a squad car.” Allen and Kirkpatrick arrived on the eastern edge of the 
campus, at Ennis Street and Wheeler Avenue, but “could not get on the campus proper 
because the street was barricaded by police officers.” The ministers tried to convince police 
officers to let them through the barricades so they could try to speak with the students, but 
the officers refused the request unless they could “get word from a higher official.” The 
ministers made their way around to the western side of campus, where Justice and Lawson 
had abandoned the squad car because it could not get through the “scores of squad cars 
and hundreds of riot-helmeted policemen.”89 
There, at Justice’s request, the ministers convinced the chief to de-escalate the 
situation by removing his officers from Wheeler Avenue. Short responded indignantly, 
saying, “You don’t tell me what to do. I know what to do.” Kirkpatrick replied, “Man, you 
don’t know what to do with Negroes. I been living with them all my life. I know what they 
want.” Short eventually agreed, moving his officers off of Wheeler Avenue and back to 
Tierwester Street. As they approached the dorms, Lawson recalled: 
Girls inside the dormitory yelled affably at Rev. Kirkpatrick. Boys in the driveway 
between the Student Union Building and the Men’s Dormitory shouted at us terms 
of brotherly acceptance. Several of the more vocal students, obviously in hopes that 
the police had gone, came to the front walk where the three of us stood. One of us 
began to report to them that the Chief seemed to be moving the officers and the 
cars.90 
Things calmed significantly enough that campus police officer W. T. Adams, who was 
scheduled to be on duty a few hours later for his work shift, left the scene with the blessing 
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of his colleagues Sergeant Butler and Officer Milton Laberier. Lawson assured the students 
that the conflict “was all over” and convinced many of them to turn in for the night. 
Kirkpatrick and Moody, then, attempted to talk to some of the students, among them 
probably Franklin Alexander, who remained agitated. Despite the calm the ministers 
brought with them, “it was obvious to them and to us,” Lawson stated, “that they [the 
officers] were not leaving the vicinity, only the front of the dormitory.” The students’ 
simplified demand for the night was for Short to close off Wheeler Avenue to traffic, which 
he said was not in his power to do. The chief refused to call the mayor for permission to 
close the street, as well. The students, frustrated, decided to close the street themselves, 
yelling, “Let’s light up the street,” throwing construction material in the street, and rolling a 
barrel of tar into the thoroughfare, setting it on fire with gunshots.91  
Perhaps believing that students were again shooting at officers, or maybe just 
frustrated with what must have appeared to be insubordination on the part of the students 
to him, Chief Short ordered officers: “Goddamn it, clean this place up!” Lawson observed as 
“[a]lready anxious police forces, either assuming that the shots were aimed at them, or 
needing an excuse to attack, prepared to besiege the area.” Then, in a boisterous approach, 
“[h]undreds of police began pouring thousands of rounds of rifle, pistol, submachine-gun, 
and riot-gun fire into the dormitories.” During the police assault, a police officer’s 
indiscriminately fired bullet ricocheted off a surface and killed Officer Louis Raymond Kuba, 
who suffered a fatal “gunshot wound of the head.”92 Lawson, finding himself abandoned by 
the other ministers and bewildered by Short’s sudden directive in what he felt was a de-
escalating situation, described the scene on Wheeler Avenue:  
In a split second of panic one sees many things—the empty street (Wheeler) is cold 
and shelterless and the officers are young, inexperienced, and excited. Inside the 
dormitories, hundreds of students were unaware of the danger they faced. A few, 
whom no one could locate, were armed, angry, and well-entrenched. Across the 
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street, a massive parking lot, vacated of the day’s load of traffic and affording no 
barricades was filled with the rush of many feet and the sounds of hundreds of 
police officers being sent unshielded into a potentially dangerous target area—their 
one alternative was to approach the crowded dormitories at high gallop and 
shooting as they ran. Hundreds of high-powered ammunitions belched forth from 
over 600 guns in volley as the police swiss-cheesed the fronts of both dormitories. 
Scattered shots from inside the dormitories came back. The officers flitted and zig-
zagged in erratic and undisciplined patterns. One officer was shot by a fellow 
policemen. Seeing themselves in a ridiculously unshielded position they dashed to 
cover under the dormitory. Bullets ricocheted wildly off walls and trees. One young 
officer spurted blood from the forehead as a heavy gauge bullet from somewhere 
pierced his face between the eyes. It may never be known whether the bullet was a 
buddy’s or his own. A rookie companion went berserk, firing his riot gun aimlessly, 
crying like a child, and being carried away by the medics in a state of shock. The face 
of Chief Short was a mask of confusion as he watched his men attempting to carry 
out an ill-conceived assignment to attack a dormitory of adolescents like a military 
bastion.93 
As the bullets poured into the dormitories, an officer grabbed Lawson, placed him in a 
squad car, and rushed him to City Hall. There, he and Kirkpatrick were escorted to Chief 
Short’s office, where Welch, a “covey of reporters,” and the chief himself were attempting 
to understand—or concoct a narrative about—the violence that was still unfolding on the 
campus.94 
 Short’s absence probably exacerbated the undisciplined nature of the assault on the 
dorms, which could have been much bloodier than it was. For instance, at one point, as 
officers emptied the Junior-Senior dorm of its residents, an officer asked a student how to 
access the roof of the building. V. J. Hollins remembered that this officer made it to the 
roof, and the over-zealous cops below, unaware that the man on the roof was one of their 
own, “started firing at him.”95 
Sometime after the bullets stopped flying, close to 1:00, Alvin Johnson peered out of 
his window to see a group of heavily armed police officers converging on his building from 
around the corner of the Student Union building on its Wheeler Avenue side. Students 
yelled down the balcony, trying to inform others that the police were coming, that they 
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were armed, and that if anyone had been shooting from the building earlier they should not 
try a reprise. One student asked others to leave their rooms to show the officers that they 
were not armed, but when they exited their rooms “the police started shooting again.” 
Johnson ducked back into his room, but he wasn’t safe. “About that time about eleven shots 
were fired in our room,” he testified. “Bullets ricocheting off walls, so we ran into the 
bathroom. Upon doing this, bullets came through the study area window into the bathroom, 
so we just laid on the floor. About 15 or 20 minutes later the police started storming into 
the dorms. We had heard them coming up the steps, so we immediately began to dress. 
After we had dressed, they came in, kicked open the door and ordered us out.”96 
Likewise according to Leroy Lewis, in the early morning hours of May 17th, as police 
barraged Lanier Hall and the Junior Senior dorm with indiscriminately fired bullets, he 
jerked out of sleep and he and Clarence Harper fled to their bathroom, where they 
remained for “about an hour”—the only place that seemed safe from the projectiles. 
Howard Williams saw the assault coming from his perch in Jones Hall. Officers moved in the 
hundreds, stalking Lanier Hall for Men and the Junior-Senior dorm from the west by 
crossing the track field, and from the east by marching along paths leading from Lanier Hall 
for Women to the men’s dormitories. Student David Harrington, resident of Lanier Hall for 
Men, reported officers shooting from across Wheeler Avenue where the Science Hall 
stood. Harrington learned that his brother had been shot in the Junior-Senior dorm, and 
attempted to escape Lanier Hall through a window, since the onslaught made it impossible 
to get to the front exit of the dormitory. While climbing out, he was also shot. He ran to a 
friend, who took him downstairs in Lanier Hall to Mrs. Harbert. The dorm matron 
attempted to call a nurse, but before she could, she and the students dove to the floor in 
order to avoid a new bombardment of bullets pouring into the building. When police came 
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in and saw Harrington’s wound, the student asked to see a doctor, but the officer instead 
stomped on his arm, “right where the wound was,” and told him, “You’re probably one of 
those niggers that shot the policeman.”97 
Many other students reported similar stories: intermittent gunfire early in the night, 
followed by quiet and calm around 1:00, that calm interrupted by rapid, indiscriminate fire 
around 2:00, culminating with a police riot in the men’s dormitories. One undergraduate 
resident of the Junior-Senior dorm, Gerald Barnes, arrived on campus around 12:30 in the 
morning. He had taken a cab to the Continental Bowling Lane at the corner of Scott Street 
and Cleburne Street, about three-tenths of a mile east of TSU’s edge. Walking west toward 
campus for about three minutes, Barnes met a police barricade at the intersection of 
Canfield and Cleburne streets. An officer asked for his identification and his destination. 
Barnes identified himself as a student, although his only proof was his “TSU mealbook.” 
After verifying that the young man was a student and on his way to his dormitory, the 
officer advised Barnes: “I wouldn’t advise you to go in because an officer just got shot.” 
Without any place else to go and with the officer advising him not to try to sleep outside in 
a car, the student continued his walk toward campus, stopping at a friend’s apartment on 
the way to see if he could stay the night. Unfortunately, the friend’s place was already 
packed. Barnes finally made it to the dorm, then, shortly after 12:30.98  
His roommate, Sidney Goode, had also recently arrived from a shift at Hermann 
Hospital. The two remained oblivious as to the events that had transpired. Between the 
time of their arrival and the time they went to sleep—about forty-five minutes later 
following Barnes’s shower—they “heard some shooting,” but not enough to frighten them. 
Barnes went to bed and the next thing he remembered was hearing officers at his door 
commanding him to “get up.” Assuming students were playing pranks, he stayed in bed for 
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another five minutes until he heard more beating on his door and an order to open it. 
“When I opened the door,” he recalled, “here was a white fellow with a gun in his hand, 
police officer, shaking like a leaf on a tree with a .45 in his hand—nickel-plated, telling me to 
get back.” This lone officer appeared wholly unprepared, and frightened. Goode had been 
asleep throughout the ordeal, until Barnes told him to wake up.99  
The officer then noticed a locker in the room and said, “Open the locker up and get 
that gun out.” Barnes replied, “I don’t have any gun in that locker.” And besides, Barnes 
continued, “I can’t. I don’t have the key.” The officer inquired about the key’s location and 
the young man told him that it was in the pillow. The shaking cop commanded him to grab 
the key, but Barnes refused, “No, you get it man, because you’re scared; you want to shoot 
somebody.” The officer replied, “You know something, boy, you’re smart.” The officer 
found the key and then commanded Barnes again to open the locker. Barnes remained still, 
“No, I’m not going to open it because you’re scared; you want to shoot somebody, you 
open it.” The anxious officer struggled to open the locker and failed, saying he couldn’t open 
it. Barnes replied, “You know what, you got a problem; that’s your business.” Again, the 
officer replied, “You’re a smart nigger,” before commanding him to go outside. Barnes 
walked out onto the third-floor balcony, and when the officer gestured to search him, 
Barnes replied that there was no need to since he was in pajamas. The young man defiantly 
removed his shirt and tossed it back into the bedroom, prompting the officer, who probably 
felt disrespected, to yell to a fellow downstairs that Barnes was “a smart nigger—the tall 
one.” The officer sent Barnes down on the south side of the Junior-Senior dorm to his 
waiting partner who attacked the student’s leg with a nightstick. There, Barnes also saw 
police forcing students from Jones Hall, the athletic dormitory.100  
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One of them was James “Jimmy” Burroughs, a white swimmer from Detroit. Barnes 
observed Burroughs get “kneed in the groin and hit in the side” by police. While in jail, 
officers asked Burroughs “was he a half-breed or something… because he was with us 
Negroes.” Though the officers interrogated all of the students with disgust, according to 
student Shelton Dotson, they seemed to find Burroughs especially repugnant. The 
University’s investigative committee noted that Burroughs “was beaten extensively by the 
police because he is a ‘white’ student.” Another athlete, football player McNorris, had been 
forced from his room without crutches, hopping as he was forced out of the dorm, hoping 
not to further injure his broken leg. He remembered that officers made him lie on the 
ground between the two dorms in a crowd of students who were mostly dressed in their 
night clothes. Over in Lanier Hall, officers threw Charles Criner and his roommate out of 
their room. They stumbled haphazardly down the hallway, lined on both sides by police 
officers on one side of the walkway. Dogs nipped at them as police officers hit them in the 
back, “kinda like an initiation or something.” Criner did his best to avoid the blows, but was 
more concerned about the glass that littered the floor under his shoeless feet.101 
Eventually, police directed Barnes and the other students laying between Jones Hall 
and the Junior Senior dormitory to join the rest of the prostrate students in front of Lanier 
Hall. Barnes witnessed more police beatings, and the mistreatment of Mrs. Harbert, who 
had been commanded to “lie down like everyone else,” after which police “walked up and 
down her back,” as they had done to students throughout the night. Barbee noted that 
officers were “actually stepping on [students’] heads and arms.” “They knew that they were 
stepping on them,” he testified, “but they just kept on.” Barnes noticed at least one officer 
allowing his canine to bite students. When one student tried to step out of line to get away 
from the dog, another officer commanded him to return. The student complained about the 
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dog biting him, and finally Barnes saw his first hint of professionalism: the officer 
commanded the cop with the dog to restrain the animal.102 
Hayward McKursson had a similar testimony. He made it back onto campus around 
1:00, walking directly to his room on the first floor of the Junior-Senior dorm. Before he 
made it inside, “the police put a spotlight” on him and commanded him to get in the 
building. Then, without warning, the police “opened up and started shooting” toward the 
moving target. Dodging the projectiles, McKursson scurried up to the second-floor TV 
room. Police continued shooting up the building, he said, until they began their final march 
toward the dorm. When they entered the TV room, they told McKursson to put his hands 
up and then one of them “promptly hit [McKursson] across the back with his shotgun and 
said, ‘Can’t you move any faster, nigger?’”103 
Robert Lewis had fallen to sleep in his bed after the noise had quieted down around 
that 1:00 hour. But no sooner than he had fully drifted off that he began hearing “shotgun 
shots, machine guns, and people hollering, girls screaming, and about that time I heard 
somebody kick on the door and say, “All you black mother-fuckers come out here or I’ll 
blow your damn head off.” The roommates remembered the officers using the demeaning 
language without provocation, calling them “niggers,” “sons-of-bitches,” “mother-fuckers,” 
and “damn niggers.” Lewis, disoriented, recalled police kicking in the door before six police 
officers stormed into the room and ordered the students in the room to stay still or he 
would immediately kill them. Lewis gestured to put on his pants and an officer aimed at him 
with a gun. After searching the closet for any hiding residents, the officers ordered the 
nearly naked men out of their room, “beating us all on the butts” with their nightsticks. “It’s 
fortunate I didn’t get hit on the head,” Lewis noted. Looking for a reason to shed more 
blood, the officers attempted to goad Lewis into “provoking” them to fire: “And they kept 
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saying run nigger run but I never did run.” Like other students, Lewis was marched out of 
the door, and forced to lay on the dewy ground in front of Lanier Hall, while officers 
continued to ravage the dorms with axes. He remembered being told that if students talked 
the officers threatened “they would blow your damn head off.”104  
James Young had been forced to lay down in the middle of the growing carpet of 
student bodies in front of Lanier Hall for Men, and was thereby insulated from the snarling 
police dogs, flying nightsticks, and thrusting shotgun butts. The slightest infraction provoked 
the police to attack the students as they laid vulnerably on the ground—a head raised too 
far off the ground or even a question. An officer told John Booker, “Eat dirt nigger,” when 
he saw the student’s head raised off the ground. The cop “came by and hit me on the head 
with the nightstick,” Booker recalled. “So, I just ate dirt.” Clarence Hall remembered how 
often he and the other students moved their hands in order to scratch themselves, saying, 
“You couldn’t help but scratch because different stuff was crawling on you, with bugs and 
things you couldn’t help but scratch.” The officers responded by addressing them as 
“niggers,” commanding them to keep their hands on their heads, and reinforcing their 
orders with kicks. Once outside, Oscar McNair, also an undergraduate, saw dogs biting “a 
number of people” before he was forced to the ground. “When an investigator asked Lewis 
if the officers came to the dorms “peacefully,” Lewis responded: “Well, it’s according to 
how you define peacefully; if there’s peace in hell, well I would say so.” V. J. Hollins 
expressed the same sentiment, saying of the police that, “They acted like savages.” 105  
Lewis and Harper did not have much in the way of valuable possessions in their 
room, but their room was in shambles when they returned from jail the next evening. They 
found clothes strewn across the floor and a broken tape recorder thrown from the closet, 
and noted $72 stolen from Harper’s pants pocket. James Young’s roommate also reported 
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that officers had stolen his money. Officers also absconded with the $70 V. J. Hollins had 
saved for summer school through his work-study job. In the athletic dormitory, officers 
stole cash from several of the men there, including $152 from Howard Williams, $127 from 
Ivory Black, and $200 from an unnamed student. Barnes remembered that police officers 
had “smashed” a Remington typewriter and reported that some people found that officers 
had ruined their clothes with “ink and bleach.” Fortunately, Leroy Lewis’s musical 
instruments—he and Harper were band members of the TSU Toronadoes—had been 
spared. Some officers, it appeared, had tried to restore a sense of professionalism through 
the officers’ search for weapons in the student rooms. At least one officer vocally objected 
to his fellow officers’ vandalism. On the ground level of the Junior-Senior dorm, the 
unnamed cop yelled at one of his colleagues who was up on the second or third floor, 
knocking out dorm room windows with a trash can. He told him, “We didn’t come up here 
to tear up these kids’ stuff; we came here to break this mess up.” The other officer, 
however, continued the destruction until the objecting one climbed the stairs and took the 
garbage can from his hand, tossing it to the ground below.106 
Madison Tyler said police entered his dorm room on the third floor of the Junior-
Senior dorm around 2:30 that morning, commanding the occupants: “Come out, niggers.” 
He and nine other students had holed up in his room during the police bombardment. 
While being removed from his room, other than the racial epithet, Tyler said he was not 
assaulted by the officers. However, he did suffer a brutal attack outside. He and his fellow 
occupants had been commanded to stand on the third floor balcony until the officers had 
cleared out the other rooms. While waiting for further commands, Tyler heard an officer 
on the ground say, “Hey you, nigger, up there.” The student looked down and then turned. 
The officer continued, “I’m talking to you.” Tyler responded, “I’m no nigger, me.” The 
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officer replied, “You’re one of those smart niggers.” Tyler, insisted on being respected, 
saying, “I’ll tell you again, I’m no nigger.” The officer then assured the young man: “I’m going 
to remember you; when you come down here I got something for you.” When Tyler finally 
made his way down to the ground floor he said he “never saw it coming”: “I got hit, and 
when I woke up again I was on the ground with blood all over my face.” Alvin Johnson did 
see it coming, noting that after Tyler had been knocked unconscious by the blow, officers 
turned him over and told him to put his hand over his head. Likely suffering a concussion, 
Tyler could not respond to their requests and when he tried to speak he failed. The officers 
then dragged his body out of the way of the staircase and left him there bleeding.107 
Tyler could not recall how long he had been laying on the ground—unconscious and 
then afterward. But, he remembered being placed in one cell with all of the students who 
had been injured around 3:30 in the morning—he guessed this was “the clinic.” One man 
attended to their wounds—although attended would be a generous way to describe the 
treatment. The man looked at Tyler’s head, said, “Oh, you got a cut up here, huh?” Then he 
rubbed “a little rag all around it” and moved on to the next student. Four students, he 
remembered, had stitches, and one suffered a fractured arm, requiring a visit to the 
hospital.108 
Facing such undiscerning violence at the hands of police officers, many students later 
articulated great distress at what had happened to them. They had been uninvolved in any 
protests. Many had been studying for exams. Most had probably never been in any trouble 
with law enforcement officials. Yet, they were all accused, tried, and sentenced that night by 
the police force. Undergraduate Shelton Dotson, who had slept through the entire crisis, 
felt disoriented and sick when he woke up to find a gun in his face. By the time he made it 
to the jail, he was suffering from a head injury that “was bleeding quite badly.” He remained 
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oblivious through the early morning, unaware of what he and the others had been charged 
with, but certain that they had all been transformed into criminals by the police force 
merely because of their presence in the dorms:109 
Well, I don’t know who was charged with anything, but they treated us like real 
criminals, you know, they weren’t too nice about it and used real harsh words, and 
they took our pictures like we were real prisoners, giving us numbers, took our 
profile, took our fingerprints, thumbs, index fingers, just like we was—you know—
hardened criminals.110 
The undiscerning dehumanization of all of the people in the men’s dormitories frightened 
Dotson and other students, who believed that as long as they were compliant citizens and 
good students, they had no need to fear police officers.111 As a result of the malicious police 
actions, Lawson speculated that “the hundreds of students… scattered on the floor like a 
bizarre game of pick-up sticks must also have wondered whether their lives would be ended 
by the angry men in blue whom they learned in kindergarten were children’s friends.” That 
night some students learned a new lesson: that race and space, not action, could define who 
was a threat to law and order in the eyes of police officers.112 
This was as true for black students as it was for the few white students who 
attended TSU that semester. The attack on James Burroughs was particularly brutal for the 
young swimmer, who said he was “attacked and brutally beaten by six officers of the law” 
around 2:30 in the morning as they forced him out of the athletic dormitory. The officers’ 
disdain for desegregation may have made them particularly violent toward Burroughs and 
the other white male students they found on the campus. These students’ mere presence in 
the student dormitories was an affront to white supremacy. It suggested social equality, and 
any upstanding white man would know better than to ever make such a suggestion to black 
people. Burroughs, they concluded, was a traitor and a deviant, operating outside of proper 
racial and gender norms, and the officers charged, sexual ones as well. Therefore, the white 
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students needed to be beaten back to sensibility—warned to stay in their place, as much as 
the black students needed to be contained in theirs. To cross over was to betray the white 
race. The officers, then, seemed to take particularly delight in their attempts to properly re-
socialize students like Burroughs back to whiteness, and particularly straight male whiteness, 
according to Burroughs himself:113 
The beating administered to me by these officers was definitely uncalled for. I was 
not resisting arrest. They beat me to a state of shock and fear so that I, after it was 
over, lost over 15 pounds in 3 to 4 days and was very ill for a period of not less than 
two to three weeks. The language and treatment I received on campus and in jail 
was not befitting a dog, little less a human being.  
Beating number 1: I was beaten with night sticks and pushed down cement stairs. 
Beating number 2: I was kicked in the groin and vigorously beaten with night sticks. I 
was also kicked on other parts of my body. I received most of the blows on my back 
except for being punctured in the ribs with the double barrel of a shot gun, which 
left prints for over two weeks. 
I received these blows mainly because I was White and those officers were 
prejudiced and filled with hatred. 
The incidents that took place in jail were like a horrible nightmare. I was given food 
not fit for dogs; they made slanderous statements pertaining to my character by 
telling me I was a homosexual prostitute for the race of “Nigger Athletes.” This is 
only one of their low degrading statements.114 
By existing in a black space but out of place—that is, out of the seat of white male 
supremacy—Burroughs became illegible to the white police officers so invested in 
maintaining their own place in Houston’s racial-gender hierarchy. They effectively accused 
him of two crimes—the sex trade, of course, but also of homosexuality, which was a 
criminal offense in Texas. Though they did not formally charge him in a court—they had no 
evidence and it would have been unprecedented—they passed their own judgement and 
accordingly meted out their own punishment against Burroughs. 
 Another white student who preferred to remain anonymous, but who was living in 
the Junior-Senior dorm as an exchange student from the University of Wisconsin, described 
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similar abuses. He had been in his dorm room through the conflict and the police assault. 
He and his roommates, Burroughs and another white student named Walter P. Fontenot, 
dove to the floor when the rapid gunfire began, and once the bullets stopped and the 
officers began shouting their way through the dorms, they “crawled into the bathroom for 
protection.” The two officers who found the hiding young students “came in with raised 
shotguns, shocked (at the fact that we were white) and stated, “Well, what have we got 
here?” The student felt that “[t]heir demeanor suggested that they were obviously having 
fun.”115 
 The officers forced the student and his roommate outside, hitting them on the way 
out of the door. On the ground below, the three students, not fully clothed and cold, 
continued to suffer racialized taunting as they laid on the wet grass like the black students. 
One police officer looked over them with a flashlight and said, “Oh gee, look at the poor 
white.” When the officers finally prepared to move them into the police wagon for 
transport to jail, one “wallop[ed]” the student “on the side of [his] head with a club” causing 
him to see “stars.” At jail, like Burroughs, he suffered interrogation and accusations about 
his sexuality, referring to the black male athletes as his “associates.” One detective 
“lectured” him about the “error” of such association, while several others, the student 
recalled, “advised us that if they ever caught us on the TSU campus again, they would kill 
us.” White supremacy was so contingent on using black space to delineate black people’s 
place in the social order that even white people, when not “appropriately” placed in a black 
setting, necessarily symbolized deviance. These “scum of the earth… nigger lovers” were as 
much a threat to white supremacy as were the advocates of black power. Out-of-place 
white bodies, when confronted by police in a black space, too became subject to the 
criminal-producing machinations of an anti-black law enforcement system.116 
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 If heteronormative gender and sexual convictions placed even white men at risk in 
black spaces, police officers certainly rendered no respect to the black women they 
interacted with during the early morning hours of May 17th. As had happened the previous 
day at Northwood, the police officers particularly targeted the male students, and no female 
students reported being abused that night by police officers. But this probably had as much 
to do with the ways black, male bodies are read as “appropriate sites for public violence” as 
with the paternalistic treatment of female students on campus by administration and staff. 
Early in the night, sometime between 10:30 and 11:00, most likely, the matrons of the 
women’s dormitories had ordered all of the female students inside. From their windows, 
they watched the conflict between the male students and the police officers. When the final 
police assault began, and the bullets began raining on the men’s dormitory, the women 
became distraught. One student recalled, “The girls were all upset because of the way they 
were treating the fellows, just like they were hardened criminals.” Watching from the 
periphery, these young women witnessed the transformation of their campus into a 
makeshift penitentiary, and charged that it was a consequence of the police officers’ actions, 
and not those of the male students. As the officers charged past the women’s dorms and 
Student Union to empty the men’s residences, the agitated female students “started yelling 
at the policemen, telling them what they thought of them.” The language probably included 
profanity and racial slurs aimed at the officers. The policemen responded by returning racist 
and misogynistic slurs and shooting “three times into the first floor door” of Lanier Hall for 
Women before aiming their weapons at the girls in the second floor windows.117 
 Over in Lanier Hall for Men, shortly after 1:00, Mrs. Harbert had failed to get 
medical help for David Harrington because the bullets “zipping” into the building and 
ricocheting off of walls made it unsafe. She and several students had managed to crawl into 
434 
 
 
an interior hallway on the first floor, where they hoped the bullets wouldn’t pierce. When 
“the firing ceased,” she recalled, “the floor was flooded with lights.”118 The silhouettes of 
police officers and canines rushed forward: 
Epithets were spat at those students who laid on the floor. Those in the basement 
studying for finals were ricked across the hall, one person pushed from one flight of 
stairs to the other. One awakened with bites from police dog in his bed. We were 
called everything from “S.O.B.’s” to “God D--- Niggers,” M.F.’s, “Bitches,” Mau-Mau 
S.O.B,’s. Rifle butts and bullets were [shot] without restraint. Students were hustled 
from beds with the canine force reinforcing the police orders to get out of bed. 
Again billies and rifle butts come into action. Students were brutalized, rooms were 
vandalized. There is no possible estimate of the personal property destroyed. Then 
they hustled me out of the office, along with other students there. Made me lie 
down in the hallway and on the sidewalk during the melee, I was trampled on, I have 
since been hospitalized for back injury, and at present I am still under the care of a 
doctor with a back injury. My own personal property, which included a sewing 
machine and electronic iron, a television, a coffee urn, a linen two-piece dress, a pair 
of gloves, a bottle of cologne. I was treated very hostile. Having tried to announce 
myself to present a passkey to rooms, I was told to keep my mouth shut and get on 
the floor with the rest… having my right as a dormitory hostess or house mother 
and as a taxpaying citizen being abused.119 
Officers finally allowed Mrs. Harbert off of the ground outside the dorms around 4:00. Back 
in the dormitory, for the next three hours, she witnessed “a man in a white coverall suit 
with an instrument similar to an ax,” several police officers, and a person with a “large 
camera”—probably a news photographer—destroy the dormitory. They chopped and 
kicked down doors, despite that Mrs. Harbert had a master key for the rooms, and 
ransacked hers and the students’ possessions. Refusing to admit that they had caused any 
damage to possessions in the dormitories, the officers justified their evacuation and search 
as an effort to find a stockpile of weapons they suspected students of using—a hoard of 
firearms that they never uncovered. Instead, they found only one shotgun, two .22 caliber 
handguns, and a few wicks for Molotov cocktails. Perhaps it was gender, age, occupation, or 
something else that helped Mrs. Harbert escape arrest that early morning, but she certainly 
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remained vulnerable as the cadre of white men, armed and undisciplined, abused her 
charges and destroyed the place she called home.120 
  
hen the sun brought light to the destruction at TSU, the bullet holes, 
broken windows, and destroyed personal property could be read as 
hieroglyphs, a story of the horror that the students at TSU faced that 
night. However, by and large, white Houstonians failed to learn the sequence of events or 
the severity of the police violence. Their physical distance from TSU, their social distance 
from black Houstonians, and their reliance on a white press that manufactured informational 
distance helped to mainstream support for the police and condemnation of the students and 
campus administration. Indeed, in Houston and elsewhere, moments like the siege at TSU 
illustrated how the maintenance of racialized space was pivotal to the preservation of the 
white supremacist social order. As Jim Crow faded and the 1950s turned to the 1960s and 
1970s, darkening cities and sprawling white suburbs and exurbs partitioned the landscape of 
the United States, helping white citizens retain socioeconomic distance from black ones by 
separating the populations through the machinations of political geography. In Houston, the 
urban-suburban dichotomy was not as pronounced, but as one reporter learned, black 
Houstonians still lived apart from their white counterparts, and black neighborhoods, 
whether rural, suburban, or urban were viewed as “nigger-towns” and “foreign.” White 
Americans looked toward the black spaces they created and maintained as areas of social 
dysfunction, civil unrest, poverty, and criminality. As the 1960s stretched into the 1970s, by 
and large white Americans abandoned the War on Poverty—which Houstonians had only 
tentatively engaged to begin with—and instead embraced a War on Crime, intentionally 
designed as a war on black people.121  
W 
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 Thus, white citizens could easily buy the police and mayor’s narrative about the 
events at TSU, and police officers could continue to work for the department, unpunished 
for their actions. Liberal individualism allowed them to rationalize the racialized social 
stratification that clearly evinced a lack of equal opportunity in the city of Houston but 
which they reasoned was a consequence of black inferiority. Racial segregation provided 
them with ample distance from which to observe and critique black people and the spaces 
they occupied. The associations of race with space and crime made it obvious that the 
police and city administration were telling the truth about Kuba’s death, on which they 
blamed student snipers—as well as the stories they concocted about students wantonly 
destroying their own possessions that night. Bill Lawson hinted at these same conclusions, 
writing: 
I have read the news accounts which have glorified the Mayor, the Police Chief, and 
the Police for heroic military action and given exaggerated condemnation of the 
Texas Southern Administration and Student Body. In a world where Black is so 
wrong we wear our villainy well—there must be good guys. But I wonder, if my son 
should go to Rice [University], and boisterous students create deportment problems 
in the dormitories, would he ever see Will Rice College [dormitories] look like 
Lanier Hall for Men?122 
Lawson would not have had to look far to find the answer to his question. When male 
students at Rice exploded a bomb at a University dormitory in 1950, police officers 
concluded that it was merely an “overdone… prank.” When, a few days later, Houston 
police learned that three male students from Rice had placed bombs at two different homes 
in the Houston area, they believed the young men’s claim that “they would have known the 
danger of the type of bomb put in East Hall.” The police admitted that they “pretty well 
knew” who placed the bomb in the Rice dormitory, but “left the matter up to school 
authorities” because it seemed to be a matter of freshmen and sophomore class rivalries. 
Rice was not a place where students committed crimes; boys will be boys, the investigators 
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concluded. That these actions were perpetrated by white men mitigated what would 
otherwise have been, at least, an act of criminal mischief if committed by black people. 
Predominantly white spaces certainly did not require the militarized assault that TSU 
endured on the night of May 16th. Unlike whiteness, blackness was a threat to law and 
order and the state had an obligation, therefore, to limit the social, economic, and political 
mobility of black people, lest they disrupt that order. During the interrogations after the 
violence at TSU, one white student recalled a conversation with police: “I asked one officer 
if he were prejudiced; he replied to the effect that no, he wasn’t prejudiced; he just didn’t 
like people who ‘did things wrong, and since all Negroes did things wrong, he just had to 
hate them all.’” The social distance perpetuated by educational and residential segregation 
made these kinds of anti-black stereotypes possible, and sustained the condemnation of 
blackness even after Jim Crow’s demise.123 
 An editorial in the San Antonio News shamed the Houston Police Department for 
their actions. Though most newspapers were still spreading misinformation about the death 
of Kuba and the sequences of events that night, the editorialist maintained that there was 
“utterly no excuse for police officers to respond” by destroying the dormitories. “Police are 
supposed to have competent training and leadership,” the editorialist commented. “The 
effective work of a good police force is supposed to make the cure less destructive than the 
disease… A riot by police officers is intolerable and utterly inexcusable.” The officers’ failures to 
protect the innocent students in the dorm, much less to find any culprits or stockpile of 
weapons, made their actions all the more unbelievable to those who considered what could 
have potentially been a massacre. And, indeed, if a riot did take place on campus that night, 
it occurred after Chief Short ordered his officers to seize the campus. At least one officer 
reportedly implied as much. When police forced Harold Williams, who had a cigarette in his 
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mouth, out of his room on the second floor of Lanier Hall, one officer commanded him to 
remove the cigarette, saying, “Nigger, take that cigarette out of your mouth; if you want a 
riot, we’ll give you a riot.” One student looked back on the events and said, “It was like a 
nightmare; they [the police] were just waiting to shoot somebody.” Lawson confirmed, 
concluding that the police violence constituted “a morning of unbelievable horror.”124 
 Residential segregation, a history of municipal negligence, long-standing patterns of 
police brutality, hate crimes committed by white Houstonians, and silence about all of these 
in the white press had effectively isolated black Houstonians at TSU and elsewhere around 
the city from the resources they needed to protect them. That is, residential segregation 
was resource segregation. This lack of protection, with its racial, gender, and sexual 
contours, exposed different kinds of black people to different but multiple and sometimes 
overlapping geographies of risk. By the late 1960s, some black Houstonians, like those in the 
Friends of SNCC, had transitioned their struggle for equal rights out of courtrooms and 
into the streets where, in the previous decade, they had won many battles to bring about 
Jim Crow’s demise. Hopeful, but also dismayed by the slow progress toward social, political, 
and economic integration, these young activists demanded quicker results, and used bustling 
national networks created by civil rights organizations like SNCC and the NAACP to 
connect local movements with each other. Across these networks, people, knowledge, and 
strategies for resistance flowed. Whatever promise “Heavenly Houston” offered to black 
people, through these networks black Houstonians could learn that they could demand 
better from their municipal and state leaders, and so they did. Their activism was met with 
surveillance, political arrests, and containment, with a sprinkle of acquiescence from political 
leaders like Welch who understood that his re-election and the city’s economic growth 
depended on the appearance of racial progress and tranquility. Young activists decried the 
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kind of tokenism couched in individualism that Welch and other white Houstonians were 
willing to offer. They understood that the institutions that structured their lives as black 
citizens were not blind to color, and therefore they refused to let the strictest 
individualists—white and black—to evade the issue of race. The city administration would 
not tolerate these activists’ adamant refusals to know their prescribed place, and in doing 
so, molded the conditions for the conflict at TSU. In the years that followed, city leaders 
relented to some of the demands of black Houstonians—closing the Holmes Road Dump 
and the stretch of Wheeler Avenue that bifurcated TSU’s campus, for example. But, with 
the backing of the police department, the mayor, and the white press, District Attorney 
Carol Vance ensured that black Houstonians would remain frustrated by the legal system. 
Though charges against most of the nearly 500 students who were arrested were dropped, 
for the next three years Vance worked to prosecute the TSU Five—John Parker, Trazawell 
Franklin, Douglas Wayne Waller, Floyd Nichols, and Charles Freeman—on charges of 
murder and assault to murder for the death of Kuba under an anti-rioting statute. And 
Houston’s commitment to residential segregation remained.125 
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CONCLUSION 
 
esidential segregation continued to generate indignities and brutality in non-
white Houston communities throughout the duration of the twentieth century. 
Only a few months after the police attack on Texas Southern University 
students, State Representative Curtis Graves toured Acres Homes to learn about a water 
shortage in the community. There, he found that the city had sent water trucks to address 
the problem. He watched as a fireperson poured the water into “buckets, jugs, and just 
about anything that would carry” it. The color of the water disgusted him. He asked a truck 
driver what officials expected the residents to do with it. The driver replied, “Mostly wash 
clothes or the dishes, but it isn’t safe to drink unless they boil it.” Graves replied, “You can 
bet that it is not safe! Look at the color of that water.” One resident scoffed at the city’s 
solution to the crisis, noting that “he did not need water to wash clothes, but for drinking 
and bathing purposes.” Mayor Louis Welch’s office claimed to “know nothing of the dirty 
water that was being given to the people in Acres Homes” when they learned that Graves 
was inspecting the neighborhood. As a community still outside the city limits due to 
underbounding practices, Acres Homes residents remained without an ally. Their own 
county commissioner, Squatty Lyons, dismissed the crisis, saying “that there is nothing that 
he can do.” Earlier fears about the neighborhood’s inability to acquire adequate services 
from the county had been appropriately placed. The assistance from the city of Houston 
could be construed as magnanimous, if, of course, the people of Acres Homes were 
somehow immune to the effects of contaminated drinking water.1 
R 
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 Meanwhile, within the city limits, black and brown communities continued to bear 
the weight of concentrated poverty. Although Houstonians of Mexican and Mexican 
American descent had been present throughout the city’s history, they became increasingly 
active after the 1930s, and especially so in the 1960s and beyond. Organizations like the 
League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) “initiated and led the campaign for 
Mexican American civil rights,” historian Guadalupe San Miguel explains, with the intention 
of having Mexican Americans classified “as part of the Caucasian or white race in order to 
achieve social equality.” Like black Americans, many Mexicans and Mexican Americans were 
victims of white terror in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, suffering 
lynching, xenophobic violence, and deportation. Ultimately, however, middle class Mexican 
Americans believed assimilation into the white race remained possible. Felix Tijerina, 
president of LULAC between 1956 and 1960, once remarked that Mexican Americans did 
not share the problems of “the Negro” and that he had no interest in being an “ally” in 
black struggles. However, many Mexican and Mexican Americans living in Houston suffered 
neighborhoods “littered with trash and junk” in their backyards, “an ideal nesting area for 
rats.” Then, when the Houston school board attempted to skirt a court mandate to 
desegregate its schools by integrating black and Mexican American students, arguing that the 
latter counted as “white,” Chicano identity caught hold in Houston. Though not officially 
recognized as a racial group, their history in the United States and in Houston testified to 
the fact that they were treated as an undesirable racial minority. Their efforts to attain a 
new kind of recognition—one not predicated on assimilation into the category “white”—
inspired a generation of young activists whose full stories remain to be told.2 
 One story that has received a great deal of attention began in May 1977 when the 
body of Jose Campo Torres was found in Buffalo Bayou, bruised and battered. The twenty-
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three-year-old Vietnam War veteran had been arrested by Houston police for alleged 
“disorderly conduct.” The officers beat him mercilessly before taking him to jail, where the 
booking officer “refused to accept him until he received medical treatment for his injuries.” 
Rather than face their wrongdoing, the officers threw Torres into the bayou on the 
northern edge of downtown. A year later, the officers were convicted of misdemeanor 
“negligent homicide” and sentenced with no time to serve in prison. Mexican Americans 
celebrating Cinco de Mayo in Moody Park, just three miles north of where Torres had been 
murdered, lamented his death and clashed with police officers who, as they had done at 
TSU, claimed that their violent assault against the residents of the neighborhood was 
provoked by physical attacks against the officers. The so-called Moody Park riot, however, 
was not just a response to Torres’s death—though the murder and the judicial outcome 
certainly catalyzed the outrage they expressed in 1978. As historian Thomas H. Kreneck 
notes, the clash with police was also an expression of “frustration… with deplorable 
neighborhood conditions.”3 
 Over in Sunnyside, black residents lamented that private developers had been 
successful in securing permits to build “substandard housing” made of “lightweight material.” 
It seemed like their suburban dream had turned into an “instant slum.” Despite retaining 
many physical rural and suburban qualities even into the twenty-first century, Sunnyside was 
“ranked among the nation’s 25 most dangerous neighborhoods” and one of Houston’s most 
impoverished. Houston’s “policy of ‘containment’” of black spaces proved detrimental to 
these communities. White residents in surrounding areas panicked and abandoned “fine 
sturdily built homes, set in lush lawns and shaded by beautiful trees.” Often, those nice 
homes were divided up into multi-family dwelling units by blockbusters and profiteers who 
saw opportunities to profit off of the still segregated rental market as black people spilled  
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Map 19 Even allowing for changes in census tract boundaries, in 2010 Houston evinced starker residential 
segregation with more areas exhibiting higher rates of extreme segregation than in 1960. 
out of their historic neighborhoods into adjacent areas.4  
Houston did witness significant changes over the last decades of the twentieth 
century. In 1950, the city was on the brink of having 600,000 residents. By 1980, near 1.6 
million people called the city home. It became the most racially and ethnically diverse city 
among the nation’s ten largest, but black residents remain notably negatively affected by 
persistent patterns of segregation. Indeed, as Map 19 illustrates, although black Houstonians 
have expanded out of the neighborhoods that once contained them, Census tract-level 
segregation is noticeably starker than it was in the waning years of Jim Crow. White and 
Asian Americans assiduously avoid living in areas with higher proportions of black residents. 
While middle class and wealthy black Houstonians have greater residential choice than they 
did prior to Shelley v. Kraemer, less affluent black residents, who continue to face 
employment discrimination, overexposure to police violence, food deserts, and paternalist 
platitudes from city officials do not have the same options.5 
 Some thought relations between black residents and the police department might 
improve after Mayor Kathy Whitmire appointed Dr. Lee P. Brown as the city’s first black 
Houston, 1960 Houston, 2010 
461 
 
 
 
police chief in 1982. Brown would eventually become the city’s first black mayor in 1998. 
Despite his efforts to professionalize and standardize the Department and its procedures, 
Brown’s tenure coincided with an acceleration of the “War on Drugs” and “War on 
Crime,” both of which brought a heavy punitive hand to economically disadvantaged black 
people in communities across the country. In 1980, the city’s police force remained nearly 
80 percent white. The department had only “hired 35 percent of the black [officers] and 49 
percent of the Hispanic [officers]” that would fulfill their proportional representation of 
each group’s population in the city. Women accounted for less than 10 percent of the force. 
Though Brown achieved some improvements in non-white recruitment and in 
professionalizing his department, police brutality remained an epidemic in Houston into the 
twenty-first century, negatively affecting black, brown, and LGBT communities. In a paper 
outlining his philosophy of responsible policing, Brown listed a number of structural factors 
that he believed contributed to community disorder, but failed to mention segregation at 
all.6 
 Indeed, though black Houstonians have greater access to fuller participation in 
Houston’s democratic processes, black leadership has not inevitably led to decreases in 
resource segregation. In the early days of January 2017, The Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD) delivered a scathing critique to Houston’s mayor, Sylvester 
Turner, a product of Acres Homes and a graduate of the University of Houston and 
Harvard Law School. Turner “refused” to allow the city council to consider the 
development of a private low-income housing project in a wealthy Uptown neighborhood. 
Well-off white residents complained that the project would lower property values, increase 
traffic, and overcrowd their already packed schools. The Houston Housing Authority 
rebutted, noting that the construction of a new elementary school in the neighborhood 
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would be completed prior to the housing project’s completion and the Houston 
Independent School District confirmed that no estimates could corroborate the claim that 
the new residents would increase crowding in neighborhood schools. Economists, 
meanwhile, have repeatedly demonstrated that low income tax credit housing does not 
lower property values in wealthy neighborhoods or produce declines in school performance 
measures. The resistance to the project, HUD found, was “unsupported by the facts,” and 
the city’s pattern of refusal to allow low-income housing projects to move forward in high 
opportunity neighborhoods was “racially motivated” and served to “perpetuate 
segregation.” Underneath the rhetoric about schools and property values, HUD discovered 
the same kind of criminalizing rhetoric that surfaced in desegregation debates throughout 
the 1950s and 1960s. Residents complained, “Crime in the area will go up. Do you 
remember how bad the crime was after Katrina? Regardless of how charitable we would 
like to be; the reality is that in the lower income areas of Houston the crime is higher.” 
HUD concluded that this was a racist dog-whistle.7 
 Turner, for his part, seemed well-attuned to the dog-whistle and capable of sending 
out his own thinly-veiled reassurances to white Houstonians that he would protect them. 
When he shut down the project, he claimed that the project would cost too much money 
and preferred that low-income housing be built in low-income neighborhoods.8 He 
responded to HUD’s charges of racism by writing: 
[T]here should be no misunderstanding about my commitment to providing options 
for low income families. I do not believe that only wealthy areas can provide what 
our children need. I have chosen to stay in the neighborhood where I grew up and I 
will not tell children in similar communities they must live somewhere else. Our 
underprivileged families should have the right to choose where they want to live, 
and that choice should include the right to stay in the neighborhoods where they 
have grown up. I categorically reject any position to the contrary.9 
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Turner implies that Acres Homes is high opportunity, even if not equivalently so, to the 
neighborhoods that compose Uptown, with a logic reminiscent of Carter Wesley’s initial 
support of Texas State University for Negroes. For exceptions like the mayor it might ring 
true that the opportunities are there—that investment in black spaces is the solution to 
maintaining black community life and providing better life chances. I suspect, that as was true 
with Wesley, Turner may one day lament that he erred on the side of segregation as 
opposed to being daring. Turner avoided discussing race and segregation, attuned as he is to 
the colorblind, economically-rational rhetoric preferred by his wealthy white constituents. 
Nevertheless, the codes are there. High opportunity neighborhoods have proven to reduce 
educational, career, and income gaps for impoverished people who have had the 
opportunity to move into them.10 Yet, Turner argues that his neighborhood, an 
underserved, predominantly black, disproportionately low-income neighborhood represents 
a “choice” for entire groups of people seeking to escape poverty. However, one of the 
central contentions of “Criminalizing Space” is that a dearth of choice has defined the 
residential experiences of black Houstonians throughout the city’s history. The “new type of 
segregation,” which allows for minimal socioeconomic integration and continues to rely on 
discourses of economics and crime, persists. Working-class and even middling black 
Houstonians often remain devoid of choice, which is why the city’s social geography 
continues to be indisputably racialized. 
 Looking forward, then, historians should continue to tease out the ways black 
leaders in the mainstream have attempted to quell dissent throughout Houston’s history. 
Where, after all, are the more extreme voices of black and white structuralists, Marxists, 
and labor organizers in the 1950s? And in what ways are low-income black Houstonians 
dissenting and resisting today? How did Lee Brown’s tenure as police chief and mayor (fail 
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to) change the racial order of the city? How do black, brown, and Asian Americans in 
Houston navigate the city’s twenty-first century tri-racial scheme, wherein proximity to 
whiteness or blackness complicates when, where, and how non-black and non-white ethnic 
groups can access the kinds of resources that correlate with a neighborhood’s racial 
makeup?11 
 Houston has remained quite successful at maintaining racial segregation, despite its 
increased diversity. Fourth Ward, as the Housing Authority of the City of Houston hoped in 
the 1940s, has been almost completely voided of its black residents. In 2010, only about one 
of every three residents there was black. The area continues to push out low-income 
renters as gated luxury apartments tower over what is left of the small single-family 
residents. Contractors have recklessly dug up and destroyed many of the bricks laid by 
freedpeople, despite the directives of city officials and the desires of black residents.12 
Meanwhile, as Fourth Ward whitenes, in Third and Fifth Wards, less than one out of every 
ten residents was white. The same remains true for Pleasantville, Sunnyside, and Acres 
Homes.13 
 Concomitantly, negative attitudes about black spaces persist. The online “City-Data” 
forum for Houston hosts conversations between users about cities and neighborhoods. In 
2010, one user inquired about buying a home in Fourth Ward, but was “worried about 
safety and the area maintaining its value.” Another user responded, “Yeah, it’s a bit sketchy 
around that area,” and another more explicitly noted, “The area was predominantly black, 
but with all the new apartments and townhomes it’s changing slowly.” In 2013, a user added 
the reply that the neighborhood seemed to be improving since some “pretty high end” 
townhomes had been built there, and that Sunnyside was certainly “still much worse than 
4th Ward.”14 
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Another thread from 2012 about Fifth Ward started when a user remarked, “I 
heard this was called the ‘Bloody Nickel.’ Is it still really dangerous? I rode my bike through 
the area a couple of times this week and I have to admit that it was probably the most 
poverty stricken area I have been to in Houston.” Without prompting, a replier warned the 
original poster not only to avoid Fifth Ward but also to stay away from Third Ward, which 
is “poverty stricken, sketchy, and deserted.” The young white woman later explained to 
users who were perturbed that she chose to ride her bike through Fifth Ward: “Funny thing 
is, I had a cop in a police car follow me until I got out on York St. where it passed over the 
bayou. I kept wondering why he was following me and driving so slow. Now I think he was 
‘escorting’ me out of the 5th Ward.” One user was “happy to hear” that a police officer had 
her back. If the officers’ actions and these interpretations reveal anything, it’s that race still 
defines who can “belong” in different spaces throughout the city. Another user, probably 
black, replied, “I doubt he was ‘escorting’ you. He was probably following you to see if you 
were trying to buy drugs. Whenever they see white people in the hood they assume they’re 
buying drugs.” When a black person with family in Fifth Ward called out forum participants 
for their veiled racism, one user laughed and replied, “Might wanna check that chip on your 
shoulder at the door.”15 
And when a black young professional in 2013 announced that she hoped to move to 
Houston with her son and begin working as a teacher, she requested information about 
where to best to find centers of black culture, but also stressed that she wanted her child 
“to grow up and attend a school in an area that is diversely made up of many cultures along 
with our own culture.” Only two users responded. One noted that “diversity is overrated 
in some facets in Houston,” as mixed-race areas also tended to be less communal, in ze’s 
opinion. The second reply noted that “every neighborhood is for the most part diverse 
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unless you start going to predominantly Black/Hispanic neighborhoods…” Underlying that 
observation is the fact that white, Asian, and Latina/o neighborhood preferences are not 
necessarily shaped by in-group preference but rather anti-black animus.16 Indeed, 
Houstonians can find diverse neighborhoods, but black residents will be dramatically 
underrepresented. The user then warned the original poster to “stay away from the Bellaire 
area near 610 Loop” because “they aren’t really tolerable of African Americans… and police 
may harass you.” The strategies for containment of black people in black spaces through 
state action, then, have not abated. Neither have white Houstonians’ expectations that their 
city and police officers will work to ensure the integrity of their residential spaces by 
keeping black residents locked away in their “sketchy” enclaves dissipated.17 
In 1966, Blair Justice wrote to Mayor Welch about his research among black 
Houstonians regarding their attitudes toward the city, white people, and their living 
conditions. He asked, “What are the causes of racial tension in Houston?” Black residents 
responded unanimously that “low wages,” “unemployment,” and “housing” shaped and 
perpetuated racial distance and animosity. “Heavenly Houston,” for all its bluster as a city of 
progress, has failed to ameliorate these issues. Its earliest attempts at desegregation, despite 
being seemingly calm, did result in violence: fights between white and black students at 
Cullen Junior High School affecting Sunnyside children, McArthur Elementary School 
affecting Acres Homes children, and McReynolds Junior High School affecting Pleasantville 
children, were among the many underreported instances of white terror exacted upon 
black Houstonians in the 1960s. Segregation within the Houston Independent School 
District, both at the district level and within schools, remains a challenge.18 This, 
unfortunately, is a national story. Residential segregation, police brutality, unfair sentencing 
practices, employment discrimination, and educational inequality continue to form a web of 
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constraint around black people in America. Can Americans revisit the question of how 
strongly they can retain their wholesale commitment to liberal individualism and their 
indefensible faith in capitalist meritocracy in a society where race(ism) determines social and 
economic value? Slipshod efforts to solve seemingly isolated problems, such as addressing 
the racial educational achievement gap by promoting charter school growth, continue to 
prove ineffective, especially relative to the gains made when the nation briefly experimented 
with integration.19 That is, until residential segregation is affirmatively tackled, ordinary 
people’s dual commitment to individualist values and racialized worldviews will continue to 
encourage new types of segregation to emerge in place of the old. 
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